Electoral change and voting behaviour in independent voters in South Korea, 1992-2002: Are independent voters rational in voting choice? by Min, Byung-O
Glasgow Theses Service 
http://theses.gla.ac.uk/ 
theses@gla.ac.uk 
n  
 
 
 
 
 
Min, Byung-O (2004) Electoral change and voting behaviour in 
independent voters in South Korea, 1992-2002: are independent voters 
rational in voting choice? PhD thesis. 
 
 
http://theses.gla.ac.uk/6814/ 
 
 
 
Copyright and moral rights for this thesis are retained by the author 
 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or 
study, without prior permission or charge 
 
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the Author 
 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the Author 
 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the 
author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 
 
Electoral Change and Voting Behaviour of Independent Voters 
in South Korea, 1992-2002: 
Are Independent Voters Rational in Voting Choice? 
by 
Byung-O Min 
A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy to 
the Department of Politics, Faculty of Social Science, 
University of Glasgow 
April 2004 
Copyright © 2004 by Byung-O Min 
All rights reserved. 
Abstract 
This study is about how independent voters make their vote decision in presidential 
election focusing on electoral behaviour in South Korea. The main argument of this thesis 
is that voters are not very rational in voting choice when party constraints are absent. 
Both qualitative and quantitative approaches are employed in this study and provide a 
comprehensive analysis of voting behaviour of independent voters in the new democracy. 
In particular, the use of focus group interviews and in-depth one-to-one interviews 
conducted during the 2002 Korean Presidential Election provides detailed analysis of 
electoral behaviour in Korea. 
Korean voters have developed party identification, a long-term psychological 
attachment with a particular political party, under the institutional underdevelopment of 
the political parties in the new democracy. Regionalism is the predominant factor to 
explain partisan alignment in Korea, but ideological self-identification also accounts for 
the partisan alignment in new democracy. Over the last 10 years, party identification has 
markedly weakened in Korea, a 15 year old democracy, in contrast to experiences of 
other new democracies. This weakening of party identification is largely due to changes 
in political interest and dissatisfaction with political processes in new democracy. 
My findings confirm that the increase of independents and the process of partisan 
dealignment are closely related to a decline of electoral stability. But an increase of 
independent voters who are free from party constraints has not lead to an increase of 
rational voting behaviour in Korean presidential elections. Although independent voters 
are most interested in short-term considerations, such as candidate evaluation, issue 
stands, and government performance, their voting choice is not politically rational. 
Independent voters are more likely to make vote decision based on insufficient 
information and heavily rely on candidate image rather than substance in their voting 
choice. Many independent voters cast their ballot based on the candidates' affective 
dimensions, such as integrity, empathy and appearance, rather than cognitive dimensions, 
such as competence to solve the nation's urgent problems. 
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Chapter l 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
This study is about how individuals in a new democracy make their voting choice. It 
focuses on voters in South Korea (hereafter Korea). In particular, it is about how 
independent voters who do not have psychological attachment to a particular political 
party vote in presidential elections. 
Partisan Decline, Electoral Volatility, and Candidate Image 
The 1997 and the 2002 Korean presidential elections were striking for their extreme 
volatility in electoral behaviour. During the election year, voters' candidate preferences 
and voting intentions fluctuated greatly in pre-elections polls. In each election, one 
candidate's popularity in polls reached as high as 55 per cent of the electorate, but within 
the election year had also fallen to as low as 20 per cent. The outcome of each election 
was unpredictable with leading contenders unable to sustain their support. Another 
distinct feature of the 1997 and the 2002 presidential elections was an increase in the 
relative importance of candidate image in voting choice along with an expansion of media 
campaigns, particularly TV presidential debates. Many voters started to support a 
particular candidate before the candidate firmly offered policies or election pledges. In 
voting choice, voters heavily relied on candidate's personal traits, specifically affective 
dimensions of character rather than cognitive dimensions. 
In the 1997 presidential election, a long-time leader in the race, Lee Hoi Chang, 
enjoyed great popularity for a while. He was the nominee of the ruling party, which had 
never been defeated any presidential election, and was also considered a man of integrity 
regarding his unshakeable convictions in his career as a judge and a high-ranking public 
officer. His popularity peaked at almost 55 per cent of the electorate. In the early stage of 
the campaign, the other major contender, Kim Dae-jung, hardly matched with Lee Hoi 
Chang. As a man of ability, Kim Dae-jung, a candidate of the major opposition party, 
gained an extremely solid support of about 30 per cent of the electorate, but was 
struggling to expand this support. This was particularly due to his negative image in the 
electorate which had been propagated by the authoritarian government during his long 
struggle for democracy. Although Kim Dae-jung was highly evaluated in terms of his 
competence to solve the nation's urgent problems and offered new policies that were 
carefully developed over a long time, he did not lead the race in the 1997 presidential 
election until two months before the day of election. However, the election race changed 
suddenly when voters questioned whether Lee Hoi Chang's two sons had intentionally 
1 
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avoided the national duty of military service. His image of integrity was ruined mainly 
due to this single issue and voter support for him fell. After this issue became public, his 
popularity in pre-election polls fell suddenly to about 25 per cent level, though he finally 
shared about 40 per cent of valid votes in the election. 
The 2002 presidential election show a similar pattern. The election was very 
unstable with public support for candidates very volatile. Voters paid attention to 
candidate image rather than issue stances or policies. Roh Moo-hyun, an outsider within 
the ruling political party, won the presidential primary of the ruling Millennium 
Democratic Party, in the first example of a presidential primary election in Korean 
political history. During the presidential primary, Roh had a great opportunity to make 
himself known to the electorate and was suddenly widely supported in the electorate. His 
popularity in the polls reached its highest level at over 60 per cent, an extremely high 
level of popularity in a Korean presidential election. As an activist in the pro-democracy 
movement, he was considered a man of integrity. As a self-educated lawyer who rose 
from poverty, he was seen as one of the few politicians who could empathise with 
ordinary people. But the high point of his popularity in the electorate could not be 
sustained for long. As the bubble burst, the support of the electorate for Roh Moo-hyun 
fell sharply less than three months after the end of the primary. 
While the popularity of Roh Moo-hyun fell to lower than 20 per cent of the 
electorate, an independent candidate, Chung Mong-joon, joined the 2002 presidential race 
as the result of a sudden increase in popular support. Chung was for a while the leader in 
a three-way election race. Chung gained wide support mainly due to his competence 
demonstrated in the 2002 World Cup football tournament partly held in Korea. As a chief 
administrator of the international event held in Korea, Chung benefited from the 
unexpected success of Korean national football team in the games and grew in popularity. 
Voters liked Chung based on his positive image, such as his relatively youthful and good- 
looking appearance, while Chung's positions on the issues were rather ambiguous and 
Chung did not offer many specific policies or election pledges. Similar to Roh Moo- 
hyun's experience several moths before, Chung was struggling to maintain his lead in the 
election race, and Chung and Roh, who both drew support from young and liberal voters, 
finally agreed on an election coalition. Chung stopped running for the presidency and 
Roh became the unified candidate for presidency. 
These two key features of the 1997 and the 2002 presidential elections were closely 
related to a change in the electorate and in election campaigns. One potential explanation 
of unstable elections relates to changes in the electorate. In Korea, partisan decline was 
apparent and the strength of party affiliation had weakened markedly. Independent voters 
free from party constraints in voting behaviour were very responsive to election 
2 
Chapter 1 
campaigns and changed their voting intention depending upon the occurrence of new 
issues or new information. Independent voters drifted along between parties during the 
election year, while partisans were anchored to a political party. An increase of 
independent voters is closely related to an increase of volatility in electoral behaviour. 
Changes in election campaigns are related to an increased reliance on candidate 
image in voting choice. In the 1997 and the 2002 presidential elections, television played 
a key role in the election campaigns. TV presidential debates were introduced for the first 
time in the 1997 presidential election and various types of TV debates were widely held 
during the year, while the use of traditional campaign tools such as electioneering tour, 
out-door gatherings, and canvassing door to door, was markedly reduced in the 1997 
presidential election and particularly in the 2002 presidential election. A candidate 
utilising the new campaign tools could expand their support swiftly. In the 1997 
presidential election, nearly four million voters (about 19.2 per cent of valid votes) 
supported a third party candidate, Rhee In je. Although he was far behind the leading 
candidates, he decisively influenced the outcome of the three-way race in the 1997 
presidential election. Rhee In je who withdrew from the ruling New Korea Party (later 
Grand National Party) did not have any organisational support, while the two candidates 
of major political parties had strong support in each party's regional stronghold. The 
remarkable success of Rhee In je in electioneering cannot be separated from his 
outstanding performance in a various TV debates during the year in which he impressed 
with his eloquence. He was much younger and dynamic, particularly compared to the 
major party's candidate, Kim Dae-jung. He attempted to adopt the image of Park Chung 
Hee whom many conservative voters remembered regarding his strong leadership in a 
rapid economic development in Korea. In the TV presidential debates, Rhee was able to 
show assured competence and his positive personal traits, while even Kim Dae-jung, a 
veteran politician and well-informed man with a broad vision, revealed his uneasiness in 
the TV debate format. In the debates, Rhee did not offer new policies or a better vision of 
the nation's future compared to the two other candidates of major political parties. Rhee's 
campaign team was extremely constrained in human and financial resources. A member 
of Rhee's campaign team in charge of the development of policies or election pledges 
confessed that he could not develop new policies and instead developed polices and 
election pledges by a selective combination of the two major parties' policies and election 
pledges, particularly the major opposition party, i. e., Kim Dae-jung's party. In the TV 
debates, all candidates discussed policies and their policy stances. Kim was good in terms 
of substance of policy and election pledges, but Rhee was outstanding in his effective 
advocacy of policy. Rhee read and practised a principle of modern election campaigns: he 
focused on style and image, but nothing with substance. 
3 
Chapter l 
Making Electoral Choice 
The salient features of Korean presidential election raise a question about voting choice 
models that are based on electoral behaviour in mature democracies. Are independent 
voters who cast a ballot on the basis of short-term considerations rational compared to 
partisans who stick to partisan loyalty? There are two contending theories on voting 
choice: the party identification model and the rational choice approach. ' The former 
focuses on voting behaviour of partisans who feel close to a political party, while the 
latter concentrates on how voters cast a ballot when party constraints are absent. On the 
one hand, according to the party identification model, voters who have an enduring 
psychological attachment to a particular political party have a consistency in voting 
behaviour within an election and between elections. Partisans reveal their loyalty to their 
political party in elections and the electoral behaviour of partisans is stable. On the other 
hand, according to the rational choice approach, voters cast their ballots on the basis of 
rational calculations. When deciding upon their voting choice, voters rely on short-term 
considerations, such as candidates' stances on issues, incumbent government performance, 
and a candidate's competence, and voters are also responsive to campaigns. Electoral 
behaviour is therefore relatively unstable. In the party identification model, voters are 
constrained by partisan loyalty and are not able to be rational in voting choice due to 
party constraints. In the rational choice approach, voters are free from party constraints 
and are able to select a candidate on the basis of rational calculations. Voters are thus 
rational actors. 
When we consider both changes in partisan alignment and two distinct types of 
voters or voting behaviour together, a decline of partisans implies an increase of 
instability in electoral behaviour. Also, an increase of independent voters means that more 
voters rely on short-term considerations in voting choice. However, an absence of party 
constraints does not necessary imply that voters are rational in making their voting 
decision. Considering electoral behaviour in Korea, it is questionable whether voters who 
are free from party constraints vote rationally. As a prerequisite condition for making 
rational voting choices, sufficient information related to the choice should be available to 
the voter. Without this information, rational calculation is not possible. Independent 
1 For an overview of electoral studies, see William L. Miller and Richard G. Niemi, `Voting: 
Choice, Conditioning and Constraint, ' in Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G. Niemi, and Pippa Norris, 
eds, Comparing Democracies 2: Elections and Voting in Global Perspective (London: Sage, 2001), 
pp. 169-209; Samuel Barnes, `Electoral Behavior and Comparative Politics, ' in Mark Irving 
Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman, eds, Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 115-41. 
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voters in Korea are less interested in politics, and pay less attention to elections. So, it is 
unlikely that independent voters have sufficient information on issues and candidates 
compared to partisans. If independent voters cast ballots based on limited information, 
and if they rely on affective traits of candidates rather than candidate issue positions or 
candidate competence, their voting choice is irrational. The rational choice approach may 
justify this irrational voting behaviour in terms of an instrumental definition of rationality 
--- i. e., how best to achieve a voter's political goals. But voting choice based on irrational 
considerations, such as style and image of candidates, cannot be rational. They may 
believe that their choice is best to achieve their political interests, but they may make a 
wrong choice because they evaluate candidates based on irrational judgements. For 
example, if voters believe that a candidate will carry out policies that are beneficial for 
the poor in society because the candidate has the image of an ordinary citizen, their vote 
decision may not result in the desired outcome. 
Themes and Plan of the Thesis 
The main theme of this thesis is that the increasing number of independent voters in 
Korea are not rational in voting choice. Independent voters are relatively alienated from 
politics, pay relatively less attention to elections and election campaigns and make their 
voting decision with limited information about issues and candidates. They also rely 
heavily on candidate factors, particularly candidate image, in making their electoral 
choice. This choice, then, is far from a rational voting choice, and independents voters 
can hardly be described as rational. 
This thesis consists of 11 chapters. Chapter 2 describes the political development of 
Korean democracy focusing on changes and continuities in political cultures, party 
politics, and elections. It briefly assesses both political developments under authoritarian 
governments and the consolidation of democracy after 1987. 
This chapter also reviews achievements and trends of Korean electoral studies. The 
modernisation theory, which was popular in explaining voting electoral behaviour under 
authoritarian regimes, is no longer useful due to a critical change in electoral behaviour 
after a transition to democracy. The politics of region have dictated electoral behaviour in 
the new democracy, but a weakening of regionalism in electoral behaviour has been 
detected recently. 
Chapter 3 reviews the existing literature on electoral behaviour and voting choice 
models, which have been developed on the basis of electoral behaviour in mature 
democracies, particularly the USA and the United Kingdom. Theories on party 
identification, partisan alignment and dealignment, rational choice models of vote 
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decision, and campaign effects are discussed in order to provide the framework for 
analysis and the guiding propositions in examining the voting behaviour of individual 
independents in Korea. This chapter also presents a causal model of voting choice and 
guiding propositions to study electoral behaviour in Korea. 
Chapter 4 discusses research methods and approaches chosen for the collection and 
analysis of data in studying voting behaviour of independent voters in Korea. In particular, 
it justifies combining a qualitative approach and quantitative approach within a study of 
electoral behaviour. It focuses on how qualitative methods that are generally neglected in 
the study of electoral behaviour can complement the weaknesses of quantitative data 
based on structured surveys when a proper practice of surveys is difficult. This chapter 
also assesses the fieldwork methods used to collect qualitative data. The procedures of 
focus group interviews and in-depth interviews conducted in the 2002 presidential 
election are described in detail, and the strengths and weaknesses of both qualitative and 
quantitative data used in the analysis of Korean voter's behaviour are discussed. 
Chapter 5 focuses on party affiliation in Korea. It investigates whether Korean 
voters have developed party affiliations comparable to the party affiliations found in 
mature democracies. Korean political parties are institutionally underdeveloped. Party 
politics is unstable, and the `meeting and parting' of political parties is common, but the 
concept of party identification is nonetheless useful to explain Korean voting behaviour. 
In contrast to findings in other new democracies, specifically post-communist countries in 
Europe, Korean voters have to some extent developed party identification, the enduring 
psychological attachment to a particular political party. 
Furthermore, qualitative data provide insights into the origin of party identification 
and its changes. Party affiliation in Korea is mixed in terms of its nature. Many voters 
become affiliated with a particular party influenced by their regional identification, but 
some voters feel close to a particular party based on long-term policy preferences. Indeed, 
party affiliation is not fixed, but is changeable depending on policy performance of 
political parties. 
Chapter 6 looks at partisan alignment in Korea. Patterns of partisan alignment have 
continued over the last 10 years under conditions of extreme party system instability. This 
confirms the argument discussed in chapter 5 that Korean voters have developed party 
affiliation and that party identification is useful to predict Korean electoral behaviour. 
`Region' again dictates partisan alignment. The two major political parties in Korea are 
based on strong support in two regions which are political rivals. But although it is 
predominant, regional identification is not the only factor to explain partisan alignment in 
Korea. In addition to regional divisions, the electorate has now also become divided on 
the basis of ideological orientation as a consequence of the sudden decline of anti- 
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Communism after fifty years and the accompanying improvements in North-South 
Korean relations. 
Chapter 7 explores the partisan decline and the increase of independent voters in the 
new democracy. The level of party identification in Korea has markedly declined for last 
10 years. It examines the main causes of partisan decline in Korea. In particular, interest 
in politics and dissatisfaction with democratic system or process are scrutinised. It reveals 
that many Korean voters nowadays reject any attachment to the political parties at a time 
when voters' interest in politics is diminishing and popular dissatisfaction with party 
politics is increasing. 
This chapter also explores the social and economic characteristics of independent 
voters in Korea. Independent voters are classified into two types of independents: a new 
type comprising those who are interested in politics, and traditional independents who are 
alienated from politics. The two types of independent voters are distinguished in terms of 
different social and economic characteristics and different political attitudes. 
Chapter 8 looks at the electoral participation of independent voters, in particular in 
comparison to partisans. In contrast to partisans who feel a utility of vote participation or 
who are willing to express their loyalty to a particular party, independent voters are less 
likely to go to the polls. The causes of the differences in voter turnout are discussed. 
This chapter also examines independent voters as floating voters. Independent 
voters, who do not have a `party anchor', drift and are affected by short-term `political 
storms'. They also make relatively late voting decisions compared to partisans who have 
a simple criterion for their electoral choice. Independent voters also make late voting 
decisions because they find it difficult to gather sufficient information and see fewer 
differences between the contending candidates. 
Chapter 9 focuses on the effects of the campaign on independent voters' voting 
choice. The key question is whether independent voters are more responsive to election 
campaigns as a result of their lack of party constraints. Compared to partisans, 
independent voters who are free from party constraints and do not have a strong voting 
intention before the official campaigns evaluate or re-evaluate candidates depending upon 
new information gathered from the various campaigns. In particular, this chapter focuses 
on TV presidential debates, which is the most important information source for voters 
during elections. TV debates held during the official campaign period attract many 
viewers and the potential influence on voters of such programmes is considerable. But the 
impact of TV debates on voting choice is not strong enough to shape the electoral choice 
of voters nor make them change their mind. 
Internet campaigns in Korea, a country with a very high rate of Internet usage, are 
discussed. It is widely accepted that Internet campaigns greatly affected the outcome of 
7 
Chapter 1 
the 2002 presidential election in Korea. In particular, Internet campaigns attracted great 
attention amongst younger voters and it could be said to have significantly affected their 
voting choice. However, the impact of Internet campaigns on voting choice has been 
exaggerated. The `digital divide' is distinctive in voter's exposure to Internet campaigns. 
Internet campaigns are not for every voter, but for a particular group of voters who have a 
strong vote intention. 
Chapter 10 examines the voting choice of independent voters in contrast to the 
voting choice of partisans. While partisans rely on long-term factors such as party 
affiliation and ideology, independent voters cast a ballot based on short-term 
considerations such as candidate evaluations, issue preferences, and evaluations of 
incumbent government performance. Although independents make a voting decision 
based on a calculation about candidates, issue, and government performance compared to 
partisans, it is doubtful that the voting choice of independent voters is rational. 
Independent voters who rely heavily on candidate factors as the criteria for their 
preference evaluate candidates based on insufficient information. Such voters gather 
information on candidate image rather than a candidate's policies and/or their political 
achievements. Many independent voters do not know all the candidates but are 
knowledgeable about a particular one. Independent voters evaluate candidates based on 
what they feel about a candidate, i. e., the candidate's image. Candidate competence is not 
a priority in the evaluation, but perceptions of integrity and empathy are important. 
Finally, chapter 11, the conclusion, assesses key findings of the thesis and provides a 
synthetic explanation on how independent voters make voting choices. Also, the chapter 
makes some suggestions for further analysis. 
The Significance of the Study 
The study is important in several respects. First, the study is based on field research 
undertaken to collect data on Korean electoral behaviour and provides new information 
for a better understanding of electoral behaviour in Korea. The study is one of only a few 
comprehensive analyses of Korean voting behaviour, particularly the voting behaviour of 
independent voters. Currently, English-language literature on Korean electoral behaviour 
is very rare. There has been some empirical research on Korean electoral behaviour after 
the transition to democracy in 1987, but most of this research focuses only on a specific 
issue in a particular election and does not provide a comprehensive or systematic 
examination of the dynamics of electoral behaviour in Korea. Based on richer data, the 
study attempts a comprehensive analysis to cover most of salient issues in study of 
Korean electoral behaviour. 
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Second, the study contributes to a theoretical development of the study of voting 
choice. In the nomothetic tradition of social science, a universal generalisation of human 
behaviour is the ultimate goal. The present of electoral studies is nowhere near to the 
completion of this goal yet. Most research on electoral behaviour has been carried out in 
mature democracies. Students of electoral studies have relatively neglected analysis of 
electoral behaviour in new democracies, although the `third wave' of democratisation 
spread throughout post-communist Europe and Asia. A study of electoral behaviour in 
the new democracies can shed light on theories and models of electoral behaviour based 
on experiences in mature democracy and contribute to an improvement or refinement of 
existing theories and models .3 While comparative analysis covering several countries 
is 
desirable, a country-specific study which uses concepts suitable for comparative study is 
also good for an in-depth understanding of electoral behaviour within a certain cultural 
context. 
Third, the study contributes to the methodological development of electoral studies. 
This thesis employs both quantitative and qualitative approach in the collection and 
analysis of data. Several researchers on social and political studies argue that combining 
qualitative and quantitative is feasible and desirable, but in practice the integration of the 
two distinct approaches is rarely achieved in one study. ' Qualitative approach provides 
richer data to examine hypotheses and also provides insights into a different dimension of 
electoral behaviour. By combining two different approaches, electoral behaviour can be 
explained broadly and deeply. The thesis is therefore an exploratory work implementing a 
multi-method research design to study electoral behaviour. 
Finally, beyond exploring empirical findings, the thesis raises an important question 
about the consolidation of democracy in Korea. ' Democracy is rule by the people and the 
people exercise their power by casting a ballot in elections. The quality of democracy 
may be largely determined by the level of popular participation in election and the quality 
of the voter's choice. 6 When voters throw away their voting power, or cast a ballot 
2 There are a few systemic researches on mass publics in post-communist Europe. For example, 
William L. Miller, Stephen White, and Paul Haywood, Values and Political Change in 
Posicommunist Europe (London: Macmillan, 1998). 
3 Pippa Norris, ed., Elections and Voting Behaviour: New Challenges, New Perspective 
(Aldershort: Ashgate, 1998), pp. xiii-xxv, at p. xiii. 
° For a rare example of studying mass publics based on the combination of both quantitative and 
qualitative approach, see William L. Miller, Ase B. Grodeland, and Tatyana Y. Koshechkina, A 
Culture of Corruption?: Coping with Government in Post-communist Europe (New York: Central 
European University Press, 2001). 
S Linz and Stephen suggest multi-dimensionality in consolidating new democracy. Juan Linz and 
Alfred Stephen, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation (Baltimore, MD: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1996). 
6 For a comprehensive study that discusses the consolidation of Korean democracy in the light of 
change in mass publics, see Doh C. Shin, Mass Politics and Culture in Democratizing Korea 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
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without careful considerations, democracy is undermined. When voters neglect policies 
and the issue stances of candidates or political parties and rely solely on candidate's 
image, voting choice resembles a beauty contest rather than a true election in which 
voters decide the policy direction for the nation. For last 15 years, Korean democracy has 
been consolidating and there is no doubt that free and fair elections take place in Korea 
today. But democracy is not fully consolidated yet or may be deteriorating as a result of 
changes in electoral behaviour. If more voters become less interested in politics and 
elections and rely on candidate image in voting choice, democracy may be at risk of 
decay. 
10 
PART ONE 
THEORY, METHOD, AND DATA 
Chapter 2 
Chapter 2. Context: Political Development and Political Culture 
in Korea 
The aim of this chapter is to describe political development in Korea focusing on changes 
and continuities in political culture and electoral behaviour. It is widely accepted that 
political behaviour can be better understood within a cultural context. ' Indeed, some 
political behaviour may be meaningful only within a certain social context. More 
generally, political behaviour is influenced by political culture and values, which have 
evolved over a long period of time. So in order to develop a general framework for an 
analysis of Korean electoral behaviour, it is necessary to start with a basic understanding 
of the course of political development in Korea. 
Koreans have experienced rapid political and economic change for several decades, 
and voters have developed their political values and political attitudes in this rapidly 
changing society. Their values, attitudes, and behaviour has changed much over time, but 
some aspects of them have not changed so much. 
Many countries got independence after the Second World War, but only a few have 
achieved both economic prosperity and political democracy. Korea is one of these few. 
During the last four decades, Korea has been transformed from one of the poorest 
countries in the world to one of the `newly industrialised countries' (NICs) 2 Koreans 
proudly celebrate their economic achievement as the `Miracle of the Han River', and the 
Korean economy remains very dynamic, despite the recession in 1997. 
Along with rapid economic development, a pre-modern Confucian society has been 
transformed into a modern society. Korea, which was a typical rural society, has become 
very highly urbanised. A modern public educational system has been developed, and the 
level of higher education markedly increased 4 The population has more than doubled in 
' Recently, students of electoral behaviours have recognised the importance of context in 
understanding electoral behaviour. See Christopher Wlezien and Mark N. Franklin, `The Future of 
Election Studies: Introduction', Electoral Studies, 21 (2002), 157-60. 
2 For example, the gross domestic product (GDP) of Korea in 2001 consisted of 4.6 per cent in the 
agricultural, forestry and fisheries sector, 42.8 per cent in the mineral and industrial sector, 8.2 per 
cent in the construction sector, and 52.6 per cent in the service sector. Also, in 2002, the heavy 
industries occupied 76.8 per cent of the entire industrial production. See Korea Scope, at 
http: //www. koreascope. org. 
' For example, the Korean economy registered a high annual growth-rate of 8.7 per cent for over 
30 years after 1965. Per capita national income peaked in 1996 as 10,548 US dollars. After the 
economic crisis in 1997, per capita national income in 2001 was still 8,900 dollars. In 1962 it was 
less than 87 dollars. So per capita national income in 2001 was over one hundred times greater 
than in 1962. In 1999, the Korean economy was the 13th biggest economy in the world in terms of 
GDP. See the National Statistics Agency, at http: //kosis. nso. go. kr. 
For example, the number of college students per 10,000 of population in 1965 was 48.3. In 2001 
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the last fifty years and the quality of life has markedly improved. 5 Civil society 
developed gradually and a variety of civil activist movements blossomed. Many Koreans 
have travelled and studied abroad and Korea itself has opened up to a globalising world. 
Korea became part of the `Third Wave' of democracy, the global surge of 
democratisation in the 1980s and the 1990s. 6 When there were major street 
demonstrations and protests against nearly three-decades of military dictatorship, the 
authoritarian government yielded to people's claims and submitted to a competitive 
presidential election. The `June Uprising' of 1987 was characterised as a middle class 
revolution. It was initiated by pro-democracy student demonstrations, but carried forward 
by the middle class. Since the transition to democracy in 1987, democratic institutions 
and procedures have been progressively consolidated, even though political culture and 
political behaviour - the residues of past authoritarian rule - have changed more slowly. 
There are controversies over the quality of this new democracy in Korea, but at least 
Koreans have chosen a President in free, fair, and competitive elections every five years 
since 1987. In sum, Korean democracy has been steadily consolidated over the last fifteen 
years without serious interruption. ' 
This chapter consists of three sections. The first describes political evolution and 
political culture under authoritarian regimes before the transition to democracy in 1987. 
The second describes the changes and continuities of political culture and electoral 
behaviours under the new democracy, focusing on the four consecutive presidential 
elections after the transition to a democracy in 1987. It reviews the issues, election results, 
and political consequences of each of the four. The third section discusses electoral 
studies of the Korean electorate, focusing on relations between political change and 
political behaviour. It summarises the achievements, and the limits of previous research 
on Korean electoral behaviour. 
it was 622.5. The number of college students was 2,947,000 in 2001, compared to 139,000 in 1965. 
College education expanded markedly in the 1990s: in 2000,70.5 per cent of high school 
graduates entered colleges compared to only 35 per cent in 1992. The National Statistics Agency, 
at http: //kosis. nso. go. kr. 
S The population of South Korea was more than 47 millions in 2001 compared to approximately 
20 million in 1948. And the combined gopulation of the two Koreas, North and South, was about 
67 millions in 1999, making it the 15 largest population in the world. The National Statistics 
Agency, at http: //kosis. nso. go. kr. 
6 See Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). Also, Larry Diamond et al., Consolidating Third- 
Wave Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1997). 
For a good assessment of democratic consolidation in Korea see Larry Diamond and Byung- 
Kook Kim, eds, Consolidating Democracy in South Korea (Boulder, Colorado and London: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2000). 
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1. Political Change and Political Culture before 1987: The Long Way to 
Democracy 
Democracy has developed with many setbacks and trials since Koreans formed their own 
government in 1948.8 Korea regained independence from Japanese colonialism in 1945 
at the end of World War 11, but it was divided into North and South Korea by the two 
superpowers, the USA and USSR, under the Cold War system. After American and 
Soviet military occupation for three years, South Korea (hereafter Korea) adopted the 
American presidential system, while North Korea developed a communist state and has 
remained a totalitarian regime. As in many Third World states, the progress of Korean 
democracy was interrupted and disturbed by military coups and dictatorships. Politics 
itself was a continuation of dictatorships and political turmoil. Before 1987 Korea had no 
experience of governmental change through elections, only the experience of military 
coups replacing one authoritarian government with another. 
Political evolution in Korea before the 1987 transition to democracy can be divided 
into five periods: (1) President Rhee Syngman's autocracy, 1948-1960, (2) a short period 
of democracy led by Prime Minister Chang Myon, 1960-1961, (3) the `Third Republic' as 
President Park Chung Hee's military government, 1961-1971, (4) President Park Chung 
Hee's authoritarian `Yusin' (revitalising reform) period, 1972-1979, and finally (5) 
President Chun Doo-hwan's `Fifth Republic', 1980-1987.9 Political evolution to 1987 is 
summarised in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1 Political Evolution in Korea before the Transition to Democracy, 1948-1987 
Year Government & Leader Political System Key Events 
1948- The `First Republic' presidential system Korean War, 1950-53 
1960 President Rhee Syngman (direct election) 
1960- The `Second Republic' parliamentary system 'April Student Uprising' of 
1961 Prime Minster Chang Mon 1960 
1961- The `Third Republic' presidential system Military coup d'etat of 1961 
1972 President Park Chung Hee (direct election Economic Development Plans 
1972- The `Yusin' period presidential system `Yusin' Constitution 
1979 President Park Chung Hee (indirect election) 
1980- The `Fifth Republic' presidential system Military coup d'etat of 1979 
1987 President Chun Doo-hwan (indirect election) Gwangju Massacre of 1980 
`June Uprising' of 1987 
As a detailed description on contemporary political history of Korea, John Kie-chiang Oh, 
Korean Politics: The Quest for Democratization and Economic Development (Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, 1999). 
9 Sung-joo Han, `South Korea: Politics in Transition', in Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and 
Seymour Martin Lipset, eds, Democracy in Developing Countries: Asia (Boulder, Colorado: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), pp. 266-303. 
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Rhee Syngman's Autocracy: 1948-1960 
Rhee Syngman (often called `Syngman Rhee' in the west) who was preferred by the 
American government and largely supported by conservative political groups and 
politicians in Korea, was the first President of the new nation-state. He ruled for 12 years, 
becoming increasingly dictatorial and determined to extend his rule with a life-Presidency. 
Rhee's Autocracy and Confucian Culture 
The `First Republic' under President Rhee was an autocracy. Although the 
constitution written under the strong influence of the American government, promised a 
viable form of democracy, his government was arbitrary and dictatorial. His dictatorial 
rule was made possible by the pre-modern political culture that prevailed in society. 
Koreans who had lived in a Confucian society and under Japanese totalitarian colonial 
rule had no experience of democracy and lacked much understanding of democratic 
values or civic culture. 1° For example, in Confucian political culture, people should obey 
the state as they do their parents. " Civil society did not exist, and political institutions 
such as political parties and parliament were premature or in the early stage of their 
development. '2 Political parties mushroomed in the new nation, but these `parties' were 
nothing more than cliques or transient entities. On the other hand many civil servants and 
administrators who had served under Japanese colonial rule survived to serve in Rhee's 
administration and continued to rule society without a deep understanding of democracy 
10 Oh, Korean Politics: The Quest for Democratization and Economic Development, pp. 12-15 
and 33. In Korean politics, the influence of Confucian culture on political understanding, political 
culture, and political behaviour remained pervasive, and the culture impeded the development of 
political parties. See Byung-Kook Kim, `Party Politics in South Korea's Democracy: The Crisis of 
Success', in Larry Diamond and Byung-Kook Kim, eds, Consolidating Democracy in South Korea 
(Boulder, Colorado and London: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 2000), pp. 53-86; Doh C. Shin, Mass 
Politics and Culture in Democratizing Korea (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 
187. Many scholars have argued that Asian political culture associated with the Confucian cultural 
heritage is an obstacle to progress towards democracy in Asia. See Lucian W. Pye, Asian Power 
and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions ofAuthority (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 
1985). 
" For a detailed description of Confucian politics, see Sangjun Kim, `The Genealogy of 
Confucian Moralpolitik and its Implications for Modem Civil Society', in Charles K. Armstrong, 
ed., Korean Society: Civil Society, Democracy and the State (London and New York: Routledge, 
2002), pp. 57-91. 
12 During the post liberation years, most Koreans were sceptical of political parties. Indeed, only 
13.5 per cent and 12.8 per cent of Korean voters in the first and second National Assembly 
elections in 1948 and in 1950 respectively agreed that political parties were necessary institutions 
in a democracy. I1-mun Cho and Kyung-woo Yun, `Popular Perception of Political Parties', in C. I. 
Eugene Kim and Young Whan Kihl, eds, Party Politics and Elections in Korea (Silver Spring: The 
Research Institute on Korean Affairs, 1976), pp. 84-94, at p. 85. 
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or democratic values. 
The Korean War and Anti-communism 
During his term, the Korean War in 1950-1953 totally devastated Korean society. 13 
it also had a lasting influence on political culture and behaviour. Rhee's government 
officially expressed anti-communism, and there was no tolerance for communists or 
communism in society. Rhee often attacked his political rivals as pro-communist and his 
government passed the National Security Law of 1958, which defined any pro-communist 
activities or expression as treason. 14 During the following fifty years, there was a high 
level of tension between the two Koreas and a stream of minor military conflicts and 
incidents. Since the 1950-53 war, the Korean peninsula has remained one of the most 
heavily armed areas in the world. In these circumstances, any ideological tolerance for 
communism hardly existed in society. 
Students' Uprising 
Rhee's government was corrupt and incapable of managing Korea's poor rural 
economy which had been ravaged by the war. Koreans could find no hope for the future 
of their country and their lives. Many disliked their corrupt and incapable government but 
the dictator was able to remain in office by rigging elections and repressing opposition. 15 
13 The Korean War was recorded in history as the first `hot war' between the East and the West 
under the Cold War international system. The United Nation forces from sixteen countries 
participated in the war to support the South Korea. On the other side, the USSR backed North 
Korea, and China intervened directly and fought against the UN forces in the war. The number of 
war casualties, both military and civilian, was huge. According to official statistics from the 
Ministry of National Defence of Korea, almost 800,000 soldiers of the UN forces including 
Korean military forces died or were wounded in the war, while the number of casualties on the 
other side was estimated at more than two millions. In addition, almost one million civilians in 
South Korea alone were killed or wounded. Most industrial factories and infrastructure in Korea 
were totally destroyed. More than three million lost their homes and became refugees. One million 
were separated from their family and had to live in two different Koreas without seeing or 
communicating with each other for the next fifty years. See, the Ministry of National Defence of 
Korea, at http: //www. mnd. go. kr. 
14 For example, Rhee's government prosecuted Cho Bong-am, a leader of the Progressive Party 
and a major contender in presidential election of 1956, for the violation of the National Security 
Law and executed him. Although there has been a controversy over Cho Bong-am, it is widely 
accepted that Rhee's government framed Cho Bong-am on charges of espionage for North Korea. 
For Cho Bong-am and the Progressive Party, see Tae-yeong Chung, Chobongamgwa jinbodang 
(Cho Bong-Am and the Progressive Party) (Seoul: Hangilsa, 1991); Jung-seok Seo, 
Chobongamgwa osipnyeondae (Cho Bong-Am and 1950s) (Seoul: Yeoksabipyeongsa, 1999). 
15 For example, in the election of 15 March 1960, the Minister of Home Affairs managed the 
systemic vote rigging at the national level. Policemen, local civil servants, various pro-government 
pressure group members, and even organised gangs were illegally involved in the election 
campaign. They sometimes directly threaten voters and candidates. They directly disturbed 
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Civil servants including the national police were directly involved in various illegal 
activities to maintain his autocracy. Factionalism within or between opposition groups 
prevented united action against the civilian dictator. In addition to unfair and corrupt 
electoral practices, President Rhee had the good fortune that candidates of the major 
opposition party, Shin Ik-hee and Chough Pyong Ok, died suddenly just before election 
day in 1956 and 1960 (See Table 2.2). 
Table 2.2 Presidential Elections in the `First Republic', 1948-1960 
Presidency Election Candidates Result 
Date 
the 2 August Rhee Syngman, Liberal Party (Jayudang) 74.6% 
1952 Cho Bong-am, independent 11.4% 
Lee Si-hyeong, independent 10.9% 
Shin Heon -woo, independent 3.1% 
the 3 May Rhee Syngman, Liberal Party (Jayudang) 70.0% 
1956 Cho Bong-am, independent 30.0% 
Shin Ik-hee, National Democratic Party Min'udan) 0% 
the 4 March Rhee Syngman, Liberal Party 100% 
1960 Chou Pyong Ok, National Democratic P (Min'udan) 0% 
. uurcu. nvicail E1V UUn'_ UEtIID1S5IO11. 
Note: Figures are the percentages of valid votes. 
Rhee tried to extend his rule by revising the constitution which limited presidential 
office to three terms. His authoritarian government failed to get the required two-thirds 
vote in the National Assembly, but achieved its goal through a creative interpretation of 
the requirement. 16 But this led to university student uprisings. When many Korean 
students and intellectuals went out on the street to demand respect for democratic 
procedures, the civilian dictator had to step down in April 1960. 
A Short Period of Democracy: 1960-1961 
After their bad experience of presidential dictatorship, Koreans overthrew the presidential 
system, and adopted a parliamentary system. The Democratic Party (Minjudang) won the 
general election of 1960 and Chang Myon was elected as the first and only Prime 
opposition party's election campaigns. Ballot boxes were replaced by fake ballot boxes during 
delivery process. True votes were replaced by fake votes during the counting process. Ki-ha Lee, 
Hanguk jeondang baldalsa (A history of development of political parties in Korea) (Seoul: 
Uihoijeongchisa, 1961); Research Institute for the April Uprising (Sawolhyeokmyeongyeonguso), 
ed., Hanguk sahoi byeonhyeok wundonggwa sawolhyeoknryeong (Social reform movement in 
Korea and the April Uprising) (Seoul: Hangilsa, 1990). 
16 The ruling party failed to get two third of votes in the National Assembly, which was required 
for a revision of the constitution. The ruling party gained 135 votes among total 203 votes - one 
vote short of the required number. But the Speaker of the National Assembly calculated two-thirds 
of votes by rounding down to the nearest integer and passed the bill. 
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Minister of a parliamentary government (see Table 2.3). His government was democratic 
but was weakened when the ruling party indulged in factional conflicts soon after he took 
power. In addition it faced endless social turmoil. After the April Student Uprising, 
Koreans who were oppressed under Rhee's autocracy asserted their own interests. The 
ideological conflict between the left and the right intensified. Demonstrations and strikes 
continued everyday, but the government proved unable to effectively manage social 
conflict. 
Table 2.3 General Election in the `Second Republic', 1960 
The Assembly Date Political Party Share of vote Seat 
The 5 July 1960 Democratic Party (Minjudang) 41.7% 175 
independents 46.8% 49 
Socialist People's Party (Samindang) 6.0% 4 
Liberal Party (Jayudang) 2.8% 2 
others 2.7% 3 
Total 100% 233 
Source: The National Assembly of Korea. 
Chang's government failed to consolidate the new democracy. His new 
parliamentary administration held power for only nine months. Then a group of young 
military officials led by Park Chung Hee, who had already planed and prepared for a 
military coup d'etat under the Rhee government, interrupted the constitutional order in 
May 1961. The military junta blamed Chang Myon's government for being corrupt, 
incapable of defending society from internal and external communist threats, and failing 
to foster social development. 
Park Chung Hee's Semi-Authoritarian Government: 1961-1972 
Park Chung Hee, a leader of military junta, again revised the constitution and restored a 
presidential system. He became the new president and ruled Korean state for 18 years as a 
military dictator until his assassination in 1979. 
Making LeRitimacy through Economic Development 
Having gained power by military coup d'etat, Park Chung Hee tried to justify his 
rule by achieving economic growth. He immediately started economic development plans. 
Japan was a major source of economic investment in the early stages of economic 
development. Park successfully claimed reparations from Japan for its 36 year colonial 
rule in Korea. At the same time he copied Japanese industrial policy and developmental 
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strategy. His Economic Planning Board (EPB), a Korean version of the Japanese Ministry 
of International Trade and Industry (MITI) with highly concentrated power, tightly 
controlled the economy and pursued an export-led industrial policy based on the cheap 
labour of workers eager for employment. '7 
During his 18 year rule, the economy was transformed from a poor rural economy to 
an industrial economy. The `state capitalism' or `developmental state', backed by the 
military and supported by bureaucrats, could effectively mobilise and allocate national 
resources for Korean economic development, and achieved great success in the 
economy. 18 There is no doubt that Park produced great economic performance. And it is 
not surprising that some Koreans who experienced this rapid economic transition from 
poverty to a successful industrialised society still admire the dictator, particularly for his 
economic achievements. 19 
However, political freedom was restricted and democratisation was retarded. Park 
severely oppressed opposition political leaders and extensively limited civic freedom. It 
was a `developmental dictatorship' or `bureaucratic authoritarian regime', similar to those 
in Latin America, though more successful achieving its own goals. 20 
Unfair Elections 
Under the `Third Republic', the incumbent government was superior to the 
oppositions at electoral campaigning. The ruling party, the Democratic Republican Party 
(DRP, Gonghwadang), was well organised, tightly controlled, and well financed, while 
the opposition groups were split and poorly financed. Local administrative organisations 
were often involved in illegal campaign activities for the incumbent government. These 
unfair practices distorted electoral competition. In elections, the ruling party gained more 
votes in rural areas and secured a majority of seats in parliament (see Table 2.4). 1 
17 For Japanese industrial policy or developmental strategy, see Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the 
Japanese Miracle (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982). 
:E Stephan Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990). 
19 One of President Park's daughters, Park Geun-hye, is currently a member of the National 
Assembly and is considered one of the leading politicians in Korea. Her influence is based on the 
support of Koreans who admire Park Chung Hee. 
20 See Hyug Baeg Im, `The Rise of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism in South Korea', World Politics, 
39 (1987), 231-57. For the concept of bureaucratic authoritarianism, see Guillermo A. O'Donnell, 
Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism : Studies in South American Politics (Berkeley: 
Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1973). 
21 The constitution of the `Third Republic' stipulated that any candidates for presidency or the 
National Assembly must be nominated by duly registered political parties. Indeed, independent 
candidacy was forbidden. 
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Table 2.4 General Elections in the `Third Republic', 1960-1971 
The Assembl Date Political Party Share of vote Seat 
The 6 November 1963 Democratic Republican Party 33.5% 110 
Democratic Justice Party 20.1% 41 
Democratic Party 13.6% 13 
Liberal Democratic Party 8.1% 9 
others (8 parties) 24.7% 2 
Total 100% 175 
The 7 June 1967 Democratic Republican Party 50.6% 129 
New Democratic Party 32.7% 45 
others (9 parties) 16.7% 1 
Total 100% 175 
The 8 May 1971 Democratic Republican Party 48.8% 113 
New Democratic Party 44.4% 89 
others (4 parties) 6.8% 2 
Total 100% 204 
Source: The National Assembly of Korea. 
However, the ruling party could not dominate presidential elections, though the 
ruling party had such a great advantage over the opposition. The military junta barely 
won the presidential election in 1963. The presidential election in 1971 was another 
example. Park Chung Hee, who tightly controlled Korean military, won all of six hundred 
thousand soldiers' votes. Other governmental organisations and bureaucrats took the 
initiative in vote rigging, but nonetheless Park defeated his major opponent, Kim Dae- 
jung, by a margin of less than one million votes (see Table 2.5). 
Table 2.5 Presidential Elections in the 'Third Republic', 1960-1971 
Presidency Date Candidates Result 
the 5 October 1963 Park Chung Hee, Democratic Republican Party 46.6% 
Yun Po-son, Democratic Justice Party 45.1% 
three others 8.3% 
the 6 May 1967 Park Chung Hee, Democratic Republican Party 51.4% 
Yun Po-son, New Democratic Party 40.9% 
four others 7.6% 
the 7 April 1971 Park Chung Hee, Democratic Republican Party 53.2% 
Kim Dae-jung, New Democratic Party 45.3% 
three others 1.5% 
source: i ne Korean Election Commission. 
Note: Figures are percentages of valid votes. 
Park Chung Hee's Authoritarian Regime (The `Yusin'): 1972-1979 
In 1972, Park intensified his authoritarian rule and tightened control over the society. 
After the strong challenge to his power in the 1971 presidential election he was 
determined to remain in office for life and in 1972 he again revised the Korean 
constitution, replacing direct election of the president with indirect election. He called 
20 
Chapter 2 
this new constitution the `Yusin' (revitalising reform) constitution. 
The Reign of Terror 
His regime turned to a higher level of authoritarianism. In the `Yusin' constitution, 
direct competition for the presidency was abolished, and Park appeared on track for a 
lifetime dictatorship. Park intensified efforts to coerce opposition political leaders and 
limit civic freedom. College students and intellectuals had persistently protested against 
the military dictatorship, but Park's government mercilessly oppressed them. 
In the `Yusin' period, Park often suspended the constitutional order and proclaimed 
martial law Under the 1975 revision of the criminal code anti-government dissidents 
were kept in prison. Park always justified his coercive rule in the name of national 
security interests regarding the potential threat from North Korea. His regime often 
cracked down on dissidents and politicians who asked for democracy or who opposed to 
the government policies by applying the National Security Law that banned any 
cooperation with or expression of sympathy for communism or communist North Korea. 
The Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), founded by Kim Jong-pil who had 
been Park Chung Hee close assistant of in the military coup, was one of the major tools 
for military-backed authoritarianism. The KCIA carried out widespread political 
inspections of opposition activities and was itself directly involved in political 
manoeuvring. The KCIA encouraged the anti-communist sentiment of the Korean public 
and made use of it to oppress dissidents. The KCIA often arrested dissidents without 
anyone knowing, tortured them, and even tried to kill them. For example, the KCIA 
kidnapped Kim Dae-jung, a prominent leader of democratic movement and a major 
candidate in the 1971 presidential election, in Tokyo and would have killed him but for 
American intervention. Park's rule was a reign of terror. 
Parliament and Elections for Form's Sake 
The legislative body did not fulfill a parliamentary role. The authoritarian regime 
controlled it. The ruling party always secured a majority of seats and dominated the 
National Assembly (See Table 2.6). This was achieved by an ingenious electoral system, 
by rigged elections, and by severe repressions the opposition 22 Furthermore, according 
22 The parliamentary electoral system favoured the ruling party. Two candidates were elected in 
each electoral district. Candidates of the ruling party were elected in most electoral districts. Then 
the ruling party could easily achieve a majority in the National Assembly by adding one third of 
seats appointed by President. The ruling party also indulged in unfair practices. Civil servants 
including police and intelligence agency staff were illegally involved in election campaigns to 
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to the Yusin constitution, Park appointed one third of the Assembly members, called the 
`Yujeonghoi' (a group for Yusin politics). So under the authoritarian government, the 
National Assembly was a mere rubber-stamp for administration policy. The opposition, a 
minority group in the National Assembly, often fought against the ruling majority in the 
Assembly and tried to obstruct proceedings, but the government passed bills if necessary 
suppressing resistance in the Assembly by force. 
Table 2.6 General Elections in the `Yusin' Period, 1972-1979 
The Assembly Date Political Party Share of vote Seat 
the 9 February Democratic Republican Party 38.7% 73 
1973 New Democratic Party 32.6% 52 
Independents 18.6% 19 
Democratic Unification Party 10.1% 2 
Yujeonghoi 73 
Total 100% 219 
the 10 December Democratic Republican Party 31.7% 68 
1978 New Democratic Party 32.8% 61 
independents 28.1% 22 
Democratic Unification Party 7.4% 3 
Yujeonghoi 77 
Total 100% 231 
Source: The National Assembly of Korea. 
Elections were not competitive. Korean constitutions have always guaranteed a free 
and fair election, but this was not practiced under the authoritarian regime. Voters had a 
free choice. But their choice was often constrained, and elections were not fair. Electoral 
fraud was pervasive. The authoritarian ruling party bribed voters. Local civil servants 
illegally influenced electorates in their voting decision. News media censored by the 
authoritarian government were not fair towards opposition parties in reporting elections. 
Electoral obstruction against opposition party candidates or supporters of opposition 
parties was systematic. 
Social Change under Rapid Industrialisation 
During his rule in 1970s, Park Chung Hee pushed ahead with industrialisation. `State 
capitalism' gaining confidence in its economic success in 1960s ambitiously invested in 
heavy industries such as steel, automobiles, and shipbuilding. A few companies such as 
Hyundai, Samsung, and Daewoo, which had the full support of the state, gained power in 
the economy and turned into big conglomerates, `chaebol', within the fast growing 
support candidates of the ruling party and to disrupt campaigns of the opposition. 
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economy. However, chaebols caused problems 23 Under the industrial policy which 
favoured chaebols, the authoritarian government oppressed any labour movements and 
restricted most of the basic rights of workers. 4 The industrial policy also hindered the 
entrance of small companies into the market and a few chaebols monopolised the 
economy. Conversely, chaebols were connected to political corruption. Indeed, chaebols 
provided a huge amount of political funds to the ruling group, and the principle of 
separation of political and economic affairs was not upheld. The close relationship 
between the ruling group and chaebols for their mutual benefit became a critical problem 
under this `crony capitalism'. 
Rapid industrialisation produced many other social and political problems. In Korea, 
economic growth was the top priority. Social welfare and the equitable distribution of 
wealth was ignored. In election campaigns, the ruling group always emphasised economic 
growth and political stability, while the opposition only argued for liberal democracy and 
did not effectively raise questions of social welfare. The gap between rich and the poor 
widened, but the state ignored the problem. Similarly, during industrialisation, the 
inequality between regions within the nation-state intensified. Gyeongsang, the 
southeastern region and the home region of the President, benefited mostly, while Jeolla, 
the southwestern region and the home region of Park's political rival, Kim Dae-jung, was 
excluded from industrialisation. 
Chun Doo-hwan's Authoritarian Regime: 1980-1987 
Park Chung Hee's life Presidency ended when he was assassinated in 1979 by a close 
aide, Kim Jae-kyu, chief of the Korea Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA). However, 
Park's death was not followed by democratisation but by another military dictatorship, the 
`Fifth Republic'. Chun Doo-hwan, who developed his career under Park's guardianship, 
led a military coup detat on December of 1979 and became the next dictator in Korea. 
`GwanRiu Massacre' 25 
Chun faced strong opposition in the society to the new military dictatorship. During 
23 For the problems of the chaebol economy and its reform, see Dae-whan Kim and Gyun Kim, 
Hangugjaebeol gaehyeoklon (Reform of chaebol in Korea) (Seoul: Nanam, 1999). 
'" In the 1970s, labour workers began to demand better working conditions and worker's rights. 
During the 1970s, more than 2,500 tabour unions were formed, and labour struggles intensified. In 
1970, Chun Taeil, a young labour worker, killed himself to criticise inhumane working conditions. 
This was considered as a starting point for labour struggles under the authoritarian government. 
'5 According to a new transliteration system recommended by Korean government in 2000, 
Kwangju is spelled as Gwangju. 
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the fu-st half of 1980, several thousand university students and dissidents, demanding 
democracy and an end to military intervention in politics, demonstrated almost everyday. 
Chun proclaimed marshal law. All universities were closed and all political activities 
banned. The military court under marshal law sentenced Kim Dae-jung, a leader of 
democratic movement to death. This provoked a protest against the new military 
dictatorship in Gwangju, a big city in Jeolla region where Kim Dae-jung came from. It 
was brutally suppressed by military forces and several hundreds citizens in Gwangf u were 
killed. 
This massacre changed the political culture. The people of Jeolla region, the victim 
of the massacre, became firn in their determination to resist the authoritarian government. 
Moreover, the Gwangju massacre directly encouraged the evolution of anti-Americanism 
in Korea. Korean democratic movement activists blamed the USA for sitting idly as a 
spectator during the military coup d'etat in 1979 and the subsequent Gwangju massacre 
in 1980. Korean military forces had moved into Seoul and Gwangiu without an 
operational order from the American Commander, despite the fact that Korean military 
forces had remained under American Command since the Korean War. Student activists 
and dissidents doubted American foreign policy on democratisation and criticised the 
American government for backing the new military dictatorship. 
Another Reign of Terror 
Chun's government, the `Fifth Republic', did not differ from Park's. It was also 
based on military force and violence. His government tightened the suppression of anti- 
government movements. Leading opposition politicians were arrested and banned from 
political activities. Riot police occupied the campuses of all of major universities and 
brutally suppressed any student gatherings by using tear gas and force. Under Chun, the 
opposition was disrupted and became somewhat submissive before the 1985 general 
election. 
The authoritarian government tightly controlled the news media. It nationalised a 
private broadcasting company and exerted pressure upon owners of newspapers to 
discharge journalists who criticised the military government. More than one hundred 
journalists in the Dong-a Daily Newspaper, one of major newspapers and the most critical 
newspaper to the government at that time, were fired in 1980. The Chun's government 
forced journalists to follow the guidance provided by the authoritarian government and 
exercised rigid censorship on news reports. As the result, most news media and many 
journalists were submissive to the authoritarian government and even took the lead in 
supporting the authoritarian regime. A few number conservative newspapers began to 
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dominate the newspaper market Z6 
Pro-Democracy Movement and the People's Uprising of 1987 
Under this `Fifth Republic', labour movements were still restrained and worker's 
interests were ignored, though the working class had increased during the rapid 
industrialisation. However, under Chun's military dictatorship, student anti-government 
activists tried to mobilise labour workers into pro-democracy movements. Student 
activists influenced by Western Marxism and by the indigenous `Hinjung' (people's) 
ideology helped workers to develop their consciousness and them into the anti- 
government movement? ' This pro-democracy coalition of students and workers with 
dissidents was the main force in the `June Uprising' of 1987 28 
Chun Doo-hwan elected by an indirect election ruled for a seven-year official term. 
In 1987, he tried to pass his power to the general-turned-politician Roh The Woo who was 
a close friend from his cadet days in the Army Academy and had led the military coup 
with him seven years earlier. However, this caused a massive protest against the 
authoritarian government. The public demanded a direct election for the next president. 
Finally, the authoritarian government had to yield to public opinion, and direct 
presidential elections, abolished in 1972, were restored in 1987.9 
2. Politics and Elections in the New Democracy: 
Change and Continuity in Political Culture and Political Behaviour 
Since 1987, democracy has been consolidated without any interruption, though there is an 
ongoing argument about the quality of democracy in Korea 30 In the new democracy, four 
26 Jun-man Kang, `Eollonhaksalgwa sugueollonui tansaeng' (Killing journalism and the birth of 
conservative journalism), Inmulgwa sasang (People and thought), 55 (2002), 118-35. 
27 The discourse emphasises the role of the grassroots in social and political development. The 
term Minjung refers to the grassroots. Minjung is defined as the social class which resists the 
dominant power and drives social and political progress. For an overview of the discourse, see 
Hansindaehak jaesamsegaeyeonguso (The Center for Cultural Studies in Third World at Hansin 
University), ed., Hangug minjunglonui hyeondangye (The current stage of minjung discourse) 
(Seoul: Dolbegae, 1989). 
28 Hagen Koo, `Engendering Civil Society: The Role of the Labor Movement', in Charles K. 
Armstrong, ed., Korean Society: Civil Society, Democracy and the State (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2002), pp. 109-31, at pp. 111-4; Sunhyuk Kim, The Politics of Democratization in 
Korea: The Role of Civil Society (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000), pp. 103-4. 
" For a detailed analysis on the transition to democracy in 1987, see James Cotton, `From 
Authoritarianism to Democracy in South Korea', Political Studies, 37 (1989), 244-59. 
30 For a discussion on the consolidation of democracy in Korea, see Diamond and Kim, eds, 
Consolidating Democracy in South Korea. 
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presidential elections, four general elections, and three local elections were held. In 
general, elections were fair, free, and competitive. Korea even experienced a power 
transition from one party to another at the Presidential election of 1997 - for the first time 
in Korean politics. The military is no longer a power group in politics and a military 
reentry into the politics is no longer conceivable. 31 
However, the new democracy is still in the process of consolidating democracy. 
Aspects of authoritarian political practice and culture still remain. Political corruption is 
still a major problem in Korean politics. The parliamentary and political parties are still 
institutionally underdeveloped. And under the new democracy, regionalism or regional 
cleavages appeared as a new problem in politics. Furthermore, Korean democracy also 
has to cope with challenges in globalisation, though it survived a serious economic 
recession of 1997 rather well. 
The `Sixth Republic' of Rob Tae Woo, 1988-1992 
In the 1987 presidential election, the candidate of the authoritarian ruling party, Roh Tae 
Woo, won the election with 36 percent of the votes. Roh won the election thanks to 
divisions among candidates linked with the democratic movements. Two opposition 
leaders, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae jung, who were at once long time rivals and 
colleagues during their decades-long fight against authoritarian governments, now ran for 
Presidency. Their division handed victory to the authoritarian party, albeit on a relatively 
small minority vote of scarcely more than one third of voters (see Table 2.7). 
Table 2.7 Presidential Election in Korea, 1987 
Candidates & Parties Result 
(share of votes) 
Roh The Woo, Democratic Justice Party (DJP, Minjeongdang) 36.6% 
Kim Young Sam, Reunification Democratic Party (RDP, Tongilminjudang) 28.0% 
Kim Dae jung, Peace Democratic Party (PDP, Pyeongmindang) 27.0% 
Kim Jong-pil, New Democratic Republican Party (NDRP, Gonghwadang) 8.1% 
Other 0.3% 
Total 100% 
31 Free election is only a necessary but not a sufficient condition for democracy. Linz and Stepan 
suggest that the concept of democratic consolidation is multi-dimensional: i. e., the concept 
comprises behavioural, attitudinal, and constitutional dimensions. In terms of the behavioural 
dimension, no political groups should seriously attempt to overthrow the elected government. In 
terms of the attitudinal dimension, the public should strongly support the democratic idea and the 
democratic system. Constitutionally, people should rely on established norms and procedures in 
resolving political conflicts. Considering these various dimensions, we may argue that Korean 
democracy has been consolidated. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic 
Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe 
(Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), pp. 5-7. 
26 
Chapter 2 
Source: the Korean Election Commission. 
The Split of the Opposition and Intensification of Regionalism 
In the 1987 election campaign, the ruling party, the Democratic Justice Party (DJP, 
Minjeongdang), emphasised political stability and security for economic development. 
The ruling party also asserted that opposition contenders who lacked of experience of 
government would not be able to control economic problems and security issues. Also, 
the authoritarian ruling party mobilised all the resources at its disposal --- such as the 
local administrative structure, a huge amount of campaign funding, and the government 
controlled news media - to survive in the new democracy by wining the election. 
Meanwhile, the two major contenders of the opposition, Kim Young Sam and Kim 
Dae-jung, failed to achieve the single candidacy that a majority of the electorate 
desperately wanted. The two Kim's camps blamed each other for the failure to achieve a 
single candidacy and competed against each other in mobilising huge numbers of their 
loyal supporters to mass rallies during the campaign period 32 
The result of the split in the opposition was severe. Koreans faced to a quite strange 
situation: a transition to democracy started, but military junta survived and continued to 
rule. Koreans had to wait another five years to elect a civilian government. Furthermore, 
supporters of democracy were divided into several groups -- voters loyal to Kim Young 
Sam, voters loyal to Kim Dae-jung, and voters disappointed with both the Kims -- and 
regional cleavages became intensified and came to overshadow Korean politics. 
The First Divided Government 
Roh's government was a weak government resting only on the support of a small 
minority in the election. Under the `Sixth Republic' of Roh Tae Woo, military-turned- 
politicians including Roh extended their political lives, but they are no longer able to rule 
as they had done under previous regimes. Koreans who had revolt against the military- 
backed authoritarian government in June of 1987 no longer accepted military interference 
in politics and demanded the consolidation of democracy. 33 
Roh faced a very strong challenge from the opposition in parliament which the past 
authoritarian regimes had never experienced. In the 1988 Parliamentary election, just 
32 For a detailed description of the 1987 presidential election, see Manwoo Lee, The Odyssey of 
Korean Democracy (New York: Praeger, 1990). 
33 For a detailed analysis of politics under President Roh's government, see Robert E. Bedeski, 
The Transformation of South Korea: Reform and Reconstitution in the Sixth Republic under Roh 
Tae Woo, 1987-1992 (London and New York: Routledge, 1994). 
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after the inauguration of his government, the ruling party was short of a majority. This 
produced `divided government' within a presidential system for the first time in Korean 
political history. The election result reflected regional cleavages combined with a newly 
adopted first-past-the-post electoral system (see Table 2.8) 34 
In a multi-party system with a minority ruling party, the government could not 
ignore the demands of the opposition for consolidating democracy. Investigation hearings 
on the `Gwangju Massacre' in 1980 and on the misrule of Chun's government were held 
in the National Assembly. Many new labour unions were formed and the labour 
movement came into full blossom. Workers often went on strike and claimed their share 
in the proceeds of economic development. 
Table 2.8 General Election in Korea, 1988 
Political Party Share of Votes Number of Seats 
Democratic Justice Party (DIP, Minjeongdang) 34.0% 125 
Peace Democratic Party (PDP, Pyeongmindang) 19.3% 70 
Reunification Democratic Party (RDP, Tongilminjudang) 23.8% 59 
New Democratic Republican Party (NDRP, Gonghwadang) 15.6% 35 
independents 4.8% 9 
others (10 parties) 2.5% 1 
Total 100% 299 
Source: The National Assembly of Korea. 
The Annexation of Three Parties 
The ruling party, the DJP, overcame its lack of a majority in parliament by a party 
merger. In 1990, the ruling party merged with two opposition parties, the Reunification 
Democratic Party (RDP, Tongilminjudang) led by Kim Young Sam and the New 
Democratic Republican Party (NDRP, Gonghwadang) led by Kim Jong-pil. As the result, 
the multi-party system turned to a two-party system, and the new ruling party, the 
Democratic Liberal Party (DLP, Minjadang), was able to dominate the National Assembly. 
Old habits were again prevalent in the National Assembly. Sloppy proceedings and even 
physical confrontation were not unusual. Further political reform was postponed. 
The 'Civilian Democratic Government' of Kim Young Sam, 1993-1997 
The two Kims, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae-jung, again competed against each other in 
the next presidential election of 1992. However, by that time, Kim Young Sam was the 
34 In the parliamentary election system under the authoritarian regimes, two candidates were 
elected in each electoral district. 
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candidate for the ruling party. Kim Young Sam, a long time leader of democratic 
movement, participated in the merger of three political parties in 1990, and became a 
candidate of the merged ruling party, the DLP (Minjadang), in the 1992 presidential 
election. In the election, Kim Young Sam then won the election and became the first 
civilian president for last 30 years, though he was the new candidate of the old 
authoritarian ruling party or its successor (see Table 2.9). 35 
Old Campaign Issues and Behaviour in New Democracy 
The main issues in the campaign were again regionalism and anti-communism. The 
ruling party argued that Kim Dae-jung, who was a major contender and advocate of 
political and economic reform, would be pro-communist. And the incumbent government 
stirred up regional antagonism among Korean electorates against Jeolla region, Kim Dae- 
jung's hometown region. 
Table 2.9 Presidential Election in Korea, 1992 
Candidates & Parties Results (share of votes) 
Kim Young Sam, Democratic Liberal Party (DLP, Minjadang) 42.0% 
Kim Dae-jung, Democratic Party (DP, Minjudang) 33.8% 
Chung Ju-young, Unification National Party (UNP, Gugmindang) 16.3% 
Park Chan-jong, New Politics Reform Party (NPRP, Sinjeongdang) 6.4% 
others (three candidates) 1.5% 
Total 100% 
Source: The Korean Election Commission. 
Meanwhile, Chung Ju-young, the owner of the Hyundai business group --- the 
biggest chaebol in Korea -- formed a new political party, the Unification National Party 
(UNP, Gugmindang), just before the general election in 1992, and achieved some success 
in the election (see Table 2.10). Then, Chung ran for the presidency. 36 Korean voters fed 
up with two Kims' domination of Korean politics looked for the third party candidate. 
Some thought that Chung, a successful businessman, might be a better candidate to deal 
with an impending economic decline. 7 However, it seems that his achievement in the 
35 For the 1992 presidential election and the consolidation of democracy before the election, see 
James Cotton, ed., Politics and Policy in the New Korean State: From Roh Tae-Woo to Kim Young- 
Sam (Melbourne: Longman, 1995). 
36 For explanations on the resurgence of the UNP, see Won-Taek Kang, `The Rise of a Third Party 
in South Korea: The Unification National Party in the 1992 National Assembly Election', 
Electoral Studies, 17 (1998), 95-110; Gil-hyun Yang, 'Liberalisation and the Political Role of the 
Chaebol in Korea: The Rise of and Fall of the Unification National Party (UNP)', in James Cotton, 
ed., Politics and Policy in the New Korean State: From Roh Tae-Woo to Kim Young-Sam 
(Melbourne: Longman, 1995), pp. 83-108. 
37 Another example was Park Chan-jong in the presidential election. Park gained more than one 
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election was not possible without his fortune and his company. He was suspected of 
illegally mobilising Hyundai workers in his campaign and spent a huge amount of illegal 
campaign funds. However, the two Kims' campaign teams also were not free from illegal 
campaign funding. After the election, Kim Young Sam confessed that an excessive use of 
campaign funding was a major political problem that Korea must overcome. 
Table 2.10 General Election in Korea, 1992 
Political Party Share of Votes Number of Seats 
Democratic Liberal Party (DLP, Minjadang) 38.5% 149 
Democratic Party (DP, Minjudang) 29.2% 97 
Unification National Party (UNP, Gugmindang) 17.4% 31 
independents 11.5% 21 
other (3 parties) 3.4% 1 
Total 100% 299 
Source: The National Assembly of Korea 
In the election, the opposition also raised questions about public servants and local 
administrative organisations illegally campaigning for the ruling party. News media 
maintaining a good relationship with the incumbent government were also not free from 
criticism for unfair electoral reports. In sum, the election was relatively fair, free and 
competitive, but the old habits of electoral campaigning persisted to some degree. 
Intensification of Regionalism in Politics and Elections 
In the first two years of his term in office, Kim Young Sam excelled in political and 
economic reform. Kim's `Civilian Democratic Government' introduced various measures 
to reduce political corruption and achieve greater economic justice. Kim also established 
civilian control over the military and prevented a military reentry to politics by 
disbanding a faction of military officials, `Hanahoi' (One association), which had been a 
major pillar of the past authoritarian regime. 
In June 1995, local elections, which had been postponed for several years, finally 
took place. This was another symbol of the consolidation of the new democracy though 
the results clearly reflected regional cleavages. In Gyeongsang region, the ruling 
Democratic Liberal Party (DLP, Minjadang) did well. In Jeolla region, voters showed 
their loyalty to the opposition Democratic Party (DP, Minjudang). And in Chungcheong 
region, a new political party, the United Liberal Democrats (ULD, Jaminlyeon) led by 
Kim Jong-pil, dominated the election. Kim Jong-pil withdrew from the DLP that he had 
and half million votes in the election, though he did not have strong organisational support in the 
campaign. He was popular among educated young urban voters. 
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helped to form in 1990 and founded the ULD just before the local election. Kim Jong-pil 
focused on regional self-respect in the Chungcheong region. 
The highlight was the election for Mayor of Seoul, the capital city. The candidate of 
the DP, Cho Soon, won the election while the candidate of the DLP was not even a major 
competitor. 
Kim Dae-jung, who was defeated in the last three presidential elections and had 
retired from politics in 1992, was encouraged by the victory of the DP in the local 
election, and decided to return to presidential politics. He formed a new opposition party, 
the National Congress for New Politics (NCNP, Gugminhoeui), and more than two-thirds 
of National Assembly members of the DP moved to his new party. The NCNP became a 
major opposition party and the opposition was divided again. 
The regional cleavage in partisan alignment was deepened by the breakup of the 
opposition. The NCNP depended heavily on the loyal support of electorates in Jeolla 
region (Kim Dae-jung's home region) and the DP barely survived except in urban areas 
such as Seoul and Busan. 
The return of Kim Dae-jung to politics meant a restoration of the old rivalry between 
Kim Yong Sam and Kim Dae-jung, and intensified the tension between the ruling and the 
opposition party. Under strong pressure from the opposition, Kim Young Sam's 
government prosecuted two former military-turned-presidents, Chun Doo-hwan and Roh 
The Woo, for their coup d'etat in 1979. By doing so, the `Civilian Democratic 
Government' tried to break off relations with the former authoritarian government, but 
the ruling party lost the support of conservative electorates in Northern Gyeongsang 
region, the home region of two imprisoned former presidents. Kim Young Sam then built 
up his ruling party's strength by recruiting well known popular reformist politicians such 
as Lee Hoi Chang and Park Chan Jong and by changing the name of his ruling party to 
the New Korea Party (NKP, Sinhangugdang). 
The ruling NKP did well in the general election of 1996, and especially advanced in 
electoral districts in Seoul traditionally considered strongholds of the opposition. The 
NCNP swept Jeolla region, but failed to achieve the anticipated number of National 
Assembly seats due to its many defeats in Seoul. As they did in local elections a year 
before, the ULD again dominated elections in their own home ground, Chungcheong 
region. The DP, which did not have any regional foothold, was a major loser in these 
regional cleavages (see Table 2.11). '8 
36 As a summary of the parliamentary election, see Peter Morris, `Notes on Recent Elections: 
Electoral Politics in South Korea', Electoral Studies, 15 (1996), 550-62. 
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Table 2.11 General Election in Korea, 1996 
Political Party Share of Votes Number of Seats 
New Korea Party (NKP, Sinhangugdang) 34.5% 139 
National Congress for New Politics (NCNP, Gugminhoeui) 25.3% 79 
United Liberal Democrats (ULD, Jaminlyeon) 16.2% 50 
Democratic Party (DP, Minjudang) 11.2% 15 
independents 11.9% 16 
others (4 parties) 0.9% 0 
Total 100% 299 
Source: The National Assembly of Korea 
Challenges to the Civilian Government 
The NKP outperformed all other parties in the general election, but failed to secure a 
majority of seats in the National Assembly. The `Civilian Democratic Government' tried 
to overcome this situation by adopting an undemocratic strategy -- tempting National 
Assembly members from opposition parties or independents. Several Assembly members 
moved to the ruling party for their own interests without considering party platform or 
policy, and the ruling party soon obtained a majority in the National Assembly. 
In the last year of his term in office, Kim Young Sam faced to a strong challenge not 
only from opposition parties, but also from the civil society. When the ruling majority 
party passed a bill to revise the Labour Law by stealth, excluding opposition party 
members, the Minjunochong (Korean Confederation of Trade Union) led by journalist- 
turned labour activist Kwon Young-gil, called a nation-wide strike. Kim's government 
also lost popular support when his son was arrested for corruption and as the impending 
economic recession of 1997 was anticipated. 
The `People's Government' of Kim Dae-j ung, 1998-2002 
Kim Dae-jung, who was a charismatic political leader but had lost the last three 
presidential elections in 1971, in 1987, and in 1992, again ran for President in the 1997, 
and was finally elected. The 1997 presidential election was a watershed in Korean 
political development. The perpetual ruling party finally and unambiguously lost the 
election. For the first time in Korea, it was a real power transition from one party to 
another by means of an election (see Table 2.12). 9 
39 For a summary of the 1997 presidential elections, Won-Taek Kang and Hoon Jaung, `Notes on 
Recent Elections: The 1997 Presidential Election in South Korea', Electoral Studies, 18 (1999), 
599-608. Also, see Nam-Young Lee, ed., Hangugui seongeo (Elections in Korea), vol. 2 (Seoul: 
Pureungil, 1998). 
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Table 2.12 Presidential Election in Korea, 1997 
II Candidates & Parties Results 
(share of votes) 
Kim Dae-jung, National Congress for New Politics (NCNP, Gugminhoeur) 40.3% 
Lee Hoi Chang, Grand National Party (GNP, Hannaradang) 38.7% 
Rhee In je, New Party for the People (NPP, Gugminsindang) 19.2% 
Kwon Young-gil, People's Victory 21 (PV, Gugminseongli 21) 1.2% 
others (three candidates) 0.6% 
Total 100% 
Source: the Korean Election Commission. 
Election Issues and the Election Coalition Based on Region 
In the 1997 Presidential election, three candidates, Lee Hoi Chang and Rhee In je 
along with Kim Dae-jung, were major contenders. The ruling New Korea Party (NKP), 
nominated Lee Hoi Chang by a free vote in a party convention. However, Rhee In je, a 
major contender in the NKP competition for the candidacy, withdrew from the party and 
formed a party, the New Party for People (NPP, Gugminsindang) in order to run for 
presidency by himself. The ruling NKP, coped with this situation by annexing an 
opposition party, the Democratic Party (DP) led by Cho Soon, and changing the name of 
the merged party to the Grand National Party (GNP, Hannaradang). 
In the mean time, Kim Dae-jung, a candidate of a major opposition party, the NCNP, 
declared that he would create a coalition government with Kim Jong-pil, the leader of the 
ULD, if he won the election. The coalition between two political parties, which had quite 
different party platforms, and between two politicians, who had lived much different 
political lives -- one as a leader of democratic movement, the other as a key member of 
authoritarian military dictatorship --- was unexpected. The coalition was prompted by the 
growth of regionalism. Kim Dae-jung had the support of the people in Jeolla region, 
while Kim Jong-pil had the support of the people in Chungcheong region. 
The campaign slogan or strategy of the ruling party did not differ from that in 
previous elections, as the leading opposition candidate had not changed. Lee Hoi Chang 
and the ruling GNP accused Kim Dae-jung of being pro-communist, and the GNP even 
encouraged suspicion of a secret connection between Kim's camp and the North Korean 
communist leadership. The GNP also tried to stimulate `anti-Jeolla regional sentiment' 
that had been promoted by authoritarian governments and was widespread in the nation. 
On the other hand, Kim Dae-jung argued for a power transition to the opposition party 
such as Korea had never experienced. He asserted that a power transition would represent 
the true consolidation of democracy. In a major economic recession that hit the economy 
in 1997, the NCNP also criticised the incumbent government's ability and management of 
the economy and Kim tried to demonstrate his ability to control the economic crisis. Rhee 
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In je of the NPP, the youngest of the three candidates, argued for generational change in 
political leadership. And the NCNP, together with its `regional coalition' of the ULD, and 
the NPP, effectively used the fact that Lee's two sons had been exempted from national 
military service duty to raise question about his morality. In short, candidate personality 
or candidate factor was a much more important issue than polices or election pledges in 
this campaign. 
TV debates were introduced for the first time in Korean presidential election history. 
Opposition candidates, who were relatively weak in campaign finance and organisation 
compared to the ruling party candidate, took advantage of this new way of electioneering. 
Rhee In je, a relatively unknown candidate, especially enjoyed the TV debates. Rhee also 
performed relatively well in the TV debates and enhanced his positive image markedly. 40 
Another Divided Government 
After his election, Kim Dae-jung coped swiftly with economic crisis. His 
government paid back all loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) within two 
and a half years and stabilised the Korean economy. His government also achieved a great 
advance in North-South Korean relationships. Kim Dae-jung visited North Korea and 
held a summit meeting with North Korean leader in 2000, the first time for fifty-five 
years. Kim Dae-jung also introduced social security programs and tried to extend social 
welfare. 
However, the ruling party, the NCNP, was a minority in the National Assembly. 
From the inauguration day of his government, Kim Dae-jung had to cope with a big 
opposition party, the GNP, and at the same time, had to try to please the ULD, a coalition 
party that had a somewhat different party platform or policy stance. Kim Dae-jung also 
lost political support due to his unavoidable measures to overcome economic crisis. 
During the economic crisis, the flexibility of the labour market was increased, and the 
salaried class, who had supported Kim Dae-jung in 1997, was a major victim. 
Before the general election of April 2000, the ruling party, the NCNP, tried to extend 
its political basis by recruiting reform-minded new politicians and even changed its name 
to the Millennium Democratic Party (MDP, Minjudang), but the former ruling party failed 
to be the biggest party, let alone get a majority in the National Assembly (see Table 2.13). 
Again, regional cleavages or regionalism influenced the result of election. 41 
40 Seung-chan Yang, `Television seongeo toron bangsongui yeonghyangnyeok yeongu' (the impact 
of televised debates in the Korean presidential election), Bangsonyeongu, 48 (1999), 284-322. 
41 For a summary of the general election, Won-Taek Kang and Scott Walker, `Notes on Recent 
Elections: The 2000 National Assembly Elections in South Korea', Electoral Studies, 21 (2002), 
473-533. Also, see Youngjae Jin, ed., Hangugui seongeo (Elections in Korea), vol. 4 (Seoul: Korea 
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Table 2.13 General Election in Korea, 2000 
Political Party Share of Votes Number of Seats 
Grand National Party (GNP, Hannaradang) 39.0% 133 
Millennium Democratic Party (MDP, Afinjudang) 35.9% 115 
United Liberal Democrats (ULD, Jaminlyeon) 9.8% 17 
Democratic National Party (DNP, Mingugdang) 3.7% 2 
independents 9.4% 5 
others (4 parties) 2.3% 1 
Total 100.0% 273 
Source: The National Assembly of Korea. 
During the second half of his term in office, Kim Dae-jung was confronted by 
various challenges. The bigger opposition party always tackled the minority government 
in the parliament. Opposition groups continually stirred up regionalism and anti Jeolla 
regional sentiment. There was strong tension between Kim's government and major 
conservative newspapers in a situation where three major conservative newspapers 
controlled about 75 per cent of the market shares. The opposition party and conservative 
newspapers focused their criticism on Kim Dae Jung's `Sunshine Policy', a peaceful 
approach toward North Korea. Furthermore, political scandals and corruptions connected 
with his two sons and his close assistants eroded his support. 
The Consolidation of Democracy: Achievement and Limits 
In general, during Kim Dae-jung's rule, Korean democracy was consolidated. Civil 
activist movements burgeoned and gained a strong voice in the society. Ideological 
divisions were weakened, and many progressive organisations such as the Jeongyojo 
(Korean Teachers' and Educational Workers' Union), which was an illegal organisation 
before Kim's government, were allowed. The power of the legislative body was enhanced 
by revisions to the National Assembly Act, such as the introduction of special prosecutor 
system. 
However, fully-fledged political reform was not achieved, though a certain level of 
institutionalisation of political system was recognised. Political corruption remained a 
chronic problem in Korean politics. Political parties were not fully developed 
institutionally, and democratic practices within parties were not implemented. Several 
dozen members of the National Assembly often withdrew from a party and switched to 
another party for their own individual interests without considering party platforms or 
policy. Parliament was more like a battlefield between government and opposition for 
Social Science Data Center, 2002). 
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party interests rather than a place for discussing public policy, and direct physical 
confrontation was not exceptional. Elections were fair and public servants stopped 
exerting influence on electorates for the ruling party, but violations of election laws in 
terms of campaign funding were not eradicated. Electorates were split by regionalism, 
and political parties inflamed regional antagonisms as a tactic in election campaigns. 
The `Participatory Government' of Roh Moo-hyun, 2003 
The three Kims - Kim Young Sam, Kim Dae-jung, and Kim Jong-pil - who were 
charismatic leaders and dominated Korean politics for a long time, were no longer the 
main actors in the 2002 presidential elections. For the first time in thirty years none of 
them ran for the presidency, and none of them strongly influenced voters. This reflected 
on a generational change in political elites and also in voters. 
The Race in the Election: Volatile Voters 
The 2002 presidential election was more like a horse race, and electoral support was 
volatile. During the year, the popularity of parties and candidates went up and down 
depending upon political events. On the one hand, Lee Hoi Chang was the de facto 
candidate of the GNP, a major opposition party, from early in the year. His popularity 
stayed about thirty five percent in polls. On the other hand, Roh Moo-hyun and Chung 
Mong-joon at different times got ahead of Lee for a while, but soon fell behind. However, 
just before the start of the official campaign period, Chung withdrew from the race and 
declared his support for Roh and Roh then returned to the lead. 
The ruling party, the MDP, used a primary election for the first time in Korean 
political history. In this primary election, which was modeled upon American presidential 
primaries, non-party members along with party members could participate. Roh Moo- 
hyun, who did not have a strong support within the party itself, gained popularity during 
the primary campaign and won. Voters welcomed the primary as a symbol of the 
development of democracy within a party and paid attention to the event. The aim of the 
MDP was accomplished, and the MDP recovered its popularity amongst the electorate. 
Roh was supported by more than sixty percent of the entire electorate according to polls 
in May 2002, immediate after the primary election. 
However, it did not take a long for that great success of Roh and the MDP in May 
2002 to became a spring dream. As it was revealed that President Kim's two sons were 
involved in corruption, the MDP's popularity again sharply declined. The MDP was a 
loser in local elections in June 2002. Indeed, the candidate of the MDP for Mayor of the 
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capital Seoul was roundly defeated. Roh was also confronted by attacks from unfriendly 
conservative newspapers tackling and experienced a sharp declining in popularity. Within 
his party he faced to criticism after the MDP's failure in the local elections. 
Roh overcame this crisis by forming a coalition with Chung Mong-joon, a son of a 
`Chaebol' Hyundai family, in November just before the beginning of official campaign 
period. Chung had became a strong candidate for the presidency through the 2002 World 
Cup Football Games held by Korea and Japan together. Koreans were pleased with the 
achievement of their Football Team and rated Chung's achievement as the representative 
of Korean Football Association highly. As Roh lost popularity, Chung took top place in 
the polls for a while and formed a new party, National Unity 21 (NU 21), but his 
popularity also declined soon. It was expected that Lee Hoi Chang, a candidate of the 
biggest party would win the presidential election if both Roh and Chung ran. Both Roh 
and Chung, who were supported by younger generations and shared a common interest in 
defeating a conservative candidate in the presidential election, agreed that only one of 
them should run for presidency. They decided which of them it should be by consulting 
the polls. Roh became the candidate to compete with Lee Hoi Chang. Through this 
coalition deal, Roh regained the lead and won the election. 
Table 2.14 Presidential Election in Korean, 2002 
Candidates & Parties Election results 
Roh Moo-hyun, Millennium Democratic Party (MDP, Minjudang) 48.9% 
Lee Hoi Chang, Grand National Party (GNP, Hannaradang) 46.6% 
Kwon Young-gil, Democratic Labour Party (LP, Minnodang) 3.9% 
others (3 candidates) 0.6% 
Total 100% 
Source: The Korean Election Commission. 
Campaigns and Election Issues 
In the 2002 presidential election, the main contenders were the candidates of the two 
major parties - unlike previous presidential elections where there were more than two 
strong contenders. During campaign, Roh pledged himself to further political reform. He 
argued for overthrowing an outdated politics and introducing a new politics, and asserted 
that the opposition party, as a descendent of the old ruling party in authoritarian regimes, 
could not put any political reform in practice. Lee depended on a negative campaign 
emphasising Roh's instability in behaviour and attitudes, and at the same time, the poor 
performance of the incumbent government. 
The illegal use of a huge amount of election campaign funding, previously a chronic 
problem in Korean elections, was no longer issue in the 2002 election. Mass rallies based 
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on mobilised audiences disappeared. TV debates and TV election broadcasts were the 
most important means in electioneering. Campaigners focused on the media and most 
electors depended solely on the media to provide information for their vote decision. In 
this media campaign, as Rhee In je had done in 1997, journalist-turned-labour-activist 
Kwon Young-gil, the candidate of the Democratic Labour Party, performed relatively well 
in the TV debates and gained a wider support from the electorate though he was never a 
major contender. In addition, the Internet appeared as a new tool of campaigning in one of 
the most webbed societies in the world. Roh whose support was based on the younger 
generation effectively used the Internet in the campaign. 
42 There is some truth in the 
claim that President Roh is the `first internet president' in the world 
43 
Voters were again split by region. Lee gained most votes in Gyeongsang, the 
southeastern region, whereas Roh swept almost all the votes in Jeolla, the southwestern 
region. A similar pattern was visible in the electoral districts in Seoul. The candidate of 
the GNP, Lee Hoi Chang, won the election in the districts where many voters come from 
Gyeongsang, while the candidate of the MDP, Roh Moo-hyun, won in the districts where 
many came from Jeolla. It is important to note that this regional cleavage was not related 
to the candidates themselves. Roh Moo-hyun, the candidate of the MDP, was from 
Gyeongsang region, but he did not do so much better than Kim Dae-jung, who came from 
Jeolla had done in 1997 in gaining votes in Gyeongsang region. 
Anti-communism no longer had special impact on electioneering. Younger 
generations, who were born in the post-Korean War period and who had experienced 
great developments in North-South Korean relationships under the incumbent 
government, were relatively free from ideological stiffness. It was a good example for 
weakening ideological stiffness among electorates that the candidate of the Democratic 
Labour Party, a progressive party, gained almost one million votes in the election. Instead, 
Korean electorates were roughly divided into the pro and the con concerning the 
`Sunshine policy' of the incumbent government, an engagement policy toward North 
Korea. At the same time, 2002 was the first occasion in South Korean electoral history 
when anti-Americanism appeared as a main issue. 
A generational difference in political attitudes and electoral behaviours became a 
main feature of electoral cleavage in Korea. The electorates were by and large divided 
into the below forty years old and the above forty years old. The younger supported Roh 
and the older voted for Lee. Roh's victory in the election was largely thanks to the 
42 Korea ranks third in the world in terms of Internet use. According to a survey in 2002 
conducted by the Ipsos-Reid Corporation, a market research firm, 53 per cent of Koreans had gone 
online at least once over the previous 30 days. See `Around the World, Gains in Internet Use', The 
New York Times, 16 February 2003. 
43 Jonathan Watts, `World's First Internet President Logs on', The Guardian, 24 February 2003. 
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younger who actively participated in the campaign through the Internet. In the past 
younger people were less interested in the campaign or election, but the 2002 election 
was different. The under 40 year olds who made up a great majority of the electorate were 
suddenly interested in the election and determined the result. It was a `revolt by the 
younger'. 
3. Explaining Electoral Behaviour in Korea 
The Modernisation Theory: 'yeo-chon-ya-do' (rural area for the ruling and 
urban area for the opposition)44 
Under the authoritarian regime, the most prominent explanation of Korean voting 
behaviour focused on the difference in voting results between rural and urban areas. The 
authoritarian ruling party gained more votes in rural areas whereas opposition parties 
gained more votes in urban areas. 5 That pattern of voting recurred in both presidential 
and parliamentary elections. 
The phenomenon was mainly explained by the different level of political 
consciousness between voters in rural and urban areas. 46 The authoritarian party could 
more effectively mobilise electorates in rural areas who relatively had low levels of 
political understanding or political consciousness. According to this explanation, voters in 
rural areas indulged in `conformity voting'. They were more likely to adapt themselves to 
circumstances rather than exercise their own judgment. Indeed, their voting decision was 
greatly influenced by family, relatives, community, and - critically - by local bureaucrats. 
The authoritarian ruling party could easily bribe voters in rural areas. And local civil 
servants who had direct influence on the community life of voters in rural areas often 
persuaded or sometimes threatened voters to cast their vote for a candidate of the 
authoritarian ruling party. 
44 For a review of Korean electoral studies before 1987, see Soong-hoom Kil, 
`Seongeoyeongumunheonoe banyeongdoin ironul byeonhwa' (Changes in theory reflected in 
literature in electoral studies), in Soong-boom Kil, Kwang Woong Kim, and Byong Man Ahn, eds, 
Hangugui seongeo (Elections in Korea) (Seoul: Dasan Publishers, 1987), pp. 69-98. 
`S Kap-yun Lee, Hangugui seongeowa j yeokjuui (Korean elections and regionalism) (Seoul: 
Oreum, 1998), p. 30. 
46 Cheon-ju Yun, 71hpyo chamyeowa jeongchibaljeon (Voter participation and political 
development) (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1989); Chong-Lim Kim, `Political 
Participation and Mobilized Voting', in Chong-Lim Kim, ed., Political Participation in Korea 
(Santa Barbara: Clio Books, 1980), pp. 119-42; Jae-on Kim and Byung Chul Koh, `Electoral 
Behavior and Social Development in South Korea: An Aggregate Data Analysis of Presidential 
Elections', Journal of Politics, 34 (1972), 845-54. 
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Explaining Mobilised Voters in Rural Area 
Political culture and social structure in rural society was used to explain why voters 
in rural areas were more easily mobilised than voters in urban areas. First, Korean 
traditional culture or values, especially Confucian culture, had been relatively unchanged 
in rural areas. This traditional political culture emphasised loyalty to authority and respect 
for hierarchical order. Other people, such as family leaders or community leaders, could 
definitely affect voters who had this traditional political culture and lacked more modern 
democratic values or political understanding of the meaning of democratic elections. 
Second, traditional rural communities were characterised by a hierarchical order and 
an extended family system. In traditional community life, family relationships ware 
important. In traditional society, the concept of family differed from concept of family in 
modem society. In an extended family system, `family' included a large number of 
relatives. It was more like a tribe or clan. In traditional communities, most members of 
such an extended family respected the family leader's decisions, and elections were not 
an exception. In other words, in rural communities, there was a good channel for 
mobilising voters effectively, and voters were easily mobilised. 
However, there is another explanation why voters in rural areas supported the 
authoritarian ruling party. 47 In elections, the ruling party, which monopolised all kinds of 
state resources, always promised to help the development of local communities, by such 
means as the construction of bridges, roads, and hospitals. So, voters preferred candidates 
of ruling party in elections. Local bureaucrats, or opinion leaders of rural communities 
could tempt electorates with such baits or expected rewards. In addition, opposition 
parties lacked human resources because the authoritarian government and ruling party 
almost monopolised the pool of highly qualified potential candidates. This was especially 
true in rural electoral districts. So in elections, through their lack of human and financial 
resources, opposition parties had to concentrate on urban electoral districts and almost 
gave up on elections in rural areas. In these circumstances, opposition party candidates in 
rural areas were not equal to ruling party candidates in terms of quality or status. Indeed, 
ruling party candidates were usually far superior to opposition party candidates. 
Limits of the Model of Mobilised Voters 
47 Kisuk Cho, Hamn#eok seontaek (Rational choice) (Seoul: Hanul, 1996), pp. 106-16. However, 
this argument is not empirically confirmed due to lack of data. Also, there is no close relation 
between supports for the ruling party and pledges for local development according to a recent 
empirical research. See Lee, Hangugui seongeowa jiyeokjuui (Korean elections and regionalism), 
p. 33. 
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Although the mobilisation explanation helps explain the pattern of voting behaviour 
of the Korean electorate under authoritarian government, this explanation had limits. First, 
it explained the pattern of voting behaviour at the aggregate level but was less successful 
at explaining the voting behaviour of individual voters. Second, the model could not be 
applied to explain the voting behaviour of Korean electorates in general. It focused on 
voting behaviour in rural areas. It could not explain the substantial support for the ruling 
party in urban areas. And this problem got more serious as Korea industrialised. During 
the industrialisation of Korea, the population of rural areas declined rapidly to become a 
small percentage of voters in the electorate. 
Third, the explanation fails to explain voting behaviour in rural areas under the new 
democracy after 1987. The pattern of voting behaviour in rural areas persists, even though 
the explanatory power of the variables is much weakened. Electorates in rural area are 
still more likely to support for the authoritarian party, even though it is now an opposition 
party without the ability to distribute state resources, and even though traditional rural 
communities have disintegrated and voters in rural areas cannot so easily be mobilised. 
Under the WTO system, agricultural issues are salient and farmers have begun to 
articulate particular interests. 
Moreover, the concept of ruling and opposition party is much confused due to the 
power transition of 1997, the first democratic transition in Korean political history. 
However, the old generation which is the main component of rural areas still supports the 
descendent of the old authoritarian ruling party. For example, many older electorates in 
rural areas say they have always checked "box number I" on the ballot paper throughout 
their life, and they hardly change their voting habit. 48 
In short, the explanation of voting behaviour in rural areas based on mobilisation 
cannot deal with voting behaviour in rural areas under the new democracy. Other factors 
should be considered to explain why voters in rural areas still support for the successor of 
the authoritarian ruling party. a9 
Democratic Movement and Electoral Behaviours in Korea: `Minju dae Ban- 
minju' (Pro-democracy vs. Anti-democracy) 
48 In Korean ballet system, a candidate of the biggest party in the National Assembly is assigned 
number I in ballet paper. A candidate of the second biggest party in the National Assembly is 
assigned the next number in ballet paper, so on. Also, in Korean political history, old authoritarian 
ruling party and its descendent has been the biggest party in the National Assembly. 
49 Lee Kap-yun explained the difference in voting behaviour between the rural and the urban area 
focusing on age and education factor. Indeed, the older and the less educated voters are more likely 
to support for the authoritarian ruling party and they remain in rural area. Lee, Kangugui 
seongeowa jryeokjuui (Korean elections and regionalism), pp. 25-40. 
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In the Korean political process or elections, political leaders rather than political parties 
have been the key actors. Among the three main factors in voting choice - party, 
candidate, and issues - the candidate factor has been the most important in Korean voting 
decisions 50 The instability of the political party system and ideological stiffness are the 
main reasons why Korean electorates depend on the candidate factor in the voting 
decisions rather than on party or issues. 
`Meeting and Partin' (Ihapiipsan) of Political Parties 
In Korea, the main feature of party politics is `meeting and parting'. This is 
especially true for opposition parties. Authoritarian governments had suppressed 
opposition parties or political leaders with all sorts of measures, and opposition party 
activities were extremely constrained. Furthermore, authoritarian governments always 
tried to disrupt opposition parties and promote factional struggles - the old principle of 
"divide and rule". Consequently, new opposition parties appeared often, but had short 
lives. 
It is hard to say that opposition parties were modern political parties. They were not 
systemised organisations. Opposition parties, which were oppressed by authoritarian 
governments, lacked human and financial resources, while the authoritarian party 
developed a systemised organisation and built a nation wide network to keep in touch 
with local individual electorates. Furthermore, authoritarian governments had made 
voters hold a biased view against opposition parties, which were described as factional 
struggles, agitators, and cliques. 
In these circumstances, an opposition party was heavily dependent on a political 
leader who could gain personal support. Charismatic leaders formed parties and 
dominated them and the life span of a political party was usually the same as the political 
life of a prominent leader. In this sense, even the ruling party was not an exception. A 
dictator who took power by a coup formed a ruling party to support his reign, and the 
party collapsed when he lost power. 
Since democratisation in 1987, the situation has not changed much. Most political 
parties in Korea still remain at a low level of institutionalisation. `Meeting and parting' is 
still the main characteristic of party politics in Korea. One political leader of each 
50 Myoung-soon Shin, 'Hanguguijeongehi chamyeowajeongchi ba jeon' (Political participation 
and political development in Korea), in Korean Political Science Association, ed., Hangug 
jeongchi balcheonui tuegseonggwa jeonmang (Features and prospect for political development in 
Korea) (Seoul: Korean Political Science Association, 1984). Cited from Cho, Hamnyeok seontaek 
(Rational choice), p. 120. 
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political party dominates that political party. 51 Many citizens have a negative perception 
of political parties as a whole. And political parties are treated with contempt as the least 
respected institution or the least developed organisations in society. 52 
No difference among Political Parties 
Party competition, based on differences on public policy, has been completely absent. 
A political party representing a particular social class has not existed. Party platforms or 
policies do not have a significant weight. There are several reasons why party platforms 
or policies are ignored in party politics. First, political parties have been formed and 
dominated by political leaders. Many political parties were built in haste just before an 
election. In many cases, they copied and modified the party platforms and policies of 
another party. Second, under the authoritarian regime, the labour movement was 
extremely restricted. Therefore, it was difficult to expect the advent of a political party 
representing specific class interests. Third, the ideological orientation of society was 
favourable to right-wing ideology. Under the Cold War system, South Korean always 
feared the threat of North Korea. And Koreans who had experienced the Korean War in 
the 1950s held very strong anti-communism views. Dictators encouraged the people's 
anti-communist sentiment, and made use of ideological rigidity to maintain or consolidate 
their rule. For example, authoritarian governments often accused opposition political 
leaders of being communists or pro-communists who would cooperate with North Korea. 
Authoritarian governments even framed and executed such opponents. In this situation, 
the appearance of a progressive or left-wing party was practically impossible. 
Due to the ideological rigidity or inclination towards a right-wing ideology in society, 
party competition based on different policies did not exist. In elections, opposition parties 
criticised the lack of freedom and argued for democracy. Electorates did not pay attention 
to specific detailed policies. They hardly recognised differences in public policies across 
different political parties and considered any election pledge on public policies as rhetoric. 
On the other hand, the authoritarian ruling party always raised issues of security, 
economic growth and political stability. 
Even the descendent of the authoritarian party after 1987 stimulated feelings of 
uneasiness on security issues. The New Korea Party (NKP), the ruling party at that time, 
sl Lee Kap-yun pointed three main characteristics of political parties in Korea: (1) no difference in 
terms of ideology and issue, (2) the instability of the party system, and (3) domination by a 
prominent leader. Lee, Hangugui seongeowa jryeokjuui (Korean elections and regionalism), pp. 
141-52. 
sZ For example, in assessments of party performance, Koreans perceive political parties negatively. 
Indeed, 73 per cent of voters perceived that political parties serve only party interests rather than 
public interests. See Shin, Mass Politics and Culture in Democratizing Korea, pp. 180-2. 
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and the news media cooperated to exaggerate a minor intrusion of North Korean soldiers 
in the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) during the 1996 general election. It affected voters who 
had strong anti-communism views and affected the result of the election. 
`McCarthyism' is still often used to attack political rivals. In the 1997 presidential 
election, Kim Dae-jung was criticised as pro-communist. Even in the 2002 presidential 
primary election of the MDP, led by President Kim Dae-jung, a strong candidate was 
attacked by another candidate and by conservative newspapers for being a radical or on 
the left. 
Electoral Cleavage of the Government and the Opposition 
When modem political parties were not institutionalised and competition on public 
policy did not exist, a key concept to explain individual voting behaviour under the 
authoritarian regime was a political attitude of `pro-ruling' or `pro-opposition' party. 53 
The concept differs from the concept of party identification or party affiliation in Western 
democracies. Korean electorates had difficulty in developing a party affiliation with 
specific parties due to the short life span of most parties, especially opposition parties. 
Therefore, the concept was not related to a specific political party. Like US party 
identification, however, the political attitude of pro-ruling and pro-opposition was formed 
over a long period of time. It was a long-term predisposition, even a belief-system. Voters 
who supported democracy or freedom were more likely to have a pro-opposition attitude, 
while voters who preferred stability to freedom were more likely to have a pro-ruling 
party attitude. This political attitude of pro-ruling or pro-opposition party was associated 
with the social and economic characteristics of individual voters. Younger generations, 
higher educated voters, and men in urban areas were more likely to have pro-opposition 
party attitudes. 
The political attitude of pro-ruling and pro-opposition party may no longer be so 
useful to explain voting behaviour of Korean electorates after the democratisation of 1987. 
Political development and change have confused the electorates. The authoritarian ruling 
party merged with two opposition parties in 1990. One of the two most prominent leaders 
of democratic movement, Kim Young Sam, won the 1992 presidential election as the 
candidate of the merged ruling party. Finally, an opposition party won the 1997 
s; Jung-bin Cho, `Yugwonjaui yeoyaseonghyanggwa lupyohaengtae' (Pro-ruling and pro- 
opposition voter attitude and voting behaviour), in Nam-Young Lee, ed., Hangugui seongeo 
(Elections in Korea), vol. 1 (Seoul: Nanam, 1993), pp. 49-66; Chan-wuk Park, `Jael4dae 
gughoiuiwon chongseongeoaeseoui jeongdangjiji bunseok' (An analysis of party support in the 
14th general election), in Nam-Young Lee, ed., Hangugui seongeo (Elections in Korea), vol. 1, pp. 
67-115. 
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presidential election and became a `ruling party' for the first time in 50 years. So it is 
natural for Korean electorates to be perplexed now with the concept of ruling party or 
opposition party. 
Under the authoritarian regime, the main issue in elections was political: 
constitutional democracy or freedom. The cleavage of Korean electorate could be well 
described by a value dimension -- pro-democracy and anti-democracy or pro- 
authoritarianism. Voters who emphasised democracy were more likely to feel pro- 
opposition. Voters who preferred authoritarianism were more likely to feel pro-ruling 
party. However, under new democracy after 1987, such grand political issues are less 
important, even though political corruption and reform are still the main issue in elections. 
The cleavage of Korean electorates can no longer be fully explained by one dimension of 
liberalism versus authoritarianism. Another dimension also should be considered. Korean 
electorates have begun to pay attention to issues, such as welfare, income inequality, and 
inflation. In order to explain cleavages in Korean electorates, a second value dimension of 
egalitarianism and market liberalism must be added. 
`Region Voting' in New Democracy 
There has been another realignment of the Korean electorate. The electorate, which was 
aligned with a political attitude of pro-ruling party and pro-opposition party under the 
authoritarian government, has been realigned with regions. Since 1987, chronic 
regionalism in politics has been intensified. 54 
Refionalism in Elections 
Geography now plays an essential role in Korean elections. Regions are much more 
important than programs or social criteria. One major political party nearly monopolises 
public support in one region, and another major party controls another region 55 The 
competition between the two major parties, the ruling party and the first opposition party, 
parallels a regional antagonism between the Southwestern and the Southeastern region in 
Korean peninsular. For example, in the 2000 General Election, the Grand National Party 
(GNP), the descendent of the old authoritarian party, swept every electoral district in the 
54 See Lee, Hangugui seongeowa j yeokjuui (Korean elections and regionalism). Also, Kisuk Cho, 
Jryeokjuui seongeowa hamnUeok yugwonja (Regional voting and rational voters) (Seoul: Nanam, 
2000). 
ss For example, in the 2002 presidential election, Roh Moo-hyun, a candidate of the Millennium 
Democratic Party (MDP), gained over 90 per cent of votes in Jeolla region, while Lee Hoi Chang, 
a candidate of the Grand National Party (GNP), took approximately 70 per cent of votes in 
Gyeongsang region. 
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Southeast region, while the ruling Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) won every 
electoral district in Southwest region. 
During the 1990s, regionalism or `region voting' developed from an antagonism or 
competition between the Southeastern and Southwestern regions - Gyeongsang and 
Jeolla - to extend to other regions. In the 1996 General Election, the United Liberal 
Democrat (ULD) calling for a regional self-respect won elections in all electoral districts 
in the Midwest, Chungcheong. 
It is true that a `region voting' is detected in some other democracies, where 
electorates cast their vote based on regional political and economic interests. However, 
in Korea, region voting is somewhat different. In Korea, `region voting' is based on an 
irrational sentiment, regionalism or regional antagonism, rather than regional interests or 
ethnic interests. Indeed, voting behaviour in Korea is closely related to voters' regional 
identifications. For example, voters in Seoul, capital city and a metropolitan city, are not 
free from regionalism. Seoul citizens come from various regions in Korea, but their 
voting choice is greatly affected by regionalism. A voter chooses a candidate because the 
candidate comes from the same province as he or she. A voter in Seoul who comes from 
the Southeastern region, Gyeongsang, is more likely to support the GNP, while a voter 
who comes from the Southwestern region, Jeolla, is more likely to vote for the MDP. 
Reasons of the Intensification of Regionalism in New Democracy 
Why has regionalism or region voting suddenly intensified among Korean 
electorates after democratisation? 57 First, in the 1987 Presidential Election, the split in 
the democratic camp which had led the democratisation campaign against the 
56 For example, in British elections, there has been a `regional polarisation' in voting patterns, 
particularly the north-south divide - Scotland and the North of England have given more support 
to the Labour Party. This pattern intensified at the end of 1970s. For effects of region on voting 
behaviour in the United Kingdom, see William L. Miller, The End of British Politics?: Scots and 
English Political Behaviour in the Seventies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981); Ron 
Johnston, Charles Pattie and Ed Fiedhouse, `The Geography of Voting and Representation: 
Regions and the Declining Importance of the Cube Law', in Anthony Heath et al., Labour's Last 
Chance?: The 1992 Election and Beyond (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1994), pp. 255-74. 
s' There are two controversial arguments on the beginning of regionalism in Korean presidential 
elections. Indeed, a group of scholars argued that the region voting started from the 1971 
presidential election, and another group of scholars agued that the region voting became apparent 
from the 1987 presidential election. For the former, Man-heuur Kim, 'Jeongchigyunyeol, 
jeongdangjeongchi geurigo j yeokjuui' (Political cleavage, party politics and regionalism), 
Hangukjeongchihakhoebo (Korean Political Science Review), 28 (1994), 215-37; Cho, Jryeokjuui 
seongeowa hamnijeok yugwonja (Regional voting and rational voters). For the latter, Lee, 
Hangugui seongeowa j yeokjuui (Korean elections and regionalism); Ho-Cheol Sohn, Samgimeul 
neomeoseo (Over three Kims) (Seoul: Pureonsup, 1997). For the beginning of regionalism in 
elections, see Myeong-se Kang, 'Jryeokjuuineun eonje s#akdoeeonneunga? ' (When did 
regionalism in presidential elections in Korea begin? ), Hangukgwa gugjejeongchi (Korea and 
international politics), 35 (2001), 127-58. 
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authoritarian government, caused a realignment of Korean electorates and intensified the 
regional antagonism. In 1987, the candidate of the authoritarian party won the 
presidential election with only 36 per cent of votes. Two charismatic political leaders, 
Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae-jung, who were heralds of the Korean democratic 
movement, ran for the president separately, and the two Kims divided the voters who 
supported Korean democratisation. Each side blamed the other for the failure of the 
election. Korean electors who had a political attitude of pro-opposition party were divided 
into two camps. Purely by coincidence, Kim Young Sam comes from the Southeastern 
region, Gyeongsang, and Kim Dae-jung comes from the Southwestern region, Jeolla, and 
personal loyalties transmuted into regional loyalties. `Region voting' has replaced the 
political attitude of pro-ruling or pro-opposition party in Korean elections. It was a `party 
realignment'. 58 
However, some scholars argue that the regional antagonism between the 
Southeastern and the Southwestern region has a long history, and `region voting' was 
found in Korean presidential elections before 1987 59 However, this argument is not valid 
when we examine voting behaviour under authoritarian regime. Even though there has 
been regional antagonism in Korean history and culture, Regionalism was not main factor 
of the vote under authoritarian government. For example, in the 1971 Presidential 
Election, Kim Dae-jung, who was the candidate for a unified opposition party, gained a 
substantial number of votes in Busan, the second biggest city in Korea and located in 
Southeastern region, although the ruling party candidate, President Park Chung Nee, was 
from that Southeastern region. Also, a regional division of Korean electorates in general 
elections appeared for the first time in 1988.60 `Region voting' emerged when the 
democratic camp was disrupted in 1987 and persisted thereafter. 
Second, politicians or political parties have stirred up regional emotions, and voters 
seem to go for it 6' Many party politicians have found it tempting to use regional 
sentiments to win an election or to gain public supports. Politicians usually point out a 
regional inequality in local development or regional disproportion in appointments of 
senior government posts, while they neglect good public policies or programs. For 
example, the opposition party claims the president excessively favours fellow natives of 
58 Lee, Hangugui seongeowa jryeokjuui (Korean elections and regionalism). 
59 Kim, `Jeongchigyunyeol, Jeongdangjeongchi Geurigo Jryeokjuui' (Political cleavage, party 
politics and regionalism); Cho, Jryeokjuui seongeowa hamn#eok yugwonja (Regional voting and 
rational voters). 
60 Scholars generally agree that the region voting in National Assembly elections started in the 
1988 general election. Kang, `Jryeokjuuineun eonje s#akdoeeonneunga? ' (When did regionalism 
in presidential elections in Korea begin? ). 
61 Lee, Hangugui seongeowa jryeokjuui (Korean elections and regionalism); Sohn, Samgimeul 
neomeoseo (Over three Kims); Kang, `Jryeokjuuineun Eonje Syakdoeeonneunga? ' (When did 
regionalism in presidential elections in Korea begin? ). 
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his home province for senior government posts. This stimulates local voter's sentiments, 
and politicians gain support more effectively. 
Third, latent regional antagonism was ignited in Korean politics when a control 
factor disappeared. Under the authoritarian regime, the passion for democracy 
overwhelmed regional sentiments. However, when Korean achieved a democratised 
society, the latent regionalism in Korean social culture or history became apparent in 
politics. The origin of regionalism as a social culture may be traced to traditional society. 
In Korean history, people who come from the Southeast, Gyeongsang, had formed the 
ruling class in the society, while the Southwest, Jeolla, was a place of exile. The 
governing class had encouraged Koreans to have a prejudice against Southwestern people. 
Some social researches show that this cultural discrimination against Southwestern 
people persists in current society. 62 Incidentally, two military dictators who governed the 
country for almost 30 years before 1987 also came from the Southeast. And under them 
the Southeast benefited from economic development. At the same time, the authoritarian 
government tended to promote cultural discrimination against the Southwest 63 
But, regardless of the reasons why regionalism became prominent in the new 
democracy, region is now a key factor in explaining current Korean politics. The Korean 
party system is based upon regional monopolisation. Stimulating regional sentiments is 
the main campaign strategy in any elections. And `region voting' is the most powerful 
explanation of Korean voting behaviour. 
New Research Interest in Korean Electoral Studies 
Since Korean democratisation in 1987, Korean election studies have reached a new stage. 
There are three reasons why the study of Korean voting behaviour flourished in the new 
democracy. First, the value of elections has been reappraised. Korea has redefined the 
importance of elections in the political process 64 Under the authoritarian political system, 
in which freedom of the press, assembly, and association was restricted and opposition 
parties were oppressed, an election was merely an attempt to provide some political 
62 Gan-chae Na, `Jryeokganui sahoejeok georigam' (Social distance between regions), in Korean 
Sociology Association, ed., Hangugui j yeokjuuiwa j yeokgaldeung (Regionalism and regional 
conflicts in Korea) (Seoul: Seongwonsa, 1990). Cited from Lee, Hangugui seongeowa j yeokjuui 
V Korean elections and regionalism), pp. 49-50. 
Some scholars argue that the regionalism in Korea is an exclusion and discrimination of a 
certain region, Jeolla. This discrimination has been promoted by the ruling bloc and has played a 
role in politics as an ideology in authoritarian regimes. Jang-jip Choi, Hnguk minjujuui jogeongwa 
jeonmang (Conditions and prospect for democracy in Korea) (Seoul: Nanam, 1996). 
61 For example, the voting rate in the 1987 presidential election, the first election in new 
democracy, suddenly increased. Cheon-ju Yun, `Tupyochamyeoui Byeonhwawa Jeongchibaljeon' 
(Change in vote participation and political development), in Kwang Woong Kim, ed., Hangugui 
seongeojeongchihak (Electoral politics in Korea) (Seoul: Nanam, 1990), pp. 23-88. 
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legitimacy for the ruling forces. In these circumstances, studies of Korean voting 
behaviour were ignored. However, the new competitive democracy has increased Korean 
interest in election studies. 
Second, a new democracy provides more liberal surroundings for social and political 
research. In the new social atmosphere, a behavioural approach to individual voting 
choice is flourishing. Surveys on political attitudes or public opinion are carried out quite 
often. Most news media report public opinion polls at regular intervals. And electorates 
feel free to give their honest view on political issues in a survey which they were unable 
to do under the authoritarian regime. 
Third, a group of young researchers on Korean elections, who studied voting theory 
abroad, usually the USA, have a good knowledge of data analysis. They are actively 
doing empirical research, and they are also trying to adapt theories and models from 
mature democracies to explain Korean elections and voting behaviour. 65 
New Issues and Candidates 
In the new democracy, new political issues have appeared and electorates behave 
somewhat differently. Korean electorates have become more sensitive to economic issues, 
such as inflation, even though regionalism is the predominant factor in Korean voting 
behaviour. Under the authoritarian regime, very broad political and constitutional issues 
were prominent. In any elections, these issues always overwhelmed other social and 
economic issues. Now Korean electorates have achieved the democracy they sought for 
several decades, their interests have changed. 
Korea experienced a very serious economic crisis in 1997. In order to overcome the 
shortage of foreign currency and to stabilise Korean currency, Korea had to borrow short- 
term loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The economic recession hurt not 
only the national economy, but also the living standards of many individuals, even though 
the economy officially recovered from the recession within three or four years 66 
Korean electorates now respond to a wider variety of detailed policy issues in 
elections. Democratisation, the end of Cold War system, and globalisation eroded the 
ideological rigidity of electorates, and voters are beginning to pay attention to new issues, 
65 For example, a group of researchers, the Korean Election Studies Association, has generated 
empirical data for every election since 1992, and these data is provided to any researchers by the 
Korea Social Science Data Center. 
66 It is generally agreed that economic factors provide only a limited explanation of vote decisions 
in Korea. However, the economic recession of 1997 had some influence on voting behaviour in the 
1997 presidential election. See Hyeon-wu Lee, `Hangugeseoui gyeongjetupyo' (Economic voting 
in Korea), in Nam-Young Lee, ed., Hmrgugui seongeo (Elections in Korea), vol. 2 (Seoul: 
Pureungil, 1998), pp. 99-150. 
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such as the promotion of a social welfare system, unemployment, the liberalisation of the 
Korean economy, and foreign policy toward North Korea. 
However, increasing interest in new issues does not automatically produce a 
corresponding rise in issue voting. In Korean elections, voters are often concerned with 
the candidates' personal qualities rather than policy issues. For example, the presidential 
candidate of the biggest party in the 1997 presidential election, Lee Hoi Chang, lost his 
popularity markedly when the fact that his two sons had been exempted from national 
military service duty was revealed. His popularity rapidly dropped down from about 45 
per cent to about 20 per cent within a month. 
In the new democracy, labour movements have been active. Labour relations acts 
have been revised and the rights of labour have markedly improved. Labour unions have 
achieved a great success in increasing wages and enhancing working conditions. However, 
labour workers have not voted as a bloc in elections. Even labour unions have failed to 
express a unified opinion in elections. In the new democracy, class is still not the main 
factor in Korean elections. 67 
Political Apathy and Dissatisfaction with Politics 
In the new democracy, political apathy among Korean electorates has increased 68 
Unlike the strong passion shown in the democratic movement of 1987, Korean electorates 
have become cynical and apathetic towards political parties and politicians. People still 
talk about political issues, but their view of politics is by and large negative. Independents, 
who do not have any party affiliation, have markedly increased in number contrary to 
what might be expected in a consolidating democracy. 
There are several plausible explanations for the increase in political apathy among 
Korean electors. First, those who expected a better political system or an improved 
political process have been disappointed with politics and politicians in the new 
democracy. They have realised that political processes or political dynamics in the new 
democracy do not differ all that much from the authoritarian regime. The collapse of 
political parties, political corruption and political conflict in parliament have all given 
electors a negative view of politics, and they have become apathetic towards political 
67 There was some change in the 2002 presidential election. Indeed, the Democratic Labour Party 
(DLP, Minnodang) supported by the Korean Confederation of Trade Union (Minjunochong) gained 
almost one million votes. However, it is doubtful that most votes for the DLP were based on class 
interests. 
6" Declining `social trust' and `civic engagement' is a general trend in both mature and new 
democracies during the last decades of the twentieth century. Pippa Norris, `Introduction: The 
Growth of Critical Citizens? ' in Pippa Norris, ed., Critical Citizen: Global Support for Democratic 
Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 1-27. 
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issues. 69 
Second, politics is no longer so dominant in society. Under authoritarian rule, 
political power or political relationships had been closely related to economic prosperity. 
Indeed, in a `developmental dictatorship', political power had a great influence on the 
business world. In a sense, politics dictated many things. However, circumstances have 
changed. Now Korean people have achieved a democracy, they have become more 
interested in economic than political issues, and in individual well being rather than 
public affairs. They have become depoliticised. 
Third, the Korean electorate as a whole is now very young. Voters who are less than 
40 years old make up more than 55 per cent of the Korean electorate. Only 36 per cent of 
the electorate is older than 50 years old. The younger generations, who were born in the 
post-Korean War baby-boom period and grew up in a better economic situation, have 
behaved somewhat differently compared to their parents' generation. Political interest or 
participation of the younger generation is much lower than that of the older. 70 
Media and Election 
The influence of the media has markedly increased in the new society. Under the 
authoritarian government, the freedom of the press was severely restricted, and the 
authorities always censored news reports and used news media as a means to promote 
public support for the authoritarian government. TV news was notorious. For example, 
reports of presidential activities were the main story on TV news every day. In the new 
democracy, all news media enjoy the freedom of the press, even though there is a 
controversy about self-censorship of news media. TV news now takes a neutral position 
on political issues and maintains a balance in political or election coverage. 71 
Furthermore, TV has become one of the most important means of election campaigning 
in Korea. In the 1997 presidential election, presidential TV debates were introduced, and 
it is estimated that more than 70 per cent of the electorate watched the debates at least 
69 An increase of political apathy or dissatisfaction is related to a decrease of vote turnout in 
Korea. See Won-Taek Kang, `Tupyo bulchamgwa jeongchqeok bulmanjok' (Abstention from 
voting and political dissatisfaction), Hangulyeongchihakhoebo (Korean Political Science Review), 
36 (2002), 153-73. 
70 For generation factor in elections in Korea, see Jin Min Chung and A-Ian Hwang, `Minjuhwa 
ihu hangugui seongeojeongchi' (Electoral politics in Korea after a transition to democracy), 
Hangukjeongchihakhoebo (Korean Political Science Review), 33 (1999), pp. 115-34. 
71 However, it is arguable that some parties got more coverage and more favourable treatment in 
TV news, though the equal treatments are assumed. The bias is found even in mature democracies. 
For example, in British election, the parties did not receive equal treatment in terms of TV 
coverage and favour. William L. Miller, Media and Voters: The Audience, Content, and Influence 
of Press and Television at the 1987 General Election (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 
50-77. 
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once during that campaign. TV is now the major source of information for the 
electorate. 72 
Under the new democracy, there is no censorship of newspapers by the authorities, 
and newspapers have expressed their own political views more distinctly than TV news. 73 
However, it is considered that the editorial policy of newspaper is not independent from 
the owner of the newspaper. Owners often directly affect the political view of the 
newspaper. Owners of newspapers are enormously powerful in politics. Three major 
newspapers taking about 75 per cent of Korean newspaper market share are considered as 
conservative, and these newspapers obviously have great potential to influence the public. 
New media have appeared and begun to play a role in politics. 74 A majority of 
Koreans have e-mail addresses and access the Internet on a regular basis. The Internet has 
affected political communication and challenged the dominance of traditional news media 
in the circulation of information. 75 Political parties and politicians use the Internet to 
communicate with its constituencies. And election campaigning on the Web is now very 
common. 
n See Seung-chan Yang, `Television seongeo toron bangsongui yeonghyangnyeok yeongu' (the 
impact of televised debates in the Korean presidential election). 
73 This trend is found in mature democracies. For example, British analysts argue that British 
press is highly partisan, while television is not. M. Hollingsworth, The Press and Political Dissent: 
A Question of Censorship (London: Pluto, 1986); Seaton and Pimlott, `The Struggle for Balance', 
in Seaton and Pimlott, eds, The Media in British Politics (Aldershot: Avebury, 1987), pp. 133-53, 
at p. 133. Cited from Miller, Media and Voters, p. 51. 
74 See Yong-cheol Kim and Seongi Yun, `Internetui jeongchyeok hwaryonggwa 16dae chongseon' 
(Political use of Internet and the 16th general election), Hangukjeongchihakhoebo (Korean 
Political Science Review), 34 (2000), 129-47. 
73 The OhmyNews is a good example in the 2002 presidential election. See Howard W. French, 
`Online Newspaper Shakes Up Korean Politics', The New York limes, 6 March 2003. 
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Chapter 3. Theory 
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the theoretical underpinning of the study of the 
voting behaviour of independent voters in Korea. This chapter reviews the literature on 
voting choice developed in mature democracies and provides a framework of analysis for 
the study. 
In early electoral studies, political independents or non-party identifiers were 
considered as a `remnant' and were neglected in the analysis of electoral behaviour. In the 
1970s and 1980s, the strength of party identification seriously weakened. Many voters in 
mature democracies shifted from strong to weak party identification or moved from being 
party identifiers to becoming non-identifiers. Accordingly, research interest in 
independents increased. Independent voters are no longer ignorable in the study of 
electoral behaviour and an exploration of voting choice of independent voters is 
necessary for a better understanding of electoral behaviour. However, as yet we have too 
few systematic studies of the voting patterns of independents, even though there is a vast 
literature on partisan decline. 
In an era of partisan decline, students of electoral behaviour have emphasised short- 
term considerations in voting choice, such as issue preference, candidate evaluation, and 
job performance of incumbent government. Moreover, many researchers argued that 
voters are more influenced by election campaigns and the media, when party affiliation is 
weakened. Therefore, many voters begin to cast a ballot based on rational calculation 
rather than on an unconditional loyalty to a political party. 
According to these contending approaches to the study of electoral behaviour, i. e., 
the social psychological approach (i. e., the party identification model) and the rational 
choice approach, it is expected that the voting behaviour of independent voters who are 
free from party constraints is different from voting behaviour of partisans. Party 
identification, a long-term predisposition, explains much of partisan electoral behaviour 
and is a dominant factor in explanations of partisan voting choice. Partisans confirm their 
loyalty to a political party in most elections. Thus, partisans are stable in their voting 
behaviour. When party constraints are absent, voters rely on short-term considerations in 
their voting choice and change their voting intention depending upon political 
developments. The electoral behaviour of independent voters is therefore unstable 
compared to that of partisans. 
This chapter consists of two sections. The first section discusses theories and models 
that are useful to explain the voting behaviour of Korean independent voters. The 
literature review focuses on theories and models of voting behaviour originating mainly 
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in the USA and Western European democracies because there are few empirical studies of 
Korean voting behaviour, particularly independent voters. The second section suggests a 
model of voting choice that is a framework of analysis of empirical research on voting 
behaviour of the Korean independent electorate. In addition, the second section provides 
propositions and hypotheses that guide the study of voting choice of independent voters. 
1. Theories and Models of Voting Choice 
Party Identification and Independent Voters 
It has been widely argued that party identification, or `partisan self-image', is a central 
concept in understanding individual political behaviour. The model of party identification 
originated in American electoral studies and was applied to electoral studies in other 
democracies. ' Since the model of party identification, or the `Michigan model' based on 
large-scale survey, was introduced in 1950s, party identification has been always a 
controversial concept in electoral studies? The concept and its measurement have been 
the focus of much argument. The applicability of the concept to different cultural contexts 
outside the USA has been questioned. Furthermore, the strength of party affiliation has 
weakened and the number of party identifiers has declined in many mature democracies 
with a decline of `party voting' widely recognised. While the importance of party 
identification in electoral studies has been contentious, party identification is nevertheless 
still a critical concept in electoral studies. Most voters in many democracies still identify 
themselves with political party, and use the `party cue' in understanding complex political 
affairs and in voting choice. 
The Concept of Party Identification 
Party identification, which is a concept derived from a psychological theory, is a 
sense of group identity or belonging. Party identification is a psychological bond between 
the individual and the group. Therefore, party identification is "some engagement of 
' Angus Campbell et al., The American Voter (New York: Wiley, 1960); David Butler and Donald 
Stokes, Political Change in Britain (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969). 
2 For an excellent summary of discussions on party identification, see Martin Harrop and William 
L. Miller. Elections and Voters: A Comparative Introduction (London: The Macmillan Press, 
1987), pp. 130-45. Also, William L. Miller and Richard G. Niemi, 'Voting: Choice, Conditioning, 
Constraint', in Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G. Niemi, and Pippa Norris, eds, Comparing 
Democracies 2: New Challenges in the Study of Elections and Voting (London: Sage, 2002), pp. 
169-88. 
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partisan feeling with self-identity" .3 The nature of party affiliation 
is often compared to 
the nature of religious affiliation. ' 
Another element of the concept of party identification is "an extended time 
horizon" 
.5 
Adults do not often change their personal identities and "party identification is 
an enduring long-term attribute for most people, from early adulthood until the last 
year". 6 Therefore, "party identification is viewed as the most stable of all political 
attitudes". ' Moreover, the early researchers of the Michigan model believed that party 
identification is passed from parent to child, and it is consistently maintained. The 
individual strength of partisan attachment reaches its peak in a voter's middle and old age. 
Furthermore, party identification is one of the most widely shared political attitudes. In 
general, most voters in the many mature democracies identify with the parties, though the 
level of party identification differs across countries. Party identification, a long-term 
predisposition and the most widely shared political attitude, is a key element of continuity 
between elections. 
The Michigan school's social psychological perspective of party identification, 
which mainly emphasised emotional ties and identity, has been criticised. Fiorina 
suggested a reformulation of the concept of party identification focusing on voters' 
retrospective evaluations on party performance. Fiorina showed that partisan 
identification is greatly influenced by voters' "past political events and experiences". In 
particular, the performance of incumbent government and people's retrospective 
evaluation affect partisanship. 8 Therefore, according to the revisionist view, party 
identification is responsive to short-term forces, while the original Michigan model 
considered party identification as a cause of short-term evaluations on candidates and 
issues rather than the effect of short-term forces. Issues bring about change in 
partisanship. Voters switch their parties from election to election largely according to 
policy consideration .9 Party 
identification is strengthened or weakened reacting to party 
performance. '° 
In addition, the concept of stable partisanship has been challenged. Empirical studies 
3 Philip E. Converse and Roy Pierce, `Measuring Partisanship', Political Methodology, 11 (1985), 
143-66. 
° Warren Miller and J. Merrill Shanks, The New American Voter (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 1996), pp. 120-21. 
s Converse and Pierce, `Measuring Partisanship', p. 143. 
6 Philip E. Converse and George B. Markus, 1979. `Plus ca Change ...: The New CPS Election Study Panel', American Political Science Review, 73 (1979), 32-09; Miller and Shanks, The New 
American Voter. 
Miller and Shanks, The New American Voter, p. 118. 
$ Morris P. Fiorina, Retrospective Voting in American National Elections (New Heaven and 
London: Yale University Press, 1981), p. 200. 
9 V. 0. Key, Jr., The Responsible Electorate (New York: Vintage, 1966). 
10 Fiorina, Retrospective Voting in American National Elections. 
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revealed that partisan attachment is much less stable than was believed. Empirical 
research showed that the intergenerational transmission of party identification is not 
critical. " Many studies provided that the difference of partisan strength across different 
age cohorts is not due to the lifetime consolidation of partisanship, but a generational 
characteristic. Thus, political change in electoral alignments was caused by change in the 
composition of the electorate rather than by changes in attitudes of those already in the 
electorate. 12 
In new democracies, such as Korea, voters have more difficulties in developing 
long-term party attachment. " In general, the parties have been formed and dissolved 
frequently. Social group ties with the parties are weak. The level of party identification is 
low and the intensity of partisanship is not strong. Voters are at the pre-aligned stage, and 
parental partisanship is negligible. In this circumstance, party identification can hardly be 
understood as an enduring, stable attitude unchanged thorough an individual's lifetime. In 
a new democracy, party identification is influenced by short-term factors, such as political 
events and politician. For example, party identification is often linked to self-identity with 
popular political leaders or ideology. Party identification may be another expression of a 
feeling of attachment with political leaders. In new democracies, the level of party 
identification fluctuates quite regularly over time. Change in the partisanship in new 
democracies often includes transitions from one party to another party, while change in 
partisanship in mature democracies is characterised as change between party identifiers 
and non-party identifiers. 
The Concept of Independents 
In the Michigan model, independents are conceptualised as voters who do not 
profess their partisan attachment. Partisanship is measured by its direction and its strength. 
Voters are allocated into five categories, or seven categories, in `a continuum of 
partisanship': strong Democrats, weak Democrats, independent, weak Republican, and 
strong Republican. In the seven-point scale, independents are subdivided into Democrat 
`leaner', `pure' independent, and Republican `leaner'. The independent `leaners' are 
those who profess a sense of feeling closer to one party, though they do not express 
11 M. Kent Jennings and Richard G. Niemi, The Political Character of Adolescence: The 
Influence of Families and Schools (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974). 
12 Paul R. Abramson, Generational Change in American Politics (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington 
Books, 1975). Norman H. Nie, Sidney Verba, and John R. Petrocik, The Changing American Voter 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979). 
13 For psychological identification with political parties in other new democracies, particularly 
post-communist countries, see William L. Miller, Stephen White, and Paul Heywood, `Political 
Values Underlying Partisan Cleavages in Former Communist Countries', Electoral Studies, 17 
(1998), 197-216. 
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partisan attachment. The `pure' independents are voters who neither profess a partisan 
predisposition nor any inclination to a party. 
Many researchers argued that a one-dimensional concept and measurement of party 
identification and non-partisanship based on American two-party system is flawed 
because it assumes that partisanship and non-partisanship are mutually exclusive 
alternatives. Empirical research found `intrasintivities' in a linear relationship between 
party identification and the vote. 14 The `leaner' independents, those who deny party 
identification but profess inclination to the parties, are more partisan in their voting 
compared to the weak party identifiers and often match the strong party identifiers. As a 
result, a multidimensional conceptualisation and measurement of partisanship has been 
suggested. " 
Miller and Wattenberg argued that one-dimensional concept and measurement of 
partisanship have combined `non-preference' respondents and self-labelled 
`independents' into the same category and have failed to account for various 
independents. 16 The no-preference, apolitical non-partisans should be distinct from 
relatively politically interested independents in their level of political involvement and 
attitudes toward political independence. 
Many researchers also divided partisan independents into sub-groups according to 
their political awareness or interests in politics. 17 One type of independent is not 
interested in political affairs, and so they do not have party preference. They are called 
`apolitical' independents. Most of independents in the 1950s and the 1960s were 
considered apolitical independents. They are uninterested and uninformed about politics. 
"Far from being more attentive, interested, and informed, independents tend as a group to 
be somewhat less involved in politics. They have somewhat poorer knowledge of the 
issues, their image of the candidates is fainter, their interest in the campaign is less, their 
concern outcome is relatively slight, and their choice between competing candidates, 
although it is made later in the campaign, seems much less to spring from discoverable 
" John R. Petrocik, `An Analysis of the Intransitivities in the Index of Party Identification', 
Political Methodology 1 (1974), 31-47. 
15 Richard S. Katz, `The Dimensionality of Party Identification: Cross-National Perspectives', 
Comparative Politics, 10 (1979), 147-63; David Valentine and John Van Wingen, `Partisanship, 
Independence, and the Partisan Identification Question', American Politics Quarterly, 8 (1980), 
165-86; Herbert F. Weisberg, `Multidimensional Conceptualization of Party Identification', 
Political Behavior, 2 (1980), 33-60. 
16 Arthur H. Miller and Martin P. Wattenberg, `Measuring Party Identification: Independent or No- 
Partisan Preference? ', American Journal of Political Science, 27 (1983), 106-21. 
'7 Asher, Herbert Asher, Presidential Elections and American Politics (Homewood, Ill: Dorsey, 
1980); Gerald M. Pomper, Voter's Choice: Varieties of American Electoral Behavior (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1975); Jack Dennis, `Political Independence in America', British Journal of 
Political Science, 18 (1988), 77-109 and 197-219. 
57 
Chapter 3 
evaluations of the elements of national politics". 's The other type of independent or non- 
party identifier is politically conscious, but do not have party preference. They differ from 
the `apolitical' independents. In the 1970s and 1980s, educated and informed partisans 
who were critical of party performance and who no longer depended on a `partisan cue' 
in understanding the complexity of politics called themselves independents. 
Furthermore, Dennis argued that independent means more than simply the absence 
of partisan attachment. He explained the growth of independents in American voters as a 
result of a change in popular attitudes toward political independence, and suggested four 
dimensions to distinguish a variety of types of partisanship and independence. 19 
The Function of Party Identification 
Party identification directly affects voting decision. In The American Voter, it was 
argued that party identification, or `partisan self-image' is the most critical variable 
among the many factors to explain voting choice, such as party, issue, and candidate. The 
authors of The American Voter suggested that party identification is closely associated 
with voting choice. They found that most strong party identifiers vote for the party and 
independent voters who do not identify with party vote for different parties. Thus, strong 
Democrats vote for candidate of the Democratic Party and strong Republican vote for 
candidate of the Republican Party in American elections. 
Moreover, party identification indirectly influences voting choice through affecting 
the voter's response to short-term forces, such as candidates or issues. One of main 
functions of party identification is to shape the voter's view of politics. "Party 
identification is the most enduring of political attitudes, responsible for shaping a wide 
variety of values and perceptions". 2° The Michigan school calls it `perceptual screen'. 
Therefore, it is expected that partisans share similar perceptions and evaluations of 
politics. 
Furthermore, empirical research found that party identification influences other 
political attitudes, but also party identification is influenced by preference for policy or 
politician. 21 In this way, party identification is the result as well as the cause in a causal 
flow. In the non-recursive explanation of party identification, it is assumed that party 
identification is susceptible to short-term factors. Fiorina emphasised that an individual's 
18 Campbell et al., The American Voter, p. 143. 
19 He suggested a classification of `political autonomy', `anti-partyism', `partisan neutrality', and 
artisan variability'. Dennis, `Political Independence in America', p. 202. 
Miller and Shanks, The New American Voter, p. 117. 
21 John E. Jackson, `Issues, Party Choice, and Presidential Votes', American Journal of Political 
Science, 19 (1975), 161-85. 
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evaluation of incumbent government performance causes change in individual 
partisanship. 22 
The Origin of Party Identification 
The origins of party identification have not been well understood. 23 In the 
development of party identification, the family plays essential role. Early empirical 
research provided a relationship between an individual's party preference and parental 
partisanship. According to the early studies of political socialisation, the family is the 
primary source of partisanship. Family party loyalty affects the partisanship of childhood 
and this partisanship evolves in later life. 
The thesis of `familial socialisation' has been challenged. Empirical research showed 
that there was a weaker partisan relationship between child and parent than one might be 
expected. 4 Furthermore, the thesis of family influence on partisanship cannot answer the 
question of the source of the parental partisanship. And in particular, in new democracies, 
where a relatively small proportion of the electorate identifies with a party, the rapid 
increase of party identifiers within a short period time cannot be explained by parental 
partisanship. 
Electoral Dealignment 
The Concept of Electoral DealiEnment 
Independents have greatly increased in mature democracies over the last three 
decades. Now, the political party, which was the basis of the modern democratic political 
process, is facing serious challenges. Electoral dealignment and partisan decline can be 
detected in many ways. The proportion of voters in the electorate who identify with a 
party has rapidly decreased and the number of non-party identifiers is increasing. The 
strength of party loyalty among party identifiers has markedly weakened. Also, from a 
behavioural perspective, `party voting' has declined, and voters often defect from their 
party in voting choice. 
Empirical research showed that the a growing body of voters in the USA and 
22 Fiorina, Retrospective Voting in American National Elections. 
23 Richard G. Niemi and M. Kent Jennings, `Issues and Inheritance in the Formation of Party 
Identification', American Journal of Political Science, 35 (1991), 970-88. 
24 Jennings and Nietei, The Political Character of Adolescence: The Influence of Families and 
Schools; Richard G. Niemi and Richard S. Katz, and David Newman, `Reconstructing Past 
Partisanship: The Failure of the Party Identification Recall Questions', American Journal of 
Political Science, 24 (1980), 633-51. 
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Western Europe have moved from party identifiers to non-party identifiers over the last 
three decades, though most voters in mature democracies still declare themselves party 
identifiers25 However, differences in the level of partisan decline across countries should 
not be ignored. 26 Some countries have experienced a rapid decline of partisanship, such 
as the USA, while some countries still maintain a relatively high level of partisanship, 
such as the UK. Additionally, a decay of partisanship has generally been identified in 
mature democracies. By contrast, in new democracies, such as the post-communist 
countries, the electorate is at the pre-aligned stage and the level of partisanship is still 
increasing from a low level. 27 
The UK, the oldest democracy in the world, is not an exception to the general trend 
of declining partisanship. In terms of the proportion of voters who identify with the 
parties, the level of partisanship has declined slowly and almost 90 per cent of the British 
electorate still identify with the parties. However, the UK is not an exception to partisan 
decline in terms of the strength of party loyalty. Even though most of the electorate still 
identify with the parties, a large percentage of party identifiers have only `semi-detached 
preferences' rather than a strong attachment to political parties. 30 years ago, there were 
more `very strong' party identifiers than `not very strong', but now `not very strong' party 
identifiers outnumber the `very strong' identifiers2e Furthermore, the relatively high 
level of partisanship of the British electorate is related to the validity problem in 
measuring party identification. Bartle suggested that the questionnaire used in the British 
Election Studies failed to measure a long-term partisan preference. In answering the 
survey questions, respondents were easily influenced by their voting choice in the 
upcoming election, and the size of non-identifiers in the British electorate was 
consistently underestimated. 29 
In addition to the substantial proportion of the electorate withdrawing their support 
's Nie, Verba, and Petrocik, The Changing American Voter; Martin P. Waffenberg, The Decline of 
American Political Parties: 1952-1996 (Cambridge, Mass and London: Harvard University Press, 
1998); Hermann Schmitt and Soren Holmberg, `Political Parties in Decline? ', in Hans-Dieter 
Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs, eds, Citizens and the State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 
pp. 95-133; Russell J. Dalton, `The Decline of Party Identification', in Russell J. Dalton and 
Martin P. Wattenberg, eds, Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial 
Democracies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 19-36; Harold D. Clarke and Marianne 
C. Stewart, `The Decline of Parties in the Minds of Citizens', Annual Review of Political Science, 
1 (1998), 357-78. 
26 Herman Schmitt, `On Party Attachment in Western Europe and the Utility of Eurobarometer 
Data', West European Politics, 12 (1989), 122-39. 
27 William L. Miller, Stephen White, and Paul Haywood, Values and Political Changes in 
Postcommunist Europe (London: Macmillan, 1998), pp. 197-216. 
28 Ivor Crewe and Katarina Thomson, `Party Loyalties: Dealignment or Realignment? ', in 
Geoffrey Evans and Pippa Norris, eds, Critical Elections: British Parties and Voters in Long-term 
Perspective (London: Sage, 1999), pp. 64-86. 
Z' John Bartle, `The Measurement of Party Identification in Britain: Where Do We Stand Now? ', 
in Jonathan Tonge et al., eds, British Elections and Parties Review, vol. II (London: Frank Cass, 
2001), pp. 9-22. 
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for parties, the degree of `party voting' has also been markedly weakened, and now voters 
respond to issues and other short-term factors than in the past 30 For example, in the 
American electorate, `split-ticket voting' is no longer unusual. 1 
However, many scholars still maintain the position that `party voting' is the most 
important factor to explain voting choice, though they also recognise the decline of 
partisan attachment in the electorate. Party identification is still a relatively stable 
political attitude and party identification explains electoral behaviour much better than 
any other factors. 2 In the USA, the `defection rate', which refers to party identifiers 
voting for parties other than their own, has recently decreased and `party voting' regained 
its strength. 33 Moreover, party identification is very useful to explain electoral behaviour, 
such as the `defection' or participation. For example, party identification can be used to 
explain how responsive voters are likely to be to campaigns and to predict how much 
voters are likely to defect from their own party in voting. 34 
The Cause of Partisan Decline 
There are two rival theories or approaches to electoral dealignment. One is the 
`sociological explanation' and the other is the `political explanation'. 5 The sociological 
explanation focuses on `socio-structural change'. One theory of partisan decline 
emphasises that electoral dealignment is a consequence of social and political 
modernisation, such as increasing levels of education and the growth of the mass media. 
In advanced industrial societies, the media have replaced political parties as the source of 
political information and rising education has produced voters who are cognitively 
sophisticated and who can understand complexities of politics without relying on political 
party. In post-industrial societies, voters have become less dependent on party than voters 
in the past, producing a new type of independent. 36 In addition, generation is an 
important factor to explain electoral dealignment. Generational change is closely related 
to the decline of party identification in the American and British electorate. In these 
democracies, the decrease in partisanship is largely explained by the increase of young 
30 Nie, Verba, and Petrocik, The Changing American Voter. 
31 Wattenberg, The Decline ofAmerican Political Parties: 1952-1996. 
32 Converse and Markus, `Plus ca Change: The New CPS Election Study Panel'; Miller and 
Shanks, The New American Voter. 
33 Larry M. Bartels, `Partisanship and Voting Behavior, 1952-1996', American Journal of Political 
Science, 44 (2000), 35-50. 
34 Miller and Shanks, The New American Voter. 
35 Miller and Niemi, `Voting: Choice, Conditioning, and Constraint'; Dalton, `The Decline of 
Party Identification'. 
36 Russell J. Dalton, Scott C. Flanagan, and Paul Allen Beck. 1984. Electoral Change in Advanced 
Industrial Democracies: Realignment or Dealignment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1984). 
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voters who did not have a party attachment" 
The political explanation of electoral dealignment emphasises that partisan decline is 
caused by the parties. Some researchers argued that the degree of political polarisation 
and ideological conflict between the parties explains the different level of partisanship 
across different mature democracies 38 Related to this is an explanation focusing on 
voters' dissatisfaction with parties. Many country specific studies emphasise that poor 
performance by the parties is the root cause of deal ignment 39 In mature democracies, the 
decay of partisanship is related to voter's dissatisfaction with political parties and the 
democratic process. For example, in the USA, the effects of political turbulence such as 
Vietnam War and Watergate scandal were linked to the decline of partisanship in the 
1960s and 1970s. 4° 
Voting Behaviour of Independents: Short-Term Factors 
Voting choice is explained by long-term predispositions and short-term factors. Long- 
term predispositions such as belief-systems and psychological partisan attachments 
explain stability in voting preference over time, and short-term factors, such as issue and 
candidate, explain voting change depending upon new events. Voting choice is also 
constrained by the political system and conditioned by the media and social context 41 
Independent voters, those who approach each election without an established long- 
term predisposition (i. e., party identification) will behave somewhat differently from 
those who identify with the parties. When a partisan cue is absent, voters are more 
responsive to short-term factors such as the issues of the day and the selection of 
candidates in specific election as well as election campaigns and the media. 
Electoral Volatility and Floating Voter 
In the Michigan model, party identification is treated as a long-term influence on 
voter's party choice and other political attitudes. Party identification, as an enduring 
attitude across a series of elections, is distinct from short-term factors specific to one 
37 Miller and Shanks, The New American Voter. 
18 Schmitt and Holmberg, `Political Parties in Decline? '. 
39 Carsten Zelle, `Social Dealignment Versus Political Frustration: Contrasting Explanations of the 
Floating Voters in Germany', European Journal of Political Research, 27 (1995), 319-45; Harold 
Clarke, Nitish Dutt, and Allen Kornberg, `The Political Economy of Attitudes toward Polity and 
Society in Western European Democracies', Journal of Politics, 55 (1993), 998-1021. 
40 Nie, Verba, and Petrocik, The Changing American Voter. 
41 For an overview of the long-term and short-term factors, see Miller and Niemi. `Voting: Choice, 
Conditioning, and Constraint'. 
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election such as issues and candidates. 42 Thus, long-term factors provide continuity in 
election and the short-term factors make each election unique. 
Partisan decline is related to the increasing volatility of elections. Many argued that 
the growth of independents is related to an increase of political instability and of the 
volatility of the voters. For example, empirical research shows that the weakening of 
party identification is associated with an increase in `split-ticket voting' by American 
voters. 43 Empirical studies discovered that partisan decline is related to the growing 
volatility of party vote share between elections in mature democracies 4° Moreover, at the 
individual level, the weakening of partisanship produces a decline in voting consistency 
between succeeding elections 45 
But some researchers have argued that the increasing number of independents is not 
related to the volatility of the electorate. 46 Keith argues that the independent `leaners' are 
`covert partisans' and that they are very similar to the `weak' party identifiers in their 
voting behaviour and political involvement. `Pure' independents are also less likely to 
vote. Therefore, the growth of independents is not linked to increased political instability. 
However, it is not correct to say that independent `leaners' are essentially covert partisans, 
even though their voting choice may reveal an inclination to one party. For example, 
independents denying partisanship may profess inclination to a political party due to other 
factors, such as political leaders or issues, rather than a sense of feeing closer to a party. It 
is possible that voters have an inclination to a party due to their favourite political leaders, 
while they do not have party identification as a group identity. In new democracies such 
as Korea, where political parties are dissolved and renamed so often, voters find it 
difficult to develop a long-term party identification. Many of them profess their party 
identification on the basis of a closer feeling to political leaders, and they are consistent 
between elections. But voters easily change their party identification or party inclination 
from one party to another, when political leaders move to other party or form a new party. 
In these circumstances, the feeling of identity with political leaders provides the element 
of electoral continuity rather than a feeling of party-identity. 
42 Campbell et al., The American Voter. 
43 Wattenberg, The Decline of American Political Parties: 1952-1996; Nie, Verba, and Petrocik, 
The Changing American Voter. 
44 Dalton, Flanagan, and Beck, Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies: 
Realignment or Dealignment, Dalton, 'The Decline of Party Identification'; Ivor Crewe and David 
Denver, eds, Electoral Change in Western Democracies (London: Groom Helm, 1985). 
45 Russell J. Dalton, Ian McAllister, and Martin P. Wattenberg, `The Consequences of Partisan 
Dealignment', in Russell J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg, eds, Parties without Partisans: 
Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 
Ep. 37-63. 
Bruce E. Keith et al., `The Partisan Affinities of Independent `Leaners', British Journal of 
Political Science, 16 (1986), 155-184; Bruce E. Keith et al., The Myth of the Independent Voter 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992). 
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Furthermore, the absence of party identification dose not mean a lack of continuity 
in election. It is possible that independents who do not identify with a party still maintain 
a consistency in voting choice. Other long-term predisposition, such as ideology and a 
voter's position on the permanent issues, affect voting choice, and can explain continuity 
in election. For example, American voters are divided along the liberal-conservative 
value dimension, and this value dimension influences voters. Therefore, voters may cast 
their ballots according to their evaluation of the policy or issue position of each party. It is 
has been shown that in new democracies where party identification is not well developed 
such as Russia, voters often find self-identification from a politician or an ideology rather 
than political party. 47 
Issue Voting and Rational Voter 
Many argue that salient issues are significant short-term factors explaining voting 
choice. Voters do not automatically cast their ballot according to party identification. In 
the Michigan model, the individual voter is not treated as an autonomous decision-maker, 
and voting is more like an act of affirmation according to a long-term predisposition. It is 
assumed that voter lacks comprehensive knowledge and understanding of politics and 
economic issues. 48 In the rational choice approach, the voter is a rational decision-maker, 
and voters make their decision based upon careful consideration of the issues at each 
election 49 Voters respond to short-term conditions, especially, economic issues, and cast 
their ballot based on rational calculation about economic prosperity. Indeed, the rational 
actor is the cognitively mobilised voter. 
Among many issues, the influence of economy on voting choice is particularly 
widely discussed in electoral studies and the literature is voluminous. Many agree that 
economic factors influence voting choice, but the results of empirical studies of 
`economic voting' are somewhat inconclusive. First, some insisted *upon `retrospective 
voting'. In this model, the voter evaluates present economic conditions compared to past 
economic conditions, and votes for or against the party in off ice according to the 
evaluation. 50 Others argued for a model `prospective voting' where the voter considers 
economic conditions in the future, and votes for the party which is expected to manage 
47 Miller and White, `Political Values Underlying Partisan Cleavages in Former Communist 
Countries'. 
°E Campbell et at., The American Voter. 
49 Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper, 1957). 
50 Fiorina, Retrospective Voting in American National Elections; John A. Ferejohn, `Incumbent 
Performance and Electoral Control', Public Choice, 50 (1986), 5-25. 
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the economy better than the other parties. " Second, there is another controversial 
argument between `sociotropic voting' and `pocketbook voting'. Empirical research 
suggests that voters are mainly concerned with the management of the national economy 
rather than worried about their own individual economic conditions. 2 Related to this 
argument, some suggest that the voter depends upon his or her personal perception of 
economic conditions rather than objective economic reality. 53 
It would be incorrect to claim that independents are more likely to vote on issues or 
economics as a rational actor. In order to be a rational actor, voters should have 
sophisticated cognition to understand the complexity of political affairs and also get 
sufficient information. Furthermore, voters should be interested in public affairs and pay 
attention to politics. However, it seems that the majority of voters in most democracies 
are not fully meet these conditions, even though educational levels and the role of the 
media have increased. For example, increasing education is not related to an increase of 
interests in public affairs or politics. In Korea, younger generations are better educated 
compared to the generation of their parents, but are strong individualistic and are less 
interested in politics compared to their parents. 
`Candidate-Centred Politics' and Candidate Image 
Evaluations of the candidates affect the vote. The early Michigan model of party 
identification did not absolutely ignore the effects of the candidate factor on the election, 
but emphasised party identification as the primary determinant of voting choice. It was 
assumed that a voting decision is not made on the basis of the candidate factor or issues. 
With partisan decline, however, the candidates have become more important than other 
factors in voting choice. Now, in the USA, the candidates are considered as an essential 
determinant of the outcome of election, and it is called as `candidate-centred politics' 54 
Kelly and Mirer also argued that the candidate is the primary determinant of vote 
51 Michael B. MacKuen, `Comment on President and the Prospective Voter', Journal of Politics, 
58 (1996), 793-801; David Sanders, `Government Popularity and the Next General Election', 
Political Quarterly, 62 (1991), 235-61; David Sanders, `Why the Conservatives Won - Again', in 
Anthony King et al., eds, Britain at the Polls 1992. (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1993), pp. 
171-222. 
52 Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Economics and Elections: The Major Western Democracies (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1988); Donald R. Kinder and D. Roderick Kiewiet, 
`Sociotropic Politics: The American Case', British Journal of Political Science, 11 (1981), 129-62. 
53 Pamela Johnston Conover and Stanley Feldman, `Emotional Reactions to the Economy: I'm 
Mad as Hell and I'm not going to Take It Anymore', American Journal of Political Science, 28 
(1984), 50-78. 
54 Martin Wattenberg, The Rise of Candidate Centered Politics, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 1991). 
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decision SS In the election, voters consider the candidates' characteristics or image, such 
as competence, leadership, integrity, and empathy, rather than their policies and public 
pledges. Some research highlighted that voters pay attention to candidate characteristics 
related to issues rather than the issue itself. 56 Furthermore, voters change their 
partisanship when they find an attractive candidate 57 
The role of the candidates in campaigns has become more important. The rise of 
`candidate-centred politics' is closely related to the increasing role of the media in the 
election. In election coverage, the media focus on candidates rather than parties. The 
media often treat the election as a horse race between the competing candidates. It is fair 
to say that, when little or nothing is known about the candidates, party identification is the 
primary determinant of voting decision. However, in different circumstances, in which 
the media provide sufficient information on the candidates and also many voters do not 
have or only have weak partisan attachments, party identification cannot be the primary 
determinant of voting behaviour. 
Election Campaign, Media, and Responsive Voter 
Recent research has shown that the effects of the campaign and the media on the 
election are significant. Early election studies developed a `minimal effects' model of the 
media; voters hardly changed their voting intention, and the media only reinforce existing 
public opinion. "' In the Michigan model of party identification, the minimal effects 
model was justified. Voter with strong partisanship depend on `party cues' in evaluating 
political affairs and information, and are more likely to maintain his or her partisan view 
through the process of the `perceptual screen'. 
Recently, the minimal effects model has been challenged. Some media studies 
suggested that the media plays an important role in making and changing public opinion. 
First, the influence of media is explained by the notion of `agenda setting' and 
`priming' S9 Furthermore, recent studies showed that the media have considerable power 
55 Stanley Kelly, jr. and Thad W. Mirer, `The Simple Act of Voting', American Political Science 
Review, 68 (1974), 572-91. 
56 D. Glass, `Evaluating Presidential Candidates: Who Focus on Their Personal Attributes? ', 
Public Opinion Quarterly, 49 (1986), 517-34. 
57 Donald E. Stokes, `Some Dynamic Elements of Contest for the Presidency', American Political 
Science Review, 60 (1966), 19-28. 
58 Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gauder, The People's Choice: How the Voter 
Makes Up His Mind in a Presidential Campaign (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948); 
Bernard Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, Voting (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1954). 
59 Shanto lyengar and Donald Kinder, News That Matters: Agenda-Setting and Priming in a 
Television Age (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987). 
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to persuade voters directly and play an important role to change people's opinion 60 
The campaign effects also have been re-evaluated. In the past research, the model of 
minimal effects of campaigns was widely accepted. Then, it was assumed that the 
outcome of the election was predetermined before the beginning of the campaign by 
factors such as loyal partisanship and the performance of incumbent government, and that 
the campaign had little influence on the outcome of election. There have been various 
theories to explain why campaign effects are limited. One is the theory of `offsetting 
effects'. The net influence of a campaign might be small but that might disguise a much 
stronger influence of campaigns which is hidden because competing messages are 
mutually cancelled 61 
Moreover, the influence of the campaign on the vote has been denied because the 
most voters could hardly recall campaign events or advertisements that might affect their 
vote. 62 But a new model of the individual assessment of campaign message was 
introduced. Graber agued that "the fact that so little specific information can be recalled 
from a story does not mean that no learning has taken place" and that voters draw 
conclusions from campaign information even though they did not remember its 
contents 63 This argument was repeated in other research, and it is called `the on-line 
model of information processing' TM 
The model of minimal effects of campaigns has been challenged. Recent research 
showed that campaigns do affect the vote 65 Many campaign studies concluded that 
campaigns activate underlying predispositions and reinforce existing partisan views. 
Partisans are not likely to defect their own party and are more likely to harden their 
partisan loyalty through campaign exposure 66 If campaigns do affect voters, but the 
60 William L. Miller, Media and Voters: The Audience, Content and Influence of Press and 
Television at the 1987 General Election (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991); Larry M. Bartels, 
`Messages received: The Political Impact of Media Exposure', American Political Science Review, 
87 (1993), 267-85; John R. Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
61 Andrew Gelman and Gary King, `Why Are American Election Polls so Variable when Votes 
Are so Predictable? ', British Journal of Political Science, 23 (1993), 409-51. 
62 Alan I. Abramowitz, `Name Familiarity, Reputation, and the Incumbency Effect in a 
Congressional Election', Western Political Quarterly, 28 (1975), 668-84; W. Russell Neuman, The 
Paradox of Mass Politics: Knowledge and Opinion in the American Electorate (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1986). 
63 Doris A. Graber, Processing the News: How People Tame the Information Tide (New York: 
Longman, 1984), p. 73. 
64 Milton Lodge, Kathleen M. McGraw, and Patrick Stroh, `An Impression-Driven Model of 
Candidate Evaluation', American Political Science Review, 83 (1989), 399-419; Milton Lodge, 
Marco R. Steenbergen, and Shawn Brau, `The Responsive Voter. Campaign Information and the 
Dynamics of Candidate Evaluation', American Political Science Review, 89 (1995), 309-26. 
65 Shanto lyengar and A. F. Simon, `New Perspective and Evidence on Political Communication 
and Campaign Effects', Annual Review of Psychology, 51 (2000), 149-69. 
66 Steven E. Finkel, `Reexamining the Minimal Effects Model in Recent Presidential Campaigns', 
Journal of Politics, 55 (1993), 1-21; Gelman and King, `Why Are American Election Polls so 
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voting choice of loyal partisans is almost fixed to their political party, we can assume that 
campaigns affect mainly independent voters. Therefore, it is natural that election 
campaigners focus on independent voters who are more likely to respond to election 
campaigns. Furthermore, it is expected that the voting choice of independents determines 
the outcome of elections when the level of loyal partisans of competing parties is almost 
even. 
In conclusion, the voting behaviour of independents, who are free from partisan 
constraints in their evaluation of political affairs and who can access sufficient 
information about the election, differs from party identifiers. Independents are more 
responsive to the influence of campaigns and the media, and are more likely to change 
their voting decision. The voting decision of independents is not made on the basis of 
party identification, but is determined by short-term factors, such as candidate 
characteristics and issues. 
2. The Model of Voting Choice of Independents 
The Model of Voting Choice 
How do Korean voters, particularly independent voters, cast a ballot in elections? To 
explore individual electoral choice for the Korean President, a modified and simplified 
variant of the `causal stages' model is assumed 67 The causal model of voting choice 
incorporates three main different groups of potential explanatory variables: (1) stable 
social and demographic characteristics, such as age, education, class, and region; (2) 
long-term predispositions, such as party identification and permanent positions toward 
policy-related conflicts (or individual ideological self-image); and (3) short-term political 
attitudes, such as issue preferences, candidate evaluation, and government performance 
evaluation. Also, it is assumed that the causal relations are conditioned by an intervening 
variable, i. e., election campaigns (see Figure 3.1). 
The model includes three causal stages. At the first stage of the causal model, stable 
social and economic characteristics of individual voters influence the voter's long-term 
predispositions such as permanent positions toward policy-related conflicts in society and 
an enduring psychological attachment to a particular political party. Also, we may expect 
Variable when Votes Are so Predictable? '; Thomas M. Holbrook, Do Campaign Matter? 
(Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1996); Stephen Ansolabehere and Shanto lyengar, Going Negative: 
How Political Advertisements Shrink and Polarize the Electorate (New York: Free Press, 1995). 
67 Miller and Shanks, The New American Voter, pp. 189-211. 
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that stable social and economic characteristics of voters may bypass long-term 
predispositions in the causal-chain and directly associate with short-term political 
attitudes such as salient issue positions and candidate evaluations. But, in order to 
simplify the model, the causal relationship between socio-economic variables and short- 
term political attitudes is excluded from the model. 
Figure 3.1 The Causal Model of Voting Choice 
Social/Economic Long-term Short-term 
Characteristics Political Attitudes Political Attitudes 
Age 
Education 
Gender 
Region Ideology 
Class 
Income 
........................... ........................ 1........................................................... 
CULTURAL CONTEXT 
Party 
ID 
Issue 
Candidate 
Government 
Performance 
VOTE 
Campaign 
................. .................... ............. 
ELECTION SYSTEM / 
STRUCTURE 
Note: Bold line = causal relations for partisans; Non-bold line = causal relations for independents. 
Keys: Party ID = Party identification. 
At second stage of the model, the voter's long-term predispositions affect their short- 
term political attitudes. The party affiliation of individual voters influences their positions 
on salient issues, evaluation of incumbent government's performance, and evaluation of 
candidate's competence and quality. In addition, a voter's continuing positions toward 
long-term policy-related conflict affects their perception of short-term considerations. 
The voter's positions on policy-related conflicts affect the party affiliation of 
individual voters in Korea. For instance, under the authoritarian regimes, Korean voters 
could develop and maintain political identification with either the government or 
opposition rather than with parties. This long-term political attitude accurately explained 
electoral behaviour in Korea where political parties were institutionally underdeveloped. 
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It is expected that this relationship remains in the new democracy. 
We may expect that there is a recursive relationship between two long-term 
predispositions. Party affiliation enhances individual voters enduring positions on policy- 
related conflicts and vice versa. However, it is assumed here that the party affiliation of 
individual voters does not greatly influence long-term policy-related preferences of 
individual voters in Korea where the life span of all political parties is much shorter than 
the duration of long-term policy-related preferences. 
At the third stage of the model, short-term considerations and party affiliation 
determine the voting choice of individual voters. At the causal stage, we can assume that 
there is a key difference in voting choice between partisans and independent voters. On 
the one hand, the voting choice of individual partisans is largely determined by their 
psychological attachment with a political party. Partisans also rely on short-term 
considerations, but the influence of short-term factors on voting choice is not as strong 
because the short-term considerations are largely determined by their partisanship (see 
bold lines in Figure 3.1). 
On the other hand, the voting choice of independent voters is mainly determined by 
short-term factors, such as their positions toward salient issues, their evaluation of 
incumbent government performance, and their evaluation of candidates (see non-bold 
lines in Figure 3.1). Furthermore, the causal relationship between short-term 
considerations and the voting choice of independent voters is shaped by election 
campaigns and the media. Campaigns and the media, an essential element of campaigns, 
affect individual voting choice by providing election information to voters and setting the 
agenda. For example, the media, particularly newspapers, affect the evaluation of 
candidates and government performance, guiding issue preference, and making voting 
decision. 
The relationship between socioeconomic characteristics of individual voters and 
long-term predispositions are bounded by cultural context. Therefore, it is expected that 
partisan alignments vary across different countries. For example, the regional cleavage is 
a key factor to explain the partisan alignment in Korean democracy, while class, religion, 
and ethnic group often explain patterns of partisanship in Western democracies. Also, the 
structure of elections and electoral systems also significantly influence the relationship 
between short-term factors and voting choice. In particular, tactical thinking can play a 
considerable role in individual voting choice. Voters do not want to waste their ballots. 
Neither do they want to let disliked candidate win the election. In the decision-making 
process, voters evaluate the possibility of preferred or disliked candidates winning, and 
may change their voting intention and cast a ballot for the candidate who is not their most 
preferred candidate (see Figure 3.1). 
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lt is assumed that there is no any single dominant influence on the vote to account 
for all individual voters. For example, party identification cannot explain the voting 
choice of non-partisans, though party identification is very valuable as a tool to explain 
the behaviour of other voters. Also, the issue variable cannot account for the electoral 
behaviour of those who are not interested in and lack knowledge on policy-related issues. 
Therefore, all three main factors, i. e., party, issue, and candidate, play some role in 
making individual voting decision, but the explanatory power of each variable differs 
across voters. 
Moreover, it is not assumed that all main factors influence each individual voting 
decision. Some voters may depend heavily on one of factors, and some voters are affected 
by all of three variables. It is assumed that the candidate factor is essential, particularly 
for independent voters. Their voting decision is essentially a choice between candidates, 
rather than parties. Individual voters pay attention to candidate characteristics rather than 
issues or parties. In their voting decision, individual voters mainly consider three aspects 
of candidate characteristics: (1) candidate personal image, such as competence, leadership, 
and empathy; (2) candidate's characteristics related to salient issues; and (3) candidate's 
partisanship. Thus, other variables such as party and issue play some role in shaping 
candidate evaluation, and candidate evaluation of individual voters is a key factor to 
explain voting choice of individual voters. 
Classifying Voters 
In classifying Korean voters, two dimensions are considered: party identification and 
interest in politics. First, voters are divided into two groups in terms of party 
identification: party identifiers and non-party identifiers (or partisans and independents). 
Party identifiers (or partisans) have a sense of attachment with the parties. Non-party 
identifiers (or independents) are those who do not identify with the parties. Second, voters 
are classified into two groups in terms of interest in politics. One group of voters is 
interested in political affairs and pay attention on politics. The other group of voters are 
relatively less interested in politics and public affairs. By combining two dimensions, four 
types of voters are classified: (1) critical partisans, those who have partisan affiliation and 
pay attention to politics and public affairs; (2) habitual partisans, those who have 
partisanship and are relatively less interested in politics; (3) attentive independents, those 
who do not identify with the parties and are very interested in public affairs; and (4) 
apolitical independents, those who do not identify party identification and also are not 
interested in politics (see Table 3.1). 
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Table 3.1 Four Types of Voters 
Partisanship 
Party identifiers Non-party identifiers 
High Critical Partisan Attentive Independent 
Interest in politics 
Low Habitual Partisan Apolitical Independent 
It is assumed that each different type of voter behaves differently in making their 
voting choice. Thus, the voting behaviour of different types of voters is explained by 
different explanatory variables. 
Critical partisan: It is expected that all long-term predispositions and short-term 
factors (ideology, party identification, issue, candidate, and government performance in 
Figure 3.1) affect the voting choice of critical partisans. 
Habitual partisan: The voting choice of habitual partisans is more likely to be 
affected by party identification and candidate factors, but not by long or short-term policy 
preferences or government performance evaluation. 
Attentive independent: The voting choice of attentive independents is largely 
determined by long and short-term issue preferences, candidate evaluation, and 
government performance evaluation. 
Apolitical independent: Apolitical voters are more likely to make their voting 
decision on the basis of candidate factor, particularly candidate's image. 
Propositions and Hypotheses 
Partisan Dealiknment 
It is assumed that Korean voters have developed the enduring psychological 
attachment to a particular political party despite the extreme instability of the political 
parties. In addition, partisan dealignment has taken place, even though Korea is a new 
democracy. Party affiliation in Korea is same with that in mature democracies in terms of 
its function and role in electoral behaviour. 
Hypothesis 1: Most Korean voters have an enduring psychological attachment 
to a particular political party. 
1.1 In Korea, the strength of individual partisanship is maintained over time, but has 
also changed on the basis of evaluation of performance of political parties. 
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1.2 In Korea, the strengthening and weakening of individual party identification is 
closely related to support for political leaders. 
1.3 Regionalism is the key determinant of the partisan alignment in the new 
democracy. In particular, Gyeongsang people affiliate with the Grand National Party or its 
ancestor parties, while Jeolla people feel close to the Millennium Democratic Party. 
1.4 Ideology (or long-term ideological self-image) is another key factor to explain 
the partisan alignment in Korea. In particular, conservatives are affiliated with the Grand 
National Party that is the successor party of the old authoritarian ruling party, while 
liberals support the Millennium Democratic Party that has developed from the pro- 
democracy opposition before the transition to democracy. 
Hypothesis 2: The key determinant of the voting choice of partisans is party 
affiliation in Korea's new democracy. 
2.1 Party identification affects candidate evaluation, issue preference, and 
government performance evaluation. 
2.2 Partisans vote continually for a particular political party in a series of elections. 
2.3 Critical partisans rely on long-term predisposition in voting choice, but also 
consider short-term factors, particularly candidate competence and quality, while habitual 
partisans solely depend on party affiliation in making vote choice. 
Hypothesis 3: Party affiliation has weakened in Korea for last 10 years. 
3.1 An increase of cognitively sophisticated voters is related to partisan decline in 
Korea. 
3.2 The young are more likely to be independent voters. 
3.3 Independent voters are more likely to be dissatisfied with politics compared to 
partisans. 
Voting Choice of Independent Voters 
It is assumed that the voting behaviour of independent voters is different from that of 
party identifiers who are heavily affected by partisan loyalty. Independent voters who are 
free from party constraints rely on short-term considerations in making their voting 
decision. Independent voters carefully examine various factors and make their voting 
decision based on sufficient information. Voters are more rational in making their 
electoral choice when party constraints are absent. The voting decision of independent 
voters is affected by election campaigns and changes their voting intentions depending 
upon new information. Therefore, the voting decision of independent voters is late 
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compared to partisans. 
Hypothesis 4: Voting behaviour of independent voters is unstable compared to 
that of party identifiers. 
4.1 Independent voters are more likely to change their voting intention over time. 
4.2 Independent voters are more likely to make a late voting decision compared to 
partisans. 
Hypothesis 5: Independent voters are more responsive to election campaigns 
and the media compared to partisans. 
5.1 Election campaigns affect on the voting choice of independent voters. 
5.2 The impact of the TV debates and Internet on voting choice of individual voters 
is considerable in Korean presidential elections. 
Hypothesis 6: Independent voters are more rational than partisans in voting 
choice. 
6.1 Independent voters rely on short-term considerations rather than long-term 
factors in making vote choice. 
6.2 When partisanship is absent, the choice of candidates is the most important 
factor to determine vote choice. 
6.3 Independent voters, particularly attentive independents, take into account a 
candidate's specific policies and pledges rather than their image. 
6.4 Economic perceptions, both `prospective' speculation and `retrospective' 
evaluation of the nation's economy, affect the voting choice of independent voters. 
6.5. Independent voters gather more information and make their vote choice based 
on sufficient information compared to partisans. 
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Chapter 4. Method and Data 
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the methods and research strategy chosen to conduct 
the collection and analysis of data. Also, this chapter assesses the generation of 
qualitative data through fieldwork and discusses the quality of qualitative and quantitative 
data used in the analysis of Korean electoral behaviour. 
This chapter consists of two sections. The first section will discuss potential 
advantages and disadvantages of `multi-strategy research', i. e., the integration of 
qualitative and quantitative approach in collection and analysis of data, chosen to conduct 
the research. It will be argued that combining qualitative and quantitative approach within 
a research project can provide in-depth understandings of electoral behaviour while a 
single method research can often fail to get as a broad and deep picture of a phenomenon. 
This section also will specify the type of multi-strategy research employed in this study of 
voting behaviour of independent voters. 
The second section will summarise the data used in the analysis of Korean electoral 
behaviour. The role of fieldwork to generate qualitative data during the 2002 presidential 
election will be examined. Also, election survey data taken for `second analysis' of 
individual electoral behaviour will be summarised. Finally, questions of measurement 
validity and the reliability of both qualitative and quantitative data will be discussed. 
1. Method 
In this thesis, I use a `multi-strategy' research in the collection and analysis of data. Both 
quantitative and qualitative approaches are used in order to collect and analyse data. 
Quantitative survey data conducted by a research group of Korean scholars is employed 
and statistical methods are used to analyse the data. At the same time, focus group and in- 
depth interviews collected during the 2002 presidential election are examined through the 
responses of respondents in the interviews. It is expected that combining qualitative and 
quantitative approaches to examine electoral behaviour can broaden and deepen 
understandings of voting behaviour. While quantitative research based on a large-scale 
survey data has sometimes provided only vague understandings of electoral behaviour, 
qualitative research can provide insights into the motivation of individuals. 
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Qualitative Approach and Electoral Studies 
A Bias in Election Studies 
The qualitative approach is nothing new in social research, but is very rare in 
electoral studies. Since the end of 1980s, the qualitative approach, which was relatively 
neglected by social researchers due to the methodological dominance of behaviouralism 
and positivism, has been reappraised in social research. Most texts on social research 
nowadays cover equally both qualitative and quantitative approaches, and even discuss 
the advantages of combining a qualitative and quantitative approach within a study. ' 
However, in contrast to the rapid progress of methods and approaches in other 
disciplines, almost all electoral studies solely rely on quantitative survey methods. Since 
the early 1990s, political scientists have also recognised the worth of the qualitative 
approach in political research, but nonetheless few students of electoral behaviour have 
conducted research on the basis of qualitative methods? For example, Electoral Studies, a 
leading journal in the field, has not carried any articles based on qualitative approach 
except for an article in a recent issue. 3 Considering qualitative approach is almost totally 
ignored in study of electoral behaviour, it is not strange that there is little research based 
on combining both qualitative and quantitative approaches in the study of political 
behaviour. 4 Students of electoral behaviour who stick to quantitative statistical analysis 
based on large-scale survey data hardly consider applying a qualitative approach in their 
research. For example, when students of electoral behaviour recently discussed a new 
direction for the future of election studies in order to overcome the limits of the 
`Michigan model' research based on quantitative data analysis accompanied with large- 
scale surveys, an improvement of survey methods was discussed, but the qualitative 
1 For example, Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2001). Tim May, Social Research: Issues, Methods, and Process (Buckingham: Open University 
Press, 2001). For an overview of the qualitative approach, see Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. 
Lincoln, 'Introduction: The Discipline and Practice of Qualitative Research', in Norman K. 
Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln, eds., Handbook of Qualitative Research (London: Sage, 2000), 2 
edition, pp. 1-29. 
2 For a discussion on qualitative and quantitative distinction in political science, Gary King, Robert 
0. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative 
Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). 
3 For example, John Battle, `Measuring Party Identification: an Exploratory Study with Focus 
Groups', Electoral Studies, 22(2003), 217-237. 
4A rare example of political research combining quantitative and qualitative approach, William L. 
Miller, Ase B. Grodeland, and Tatyana Y. Koshechkina, A Culture of Corruption: Coping with 
Government in Post-communist Europe (New York: Central European University Press, 2001). 
Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Tradition in Modern Italy (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1993). 
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approach was totally excluded from their discussion. ' 
It is interesting that the authors of The American Voter, a seminal electoral study 
designed on the Michigan model research, analysed both qualitative and quantitative data 
in the book although they gave a strong emphasis to the quantitative aspect. But students 
of electoral studies largely influenced by the Michigan model research have totally 
ignored the qualitative approach for the last 40 years and still fail to incorporate it in their 
research. This conforms to Kuhn's argument about the delay of paradigm changes, even 
though it is questionable that adopting qualitative approach can be considered a 
paradigmatic change 6 
Apart from academic researchers, since the early 1990s, practitioners in election 
campaigns, such as Dick Morris in Bill Clinton's election campaign team, or Philip Gould 
in Tony Blair's campaign team, have heavily relied on qualitative methods, particularly 
focus group interviews, to keep track of electoral attitudes, preferences, and behaviour. ' 
Focus groups may become indispensable in governing democracies. Bill Clinton said 
"There is no one more powerful than a member of a focus group. If you really want to 
change things, that's where you want to be"! 
Qualitative and Quantitative Distinction in Social Research Methods 
Most researchers recognise the distinction between quantitative and qualitative in 
social research methods. A clear difference between qualitative and quantitative research 
is related to measurement, i. e., quantification. In other words, quantitative research 
employs quantification in the collection and analysis of data, and qualitative research 
emphasises words rather than quantification. 
Incommensurability between Quantitative and Qualitative Approach: Besides a 
superficial difference, i. e., the issue of measurement, many researchers recognise that 
there are fundamental differences between quantitative and qualitative researches. 9 
Bryman contrasts qualitative research with quantitative research in three aspects. First, 
considering the principal orientation to the role of theory in relation to research, 
quantitative research has a deductive approach and qualitative research entails an 
S Electoral Studies has a special issue on the future of election studies based on a conference held 
in March 1999. See Electoral Studies, 21 (2002), 157-338. 
6 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1970). 
7 `Gambling on Gurus Who Won't Choose Red', The Guardian, 10 August 1996. Dick Morris , Behind the Oval Ofce: Getting Reelected Against All Odds (Riverside, CA: Renaissance Books, 
1998). Philip Gould, The Unfinished Revolution: How the Modernisers Saved the Labour Party 
(London: Abacus, 1998). 
8 `Focus Groups Feed on Politics', The Guardian, 14 July 1997. 
9 Bryman, Social Research Methods, p. 20. 
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inductive approach. Typically, quantitative research tests theories and qualitative research 
emphasises the generation of theories. Second, regarding epistemological orientation, 
quantitative research adopts the practice and norms of the natural science model, 
particularly positivism, and qualitative research emphasises individual interpretation of 
the social world. Third, concerning ontological orientation, quantitative research is 
`objectivism' and qualitative research is `construction ism'. Quantitative research assumes 
that social reality is an objective reality, and qualitative research considers social reality is 
a property of individual creation. 10 
In other words, several researchers argue that quantitative and qualitative methods 
are incompatible with each other due to their differences in epistemological, ontological, 
and methodological underpinnings. These researchers argue that qualitative and 
quantitative distinction is based on paradigmatic differences, and combining qualitative 
and quantitative methods is problematic. "Qualitative and quantitative paradigms have 
entirely different goals, different uses of research methods, and the need for different 
criteria to fit with each paradigm... One cannot mix research method across qualitative 
and quantitative paradigm". 1 1 
The Same Logic of Inference: Although the qualitative and quantitative distinction 
has been recognised, several researchers nowadays do not agree that one or other of the 
approaches is superior to the other. David de Vaus takes an eclectic position in view of 
research methods. He suggests that empirical social research comprises various types of 
research, i. e., descriptive research and explanatory research, or theory building approach 
or theory testing approach. Indeed, "any research design can, in principle, use any type of 
data collection method and can use either quantitative or qualitative data". ' 2 Bryman also 
argues that the distinction of quantitative and qualitative research is not always clear nor 
fixed. Studies often have characteristics of both these two approaches within a research 
project, though one of them is more strongly emphasised. Many researchers even 
deliberately combine these two distinctive approaches within a research so that they 
supplement each other or even bring about a synergy effect. 13 Bryman is opposed to the 
notion that qualitative and quantitative approaches are incomparable or 
`incommensurable' with each other because the two approaches are based on different 
epistemological and ontological assumptions. He suggests that combining quantitative 
and qualitative approach within a study can enhance the collection and analysis of data. 
'° Bryman, Social Research Methods, p. 20, and pp. 421-41 
ýý Madeleine Leininger, `Evaluation Criteria and Critique of Qualitative Research Studies', in J. M. 
Morse, ed., Critical Issues in Qualitative Research Methods (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1994), 
pp. 95-115, at p. 101. Recited from Rosaline S. Barbour, `Mixing Qualitative Methods: Quality 
Assurance or Quality Quagmire? ', Qualitative Health Research, 8(1998), 352-61, at p. 353. 
12 David de Vaus, Research Design in Social Research (London: Sage, 2001), pp. 1-16. 
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The bias against non-quantitative approaches within political science has weakened. 
Several political scientists nowadays share the notion that the logic of good qualitative 
and quantitative research is essentially the same and the difference between two 
approaches is merely stylistic, though the controversy over the qualitative-quantitative 
divide in political research has not been concluded yet. 14 Gary King et al. argue that the 
same rules of causal inference apply to both the qualitative and quantitative approaches. 
"The differences between the quantitative and qualitative traditions are only stylistic and 
are methodologically and substantively unimportant". 15 Furthermore, they suggest that 
the combination of quantitative and qualitative data is feasible and desirable. "Indeed, 
much of the best social science research can combine quantitative and qualitative data, 
precisely because there is no contradiction between the fundamental processes of 
inference involved in each". 16 
Advantages of Combining the Qualitative and Quantitative Approach 
There is no doubt that each approach has advantages and disadvantages and 
strengths and weaknesses. There is much room for improvement in research methods 
when both qualitative and quantitative approaches are employed within a research project. 
A qualitative approach can supplement, or offset the weaknesses of, a purely quantitative 
approach in election studies. 
Limits of Quantitative Surveys: For the last 50 years, the `Michigan model 
research' based on quantitative approach accompanied with large-scale surveys has made 
a great contribution to the development of elections studies. However, there are many 
unsolved questions in the study of voting behaviour. Although the quantitative approach 
based on large-scale surveys is still a powerful and useful tool in studying electoral 
behaviour, a new approach or paradigm is necessary to answer unsolved questions. In 
social research, qualitative approaches such as participatory observation, focus group 
interviews, and in-depth interviews, have gained in prominence during the last fifteen 
years as the drawbacks of traditional survey based on structured questionnaires have been 
revealed. Surveys are expensive and time-consuming. Surveys often fail to provide in- 
13 Bryman, Social Research Methods, pp. 21-2. 
14 For a discussion on qualitative methods in political research, King, Keohane, and Verba, 
Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research, and a symposium on this 
book. David Latin et al., 'The Qualitative-Quantitative Disputation: Gary King, Robert 0. 
Keohane, and Sidney Verba's Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative 
Research', American Political Science Review, 89(1995), 454-481. 
'S King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative 
Research, p. 4. 
16 Gary King, Robert 0. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, `The Importance of Research Design in 
Political Science', American Political Science Review, 89 (1995), 475-481, at p. 475. 
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depth understanding of a research issue. The limits of quantitative survey method are less 
about the potential power of survey methods, and more about the difficulties in the proper 
carrying out of surveys. " 
Quantitative surveys have a number of problems. First, one of main problems with 
quantitative surveys is concerned with small sample size. In order to achieve statistical 
significance, the sample size should be more than 2,000 cases, in which the estimate of 
sampling error is plus and minus 3 per cent against the true percentage. Even this number 
is not sufficient for sub-group analysis, and sub-group analysis is limited. Indeed, sub- 
group analysis may fail to gain statistical significance due to small sample size. '& 
Second, quantitative survey method is affected by different cultural contexts. 
Surveys do not consider the social and cultural context. 19 In some societies, respondents 
do not want to reveal their own opinion, and this causes measurement errors. In other 
words, surveys may be unreliable depending upon the cultural `space' the research is 
conducted within and the research topic. Third, another limit or problem of quantitative 
surveys is concerned with establishing causation. Quantitative analysis can recognise 
covariance or correlation between variables, but a causal direction is not certain 
depending upon the research question. 20 
Fourth, quantitative methods sometimes fail to reveal meaning. "Critics argue that 
quantitative methods may establish `what' and `when', but not `why': motivation and 
meanings are inevitably hidden' . 2' Surveys ask respondents directly about motivation of 
their behaviour, but respondents may reluctant to disclose deeper motivations of their 
behaviour. Fifth, quantitative studies are not appropriate to study a decision-making 
process for a short period of time. Multi-wave panel surveys can be adopted to explore a 
decision-making process, but it is too expensive and difficult to control panel surveys. 
Finally, quantitative surveys are not flexible. A researcher may ask the wrong questions in 
surveys, but there is little space for feedback or dialogue in conducting surveys. 
How the Qualitative Approach Enhances the Quantitative Approach: When it is 
17 For arguments for and against survey, see William L. Miller, The Survey Method in the Social 
and Political Sciences: Achievements, Failures, Prospects (London: Frances Pinter, 1983), pp. 47- 
91. William L. Miller, `Quantitative Method', in David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, eds., Theory and 
Methods in Political Science (London: Macmillan Press, 1995), pp. 154-172, at pp. 166-170. 
18 Miller, The Survey Method in the Social and Political Sciences, pp. 9-15. Also, John Zaller, 'The 
Statistical Power of Election Studies to Detect Exposure Effects in Political Campaigns', Electoral 
Studies, 21 (2002), 297-329. 
19 For contextual effects and its measurement, see M. Johnson, W. Phillips Shively, and R. M. Stein, 
Contextual Data and the Study of Elections and Voting Behavior: Connecting Individuals to 
Environments', Electoral Studies, 21 (2002), 219-233. Michael March, `Electoral Context', 
Electoral Studies, 21 (2002), 207-217. 
20 For a discussion on difficulties in disentangling cause and effect, John Curtice, `The State of 
Election Studies: Mid-life Crisis or New Youth? ', Electoral Studies, 21 (2002), 161-168. 
21 Miller, `Quantitative Method', p. 169. 
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difficult to carry out quantitative surveys satisfactorily, qualitative studies, such as in- 
depth interviews, or focus group interviews, can supplement incomplete quantitative 
surveys. Qualitative approach can thus enhance quantitative research. 2 First, qualitative 
studies can assist researchers to identify relevant variables to investigate, particularly 
when new topics are studied. Also, qualitative studies can help researchers to detect new 
variables, which have been overlooked in previous work. Before conducting large-scale 
surveys, qualitative research, such as focus group interviews or in-depth interviews, can 
be used in order to develop survey questionnaires of considerable sophistication. 
Second, qualitative researches can generate hypotheses or research questions. One 
aim of qualitative research is to develop theories, while an aim of quantitative research is 
to test theories. Third, qualitative approach can provide explanations for deviant cases. 
Quantitative approach emphasises generalisation and neglects outliers unless measuring 
errors are detected. Qualitative approach focuses on deviant cases. `Non-systemic 
variables' are important in explaining the variance between different phenomena, while 
quantitative approach relies on `systemic variables' in explaining such variance. 
Finally, another strength of qualitative studies is the practice of process tracing, 
which is not effectively studied through quantitative survey method. In qualitative 
research, researchers can look closely at "the decision process by which various initial 
conditions are translated into outcomes" and identify the true reasons for a particular 
decision. 24 
Promises of Multi-Strategy Research: In sum, several researchers suggested that 
the integration of these two different approaches, or `multi-strategy research', is feasible 
and desirable. The potential for combining qualitative and quantitative is considerable. Z" 
Each approach has strengths and weaknesses, but combining the two approaches can help 
overcome these. The `triangulation' of different methods on the same research problem 
can be the best strategy to improve the quality of research. 6 First, combining the two 
approaches will provide richer data to test theoretical claims. Researchers can be much 
u Rosaline Barbour, 'The Case for Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches in Health 
Services Research', Journal of Health Services Research Policy, 4 (1999), 39-43, p. 41. 
23 Sidney Tarrow, `Bridging the Quantitative-Qualitative Divide in Political Science', American 
Political Science Review, 89 (1995), 471-474, p. 472. 
24 King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry, p. 226. Also, Tarrow, `Bridging the 
Quantitative-Qualitative Divide in Political Science', p. 472. 
25 Jane Ritchie, `The Applications of Qualitative Methods to Social Research', in Jane Ritchie and 
Jane Lewis, eds, Qualitative Research Practice (London: Sage, 2003), pp. 24-46, at pp. 38-44. 
However, still some researchers emphasise that two approaches are incomparable and the 
integration of two distinct approaches is not feasible. Yvonna S. Lincoln and E. G. Guba, 
`Paradigmatic Controversies, Contradictions, and Emerging Confluences' in Norman K. Denzin 
and Yvonna S. Lincoln, eds, Handbook of Qualitative Research (London: Sage, 2000), 2°d edition, 
pp. 163-88. 
Tarrow, `Bridging the Quantitative-Qualitative Divide in Political Science', pp. 473-4. Clive 
Seale, The quality of qualitative Research (London: Sage, 1999), pp. 52-61. 
81 
Chapter 4 
more confident with findings which have been yielded by more than one method. 
Combining qualitative and quantitative methods can produce an improvement in the 
`trustworthiness' of findings. 
Second, when two different approaches are used in the investigation of a reality, 
researchers get a deeper knowledge of that reality and a single fixed reality can be known 
objcctively. 2' Two distinctive approaches provide a different kind of evidence. `By and 
large, the two research traditions can be viewed as contributing to the understanding of 
different aspects of the phenomenon in question". 28 The integration of two approaches 
may provide a broader and deeper understanding of reality. 
The Multi-Strategy Research: The Voting Behaviour of Independent Voters 
in Korea 
There are a variety of ways to combine qualitative and quantitative approaches in a 
study. 29 The type of the methodological integration chosen to conduct the collection and 
analysis of data will be different depending upon the research question and the 
phenomenon to be investigated. In addition, the type of combining qualitative and 
quantitative approach will differ depending upon prevailing research constraints, i. e., time, 
cost, and context. 
In general, this study of the voting behaviour of independent voters in Korea 
prioritises the quantitative method in the analysis of data in order to achieve the goal of 
generalisation, although the research uses both the quantitative and qualitative methods 
equally in gathering data. 3° This is based on the main question of the research. The main 
research question compares the voting patterns of independent voters compared to party 
identifiers. Cross-sectional quantitative analysis at the individual level is the basis of the 
research, while the qualitative analysis and data provides a deeper understanding of the 
meaning of the individual's behaviour. 
Combining the Two Approaches Concurrently 
A qualitative approach can be combined with quantitative methods in three different 
27 Seale, The quality of qualitative Research, p. 53. 
28 Alan Bryman, Quantity and Quality in Social Research (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 170. 29 For example, Bryman specified 10 different ways to combine quantitative and qualitative 
approach. Bryman, Social Research Methods, pp. 447-54. 
3 Morgan classified multi-strategy research in terms of the priority given to either qualitative or 
quantitative method as the principal data-gathering tool. David L. Morgan, "Practical Strategies for 
Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Methods: Application for Health Research, Qualitative 
Health Research, 8 (1998), 362-76. 
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ways in terms of the possible sequential relationship of qualitative and quantitative 
studies: (1) Preceding statistical enquiry; (2) Alongside statistical enquiry; or (3) As a 
follow-up to statistical enquiry. 31 Such sequential relationships are common ways of 
combining qualitative and quantitative approaches but this study is not based on these 
methods. In this study, the qualitative and quantitative aspects were conducted separately. 
The qualitative data was generated during the 2002 presidential election, but the 
quantitative data used here comes from a survey by other researchers. Therefore, this 
study cannot exploit fully the potential benefits of combining qualitative and quantitative 
approach in sequence, e. g., in sequential combination, qualitative research can be an 
exploratory study to develop hypothesis and to help the construction of survey 
questionnaires of considerable sophistication. In other words, the research focuses on 
combining approaches in the analysis rather than collection of data because the 
qualitative research did not precede the quantitative surveys which were constructed and 
carried out independently. 
Three Ways of Combining the Two Approaches in the Research 
In the research, by combining qualitative and quantitative approaches, the qualitative 
research enhances the quantitative work and vice versa in three dimensions, i. e., 
`facilitation', 'complementarity', and 'triangulation'. 32 
Facilitation: First, qualitative research facilitates quantitative research. One of the 
ways in which qualitative research can prepare the ground for quantitative research is to 
provide hypotheses that can be subsequently tested in quantitative approach. In the 
research, hypotheses are mainly deduced from existing theories or previous research on 
voting choice, but causal relations are adjusted or established on the basis of findings 
from qualitative research. Meanwhile, quantitative research also facilitates qualitative 
research. The researcher can select interviewees based upon findings of previews 
quantitative research identifying sub-groups of respondents. 
Complementarily: Second, qualitative approach compensates for the shortcomings 
of the quantitative approach. Indeed, a qualitative approach studies a different dimension 
of the phenomenon, which a quantitative investigation cannot examine. 33 In designing 
interviews and constructing interview questions, qualitative research sets out to uncover 
31 Ritchie, `The Applications of Qualitative Methods to Social Research', pp. 38-44. 
32 M. Hammersley, `The Relationship between Qualitative and Quantitative Research: Paradigm 
Loyalty versus Methodological Eclecticism', in J. T. E. Richardson, ed., Handbook of Research 
Methods for Psychology and the Social Science (Leicester: BPS Book, 1996). 
33 Bryman referred this issue as the relationship between `macro' and `micro' level. Bryman, 
Quantity and Quality in Social Research, p. 147-51. 
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findings that a quantitative survey may have failed to gather. In the study, the quantitative 
aspect is concerned with the behaviour of voters while the qualitative approach reveals 
the meaning of actions, i. e., the underlying motives and causes of voting behaviour. 
Qualitative analysis provides a deeper understanding of the decision-making process of 
individual voters. Meanwhile, some quantification of findings from qualitative research 
can help to overcome the problem of generalisation in qualitative research. 
Triangulation: Third, qualitative research is used to corroborate quantitative 
research findings. In the research design, qualitative data is used here to crosscheck 
findings provided by the quantitative research. 34 Qualitative analysis reinforces the 
evidence of the findings of the quantitative research if there is consistency between the 
findings in qualitative and in quantitative research. The results of the qualitative analysis 
suggests new questions or demands further analysis if there are contradictions between 
the findings in qualitative and in quantitative approach. By the triangulation of qualitative 
and quantitative data, the research provides a more complete picture of a voter's thinking, 
though not necessarily a more certain one. 35 Regardless of the confirmation or 
contradiction of findings, the triangulation of qualitative and quantitative data strengthens 
the total research project. 
2. Data and Fieldwork 
This study is based on combination of three types of data - i. e., focus group interviews, 
semi-structured in-depth interviews, and a large-scale survey. I collected the qualitative 
data during fieldwork in the 2002 presidential election, and I acquired the survey data in 
the form of data-matrix, i. e., SPSS data files, from the Korea Social Science Data Center. 
Qualitative Data on Korean Electoral Behaviour 
Fieldwork: Focus Group Interviews 
Focus group interviews were used to discover voters' perceptions toward political 
parties and underlying causes of voting behaviour. I drew up the questions, but left the 
interviewing to a research agency. A research company, Research Bank, recruited 
34 Bryman, Social Research Methods, pp. 447-9. 
35 Ritchie, `The Applications of Qualitative Methods to Social Research', p. 44. 
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participants and conducted the focus group interviews 36 Two group interviews were held 
in a room of the research agency in Seoul on 26 December 2002. I observed the 
discussion through a two-way mirror and was able to contact a moderator during the 
discussions. All discussions were tape-recorded and were transcribed by the research 
agency. 
Interviewees: I initially planned to recruit only independent voters or non-party 
identifiers in their 30s or the early 40s, but this had to be changed due to the extreme 
difficulties experienced in finding independent voters who went to the polls and were 
willing to participate in the focus group discussions. The research company looked for 
participants a week before the day of election, but failed to recruit enough people wanting 
to join the focus groups. This was due to several factors. First, many independent voters 
did not go to the polls. Second, independents who are relatively less interested in politics 
were not willing to talk about politics with strangers. Third, most people were busy 
preparing for the holiday season in December. Therefore, I allowed weak party identifiers 
to participate in the focus groups. I expected that mixing independents and weak partisans 
would not prevent the focus groups from having a free discussion. 7 Also, I expected that 
I could use partisans as a reference group to compare against the voting behaviour 
focused on independent voters. 
Participants are between 30 to 45 years old. I mainly focused on this age group of 
voters because they are relatively more involved in the election compared to younger 
voters and they are relatively free from the partisan constraints more common among 
older voters. Younger and older members of the electorate were excluded because I 
believed that a wide age gap among participants might deter free discussions. Also, I 
divided participants into two groups for women and men because I assumed that female 
participants might be more passive or quieter in mixed groups discussing politics. The 
number of participants in each female group was 8 and the number for male groups was 9. 
All female participants were fulltime housewives, and most male participants were non- 
manual workers or self-employed. 
All participants of the focus groups lived in Seoul. I decided that my qualitative 
research, i. e., the focus group interviews and in-depth interviews, would focus on voters 
in a particular region, Seoul and the suburb of Seoul. Financial and time constraints were 
the key reason, but I expected that the restriction in recruiting interviewees would not 
prevent me achieving my research target which was to explore the voting behaviour of 
36 Research Bank is small, but is an experienced research agency, particularly in qualitative 
research. Roh Hee-sun was a moderator for the focus groups. 
37 In relation to problems in determining participants, Morgan said that "the goal is homogeneity in 
background, not homogeneity in attitudes". David L. Morgan, Focus Groups As Qualitative 
Research (London: Sage, 1988), p. 46. 
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independent voters, and not the differences in independent voters' electoral behaviour 
across different regions. More than 10 million people live in Seoul, the capital city of 
Korea, and about one third of Koreans live in Seoul and the nearby, Gyeonggi region. 
Many inhabitants of Seoul and its suburb come from the various regions of Korea. In this 
way, Seoul can be considered as a very large size sample of Korean population. Another 
reason to focus solely on Seoul is that the voting behaviour of Koreans in other regions, 
particularly Jeolla, Gyeongsang, and Chungcheong, is influenced by regionalism or party 
affiliation strongly connected to regionalism. In other words, a large proportion of 
independent voters reside in Seoul and nearby compared to local districts. Brief personal 
information about the participants is summarised in Table A4.1 (see Appendix). 
Contacts with the Moderator: I had a meeting with the moderator one week before 
the interviews. I had the meeting in advance in order to provide her with enough time to 
prepare the focus group interviews. I realised that the moderator had experience of many 
market research studies and some social research, but not any political research. It was 
practically impossible to find a moderator with experience of political research, because 
focus groups interviews in market research are very popular, but focus group interviews 
in social research, particularly political research, are rare in Korea. 
As the best alternative, I considered that I might take the moderator's role in the 
discussion. But this option had disadvantages as well as advantages. Indeed, if I 
moderated the discussions, focus groups would concentrate on the most important topics 
in my research, but as an inexperienced moderator, I might fail to lead the discussions 
effectively. By contrast, a professional moderator could lead the discussion more 
effectively and induce participants to speak spontaneously in the discussions, though she 
was not familiar with the topics. 
Rather than take the risk, I hired the professional moderator and instead, I observed 
the discussions and secured a way to communicate with the moderator during the 
discussions if I needed to. I tried to illustrate the research purpose and topics to the 
moderator before the discussion. I provided the moderator with my interview questions 
one week before the preparation meeting. Then, I clarified my questions and explained 
the underlying theoretical notions of each question in the preparation meeting. In the 
meeting, I discussed possible answers and was able to add follow-up questions into the 
original questionnaire. Indeed, the moderator developed an adequate level of knowledge 
of the topic. 
Topics: The focus groups mainly discussed three topics. The first topic was about 
the participants' perceptions and attitudes toward political parties. Participants discussed 
their perceptions and evaluation of party politics and politicians. They also discussed why 
they did or did not feel close to political parties. The second topic was related to 
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participants' experience of election campaigns. They spoke about the most important 
information source in the election with a particular focus on the TV debate involving the 
candidates. Participants were asked what they got from watching the TV debates and 
whether TV debates affected their voting choice. The third topic was about why they 
voted as they did in the presidential election, the most important consideration in their 
voting choice and the timing of their voting decision. These three topics were repeated in 
one-to-one in-depth interviews with some additional questions. 
Fieldwork: Semi-structured In-depth Interviews 
In total, 56 semi-structured interviews were carried out in Seoul and urban areas in 
Gyeonggi region within 2 weeks following the election, 19 December 2002. All 
interviewees were ordinary citizens who live in the cities and had turned out to vote in the 
2002 election. Each interview took time between 40 minutes and 80 minutes and was 
tape-recoded. I made transcripts based on the tapes after all interviews were conducted, 
while a group of students conducted the interviews. 
Contacts with Interviewers: I initially planned to conduct all interviews by myself, 
but I had to ask other people to help conduct the interviews. First, it was very difficult to 
find volunteers who were willing to talk about politics for approximately one hour. This 
was partially related to the fact that most people were busy at that time of year, the end of 
December. Independent voters were relatively less interested in politics and thus reluctant 
to be interviewed about politics. Also, it seemed that many independent voters did not 
vote, and so it was difficult to recruit interviewees who were independent voters and went 
to the poll in the last presidential election. Second, it was practically impossible to set up 
more than three interviews for a day when I had to visit each respondent's home or a 
place where interviewee wanted to have the meeting. I anticipated that I should complete 
all interviews within a short period time because voters quickly forget election campaigns 
or what they did in an election. These problems might have been solved if I had recruited 
interviewees through a research company. In such a scenario, interviewees were expected 
to visit an office of the research company, and more than five or six interviews could be 
scheduled for a day. However, I could not take this option because both interviewees and 
the research company would require payment. As an alternative way to recruit 
interviewees at low cost, I recruited interviewers who could find voluntary interviewees 
and conduct interviews. 
The 10 interviewers consisted of mostly postgraduate and some undergraduate 
students in politics or related disciplines. I had a meeting with interviewers in Seogang 
University, Seoul, on 23 December 2002 before conducting interviews. Some of them 
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missed the meeting and I had to contact with them through telephone and e-mail. I 
provided each interviewer with a semi-structured interview questionnaire and made them 
aware of the exact reasons for each question. Furthermore, I emphasised the differences 
between open-ended interviews and structured survey interviews because most 
interviewers were not familiar with the process of in-depth interviews. I encouraged them 
to ask follow-up questions to interviewees, and discouraged them from stopping 
interviewees from saying anything. I knew that the quality of the interviewers would 
largely determine the quality of the interviewing, but it was difficult to recruit 
experienced interviewers due to a lack of research funding. Instead, in order to help the 
inexperienced interviewers, I provided interviewers a detailed questionnaire, in which 
many possible follow-up questions were included. I also anticipated that I could 
crosscheck the quality of the interviewing because all interviews were tape-recorded. 
Following this check, I found most interviewers were not particularly flexible in the 
interviewing, but did not act contrary to my guidelines. On a few occasions, I found that 
an interviewer made mistakes during some parts of interviews. For example, one 
interviewer failed to induce respondents to answer spontaneously or instantly, and so 
sometimes suggested a hint or possible answers to the respondents. These mistakes could 
be detected, however, from the tapes and were excluded the answers from the data during 
the transcription-making process. 
Developing Semi-structured Questionnaire: I conducted in total four informal 
interviews with my family members and friends in order to pre-test the semi-structured 
questionnaire that I provided the interviewers. These informal interviews were not used as 
core information in this research because I conducted the interviews before the election 
and I revised many parts of the questionnaire depending on the feedback from the 
informal interviews. In other words, I excluded the informal interviews from my core data 
on the voting behaviour of independent voters because the informal interviews were not 
completed and were not consistent with the formal interviews conducted by the hired 
interviewers. 
Selection of Interviewees: Each interviewer recruited 4-6 interviewees. The process 
of selecting interviewees was not a true random sample based on scientific rules, but I 
was concerned to minimise any potential bias in selecting interviewees. I provided 
interviewers a guideline for recruitment of interviewees as follows: 
" First, I demanded that interviewees should be mainly independent voters 
who went to the polls in the 2002 presidential election. However, I expected 
that they might have difficulties finding qualified interviewees because the 
research agency had experienced the same problem when recruiting 
participants for focus groups interviews. Therefore, I allowed them to 
88 
Chapter 4 
include weak party identifiers when they could not find independent voters. 
" Second, I stipulated that interviewees should not be related either through 
family or friendship. Indeed, no more than one interviewee from a family 
should be recruited. No interviewee should be a friend or a colleague of 
other interviewees. 
" Third, I wanted interviewees to be as diverse as possible in terms of 
occupation, gender, and age. 
" Finally, I asked that all interviewees live in Seoul or the suburb of Seoul in 
the Gyeonggy region. 
In total, 56 people were interviewed. In terms of party affiliation, 42 interviewees 
were independent voters and 14 interviewees were party identifiers (see Table 4. A2 in 
Appendix). Although the selection of interviewees was not based on a scientific sampling 
method, the 42 interviewees who were independent voters consisted of various types of 
voters in terms of social characteristics and roughly represented the population - i. e., 
independent voters in Seoul area. The 42 independents were comprised of 
" 20 men and 22 women. 
" 25 interviewees below 30 years old and 17 interviewees 30 years old or 
above with 7 interviewees over 44 years old. 
" 14 students, 9 non-manual workers, 7 self-employed workers, 6 fulltime 
housewives, 3 professional, and 3 unemployed or other types of workers. 
" 30 residents of Seoul and 12 living in the suburb of Seoul, i. e., Gyeonggi 
region. 
" 14 interviewees originated from Gyeongsang, 10 interviewees were from 
Chungcheong, 8 interviewees were from Seoul or Gyeonggi, 6 interviewees 
were from Jeolla, and 4 interviewees were from another region. 
" 15 interviewees were relatively interested in politics and 27 interviewees 
were not. 
Quantitative Survey Data on Korean Electoral Behaviour 
`Secondary analysis' of quantitative data is adopted in this research i. e., the data being 
used has been collected by other scientists. Secondary analysis has disadvantages and 
advantages . 
3" Researchers can save data-gathering costs and time. The quality of the data 
is relatively safe because the data is collected by a group of scientists. But secondary 
analysis has some disadvantages. Researchers are separated from the collection of data, 
38 Bryman, Social Research Methods, pp. 196-201. Piergiorgio Corbetta. Social Research: Theory, 
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and so cannot control data quality. Moreover, researchers establish the issues what they 
want to analyse or examine, but important questions may not be fully answered due to the 
absence of key variables in the data. However, I expected that these problems could be 
partially overcome by the triangulation of qualitative and quantitative approaches in the 
collection and analysis of data. For example, in the qualitative research, I tried to add 
some questions about voter's attitudes, value, and behaviour, which were excluded in 
surveys. 
In this thesis, survey data from the Korea Social Science Data Center (KSDC) is 
used in the quantitative analysis of individual voting behaviour. The survey was 
conducted by a group of Korean researchers in electoral studies. This group of Korean 
researchers has conducted a post-election survey immediately after every election since 
1992. The KSDC collects this survey data and provides the data to any individual 
researcher who wants to use it. Survey data from the KSDC is the only dataset that is 
available for individual researchers to access. During the election year, news media, 
political parties, and campaign teams conducted a total of more than a hundred surveys 
but it is impossible for individual researchers to access these datasets. Even most news 
media did not open the results of these surveys in the form of cross tabulations to the 
public 39 In other words, survey data from the KSDC is the only dataset to be available for 
individual researchers to access. At the same time, the KSDC survey data is the only 
available dataset to examine change and continuity of electoral behaviour over time, 
though there has been some inconsistency in survey questions across different surveys 
carried out by the KSDC. 
In this thesis, the dataset from the KSDC, the Korean Presidential Election Study of 
2002 (hereafter KPES) is mainly used in order to explore individual voting behaviour. 
Furthermore, in order to examine changes and continuities in voting behaviour across 
different elections, two datasets, the KPES of 1992 and 1997, are used. Some general 
election surveys from the KSDC also used. The sample size of each presidential election 
survey is 1,200 in 1997,1,200 in 1997, and 1,500 in 2002. The samples were selected 
based on a stratified random sampling from the whole electorate excluding residences in 
Jeju. The standard error of these surveys is plus and minus 3 per cent point. Each survey 
was conducted within a week following the election. Interviewers visited selected 
respondents and conduced face-to-face interviews based on a structured questionnaire. 
Methods, and Techniques (London: Sage, 2003), pp. 150-51. 
" Chosun Daily Newspaper, Choongang Daily Newspaper, and SBS television reveal results of 
most surveys in the form of cross tabulations. But still they do not allow individual researchers to 
access the dataset in the form of data-matrix. 
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Quality of the Data: Validity and Reliability 
An important concern in any research is the assessment of validity and reliability of 
findings. Although employing both quantitative and qualitative approach can enhance the 
quality of research, such as internal validity or external validity of research design, the 
integration of qualitative and quantitative method does not guarantee the quality of data. 
Therefore, questions of measurement validity and reliability must be addressed. 
Quality of Interview Data 
The validity of findings is not an important issue in qualitative research if we agree 
that there is no perfect validity of findings. Focus group interviews or in-depth interviews 
have high `face validity' unless the researcher deviates from established procedures. 40 An 
interviewee's comments are believable, though people are not always trustworthy. A 
respondent may hold back important information or distort answers intentionally in a 
structured questionnaire survey, but they often fail to mislead the interviewer in 
qualitative interviews. For example, in this research, among the total of 56 in-depth 
interviewees, 4 respondents gave inconsistent answers about party affiliation. Indeed, in a 
mini-survey conducted in a very early part of the interview, 4 of 56 interviewees 
concealed their party affiliation, but could not hold back the information in order to make 
comments on other questions and subsequently revealed their party affiliation during the 
in-depth interview. 
Concerning the reliability or `dependability' issue, the qualitative data about the 
voting behaviour of independent voters in Korea is reliable. Even though the selection of 
interviewees was not based a rigorous scientific random sampling method - this was not 
feasible and not needed due to a small number of interviewees --- interviewees were 
randomly recruited. Furthermore, all interviews followed a structured process so that the 
method used in the collection of the data is easily repeated. Following the same process 
and a similar context, a repeat research project should arrive at similar results. 
Quality of Survey Data 
We may assess that the quality of the survey data obtained from the KSDC is not in 
question in terms of measurement validity and reliability because the survey was 
conducted by a group of election study specialists and was based on a questionnaire that 
40 Richard A. Krueger, Focus Groups: A practical Guide for Applied Research (London: Sage, 
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has been developed and used for several years. Measurement validity of the survey data is 
therefore not a significant issue. However, some potential problems of the survey data 
related to `unsystematic' measurement errors can be recognised. 
One problem is related to the timing of the survey. The survey was carried out after 
the election. As discussed above, in questionnaire surveys, respondents can easily mislead 
interviewers intentionally or unintentionally. Respondents sometimes might not speak 
truthfully in the post-election survey. Some respondents might conceal their true feelings, 
attitudes, and behaviour in answering sensitive questions, such as voting choice or party 
affiliation. For instance, the reliability of a measurement of individual party affiliation 
might be questioned. Also, the level of party identification for the defeated party shrinks 
and the level of party identification for the winning party swells in the post-election 
survey compared to the polls conducted just before the election. 
The distribution of voting choice suggests a similar measurement error. The 
percentage of respondents who voted for the winning candidate is bigger than the actual 
share of votes received by the candidate. Additionally, measurement of voter turnout is 
problematic in the post-election survey. Voter turnout rate as measured by the post- 
election survey is much higher than actually happened. Another potential problem is 
related to difficulties in measuring campaign effects. Election campaigns easily escape 
voters' memories immediately after the election ended, and respondents hardly remember 
any election campaigns in the post-election survey. In addition, a respondents' voting 
choice might affect their answers in the post-election survey. For example, in the survey, 
they might answer that they had voted for a candidate because they assessed the quality or 
competence of a candidate favourably, but this generous evaluation of the candidate in the 
post-election survey might be a post-election justification for their original electoral 
choice. 
1988), pp. 40-45. 
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Chapter 5. Party Affiliation in a New Democracy 
The aim of this chapter is to explore the concept of party identification in Korea. The 
main features of party affiliation and the limits of the concept in the new democracy will 
be discussed. An analysis of party affiliation is required to explore the electoral behaviour 
of independents. The concept of party identification suggests a division of voters into 
those affiliated to a particular political party and those unaffiliated to any political party. 
It is also assumed that party identifiers are different from non-party identifiers in terms of 
voting behaviour. Therefore, it is necessary to discuss the concept of party identification 
in Korea before further analysis of independent voters and their behaviour in election. 
This chapter consists of two sections. The first section discusses the existence of 
long-term party affiliation under circumstances of party system instability. I will argue 
that psychological identification has developed among the electorate in the new 
democracy, although party politics is institutionally underdeveloped. The second section 
explores key features and limits of the concept of party identification in the new 
democracy. I will argue that party affiliation in the new democracy is changeable and 
depends upon the performance of political parties unlike the assumption of long-term 
stability of party identification made by the authors of The American Voter. ' 
1. Party Identification under Institutional Underdevelopment of Party 
Politics 
Modern democracy entails mass politics and mass voters, and political parties still play 
many essential roles in mass politics. "Political parties structure the popular vote, 
integrate and mobilise the mass of citizenry; aggregate diverse interests; recruit leaders 
for public office; and formulate public policy. "Z Mass participation and mass politics is 
unthinkable without political parties. In other words, as long as mass politics is associated 
with political parties and as long as the functions associated with political parties are 
important in democratic politics, party identification which shows a relationship between 
mass voters and political parties can explain the political behaviour of mass voters. 
As discussed in chapter 3 of this thesis, party identification is a key concept in 
explaining mass electoral behaviour in mature democracies, but is still one of the most 
1 Angus Campbell et at., Tire American Voter (New York: Wiley, 1960). 
2 Peter Mair, `Introduction', in Peter Mair, ed., The West European Party System (Oxford: Oxford 
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controversial concepts in the electoral research.; Electoral studies specialists have 
explored the limits of the party identification model. The concept and its measurement 
have been discussed and the decline of party identifiers is recognised in many 
democracies. Moreover, the applicability of the concept in different political culture 4 
outside of the USA has been challenged. 
In particular, considering the long-term nature of party identification, it is 
questionable whether one can refer to an enduring partisanship in a new democracy only 
fifteen years old. The history of the new democracy is not only short, but also unstable, so 
it may be not possible to refer to the `endurance of partisanship'. Students of Korean 
electoral studies often exclude the concept of party identification in their research because 
of the institutional underdevelopment of political parties in Korea. 5 Few researchers 
directly approached party identification, but some researchers have measured the party 
affiliation of the electorate in terms of political attitude to the pro-ruling and pro- 
opposition political parties instead of the concept of party identification. 6 In doing so, 
they are seeking in pro-ruling and pro-opposition attitudes a `functional equivalent' to 
party identification. 
University Press, 1990), p. 1. 
3 See Warren Miller and J. Merrill Shanks, The New American Voter (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1996). 
For a good summary of the concept of party identification and the party identification model of 
voting, see Martin Harrop and William L. Miller, Elections and Voters: A Comparative 
Introduction (London: The Macmillan Press, 1987), pp. 130-45. For limits and issues of the 
concept of party identification, see Ian Budge, Ivor Crewe, Dennis Farlie, eds, Party Identification 
and Beyond (London: John Wiley & Sons, 1976). For decline of party identification in mature 
democracies, see William L. Miller and Richard G. Niemi, `Voting: Choice, Conditioning, and 
Constraint', in Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G. Niemi, and Pippa Norris, eds, Comparing 
Democracies 2 (London: Sage, 2002), pp. 169-209; Herman Schmitt and Soren Holmberg, 
`Political Parties in Decline? ', in Hans-Dieter Klingmann and Dieter Fuchs, eds, Citizens and the 
State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 95-123; Russell J. Dalton and Martin P. 
Waffenberg, eds, Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
For example, Youngjae Jin, Budongcheongyugwonja hyeongtae bunseok (An analysis of floating 
voters) (Seoul: Jipmundang, 2002), pp. 10-11. However, a few researchers have dealt with the 
concept of party identification in explaining Korean electoral behaviour. For example, A-ran 
Hwang, `Jeongdangtaedowa tupyohangtae' (Party identification and voting behaviour), in Nam- 
Young Lee, ed., Hangugui seongeo (Elections in Korea), vol. 2 (Seoul: Pureungil, 1998), pp. 257- 
314. 
6 Government identification is corresponded to party identification where parties are weak such as 
new democracies in post-communist Europe. See William L. Miller, Stephen White, and Paul 
Heywood, Values and Political Change in Postcarnmunist Europe (London; Macmillan, 1998), pp. 
302-7. 
7 For example, Jung-bin Cho, `Yugwonjaui yeoyaseonghyanggwa tupyohaengtae' (Pro-ruling and 
pro-opposition voter attitude and voting behaviour), in Nam-Young Lee, ed., Hangugui seongeo 
(Elections in Korea), vol. 1 (Seoul: Nanam, 1993), pp. 49-66. Also, Chan-wuk Park, `Jae l4dae 
gughoiuiwon chongseongeoaeseoui jeongdangjyi bunseok' (An analysis of the support for 
Political Parties in the 14th general election), in Nam-Young Lee, ed., Hangugui seongeo 
(Elections in Korea), vol. 1 (Seoul: Nanam, 1993), pp. 67-115. However, the concept of political 
attitude of pro-ruling and pro-opposition party may be no longer useful due to the power transition 
from a party to another party in the 1997 presidential election. Voters have been confused of the 
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The nature of party identification and the nature of party attachment in the new 
democracy should be discussed prior to further analysis of the partisan alignment and of 
independent voters without party attachments. Several questions or problems related to 
the nature of party identification in new democracy should be explored. Is it possible for 
voters to develop a durable attachment to a political party in the new democracy where 
political parties are institutionally underdeveloped and the political party system is very 
unstable? How do short-term political affairs affect party attachment? Is it party 
identification if party identification is changeable within a relatively short-period time? 
Does party identification differ from party preference or candidate popularity in a specific 
election? Is there any relationship between attachment to a party and attachment to a 
political leader? How do negative feelings to a political party constrain electoral 
behaviour? Finally, does party identification explain voting choice in the new democracy? 
Instability of Party Politics in Korea 
Political parties in Korea's new democracy are institutionally underdeveloped. It is 
possible that voters are confused by unstable party politics, and it is very difficult for 
voters to develop any long-term party affiliation. Furthermore, the concept of party 
identification in the new democracy may not be same as party identification in advanced 
democracies. 
`Meetin! and Parting' of Political Parties 
Political parties in Korea have a relatively short life. `Meeting and parting' is the 
best term to describe the development of political party in Korea. For example, since the 
transition to democracy in 1987, about sixty political parties emerged while forty-six 
parties have dissolved during the sixteen years of the new democracy. Each year 
approximately four political parties are newly formed and approximately three political 
parties disappear. On average nine political parties are in existence each year although 
twenty-two political parties were registered in 2002 (see Table 5.1) .8 
Major political parties are not exempt from the `meeting and parting'. For example, 
in most elections, the Korean electorate cast their vote for a candidate of a newly formed 
political party. Indeed, in the 1987 presidential election, all of the major competing 
concepts of the ruling party and the opposition party since the electorate experienced a power 
transition the first time for 40 years. Instead of the pro-ruling and pro-opposition party attitude, the 
ideological disposition of the voters is often measured in recent surveys. 
8A revision of Political Party Act of 2002 has eased the legal conditions of political party, and has 
promoted the establishment of many new parties. 
96 
Chapter 5 
parties except the authoritarian ruling party, the Democratic Justice Party (DJP), were 
formed just before the election. In the 1992 presidential election, all competing parties 
were new parties. The authoritarian ruling party was transformed into a gigantic party, the 
Democratic Liberal Party (DI. P) by annexing two opposition parties in 1990. A major 
opposition party also changed to a new party, the Democratic Party (DP), in 1990, as a 
response to the appearance of the DLP. Third party, the Unification National Party (UNP), 
was formed in election year. In the 1997 presidential election, the ruling party annexed 
one of opposition party, United Democratic Party (UDP), and changed its name to the 
Grand National Party (GNP) just before the election. The major opposition party, the New 
Congress for New Politics, was formed two years before the election, and the third party, 
the New Party for People (NPP), was formed just before the election. The presidential 
election of 2002 again conformed to this pattern. The major opposition party, the GNP, 
again fought the election, but the ruling party, the NCNP, was dissolved and became the 
Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) in 2000. By 2003, the United Liberal Democrats 
(ULD), formed in 1995, has the longest history among all existing parties in Korea. 
Table 5.1 Numbers of Political Parties in Korea, 1987-2002 
NUMBER OF POLITICAL 
PARTIES (A) 
NUMBER OF PARTIES 
FORMED (B) 
NUMBER OF PARTIES 
DISAPPEARED (C) 
1987 8 6 1 
1988 13 4 12 
1989 5 0 0 
1990 5 4 3 
1991 6 1 3 
1992 4 6 2 
1993 8 1 0 
1994 9 1 3 
1995 7 5 3 
1996 9 5 3 
1997 11 6 6 
1998 11 2 3 
1999 10 0 2 
2000 8 6 2 
2001 12 3 3 
2002 12 10 0 
2003 22 * * 
Total 60 46 
Source: Calculated from the National Election Commission, Jeongdangui hwa/donggaehwang mit 
jaesansanghwang bogogip (A report on general activities and financial status of political parties), 
1988-1995,1996,1997,1998,1999,2000,2001, and 2002 (Seoul: the National Election 
Commission, 1996,1997,1998,1999,2000,2001,2002, and 2003). 
Notes: The figures of column (a) are numbers of parties by Ist of January of each year. The figures 
of column (b) and (c) are numbers of parties formed and abolished during each year. Also, the 
figures include cases of only change in party name. 
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Political Parties for a few Political Leaders 
Another significant feature of political parties in Korea is that political parties are 
formed and dissolved by a few political leaders who can mobilise many political 
supporters, such as `three Kims' - Kim Dae jung, Kim Young Sam, and Kim Jong-pil. 
Kim Dae-jung was involved in the establishment of the PDP in 1987, the DP in 1990, the 
NCNP in 1995, and the MDP in 2000. Kim Young Sam was involved in the foundation of 
the RDP in 1987, the DLP in 1990, and the NKP in 1996. Kim Jong-pil also formed the 
NDRP in 1987 and ULD in 1995, and was involved in the creation of the DLP in 1990. 
In general, a political leader forms a party or annexes other party for his own 
political interests, and the political party becomes a group of politicians following the 
political leader. Political parties are more like an organisation for the interests of the 
politicians, especially in an impending election. Indeed, many political parties in Korea 
are formed just before elections and are dissolved afterwards. For example, the UNP led 
by Chung Ju-young, the owner of Hyundai business group, was formed in 1992 and 
gained more than 16 per cent of votes in both the parliamentary and presidential elections 
of 1992. However, it was dissolved after the 1992 presidential election. Another case is 
the NPP led by Rhee In je, who after withdrawing from the ruling NKP formed the NPP 
just before the 1997 presidential election. It gained about twenty per cent of votes in the 
election, but was later annexed to the new ruling NCNP in 1998. 
The Lack of Grassroots Participation in Political Parties 
No Korean political parties can be described as a modern political party in terms of 
grassroots participation in party activities. Every major party has a nation-wide 
organisation, but the political parties do not employ this structure for communication, 
policy making, and debate. Party activities are extremely concentrated around the leaders 
and core politicians. Indeed, political parties are formed from the top down and run by a 
small number of politicians. In this way, they are more like `cadre parties' rather than a 
`mass parties'. The major political parties claim that they each have more than one 
million official party members. However, the numbers do not reflect `true' members, but 
`factitious' members or party members in name only. 9 For example, according to the 
National Election Commission of Korea, only a few official party members pay the party 
membership fee. 1° In 2001, the GNP, the biggest party in the National Assembly and 
9 `Special topic on political party reform', Dong-A Daily Newspaper, 7 January 2003. 
10 Illegal campaign activities explain one of reasons why political parties produced many 
`factitious' members. According to the Election Act in Korea, candidates can contact own their 
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major opposition party, has approximately only thirteen thousand members who pay fees 
out of approximately 2.7 million official members. The ruling MDP has only 
approximately ten thousand `actual' members out of a total of 1.8 million official 
members. It is clear that the number of party members is exaggerated when the ULD 
party membership is considered. There are more than 1.3 million ULD party members 
officially registered in Korea out of a total electorate of 24 million. This membership 
statistic appears exaggerated considering the number of ULD party identifiers in public 
polls is now only about I or 2 per cent of valid respondents (see Table 5.2). 
Table 5.2 Numbers of Party Membership, 2001 
A B C 
Grand National Party 2,684,307 13,288 0.50% 
Millennium Democratic Party 1,824,248 10,453 0.57% 
United Liberal Democrats 1,364,735 530 0.04% 
Democratic Labour Party 10,314 6,552 63.53% 
Source: The National Election Commission. Copied from Dong-A Daily Newspaper, 7 January 
2003. 
Keys: A= Numbers of registered members; B= Numbers of members who pay partisan fee; and C 
= proportion of B in A. 
Lack of Ideological Differences between Political Parties 
Finally, most political parties are indistinguishable from each other in terms of 
policy and party platform. Many political parties are formed hastily before elections, and 
in many cases, they copy each other's policies. Politicians assume that voters are less 
affected by policies or election pledges when making their voting decision, and voters 
also assume that policies or pledges articulated by every major party are not distinctive or 
even meaningless. 
Old Party Affiliations in the New Democracy 
The institutional underdevelopment of political parties does not confirm that party 
identification dose not exist in Korea. The electorate may find it difficult to develop a 
long-term party affiliation due to party system instability and the institutional 
party members without restrictions, but are strictly regulated in contacting non-party members 
during the election campaigns. For example, small group indoor meetings for election campaigns 
are absolutely restricted during the election campaign period because candidates sometimes 
illegally give money and provide food to voters in the meetings. In a sense, the `Eatanswill 
Election' of Charles Dickens has existed in Korea and so the Korean Election Act restricts various 
types of campaign activities. Therefore, political parties often recruit new party members in order 
to avoid these legal restrictions in campaigns. In other words, many new official party members 
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underdevelopment of the political parties, but the electorate may adjust to these unique 
circumstances and develop a certain form of party affiliation. 
The Lecacy of Old Party Politics 
First, Korea is a new democracy, but party politics has a history of about 40 years 
before the transition to democracy in 1987. During the 1950s, party politics was 
established in Korea although it was barely developed. Many political parties were 
established immediately after the founding of the new independent nation-state in 1948, 
but they were nothing more than transitional entities or cliques. Moreover, in the early 
period of the new state, the Korean electorate did not recognise the value of party politics 
or the importance of political parties in a representative democracy. For example, during 
the post-liberation years, most voters were very sceptical to political parties. In the first 
and the second parliamentary election of 1948 and 1950, only 13.5 per cent and 12.8 per 
cent of the voter perceived that political parties are a necessary institution for a 
representative democracy. However, this figure increased markedly later. Indeed, in the 
late 1960s, more than three out of four Korean voters (76.1 per cent) considered political 
parties essential. " 
This perception was reflected in election results. During the first decade of the new 
independent government, apart from the election of 1958, independent candidates took 
the biggest share of votes in every parliamentary election. Indeed, as shown in Table 5.3, 
independent candidates had approximately 38 per cent of votes in the first parliamentary 
election of 1948, approximately 63 per cent in 1950, approximately 48 per cent in 1954, 
approximately 22 per cent in 1958, and approximately 49 per cent and 47 per cent in 
1960.12 
However, from the late 1950s, few parties had established themselves in voters' 
minds, even though so many parties had formed and dissolved. Under the military-backed 
authoritarian regimes from the 1960s, Korean politics had rapidly become a bi-party 
political system with a dominant ruling party and a major opposition party. Korean voters 
also mainly fell into two camps: pro-authoritarian ruling party and pro-democracy 
opposition party. As shown in results of presidential elections, most Korean voters were 
aligned with the two major parties. As shown in Table 5.4, in each of the three direct 
are mobilised and join a political party without strongly supporting it. 
" I1-mun Cho and Kyung-woo Yun, `Popular Perception of Political Parties', in C. I. Eugene Kim 
and Young Whan Kihl, eds, Party Politics and Elections in Korea (Silver Spring: The Research 
Institute on Korean Affairs, 1976), pp. 84-94, at p. 85. 
12 This trend was not continued in the 1960s because a new constitution under the military-backed 
authoritarian regime prevented independents from running for the presidency or membership of 
100 
Chapter 5 
presidential elections --- in 1963, in 1967, and in 1971 --- under the authoritarian regime, 
the two major parties had more than 90 per cent share of the votes. 
Table 5.3 Share of Votes by Independent Candidates in Parliamentary Elections, 1948-1971 
INDEPENDENT 
CANDIDATES 
THE 1ST PARTY THE 2ND PARTY 
1948 38.0% 24.6% 12.7% 
1950 62.9% 9.8% 9.7% 
1954 47.9% 36.8% 7.9% 
1958 21.5% 42.1% 34.2% 
1960 49.3% 
46.8% 
39.0% 
41.7% 
5.9% 
6.0% 
Source: Calculated from election statistics provided by the National Election commission. 
Note: In 1960, the National Assembly composed of the two Houses, which was first also last time 
in Korean political history. In this table, the first row of 1960 is about the Upper House and the 
second row of 1960 is about the Low House. 
Table 5.4 Share of the Vote by Major Parties in Direct Presidential Elections, 1948-2002 
THE 1ST PARTY (A) THE 2ND PARTY (B) THE 3RD PARTY (A) + (B) 
1952 74.6% 0.0% 0.0% 74.6% 
1956 70.0% 0.0% 0.0% 70.0% 
1960 100% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
1963 46.6% 45.1% 4.5% 91.7% 
1967 51.4% 40.9% 2.4% 92.3% 
1971 53.2% 45.3% 1.0% 98.5% 
1987 36.6% 28.0% 27.0% 64.6% 
1992 42.0% 33.8% 16.3% 75.8% 
1997 40.3% 38.7% 19.2% 79.0% 
2002 48.9% 46.6% 3.9% 95.5% 
Source: Calculated from election statistics provided by the National Election Commission. 
Notes: In 1952, there was only one party candidate. Indeed, other competitors in the election were 
independent candidates. In 1956 and 1960, a major opposition party candidate suddenly died 
during the election campaign. From 1972 to 1986, there was no direct presidential election under 
military-backed authoritarian regimes. In 1997, there was a power transition from one party to 
other party, which was first time in Korean presidential elections. 
The legacy of authoritarian-era party politics has continued after the transition to 
democracy in 1987. In 1987, Korean voters quickly developed affiliations to the main 
three political parties and this quick partisan alignment was possible due to the legacy of 
party politics before the transition to democracy in 1987. While voters were mainly 
divided into the pro-authoritarian government voters and the pro-democracy voters under 
the authoritarian regimes before 1987, pro-democracy voters were realigned in new 
democracy. Two prominent democratic leaders, Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young Sam, 
previously banned from political activity, were allowed to return to the political world in 
1987. Pro-democratic Korean voters now supported either the Peace Democratic Party led 
the National Assembly. 
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by Kim Dae-jung or the Reunification Democratic Party led by Kim Young Sam. 
Meanwhile, voters who had supported the ruling authoritarian party under the past 
authoritarian regimes continually supported the ruling Democratic Justice Party. 
In the new democracy, the party system again has evolved into a bi-party system. In 
the 1988 parliamentary election, the three major parties and one minor party divided the 
National Assembly seats. In 1992 parliamentary election, the two major parties and one 
minor party held most of the National Assembly seats. In the parliamentary election of 
1996, two large parties and one smaller party became `parliamentary parties', which 
formed negotiation groups in the National Assembly. 13 However, in the 2002 
parliamentary election, two major parties took most seats in the National Assembly (see 
Table 5.5). Also, the results of presidential elections have produced the same pattern. In 
the 1987 presidential election, the candidates of the three major parties and one minor 
party competed for the presidency. In the 1992 and 1997 presidential elections, two major 
parties and one minor party were the main competitors. In 2002 presidential election, two 
major parties were involved in the competition (see Table 5.4). In conclusion, although 
many parties have been formed and dissolved in the new democracy, only a few have 
been successful in establishing themselves in voters' minds. 
Table 5.5 Share of the Votes by Major Parties in Parliamentary Elections, 1987-2002 
THE I PARTY 
(A) 
THE 2 PARTY 
(B) 
THE 3 
PARTY 
(A) + (B) (A)+(B)+(C) 
1988 34.0% 23.8% 19.3% 57.8% 77.1% 
1992 38.5% 29.2% 17.4% 67.7% 85.1% 
1996 34.5% 25.3% 16.2% 59.8% 76.0% 
2000 39.0% 35.9% 9.8% 74.9% 84.7% 
Source: Calculated from election statistics provided by the National Election Commission. 
The Historical Lineage of Political Parties 
Second, the historical lineage and continuities of the political parties should be 
recognised, even though `meeting and parting' of political parties is an important feature 
of Korean politics. While names and components of political parties in Korea have 
changed repeatedly over time, the two major competitors in party politics have 
maintained their basic forms and their `historical lineages' have been continued. 
As shown in Figure 5.1, the incumbent ruling party, the Millennium Democratic 
Party (MDP), has developed from the Peace Democratic Party (PDP) formed by Kim 
13 According to National Assembly Act, the minimum number of seats for a negotiation group is 
20 seats, and only representatives of negotiation groups, floor leaders, are involved in the 
management of various activities at the National Assembly. 
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Dae-jung in 1987. Even the MDP acknowledges its historical relationship with the pro- 
democracy opposition parties existing before 1987. For example, former President Kim 
Dae-jung argued that the historical lineage of the MDP should trace back to the 
Democratic Party led by Chough Pyung Ok under President Rhee's autocracy in 1950s. 14 
At the same time, the present major opposition party, the Grand National Party (GNP), 
has its origin in the Democratic Justice Party (DJP), which was formed under the 
military-backed authoritarian regime in 1981. These two major parties have maintained 
their central place in party politics for the last fifteen years after the democratic transition 
in 1987, although they sometimes separated and annexed small parties, or sometimes 
merely changed their names. 
The Continuity of Political Parties in terms of bdeolo w `Party Families' 
Third, the MDP and the GNP have maintained not only their key party members, 
but also most of their party platforms. The MDP has adopted the PDP's party platform 
and policies, and is considered more liberal and reformist. On the other hand, the GNP, 
the descendent of the authoritarian party, has maintained its more conservative party 
platform without critical changes. The MDP and its predecessor parties have emphasised 
a peaceful relationship between the two Koreas and an `engagement policy' toward North 
Korea, while the authoritarian ruling parties have stressed military build-up and have 
preferred a `containment policy' toward North Korea. Also, the MDP and historical 
opposition parties have demanded economic justice and a balanced economic 
development between big and small business, while the authoritarian parties have always 
promoted economic growth regardless of inequalities of distribution and have pursued an 
industrial policy favouring big companies. 
In Figure 5.1, political parties are placed in terms of the ideological spectrum of the 
liberal and the conservative or the left and the right. For example, the United Liberal 
Democrats (ULD), which is the third party in the present party system, is considered and 
views itself as the most conservative party in the party system. The conservative 
politician, Kim Jong-pil, formed and led the ULD. He was the right hand man of dictator 
Park Chung Hee, and also formed Korean Democratic Republican Party (KDRP), another 
a conservative party in 1987. 
14 Former president Kim Dae-jung articulated that "I think that the Democratic Party has been 
continued by leaderships of Shin Ik-Hee, Chough Pyung Ok, Park Soon-chun, and Chung II- 
hyeong and has devoted itself and has contributed to democracy in Korea". See Hanguk daily 
newspaper, 12 June 2003, and also various newspapers on same day. 
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Figure 5.1 The Evolution of Major Political Parties in Korea, 1987-2002 
LIBERAL E- 4 CONSERVATIVE 
1987 (P) 
1988 (G) 
1990 
1992 (G/P) 
1995(L) 
1996 (G) 
1997 (P) 
1998 (L) 
2000 (G) 
2002(L/P) 
Source: Formulated based upon political party registry records of the National Election 
Commission. 
Keys: P= presidential election; G= Parliamentary election; L= local election; PDP = Peace 
Democratic Party; RDP = Reunification Democratic Party; DJP = Democratic Justice Party; 
NDRP = New Democratic Republican Party; DP = Democratic Party; DLP = Democratic Liberal 
Party; UNP = Unification National Party; ULD = United Liberal Democrats; NCNP = National 
Congress for New Politics; UDP = United Democratic Party; NKP = New Korea Party; NPP = 
New Party for People; GNP = Grand National Party; and MDP = Millennium Democratic Party. 
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The electorate can accurately recognise the relative positions of each political party 
on the ideological spectrum. According to surveys, Korean voters consistently locate the 
major political parties in roughly the same place in the ideological spectrum of the left 
and the right. For example, as shown in Table 5.6, in the 1987 presidential election, voters 
identified the DJP, the authoritarian ruling party, as the most conservative party, while 
they recognised the PDP led by Kim Dae-jung as the most progressive party. The RDP 
led by Kim Young Sam was in the middle of these two parties. " 
Table 5.6 Voters' Perception of Ideological Characteristics of Political Parties, 1987 
GENDER AGE EDUCATION 
Men Women 20s 30s 40s Middle High University 
school school 
More Conservative 
DJP 44.1 44.5 42.0 37.2 39.1 37.3 46.3 40.3 
PDP 8.1 12.5 8.9 15.2 11.6 14.4 9.5 6.7 
RDP 20.3 17.3 19.8 23.4 26.8 22.9 17.4 23.9 
Other 27.5 25.7 29.3 24.2 22.5 25.4 26.8 29.1 
Total (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
More Progressive 
DJP 7.4 13.3 7.5 12.7 21.7 16.8 9.0 6.6 
PDP 55.8 52.3 57.3 42.7 44.8 49.6 53.5 60.3 
RDP 27.5 27.8 26.4 33.1 26.6 27.2 28.9 23.3 
Other 9.3 6.6 8.8 11.5 6.9 6.4 8.6 9.8 
Total 1/6) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Copied from Jong-min Hyeon, `Seongeoinui jaepyeonseonggwa tupyo' (Electoral 
realignment and vote), Hangulyeongchihakhoebo (Korean Political Science Review), 23 (1990), 
209-26, p. 217. 
Note: Sample size of the panel survey was 1,500. 
In 2002, a survey also showed the same pattern, though party names has changed 
since 1987. Voters identified the MDP as the most progressive party and considered the 
GNP to be a relatively conservative party. For example, in a survey conducted by a major 
daily newspaper, voters perceived the ruling MDP is more progressive compared to the 
GNP. In an 11-point scale from zero to ten (0 = strong progressive, 10 = strong 
conservative), the MDP was placed at 4.7 with the GNP at 6.9.16 Also, the ideological 
positions of members of each political party fit this pattern. For example, in a survey 
conducted by a major daily newspaper, among members of the National Assembly, 
members of the ruling MDP were more liberal or progressive compared to members of 
the opposition GNP in terms of policy preference. " In an 11-point scale from zero to ten 
(where zero means a strong progressive and ten means a strong conservative), members 
Jong-min Hyeon, `Seongeoinui jaepyeonseonggwa tupyo' (Electoral realignment and vote), 
218. 
Dong-A Daily Newspaper, 2 April 2003. 
'7 Choongang Daily Newspaper, 23 February 2002. 
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of the MDP averaged 3.7, while the average score for members of the GNP was 5.3. 
Indeed, there was a quite distinct difference between the two major parties in terms of 
ideological position of the Assembly members measured by policy preferences. In 
conclusion, differences between the major parties existed and the electorate recognised 
the differences despite the widespread understanding in Korean politics that ideological 
distinctions between the parties are minimal. 
Voter's Perception of the Continuity of Political Parties 
As a result of the continuity in the major political parties, the Korean electorate has 
been able to develop party identification, despite the frequent changes within the parties. 
Korean electors can recognise and distinguish between the major political parties, even 
though they have often changed their names and forms. Korean voters may confuse the 
new names of the parties, but can identify the new parties by their leaders. For example, 
in 2000, the National Congress for New Politics (NCNP) was renamed the Millennium 
Democratic Party (MDP) in order to mitigate its negative public image in the south-east 
region, Gyeongsang. However, it failed because voters in the region correctly identified 
the MDP as the new name of the former NCNP. Some voters even confused the NCNP 
with the old party name, such as the PDP or the DP, but they still remembered the leader 
of the parties, Kim Dae-jung. 
Furthermore, most party supporters have transferred their loyalty to the new parties 
when the two major parties have changed their names and forms. For example, most of 
electorate in the south-west region of Korea have supported the PDP, the DP, the NCNP, 
and the MDP in elections during the last 15 years. On the other hand, voters in south-east 
region have continually shown their loyalty to the GNP, the NKP, the DLP, and the DJP in 
each election. 
Qualitative data generally confirmed that voters are able to recognise the identity of 
each major political party regardless of alterations in name and its form. Interviewees 
often understood the lineage of the major political parties when answering the question of 
how long they maintained their party attachment. For example, "I have continually 
identified with the political party [the Millennium Democratic Party] since the last 
presidential election five years ago" (I-204). 18 "Since I preferred Mr. Kim Dae-jung in the 
[1997] presidential election, I have identified with the party [MDP]" (1-207). "I have not 
felt affiliation to the party [GNP] for very long. About 10 years ago, I suddenly changed 
1e She began to identify herself with the National Congress for New Politics (NCNP), and 
maintained her party attachment even though the party changed its name and its form to the 
Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) in 2000. 
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my thinking to the politics, and shifted from candidate-centred thinking to party-centred 
thinking" (1-213). 19 Therefore, although the conditions of the `meeting and parting' and 
institutional underdevelopment of political party may confuse voters and make it difficult 
for them to develop party affiliation, they can nevertheless develop a certain form of party 
identification. 
2. The Main Features and Limits of Party Identification in Korea 
Although Korean voters have been able to develop party identification in very unstable 
party politics, this does not mean that the concept in the new democracy is exactly 
equivalent to that in advanced democracies where partisanship has developed under a 
stable party system over a period of several decades. It is expected that party 
identification in the new democracy is somewhat different from party identification in 
advanced democracies because of Korea's unique political culture. This will be examined 
through a discussion of the main features of party affiliation in Korea. 
Instability of Party Affiliation 
A key feature of party identification, as an enduring predisposition, is its long-term 
stability. For example, in The American Voter, a redistribution of party identification was 
not feasible for several years. ° Unlike party affiliation in mature democracies where the 
party system is very stable, party identification in the new democracy is relatively 
unstable even within a relatively short time period. The level of party identification in 
Korea has often changed depending upon political affairs during a relatively short-period 
time. 
As shown in Table 5.7, the level of affiliation to each political party rose and fell 
during the final six months of 1997. The ruling NKP/GNP experienced a great change in 
the level of party identification, while the level of the major opposition NCNP party 
identification was relatively stable. During six months, the highest level of the GNP party 
identification was 31.3 per cent on 21 July 1997 and the lowest was 14.9 per cent on 25 
October 1997. Table 5.8 shows the redistribution of party identification during 2002. In 
this year, the level of the major opposition GNP party identification was relatively stable, 
19 He assumed a historical link between the GNP and its old form, and ignored the fact that the 
GNP is only five years old. 
20 The distribution of party identification in 1952 was almost identical to that in 1958. Campbell et 
al., The American Voter, p. 124. 
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but the level of the ruling MDP party identification frequently fluctuated. During the 
election year, the highest level of the MDP party identification was 29.7 per cent on 23 
March 2002 and the lowest level was 16.4 per cent on 2 November 2002. 
Table 5.7 Party Identification in Presidential Election, 1997 
DATE N NKP/GNP NCNP ULD UDP NPP NON 
14-Jun-9 missin 22.9°/ 23.7°/ 10.0°/ 4.4°/ 31.7% 
21-Jul-9 158 31.3% 21.8°/ 7.9°/ 5.6°/ 32.7% 
31-Ju1-9 1605 29.3°/ 23.6°/ 9.7°/ 4.4°/ 32.8°/ 
13-Aug-9 101 23.5°/ 26.0°/ 9.2°/ 6.6°/ 34.3°/ 
17-Sep-97 1033 17.6°/ 23.80 5.1°/ 8.2°/ 44.7°/ 
27-Sep-9 1555 20.7°/ 27.1°/ 6.0°/ 5.0°/ 39.2°/ 
25-Oct-9 210 14.9°/ 28.9°/ 3.8°/ 3.8°/ 15.7°/ 32.7% 
4-Nov-9 105 15.2% 26.70,4 2.7°/ 3.0°/ 17.9°/ 34.7% 
8-Nov-9 103 18.1°/ 29.0°/ 2.7°/ 1.8°/ 13.8°/ 34.4% 
15-Nov-9 103 19.6°/ 26.2°/ 2.7°/ 2.39/j 12.20/1 36.5% 
20-Nov-9 526 22.6% 25.7°/ 1.3°/ 10.2°/ 39.9°/ 
29-Nov-9 121 22.1% 26.4°/ 1.6°/ 8.3°/ 41.4% 
2-Dec-971 158 23.0°/ 26.3°/ 1.5°/ 11.8°/ 37.3% 
3-Dec-9 3151 22.8°/ 26.6°/ 2.2°/ 11.0°/ 37.1°/ 
6-Dec-9 123 17.9°/ 24.41X 1.5°/ 10.0°/ 45.9% 
8-Dec-9 153 21.6°/ 29. °/ 1.1 °/ 12.1 °/ 35.9% 
10-Dec-9 102 19.8°/ 28.0°/ 2.2°/ 12.6°/ 36.9°/ 
13-Dec-9 2603 23.4% 27.2°/ 1.0°/ 9.4°/ 38.8% 
15-Dec-9 404 23.6% 26.2°/ 1.4°/ 12.6°/ 35.8°/ 
17-Dec-9 221 25.6% 28.7°/ 1.0°/ 12.511 32.0°/ 
i 8-Dec-9 2521 25.6°/ 31.2°1 0.5°/ 11.90/4 30.213 
19-Dec-9 152 26.0°/ 30.4°/ 1.8°/ 13.3°/ 28.2°/ 
Data: (iallup Korea, various surveys in 1997. 
Keys: N= sample size; NKP/GNP = New Korea Party and the Grand National Party later; NCNP 
= National Congress for New Politics; ULD = United Liberal Democrats; UDP = United 
Democratic Party; NPP = New Party for People; and NON = non-identifiers. 
Notes: The following question is used in measuring party identification: indeed, `Which political 
party do you support? '. 
Non-identifiers includes `no answer' or `don't know' in surveys. 
The proportion of `no answer' and `don't know' is expected about 5 per cent of total respondents. 
In the surveys of 21' July, 3 July, 13th August, and 19th December the proportions of `no answer' 
and `don't know' were 8.9 per cent, 5.6 per cent, 5.6 per cent, and 4.7 per cent, respectively. 
108 
Chapter 5 
Table 5.8 Party Identification (%) in Presidential Election, 2002 
DATE N GNP MDP ULD DLP NU21 OTHER NON 
22-12-2001 315 33. 23. 1. 1. 40.5 
27-Feb-O 104 32.1 22. 2.5 1. 40. 
2-Mar-O 1053 31.5 27. 1.7 0. 1. 37. 
23-Mar-O 159 28. 29. 1. 2.4 38. 
25-Apr-02 1023 30. 28. 1.3 1. 1.3 36. 
1-May-02 1053 31.5 27. 1. 0. 1. 37. 
1-Jun-O 101 30. 24. 1.1 1.3 1. 40. 
6-Jul-0 1011 36. 20. 1.4 3. 1.2 37. 
17-Aug-02 103 35. 20.1 0. 4. 1. 36.8 
22-Sep-02 105 32. 20.1 1.4 4. 2. 39.5 
30-Sep-02 105 33.5 21. 1.7 4. 2. 36.7 
19-Oct-02 104 33. 21. 1. 4.5 I. 37.3 
19-Oct-0 104 "i"0. 14 4.1 20. 0. 29. 
2-Nov-02 104 32.5 16. 1. 3. 9.3 0.7 36.4 
16-Nov-02 201 34. 19.5 1.1 4. 7. 0. 32.2 
02-Dec-03 2072 35. 27. 0. 4. 3. 0.3 27.4 
05-Dec-02 213 35. 26. 0. 6. 3. 0. 28.2 
09-Dec-0 203 34. 28. 1.1 7. 5. 0.5 22.7 
12-Dec-02 2164 35. 26. 1.2 6. 3. 0.3 25.8 
15-Dec-0 2055 34.1 27. 0. 9. 3. 0. 24.3 
16-Dec-O 2055 36.1 28. 0. 8.1 3.1 0.1 24.14 
17-Dec-0 215 33.5 27. 1.3 7.5 3.1 0.3 26.5 
18 Dec-0 2055 38. 29.1 0. 7. 2. 0.3 20. 
Data: Gallup Korea, various surveys in 2002. 
Keys: N= sample size; GNP = Grand National Party; MDP = Millennium Democratic Party; ULD 
= United Liberal Democrats; DLP= Democratic Labour Party; NU21 = National Unity 21; and 
NON = non-identifiers. 
Notes: The following question is used in measuring party identification: `Which political party do 
you support? '. 
Independents include `no answer' and `do not know' in the surveys. 
The second row of 19th October is about the percentage of party identification when Chung Mong- 
joon's expected (at this stage as yet unformed) new party (NU2 1) was included in the surveys. 
Measurement Errors? 
Considering the fluctuations in the level of party identification in Korea within a 
relatively short-period time, the limits of the data or possible measurement errors should 
be discussed. First, most of the data used in Table 5.7 and Table 5.8 came from relatively 
small sized samples. The sample sizes of most surveys are about 1000, and the estimated 
standard error of these surveys is plus and minus 3 per cent point in the true percentage 
with 95% confident interval. Therefore, although there was a clear change in the level of 
party identification during the election year, fluctuations in the level of party 
identification within a short-period time may be a relatively minor concern. 
Another possible problem related to the limits of the data is the question used in 
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measuring party identification. The dataset is based on a simple question - "Which 
political party do you support (jYihaneun jeongdang)? ". The questionnaire does not ask 
specifically about a long-term predisposition, and the questionnaire may fail to 
distinguish between party identification as a long-term political attitude and party 
preference a short-term attitude immediately prior to an election. In British electoral 
studies, it has been argued that the level of party identification is different depending 
upon the specific question used. 21 In Korean electoral studies, party identification has 
often been measured, but there is no single established question to measure party 
identification. The question used to measure party identification is quite different 
depending upon surveys or researchers. There is even no consistency in the question used 
by the group of leading academic researchers in Korea. For example, the data generated 
and accumulated by the Korean Social Science Data Center are also based on inconsistent 
questions. They used the question - "Which political party do you feel close to (ggapge 
neugineunjeongdang)? " - in 1992, but they used different wording - "Which political 
party do you prefer (joahaneun jeongdang) in general? " - in 1997 and in 2002. In 
general, professional pollsters in social research widely use the question - "Which 
political party do you support (jijihaneun jeongdang)? " - in measuring party 
identification of Korean electorate, and academic researchers have also used the same 
question . 
22 They are all questions with some merit, but they have not been designed in 
accordance with the Michigan model. The validity of these questions still is questionable, 
despite their wide use in Korea. Therefore, an explanation of change in party 
identification within a relatively short-term period is more difficult due to this potential 
measurement problem. 
Strength of Party Identification 
Despite the potential problems of measurement errors, several key features of party 
identification in Korea should be noted in view of the changes in the level of party 
21 John Bartle, `The Measurement of Party Identification in Britain: Where Do We Stand Now? ', 
in Jonathan Tonge et al., eds, British Elections and Parties Review, vol. II (London: Frank Cass, 
2001), pp. 9-22. 
22 Academic researchers also often used a same question in measuring party identification. For 
example, in a survey conducted by a major research institute in Korea, the Sejong Institute, party 
identification is measured by a same question - i. e., `Do you have any political party you 
support? ' See the Sejong Institute, ed., Je sipodae chongseon bunseok (Analyses of the 156, 
general election) (Seoul: Sejong Institute, 1996); and especially, Lee Nae-young, `Je sipodae 
chongseonui tupyohaengtae byeonhwa' (Changes in electoral behaviour in the 15th general 
election), pp. 95-128. Another researcher also used a similar question - i. e., `Which party do you 
think speaks for you? ' - in measuring party identification. See Aie-Rie Lee and Yong U. Glasure, 
`Party Identifiers in South Korea: Differences in Issue Orientations', Asian Survey, 35: 4 (1995), 
367-76. 
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identification during election year. First, the instability of party identification suggests 
that the strength of party identification is so weak that party identification is easily 
affected by short-term political affairs. We assume that the strong identifiers are relatively 
constant in their party attachment and that the weak identifiers are relatively sensitive to 
short-term political events. It is assumed that the strength of party identification in Korea 
is relatively weak compared to a mature democracy. However, it is difficult to examine 
the strength of party identification due to the lack of appropriate data. It is also not 
possible to examine whether the drifters or changeable party identifiers are usually weak 
party identifiers. 23 
Although there are limits on analysis based on aggregated data, we may assume the 
approximate number of the strong party identifiers relatively less affected by short-term 
political affairs and the number of weak party identifiers who easily change their 
partisanship as a consequence of short-term factors. Although the level of party 
identification for the two major parties varied during the election year, the level of party 
identification for the GNP did not fall below 28.2% with that of the MDP not falling 
below 14.5%. It is assumed that the majority of party identifiers maintained their party 
attachment under unfavourable political conditions, even though some party identifiers 
abandoned their partisanship according to changes in political conditions. 
Before the beginning of the official election campaign in 1997, the level of party 
identification of the GNP fluctuated. The lowest level was about 15 per cent on the end of 
October, while average level of party identification of GNP during the period was about 
21 per cent and the highest level was about 31 per cent with about a 16 per cent gap 
between the highest level and the lowest level. This wide gap may be interpreted as 
resulting from the strength of individual party identification. We may assume that half of 
GNP party identifiers had a strong party attachment, while a half of them were willing to 
give this up depending upon political conditions. In 2002, the MDP also experienced a 
great change in the level of party identification. The lowest level was 16.4 per cent in 
early November and the highest level was 29.7 per cent, while the average level of party 
identification with the MDP was about 23 per cent with the gap between the highest level 
and the lowest level about 13 per cent. Again, we may assume that a half of party 
identifiers of the MDP never changed their party affiliation even though the party faced to 
a serious crisis, while half of party identifiers were willing to abandon their party 
identification under unfavourable political conditions. 
In sum, only a half of party identifiers at most are strong party identifiers who have 
an enduring affiliation immune from short-term effects. Also, when we assume that the 
23 In order to measure changes in individual party identification, a multi-wave panel survey is 
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average level is the true level of party identification, among the weak party identifiers 
who gave up their party affiliations, half of them were short-term supporters for the 
political parties in the election rather than party identifiers with a long-term affiliation. It 
might be guessed that about 5-6 per cent point of party identifiers are those who express 
short-term party preferences when the level of party identification reaches its highest 
level - i. e., 31.3 per cent of the GNP in 1997 and 29.7 per cent of the MDP in 2002. 
Party Identification and Short-term Political Affairs 
Second, positive or negative political issues and events directly related to the 
political parties cause changes in the level of party identification. Political affairs mainly 
related to the candidates have relatively less influence on the level of party identification. 
For parties not experiencing a serious internal party conflict, the level of party 
identification was relatively stable during election year. For example, party identification 
for the NCNP was relatively stable about 25 per cent before December in 1997. In 2002, 
party identification with the GNP also was relatively stable at about 32-33 per cent. 
On the other hand, those political parties having a serious setback, such as internal 
conflict or even the withdrawal of a faction from the party, experienced great decreases in 
identification. For example, in 1997, the NKP/GNP was involved in an internal party 
conflict, and Rhee In je left the party in order to form a new party to run for the 
presidency by himself. During this internal conflict, some NKP/GNP party identifiers 
drifted to the new party following Rhee In je or became non-identifiers. During this 
conflict, the level of party identification of the NKP/GNP dropped to 15.2 per cent, but 
soon recovered to the previous level, i. e. about 21-22 per cent, when the official election 
campaign started. 
In 2002, the level of MDP party identification stayed quite stable at 22-23 per cent, 
although the level of party identification reached to 29-30 per cent for a while after the 
presidential primary. However, when the MDP experienced a serious internal party 
conflict, party identification fell to about 16-17 per cent. When the internal conflict was 
over and the MDP announced an electoral coalition with the strong candidate Chung 
Mong-joon on 25 November 2002, the level of the MDP party identification rose to 
higher than the usual level. Thus when a party has a serious problem, identification with 
it in the electorate was about 5-6 per cent lower than its average level. 
Unlike negative political events directly related to the parties, political issues or 
scandals related to the candidates have less impact on the levels of party identification. 
desirable. However, panel surveys are very rare in Korean electoral studies. 
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For example, in 1997, Kim Dae-jung was embroiled in a series of negative events such as 
a formation of illegal fund, but the level of the MDP party identification was relatively 
stable. In 2002, the popularity of Lee Hoi Chang fell rapidly due to his family's luxurious 
houses and a suspicion about his illegal involvement in his two sons' exemptions from 
national military duty. Despite this, the level of GNP party identification was relatively 
stable. Therefore, the popularity of individual candidates does not seem to greatly affect 
the level of party identification. 
However, positive political events related to both the parties and the candidates 
bring about an increase in the level of party identification. If a candidate was officially 
nominated by the parties after a free intra-party competition, the candidate's popularity 
and the level of part identification increased. For example, in 1997, the level of the 
NKP/GNP party identification increased rapidly and reached its highest level at 31.3 per 
cent. In 2002, the MDP also experienced the same pattern of increase at the end of the 
presidential primary, which was introduced for first time in Korean political history. The 
level of MDP party identification jumped to about 28-29 per cent from about 22-23 per 
cent. However, this increase of party identification was not sustained. When candidates 
have faced unfavourable political issues and events, the level of party identification 
swiftly decreased to the previous level. Therefore, an increase of a candidate's popularity 
within a short-period time causes an increase in party identification, but this returns to the 
previous level when the bubble of the candidate popularity bursts. 
The Flow of Party Identification 
Third, regarding increases or decreases in the level of party identification, the 
direction of change of party identification must be discussed. In order to examine the 
direction of redistribution of party identification, panel survey data is required, but such 
data is not available. Although aggregate data can only show directions of change in party 
identification to a limited extent, changes in the level of non-party identification provide a 
hint as to the direction of change. 
It is assumed here that party identifiers may give up their affiliation to a political 
party depending upon political conditions, but usually become non-party identifiers and 
later return to the same political party rather than move to another political party. This 
assumption is well-supported by the fact that many voters have both positive feelings to a 
party and negative feelings to another party. This would suggest that party identifiers are 
hardly likely to move to another party they previously had negative feelings about. Also, 
Table 5.7 and Table 5.8 shows that a decrease of the level of party identification in one 
political party is not related to an increase in the level of party identification for another 
113 
Chapter 5 
party. For example, in 1997, the shifts in the level of party identification with the GNP 
were closely related to changes in the level of non-party identification. 
However, this argument does not explain changes in party identification when a 
new party is formed and attracts adherents from the existing parties. For example, in 1997, 
the level of party identification of the GNP decreased markedly when the NPP was 
formed. Although it is clear that many party identifiers of the GNP gave up their party 
identification when the new party was formed, it is not possible to estimate the direction 
of change of party identification. Some identifiers may have switched to the new party, 
but some of them may have become non-party identifies. 
It can be assumed that the voters who identified with the new party were mainly 
former non-party identifiers rather than former party identifiers of the established political 
parties. In 1997, when Rhee In je withdrew from the GNP and formed the NPP, the level 
of party identification of the GNP decreased. As shown in Table 5.7, the decrease of non- 
party identifiers was bigger than the decrease of the GNP party identifiers between the 
survey on 27 September and the survey on 25 October in 1997. Some party identifiers 
who gave up their party affiliation to the NKP/GNP turned to non-identifiers rather than 
to the new party, while many non-party identifiers who were dissatisfied with the major 
parties moved to the new party. 24 Indeed, it is quite possible that the aggregate data 
actually underestimates the numbers of non-party identifiers moving to the NPP. 
In 2002, a similar situation developed. In the 2002 presidential election, Chung 
Mong-joon suddenly received a great public supports and tried to find a way to run for 
the presidency. He was widely supported by younger voters who were mainly non-party 
identifiers and by those MDP identifiers disappointed with their own candidate, Roh 
Moo-hyun. On 19 October, Gallup Korea included a question about electoral supports for 
an expected new party, the National Unity 21. About 20 per cent of voters were willing to 
change their partisanships if the new party was set up (see shaded cells in Table 5.20). As 
shown in the difference between the distribution of party identification excluding the new 
party and the distribution including the new party in the survey, some GNP identifiers 
moved to the new party (i. e., 3 per cent), while many non-identifiers (i. e. 8 per cent) 
supported the new party. Also, many MDP identifiers (i. e., 7 per cent) were willing to 
change their party affiliation to the new party. They were generally younger voters, a 
group thought to identify only weakly with parties. Concerning the changes in party 
identification of the MDP, it is might be assumed that some MDP identifiers moved to the 
new party, but some also became non-party identifiers, as in 1997. However, this 
argument is inconclusive due to the lack of data. 
24 Gallup Korea believed that some NKP (later GNP) identifiers and many non-identifiers move to 
114 
Chapter 5 
From this data then, it is not expected that many voters switch from one political 
party to a rival major party, particularly as party identifiers of two major political parties 
also strongly dislike the rival political parties. 5 While Keith and his colleagues suggested 
that the weak party identifiers are the hidden party identifiers, there are a thin line 
between weak party identifiers and non-party identifiers 26 
The Revisionist Understandins of Party Identification 
The instability of party identification raises questions about the quality of party 
identification as an enduring predisposition. This may be directly related to an incorrect 
measurement which fails to distinguish between party identification as a long-term 
enduring affiliation and party preference in a specific election as a short-term attitude. 
However, at the same time, instability of partisan affiliation should be understood as an 
important feature of party attachment in the instable Korean party system. In other words, 
party identification in Korea is a changeable political attitude rather than an enduring or 
unchangeable political predisposition as the Michigan model assumed. Changes of party 
identification can be understood as a part of the nature of party identification, and this 
conforms to an alternative conceptualisation of party identification. While the Michigan 
model focuses on long-term stability of party identification, a revisionist perspective 
suggests that - party identification is evaluated based on the performance of political 
parties. This school of thought argues that the level of party identification changes over 
time, though this does not mean instant evaluations or short-term changes in the level of 
party identification. 27 
Qualitative Data. Durable, but Weak Party Affiliations 
In contrast to survey data, in-depth interview data suggests that party affiliation is 
durable and maintained without interruption, and that changes of party identification from 
one party to another is very unusual. Most respondents who identify with a political party 
revealed that they have not experienced any change in their party affiliation. Following 
this, the changes in the level of party identification within a relatively short-period time 
revealed by the quantitative data can be understood as a change between the weak party 
the NPP, the new party. Chosun Daily Newspaper, 10 November 1997. 
u Negative party identifications in Korea are discussed in the later part of this section. 
'b For the concept of the hidden party identifiers, see Bruce E. Keith et al., The Myth of the 
Independent Voter (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992). 
27 For a revisionist understanding of the concept of party identification, see Morris P. Fiorina, 
Retrospective Voting in American National Elections (New Heaven and London: Yale University 
115 
Chapter 5 
identifiers and non-party identifiers. 
However, at the same time, many party identifiers also suggested that they are able 
to give up their attachment to a particular political party under specific circumstances in 
the future. Indeed, it seems that most party identifiers were not fully satisfied with the 
party they attach to and that their identification is not unconditional. 
Changing party affiliation based on policy preference: Party identifiers who have a 
rational basis for their affiliation, such as policy preferences or ideology, suggested that 
they would lose this identification if the party was no longer matched with their policy 
preference or ideology. For example, "I have supported the party because I think the party 
is more liberal than any other parties, but if the party is not liberal, I will be disappointed 
and give up my affiliation to the party" (1-207). "I am willing to change to a more 
progressive party if I can find one" (1-204). "Of course, I can change my affiliation to a 
party... I would support a new party if the party proposed better welfare polices" (1-212), 
"I would be unlikely to change my party affiliation, but it will be different if a new party 
speaks for the poor" (1-208). 
In conclusion, the qualitative interview data show that party identification varies 
depending upon the performance of political parties. Voters do not align themselves to a 
particular party unconditionally. The attachment to a particular political party is not 
similar to religious attitudes as the Michigan model assumed. 28 Party identifiers examine 
and compare policies and the behaviour of political parties and make a change in their 
affiliation if the party deviates from their preferences. 
Fragile party affiliation based on regionalism: Among party identifiers who were 
influenced by regionalism or the family, most interviewees also suggested the possibility 
of changing their party affiliation if a better political party was formed. This again 
implied that despite their attachment to a party for family or regional reasons, they were 
not fully satisfied with the party and were waiting for another party that can fulfil their 
expectations. "I can change it. If any party shares my ideas, I will change my party 
affiliation" (1-202). "If other party has better policies, I will give up my present 
affiliation" (1-206). "1 may support any party which provides us with a better vision of 
our society" (1-214). "If president Roh runs the government well, I may change my 
affiliation and support his party" (1-210). 
Absolute Loyalty: A few party identifiers denied any possibility of giving up their 
attachment to a political party. These voters had some common characteristics. They were 
generally old and constrained by regionalism concerning their partisanship. For example, 
Press, 1981). 
28 Miller and Shanks compared the nature of party identification with religious affiliation. Miller 
and Shanks, The New American Voter, p. 120. 
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"I have never thought about it" (1-213). "1 do not have any desire for it. I believe in my 
party" (1-205). "I will not give up my attachment to the party" (1-203). The data suggests 
that these party identifiers initially had an attachment to a particular party due to 
regionalism, and this partisanship has strengthened over time. Such identifiers conform to 
the image of party identifiers assumed by the Michigan model. 
Party Identification and Political Leaders 
Another potential problem related to the concept of party identification in new democracy 
is that party identification may be affiliation to a politician rather than to a political party 
where the party has been formed and dominated by one individual. It is possible, then, 
that voters identify themselves with a political party because they prefer a politician who 
leads the party, and that their party affiliation may change if the politician leaves the 
political party. 
One-Man Dominated Political Parties 
In the new democracy, the `three Kims' --- Kim Dae-jung, Kim Young Sam, and 
Kim Jong-pil -- were charismatic politicians popular with Korean voters, and it is 
possible that the party affiliation of many voters was nothing but an expression of 
supports for one of the three Kims. For example, when the three Kims were released from 
the ban preventing them from political activity in 1987, they formed new parties which 
immediately gained support from a large proportion of the Korean electorate. Another 
example was when Kim Dae-jung, who retired from politics immediately after the failure 
in the 1992 presidential election, returned to politics and formed a new party, the NCNP, 
in 1995. Many former party identifiers of the Democratic Party moved to the NCNP 
following Kim Dae-jung. 
Party affiliations with a new party formed just before elections may be related to the 
personal popularity of the individual who formed and led the party. For example, in the 
2002 presidential election, approximately twenty per cent of Korean electorate identified 
themselves with a new party - the National Unity 21 formed by one time leading 
candidate Chung Mong-joon - even before the party had actually formed and been 
named (see Table 5.8, especially, figures in shaded cells). In 1997, the New Party for 
People formed by Rhee In je was another example of a close relationship between party 
affiliation and support for an individual politician. During the election the NPP gained a 
respectable level of party affiliation, but the number of NPP adherents diminished soon 
after the election. 
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The Annexation of Three Political Parties and Electoral Response 
However, party affiliation cannot be considered as the same as the popularity of a 
politician or a candidate in an election. For example, when three major parties merged 
and formed a giant ruling party in 1990, the level of the party affiliation of the new party 
did not increase greatly. Many party identifiers with former parties did not moved to the 
new party following their preferred politicians - in this case, Kim Young Sam and Kim 
Jong-pil. 
Changes in the level of party identification: The level of party identification before 
the merger of the three parties in 1990 is unknown 29 Most researchers did not included 
party identification in measuring various political attitudes in the early period of 
democracy. Therefore, it is not possible to directly compare the level of party 
identification before the merge of three parties to the level subsequently. The level of 
party identification in the 1987 presidential election is unknown, but it can be assumed 
that the level of party identification in the early period of the new democracy was not so 
much higher than the level before the transition to democracy in 1987 30 
Although it is not possible to directly examine change in the level of party 
identification caused by the merger of three political parties, the low level of party 
identification of the merged parties suggests that an annexation of two opposition parties 
to the ruling DJP did not greatly increase the level of party identification with the ruling 
party. In a survey conducted by the press three months after the merger in 1990, the level 
of party identification of the new Democratic Liberal Party (DLP) was only 13.9 per cent, 
while the level of party identification of a remaining opposition PDP was 15.6 per cent. 1 
In other words, the level of party identification of the gigantic ruling party was still lower 
than the major opposition party. It is also interesting that the level of the expected new 
party, the Democratic Party, was 12.5 per cent in the same survey. 32 This implies that 
29 Under the authoritarian regimes, the level of party identification was very low. In 1985, two 
years before the transition to democracy, only 24.3% of the voters identified themselves with a 
political party. Indeed, about 75.7% of the voters were non-party identifiers or did not answer. See 
Cheon-ju Yun, Tupyo chamyeowa jeongchibaljeon (Vote participation and political development) 
(Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1989), pp. 204-15. 
30 In the 1987 presidential elections, there was a survey on people's positive and negative feelings 
to political parties, though this was not a true measurement of party identification. Approximately 
30 per cent of respondents have a positive feeling to each two opposition parties -- the Peace 
Democratic Party and the Reunification Democratic Party. Only 6 per cent of respondents 
answered that they feel positively to the Democratic Justice Party, the authoritarian ruling party, 
while about 58 per cent of respondents said a negative feeling to the party. Hyeon, `Seongeoinuf 
jaepyeonseonggwa tupyo' (Electoral realignment and vote), pp. 219-20. 
31 The survey was conducted through telephones, and the sample size was 1,600. Dong-A Daily 
Newspaper, 8 May 1990. 
Some of politicians of the former RDP did not follow their boss Kim Young Sam who jointed to 
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many party identifiers of the former RDP did not follow Kim Young Sam and preferred 
some form of reconstruction or continuation of the RDP. In the same survey, 53.1 per cent 
of the respondents answered that they do not feel close to any party. It would seem likely 
that this figure included some former party identifiers of the RDP who were confused of 
the merger of the political parties and became non-identifiers. Another survey conducted 
by the same newspaper two months later showed a similar result. Here the level of party 
identification of the DLP, the PDP, and the DP was 11.4 per cent, 16.0 per cent, and 13.5 
per cent, respectively, while the level of non-identifiers was 59.1 per cent 33 
In summary, it seems that there was little change in the distribution of partisanship 
resulting from the merger of the three political parties in 1990, though this analysis is not 
conclusive due to the lack of data. Many party identifiers of the RDP and the NDRP did 
not follow their leader's decision to merge with the ruling party. This would therefore 
suggest that party affiliation is not same with a mere support for a popular political leader. 
Outcome of the following election: This argument is also confirmed by election 
results. It is true that election results do not directly indicate the level of party affiliation, 
but it is possible to estimate an increase or decrease of the level of party identification 
based upon election results because a party's share of votes in any election is roughly a 
combination of the votes of loyal partisans and the votes of non-party identifiers 
influenced by short-term factors. If there is a great change from one election to the next, 
we would expect significant change in party affiliations. This has been borne out in 
British elections. In British elections, there is a positive relation between an increase in 
the share of the vote and an increase of the level of party identification. 34 We would 
therefore expect a redistribution of party identification to accompany the redistribution of 
the vote at the same election. 
According to Korean election results in 1988 and in 1992, it appears that the merger 
of the three major parties and the birth of a giant ruling party in 1990 did not bring about 
a merger of their electorates. In 1987 and 1988, the three parties, which participated in the 
merger of 1990, together took 72.7 per cent and 73.4 per cent share of the vote, 
respectively. However, in the two elections in 1992, the merged ruling party gained only 
42.0 per cent and 38.5 per cent of votes (see Table 5.9). Indeed, there was no 
mathematical increase of support for the merged party in elections. The election result 
suggests that some of the voters followed the political decision of party leaders, but most 
the formation of the DLP, and tried to rebuild the RDP - the party's provisional new name was 
the Democratic Party. 
33 Dong-A Daily Newspaper, 16 July 1990. 
34 Ivor Crewe and Katarina Thomson, `Party Loyalties: Dealignment or Realignment? ', in 
Geoffrey Evans and Pippa Norris, eds, Critical Elections: British Parties and Voters in Long-term 
Perspective (London: Sage, 1999), pp. 64-86. 
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of them defected from the party leaders and instead supported either the new third party, 
the UNP, or the remaining major opposition party. Therefore, it is not true that party 
identification or party affiliation was merely based on loyalty to a political leader when 
most partisans did not actually follow their political leader's decision. 
Table 5.9 Election Results before and after a Merger of the Ruling Party in 1990 
BEFORE THE MERGER AFTER THE MERGER 
Presidential Election 
(1987 and 1992) 
DJP 
RDP 
NDRP 
36.6% 
28.0% 
8.1% 
DLP 42.0% 
PDP 27.0% DP 33.8% 
Other/independents 0.2% Other/independents 24.3% 
Parliamentary 
election 
(1988 and 1992) 
DJP 
RDP 
NDRP 
34.0% 
23.8% 
15.6% 
DLP 38.5% 
PDP 19.3% DP 29.2% 
Other/independents 7.3% Other/independents 32.3% 
Jource: l, aiculaiea unm election statistics provlaea by the National Election Commission. 
Key: DJP = Democratic Justice Party; RDP = Reunification Democratic Party; NDRP = New 
Democratic Republican Party; PDP = Peace Democratic Party; DLP = Democratic Liberal Party; 
and DP = Democratic Party. 
Party Identification without Dominant Political Leaders 
Furthermore, the period of the `three Kims' in politics was over, but party 
affiliations formed during the period of the two Kims continued. Party leadership was 
handed over to a new generation by those who had created the parties. Kim Young Sam 
withdrew from the GNP in 1997 and retired from politics in early of 1998, and Kim Dae- 
jung did take exactly same steps five years later, but party identifiers of both the GNP and 
the MDP maintained their loyalties despite the departure of their beloved. Again this 
demonstrates that party affiliation with the two major parties in the new democracy is 
different from mere loyalty to political leaders. Some voters may develop party affiliation 
because of charismatic leaders, but the affiliation is maintained even when the leaders no 
longer present in the parties and party affiliation is consolidated. 
Qualitative Data: Attachment to Political Parties rather than Politicians 
Qualitative data generally confirmed the argument that party identification with a 
party is different from a support for a certain political leader. In answering the question of 
whether a withdrawal of a preferred political leader from a party would affect an 
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interviewee's affiliation to the party, most party identifiers said that they would maintain 
their partisanship to a party, even though their preferred politicians leave the party. For 
instance, "I feel I am a member of the party. In the party, there are several thousands 
members. Even if one of the members leaves the party, I cannot change my partisanship" 
(I-213). "I do not care about the withdrawal of a politician from the party [Democratic 
Labour Party]. I affiliate with the party without regard for any politicians in the party" (I- 
212). "I think that the political party consists of many members, and the withdrawal of a 
politician will not affect my party affiliation" (1-209). "1 like the party due to policies 
rather than politicians. So, I will maintain my party identification even if a few politicians 
withdrew from the party" (1-208). "I support the party as a whole rather than a particular 
politician of the party, and the withdrawal of a politician is not a matter of consideration 
for me" (1-203). "A withdrawal from a party and an affiliation to another party is not 
rightful. I will not change my party affiliation" (1-204). A respondent was more critical, 
"If my preferred politician left my party, I would no longer like the politician" (1-206). 
However, some interviewees suggested that they may follow a politician who left 
the party. They generally opposed the withdrawal of politicians from a party, but some 
also suggested they might consider following their preferred politician. For example, "If a 
politician who I like left the party, I may follow him depending upon the circumstance" 
(1-210). "I think that the party is working rather than the politician. I believe the party. 
But, I may change my thinking depending upon the reason why my preferred politician 
had to leave the party" (1-205). 
Party Identification and Voting Preference in a Specific Election 
Voters find it difficult to distinguish between party identification and voting preference in 
a specific election, and respondents may express their voting preference in a specific 
election rather than a durable party identification. Voters' party identification is thus 
affected by their voting preference in a specific election. For example, British researchers 
argue that British voters change their party identification to conform with changes in their 
voting preference 35 
Relatively Stable Party Identification and Unstable Candidate Preference 
35 David Butler and Donald Stokes, Political Change in Britain (London: Macmillan, 1969), pp. 
41-2. Cited from Ivor Crewe, `Party Identification Theory and Political Change in Britain', in Ian 
Budge, Ivor Crewe, and Dennis Farlie, eds, Party Identification and Beyond: Representations of 
Voting and Party Competition (London: John Wiley & Sons), pp. 33-62, at p. 51. 
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Although some party identifiers may confuse their voting preferences with their 
affiliation with a political party and change of party identification is related to change of 
voting choice, party identification can still be distinguished from candidate preference in 
a specific election. For example, in the 1997 and 2002 presidential elections, the level of 
party identification for the two major parties was much more stable than candidate 
popularity, even though both party identification and candidate popularity fluctuated 
depending upon political issues and events during the election year (see Figure 5.2 and 
Figure 5.3). 
As discussed above, candidate factors affected the level of party identification. 
When the level of support for party candidate increased, the level of party identification 
increased as well. In 1997, when Lee Hoi Chang's popularity markedly increased, the 
level of the NKP/GNP party identification increased. In 2002, when the level of Roh 
Moo-hyun' popularity peaked just after he was nominated in the primary, the level of 
party identification of the MDP markedly increased. However, increased levels of party 
identification decreased soon after Lee or Roh lost their popularity. In this context, it is 
true that some proportion of party identification is related to candidate popularity. 
However, this fact does not suggest that party identification is generally identical with 
candidate popularity. 
Although the level of party identification and the level of candidate popularity 
varied together during the election year, there is some difference in the degree of the 
change. The level of candidate popularity increases or decreases to a greater degree 
compared to the level of party identification. Moreover, the level of party identification 
generally remains at a certain level despite rapid falls in a candidate's popularity. This can 
be seen in the level of party identification of the NCNP in 1997 and the GNP in 2002. 
Conversely, the level of party identification reached its lowest level when the parties were 
involved in internal conflict rather than when candidates faced a serious personal problem. 
For example, the NKP/GNP in 1997 and the MDP in 2002 experienced serious internal 
conflicts causing the level of party identification for each party to fall to its lowest point. 
It must also be noted that an increase or decrease of the level of party identification 
and candidate popularity do not always go together. For example, in 1997, at some points, 
the level of party identification of the NCNP increased when the level of the candidate 
popularity decreased, or vice versa. This was again evident in 1997 when Kim Dae-jung 
joined with Kim Jong-pil through an election coalition between the NCNP and the ULD. 
Consequently, Kim Dae-jung gained more popularity, but the level of party identification 
of the NCNP was unchanged. 
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Figure 5.2 Changes in Party Affiliation and Candidate Popularity in Presidential Election, 
1997 
Grand National Party, 1997 
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Figure S. 3 Changes in Party Affiliation and Candidate Popularity in Presidential Election, 
2002. 
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Because the level of party identification was relatively stable and the level of 
candidate popularity was relatively unstable, there was a moment when the level of party 
affiliation was higher than the level of candidate popularity. For example, in 2002, 
candidate popularities of both major parties, the GNP and the MDP, were lower than 
party affiliations of the parties. Indeed, the level of popularity of Lee Hoi Chang, a 
presidential candidate of the GNP, was 33.1 per cent and the level of party affiliation of 
the GNP was 35.3 per cent while 76.1 per cent of the GNP party identifiers supported Lee 
Hoi Chang. Also, popularity of Roh Moo-Hyun, a presidential candidate of the MDP, was 
17.0 per cent and party affiliation for the MDP was 21.0 per cent, while only 50.6 per 
cent of the MDP party identifiers were loyal to their own party candidate'6 This reverse 
of the level of candidate popularity and the level of party affiliation suggests that party 
identification is not mere support for a candidate. 
The Influence of Candidate Preference on Party Identification 
Although a voter's attachment to a political party is distinct from their preference 
for a specific candidate in a presidential election, it should be noted that candidate 
preferences does influence party affiliation. Qualitative data shows that a few 
interviewees pointed to a candidate as the sole reason why they feel close to a particular 
party. For example, "I do not support a candidate because I identify with a party. Instead, 
I support the party because I like a presidential candidate of the party" (1-211). "In the 
1997 election, I voted for the present president because I thought that he was good for 
democracy, and I did the same thing in this election" (1-207). The same respondent, in 
answering a question of why they have an affiliation to a particular party, referred to the 
candidates of the party she felt close to. 
In the in-depth interviews, many party identifiers suggested a candidate of a 
political party as one of the reasons why they identified with a particular party. However, 
in general, a candidate was not the first reason for their party affiliation, but a secondary 
factor. Additionally, most party identifiers who referred to a candidate as the reason why 
they feel close to a particular party have maintained their partisanship since developing 
the affiliation. For example, in answering a question of why they feel close to a particular 
party, many partisans mentioned regionalism, "I am from Gyeongsang, so regional 
feeling affected my party affiliation. Also, I like the candidate of the party" (1-214). "1 
lived in Daegu [a big city in Gyeongsang region], so I like the party. As another reason, I 
like Mr. Lee Hoi Chang, the presidential candidate" (1-210). "I know it is not right, but I 
36 Kyeonghyang Daily Newspaper, 7 October 2002. 
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am influenced by regionalism. Also, I like a politician in the party, and his old home is 
same as mine" (1-201). "My parents are from the Jeolla region... From my childhood, I 
heard that Mr. Kim Dae-jung was a victim of a rigged election under president Park's 
rule... I think that Mr. Kim is a very able man and has done a lot of things for the 
transition to democracy, so I began to support him [or his party]" (1-206). 
Therefore, many interviewees suggested that their voting choice had consolidated 
and turned into party affiliation. An election is a moment for them to think about politics 
and parties. They are suddenly interested in politics during elections and gain information 
about candidates, with the candidates influential in the development of an affiliation. 
Then, this partisanship is continued to the next election and support for a candidate turns 
into party identification. 
However, although positive feelings towards a candidate may lead to party 
affiliation, it is wrong to overestimate the influence of candidate factor. Compared to the 
power of regionalism the candidate factor may be not especially influential in the 
direction of partisanship. Regionalism may be the initial reason for affiliation with 
positive feelings towards candidates developing because the politician belongs to the 
party and they feel close to a candidate because the politician belongs to the party. Also, 
in the interviews, many felt that they were not honourable because they were affected by 
regionalism. From this, it can be suggested that they tried to justify their affiliation to a 
particular party by suggesting a candidate as a secondary reason why they identified with 
the party. 
Party Identification and Election: Effects of `Electoral Cycle'? 
Another feature of party identification in Korea is that party affiliations are often 
influenced by elections. The percentage of party identifiers in the electorate increased 
throughout the election year and peaked on the day of election. 37 In addition to this 
increase, the levels of party identification rapidly changed between the days immediately 
before and after the ballot. 8 
37 In British elections, feelings about political parties grow and are strengthened during election 
years compared to non-election times. William L. Miller et al., How Voters Change: The 1987 
British Election Campaign in Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 4. 
'a A regular `inter-election swing' in party popularity has been found in mature democracies. The 
electoral cyclical pattern consists of three stages: (1) a `short-lived burst' of additional support for 
the winning party immediately after elections (the honeymoon effect), (2) a `slow erosion' of the 
party's popularity (the mid-teen effect), and (3) the `run-up' to the next election (the swing-back 
effect). Using Gallup polls conducted in each month between 1987 and 1999, a graph can be 
drawn to illustrate an electoral cycle in British elections. After 11 June 1987,9 April 1992, 
popularity of Conservative Party increased and after I May 1997, popularity of Labour Party 
increased, while the popularity gradually declined during the mid-term period (see Figure 5. A1 in 
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`Swing-Back Effects' 
Close to an election day party identifiers gradually increased and non-party 
identifiers fell in number. For instance, according to surveys by Gallup-Korea during the 
election year, the average level of party identification for each major party during 
December was roughly between 2 and 4 per cent higher than the average level of party 
identification before December. As shown in Table 5.10, in 2002, the average of the level 
of party identification for the GNP before December was 32.6 per cent while the average 
during December was 35.5 per cent. The average for the MDP before December was 23 
per cent while the average during December was 27.6 per cent. Five years earlier during 
the previous presidential election, the average level of party identification for the GNP 
before December was 21.5 per cent while the average during December was 22.9 per cent. 
The average of the level of party identification for the NCNP that year before December 
was 25.7 per cent while the average during December was 27.8 per cent. 
This change can be interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, during election 
campaigns, some non-party identifiers turn into party identifiers because they are 
attracted by a specific candidate. Their party affiliation may be nothing but an expression 
of their preference for a certain candidate, and may not be an enduring partisanship. On 
the other hand, it could be suggested that weak party identifiers who do not express their 
party affiliation before eventually revealed their own party affiliation closer to the 
election day. 
Table 5.10 Average of Levels of Party Identification during Election Year, 1997 and 2002 
AVERAGE OF LEVELS OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION 
January through November (A) December (B) - (A) 
1997 Number of surveys 12 10 
GNP 21.5% 22.9% 1.4% 
NCNP 25.7% 27.8% 2.1% 
2002 Number of surveys 14 8 
GNP 32.6% 35.3% 2.7% 
NCNP 23.1% 27.6% 4.5% 
Data: Gallup-Korea, various surveys in 1997 and in 2002. 
Appendix). For the effects of the electoral cycle in mature democracies, See William L. Miller and 
T. Mackie, `The Electoral Cycle and the Asymmetry of Government and Opposition Popularity: 
An Alternative Model of the Relationship between Economic Consideration and Political 
Popularity', Political Studies, 21 (1973), 263-79; C. A. E. Goodhart and R. J. Bhansali, `Political 
Economy', Political Studies, 18 (1970), 43-106; James A. Stimson, `Public Support for American 
Presidents: A Cyclical Model', Public Opinion Quarterly, 40 (1976), 1-21; Stephanie Stray and 
Mick Silver, `Goverment Popularity, Bi-Election and Cycles'. Parliamentary Affairs, 36 (1983), 
49-55; Richard Johnston, `Business Cycles, Political Cycle and the Popularity of Canadian 
Government, 1974-1998', Canadian Journal of Political Science, 32 (1999), 499-520. 
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`Post-Election Euphoria' 
Concerning the relationship between elections and party identification, there is a 
clear redistribution of party affiliation following the election result. As shown in Table 
5.11, the level of party identification of a winning party in an election was sustained and 
increased, while the level of party identification for losing parties in elections decreased 
markedly after the election. Some GNP identifiers switched to non-party identifiers after 
the election, while some non-party identifiers developed an affiliation with the MDP. 
Table 5.11 Change in the Level of Party Identification before and after Presidential Election, 
2002 
BEFORE AFTER ELECTION THE DIFFERENCE 
ELECTION 
(A) (B) (C) (A) & (B) (A) & (C) 
Number of cases 1122 1500 1000 
GNP 33.8% 23.3% 24.0% -10.5% -9.8% 
MDP 27.5% 27.0% 35.1% -0.5% 7.6% All other parties 10.5% 9.0% 6.9% -1.0% -3.6% Non-identifiers 28.2% 40.5% 34.0% 12.3% 5.8% 
Data: Column (A) and (C) is based on surveys cond ucted by the TNS-Korea on 1 7 December 
2002 and on 25 February 2003, respectively. The standard error is +3.0% and -3.0% with 95% 
confidence interval. Column (B) is based on a post-election survey conducted by the Korean 
Social Science Data Center, i. e., Korean Presidential Election Study, 2002. 
Keys: GNP = Grand National Party; and MDP = Millennium Democratic Party. 
A change in the distribution of party identification between pre-election surveys and 
post-election surveys suggests that the level of party identification included some 
spurious party identifiers. In pre-election surveys, they gave their party preference for the 
upcoming election rather than a long-term affiliation, immediately abandoning this 
affiliation after their party lost the election. However, at the same time, this suggests that 
at least about 23 per cent of Korean voters are strong party identifiers for the GNP, and 
they have enduring affiliations that is stable regardless of the election result. Conversely, 
the level of party identification of the MDP increased in the two months after the election, 
i. e., the level increased by 7.6 per cent as shown in Table 5.11. This suggests that among 
the party identifiers for the MDP are many weak party identifiers whose identification 
developed following the election result. This party affiliation is thus very weak, and it can 
be expected that this attachment will change depending upon political circumstances. 
Some change in the level of party identification before and after an election may be 
customary in the new democracy, but a similar trend in identification in mature 
democracies has been detected. A panel survey in British Election Study shows that there 
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was a similar pattern of changes between pre-election study and post-election studies. 
Gallup polls conducted each month also show a post-election burst of additional 
popularity for the winning party in the 1987,1992, and 1997 British General Elections. 
Indeed, the popularity of the winning party increased 2-3 per cent immediately after each 
election, while the third party, the Liberal Democratic Party experienced a decline of 
popularity immediately after each election (see Table A5.2 in Appendix). 39 Nonetheless, 
the change is marginal compared to the Korean case (see Table A5.1 in Appendix) 
Positive and Negative Party Identification 
Negative feelings towards political parties are evident in the new democracy. Voters not 
only feel positively toward certain political parties, but they also have a negative feeling 
toward political parties. 40 In terms of positive and negative party identification, voters can 
be classified into four categories; that is, (1) those who have both positive and negative 
party identification, (2) those who have only positive party identification, (3) those who 
have only negative party identification, and (4) those who do not have any party 
identification. 1 
Table 5.12 shows that 49.1 per cent of total voters in 1997 and 42.6 per cent in 2002 
had negative feelings to a party with more than two thirds of party identifiers feeling this 
way. Therefore, most party identifiers in the new democracy also have a party they do not 
like. 
Table S. 12 Positive and Negative Feelings to the Parties in Presidential Election, 1997 and 
2002 
PARTY IDENTIFIERS NON-IDENTIFIERS 
N I II III IV Total 
1997 1190 49.1% 13.9% 13.7% 23.4% 100.0% 
2002 1500 42.6% 16.9% 13.9% 26.6% 100.0% 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1997 and 2002, by KSDC. 
Keys: I= those who have both positive and negative party identification; II = those who have only 
positive identification; III = those who have only negative identification; and IV = those who have 
neither positive nor negative identification. 
Note: The following questions are used: i. e., `Which political party do you like? ' and `Which 
political party do you dislike? ' 
" Calculated from David Butler and Gareth Butler, Twentieth-Century British Political Facts, 
1900-2000 (London: Macmillan, 2000), pp. 276-78. 
40 Party affiliation includes both `attracting quality of a party' and `repelling quality of a party'. 
See Campbell et al., The American Voter, pp. 121-22. 
41 Using a similar system, Ivor Crewe classifies four types of party identifiers focusing on negative 
identification: the Polarised identifiers; the Loyal identifiers; the Negative identifiers; and 
Apathetic identifiers. See Crewe, `Party Identification Theory and Political Change in Britain', pp. 
52-4. 
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Impacts ofNeiative FeelinP to Political Parties on Voting Choice 
In this classification, type III and type IV voters are non-party identifiers in a 
measurement based only on positive feeling toward a party. However, even though they 
are non-party identifiers, the type III of electorate will be constrained by their negative 
feelings towards a party in their voting decision as it can be assumed that they are more 
likely not to vote for the candidate of the party they dislike and are more likely to vote for 
another party despite their lack of party affiliation. In this way, negative party 
identification constrains electoral choice and can direct voting direction, just as positive 
party identification does. If we assume bi-party competition, the voting behaviour of non- 
party identifiers with a negative feeling to a party will actually be similar to the hidden 
party identifiers. According to Table 5.12, approximately one third of non-party 
identifiers in Korea have a negative feeling to a party. Taking into account these negative 
identifiers, the level of the `pure' non-party identifiers, who do not have any partisan 
constraints, is reduced from 36.9 per cent to 23.4 per cent in 1997 and from 40.5 per cent 
to 26.6 per cent in 2002. Of the non-identifiers in the Korean electorate, it is estimated 
that one third are not totally free from any partisan constraints in their vote choice. 
Table 5.13 Crosstab: Negative Feelings toward the Competing Parties, 1997 and 2002 
N GNP NCNP NPP OTHER NONE TOTAL 
1997 
GNP identifiers 217 1.4% 46.1% 26.7% 0.5% 25.3% 100% 
NCNP identifiers 388 71.1% 2.1% 6.4% 0.5% 19.8% 100% 
NPP identifiers 123 42.5% 32.5% 1.6% 0.8% 23.6% 100% 
Non-identifiers 441 15.9% 10.0% 10.2% 0.9% 63.0% 100% 
N GNP MDP ULD OTHER NONE TOTAL 
2002 
GNP identifiers 350 40.6% 20.6% 9.5% 29.4% 100% 
MDP identifiers 405 52.6% 0.2% 11.6% 5.0% 30.6% 100% 
DLP identifiers 85 41.9% 16.3% 23.3% 2.3% 16.3% 100% 
Non-identifiers 608 15.1% 5.8% 8.4% 5.1% 65.6% 100% 
Data: Korean Presid ential Elect ion Study 1997 and 2 002. 
Keys: N= number of cases; GNP = Grand National Party; NCNP = National Congress for New 
Politics; NPP = New Party for People; MDP = Millennium Democratic Party; UDL = United 
Liberal Democrats; and DLP = Democratic Labour Party. 
Negative feelings mainly exist among the partisans of the two largest parties. For 
example, as shown in Table 5.13, in 1997, GNP partisans disliked the NCNP (46.1%) the 
most, but also significant minority also disliked the NPP (26.7%), the separatists from the 
GNP. On the other hand, most party identifiers of the major opposition NCNP (71.1%) 
had negative feelings towards the GNP. In 2002, again the negative feeling existed mainly 
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between partisans of two major parties, the major opposition GNP and the ruling MDP, - 
- i. e., 40.6 per cent of the GNP identifiers and 52.6 per cent of the MDP identifiers felt 
negatively to the other major party. 
This antagonism towards other parties is not unique to Korean. Party identifiers in 
mature democracies often dislike competing parties. For example, in British election in 
2001, most Labour Party identifiers strongly disliked the competing Conservative Party 
(see Table A5.3 in Appendix). In the 11-point scale from zero to ten where zero stands for 
strongly dislike and ten stands for strongly like, 54.5 per cent of Labour Party identifiers 
expressed their feelings towards the Conservative Party as 2 or less with the average 
score for all Labour Party identifiers 2.37. Conservative Party identifiers also had a 
strongly negative feelings towards the Labour Party, although to a lesser extent than the 
antipathy of Labour Party identifiers towards the Conservatives. The average score is 
3.17, and 37.5 per cent of Conservative Party identifiers expressed their feelings about the 
Labour Party as 2 or less. Thus, the existence of negative feelings towards an opponent by 
loyal party identifiers is common both in new and in mature democracies. 
Negative Feelings to Parties and Candidates in Korean Presidential Election 
Negative feelings to a competing party or a candidate may be important in 
understanding voting behaviour in Korean presidential elections. There is a widely shared 
perception that negative feelings towards parties and/or candidates exist and affect 
electoral behaviour. For example, in 2002, many voters in Gyeongsang region often said 
that they were willing to cast their vote for Roh Moo-hyun if he was not the candidate of 
the MDP. They liked Roh, but they could not support the candidate of the MDP. 
Meanwhile, most voters in Jeolla region ruled out voting for Lee Hoi Chang because Lee 
was the candidate for the GNP. This negative perception of a party affected Lee's 
popularity during the election. In the presidential election of 2002, Lee enjoyed very 
favourable conditions due to the failures of the incumbent government and an internal 
conflict within the ruling party. However, his popularity was stuck at 40 per cent and the 
level of party affiliation of the GNP was very stable at about 30 per cent during the 
election year, while the party affiliation and candidate popularity of the MDP fluctuated 
continually throughout the year. Many voters were disappointed with the incumbent 
government and the ruling party candidate, but at the same time, they did not want to 
support the GNP candidate. During the election, pollsters suggested that approximately 
half of the Korean electorate had negative feelings towards the GNP and/or Lee Hoi 
Chang, and therefore Lee could not achieve popularity ratings of 50 per cent in spite of 
favourable political conditions. 
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In 1997, Kim Dae-jung's popularity and party affiliation for the NCNP were 
relatively stable, while the ruling NKP/GNP experienced great volatility in terms of 
candidate popularity and party affiliation. The NKP was involved in internal conflict and 
split into the GNP and NPP, as did its partisans. However, the failures and conflicts within 
the ruling party were not related to increases or decreases in the party affiliation of the 
major opposition NCNP and the popularity of its candidate Kim Dae-jung. Kim Dae-jung 
and the NCNP were unable to increase Kim's popularity and NCNP party affiliation by 
attracting the NKP supporters. These voters wandered between the GNP and the NPP and 
between Lee Hoi Chang and Rhee In je, but very few supported the NCNP or Kim Dae- 
jung. This can be understood as resulting from the strongly negative view of Kim Dae- 
jung and his party existing among Korean voters, especially, voters in Gyeongsang region, 
the stronghold of the ruling NKP. Therefore, there was `anti-candidate voting' against 
Kim Dae jung. 42 
Party Identification and Vote Choice 
Although there are some limits of the concept of party identification in Korea because of 
an institutional underdevelopment of party politics, party identification has developed and 
exists in the new democracy. Furthermore, party identification constrains voting choice in 
the new democracy. Partisan affiliation has a very strong correlation with voting choice in 
new democracy. As shown in Table 5.14, in election of 1992, almost every party 
identifier of major parties voted for their own party candidate (i. e., 91.2 per cent of the 
ruling DLP party identifiers, 86.3 per cent of the major opposition DP party identifiers, 
and 83.1 per cent of the UNP party identifiers). In the presidential election of 1997, the 
same pattern was clear. Of the ruling GNP party identifiers, 94.7 per cent voted for Lee 
Hoi Chang, the GNP candidate, and 84.9 per cent of a major opposition NCNP party 
identifiers voted for the NCNP candidate Kim Dae-jung (see Table 5.15). In 2002, again 
most of party identifiers support for their party candidate; 90.5 percent of the major 
opposition GNP party identifiers and 94.9 per cent of the ruling MDP party identifiers 
were loyal to their own party (see Table 5.16). 
In general, party identifiers of small parties were relatively less loyal to their own 
party, though still more than half cast their ballot for their own party in elections. Indeed, 
in the 1992 presidential election, 42.9 per cent of party identifiers of the NPRP led by 
Park Chan-jong voted for another candidate. In the 1997 election, 37.4 per cent of the 
42 For the concept of `anti-candidate voting', see L. Sigelman and M. M. Gant, `Anticandidate 
Voting in the 1984 Presidential Election', Political Behaviour, 11 (1989), 81-92. Cited from 
Hwang, `Jeongdangtaedowa tupyohanglae' (Party identification and voting behaviour), pp. 273-4. 
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NPP partisans moved to other party candidate. In 2002,55.8 per cent of partisans of the 
LDP did not support their own party candidate in vote choice. Small party partisans were 
quite likely to defect from own party candidate to a major party candidate in an election. 
This trend may result from their perception about the likelihood of a small party 
candidate winning. In general, voters do not want to waste their ballots and therefore tend 
to support a major party candidate. When this occurs, they are more likely to move to a 
candidate of a major party close to their own party. For example, in 2002,44.2 per cent of 
party identifiers of the Democratic Labour Party, the most progressive party in Korea, 
cast their ballot for Roh Moo-hyun of the MDP, who is considered a progressive and 
reform-minded politician. 
Table 5.14 Crosstab: Party Identification and Vote Choice, 1992 
VOTE CHOICE 
PARTY 
IDENTIFICATION N 
Kim Y. 
(DLP) 
Kim D. 
(DP) 
Chung J. 
(UNP) 
Park C. 
(NPRP 
Total 
Total 1066 50.4% 30.5% 10.7% 8.4% 100.0% 
DLP 434 91.2% 2.5% 3.5% 2.8% 100.0% 
DP 299 8.0% 86.3% 3.7% 2.8% 100.0% 
UNP 65 6.2% 7.7% 83.1% 3.1% 100.0% 
NPRP 42 16.7% 21.4% 4.8% 57.1% 100.0% 
Other 6 33.3% 33.3% 33.3% 100.0% 
Non-identifiers 220 47.3% 18.2% 14.5% 20.0% 100.0% 
Data Korean Presidenti al Elect ion Studv. 1992. 
Keys: N= number of cases; DLP = Democratic Liberal Party; DP = Democratic Party; UNP = 
Unification National Party; and NPRP = New Politics Reform Party. 
Table 5.15 Crosstab: Party Identification and Vote Choice, 1997 
VOTE CHOICE 
PARTY 
IDENTIFICATION N 
Lee H. 
(GNP) 
Kim D. 
CNP 
Rhee I. 
(NPP) 
Other Total 
Total 1083 37.2% 41.0% 17.3% 4.5% 100.0% 
GNP 207 94.7% 3.4% 1.4% 0.5% 100.0% 
NCNP 372 3.0% 84.9% 10.8% 1.3% 100.0% 
NPP 115 13.9% 13.0% 62.6% 10.4% 100.0% 
Other 17 11.8% 41.2% 17.6% 29.4% 100.0% 
Non-identifiers 372 47.8% 26.6% 18.5% 7.0% 100.0% 
Data: Korean Presidenti al Elect ion Studv_ 1997. 
Keys: N= number of cases; GNP = Grand National Party; NCNP = National Congress for New 
Politics; and NPP = New Party for People. 
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Table 5.16 Crosstab: Party Identification and Vote Choice, 2002 
VOTE C HOICE 
PARTY 
IDENTIFICATION N 
Lee H. 
(GNP) 
Roh M. 
(MDP) 
Kwon Y. 
(DLP) 
Total 
Total 1312 38.8% 56.5% 4.7% 100.0% 
GNP 328 90.5% 8.8% 0.6% 100.0% 
MDP 370 4.1% 94.9% 1.1% 100.0% 
ULD 11 9.1% 72.7% 18.2% 100.0% 
UP21 19 26.3% 57.9% 15.8% 100.0% 
DLP 77 11.7% 44.2% 44.2% 100.0% 
Other 9 22.2% 77.8% 100.0% 
Non-identifiers 498 36.1% 60.4% 3.4% 100.0% 
Data: Icorean Presidential Election Study, 2002. 
Keys: N= number of cases; GNP = Grand National Party; MDP = Millennium Democratic Party; 
ULD = United Liberal Democrats; NU21 = National Unity 21; and DLP = Democratic Labour 
Party. 
In 1997, party identifiers of the ULD also showed their loyalty in a different way. 
The ULD did not nominate own candidate for presidency, but supported Kim Dae-jung of 
the NCNP through an electoral coalition with the NCNP. Although data was limited, 
approximately 40 percent of ULD partisans supported Kim Dae-jung following the 
coalition, while only approximately 10 per cent of the partisans voted for Lee Hoi Chang, 
the candidate of the ruling party. 43 
When most partisans are loyal to their own party in voting choice, it can be expected 
that election results will be greatly affected by the electoral behaviour of non-party 
identifiers who make up a sizeable proportion of the electorate (i. e., 22.7% in 1992, 
36.9 % in 1997, and 40.5% in 2002). In 2002, Roh Moo-hyun gained 60.4 per cent of 
votes of non-identifiers, while Lee Hoi Chang was supported by 36.1 per cent of non- 
party identifiers. This seems to confirm the widely accepted argument that Roh's victory 
in the election was possible because he attracted younger voters, who are more likely to 
be non-identifiers. 
However, earlier data does not fully support the argument that non-identifiers' vote 
choice strongly influences the outcomes of elections. In 1997, Kim Dae-jung attracted 
only 26.6 per cent of non-party identifiers, compared 47.8 per cent of non-party 
identifiers for Lee Hoi Chang. Consequently, Kim Dae-jung's victory was not based on 
gaining more supports amongst non-identifiers, but was instead possible through the 
GNP/NKP split during the election. Korean voters actually had a negative perception of 
Kim Dae-jung, a long-serving politician. Before the transition to democracy in 1987, 
authoritarian government tainted him as a radical and pro-communist. This negative 
43 In the Korean Presidential Election Study of 1997, the ULD were included in `other parties'. 
However, the ULD was one of the three largest parties in the National Assembly. Therefore, most 
`other party' identifiers may be considered ULD identifiers. An additional problem is that the 
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image was further worsened by the intensification of regionalism in the new democracy. 
Kim was a charismatic leader in his home region, Jeolla, but was also strongly disliked in 
other regions, especially, Gyeongsang. In such circumstances, he was not able to attract 
many non-identifiers in the election, but he was able to win the election due to a split 
within the pro-ruling party and its partisans. 
In conclusion, party politics is unstable, and the `meeting and parting' of political parties 
is common in the new democracy, but Korean voters have to some extent developed party 
identification, the enduring psychological attachment to a particular political party. In 
particular, most Korean voters can effectively recognise and distinguish between the 
major political parties in terms of politicians, loyal supporters, and platforms and policies 
of the political parties, even though the forms and names of the political parties have 
changed frequently. Moreover, partisan loyalty to a political party in voting choice is 
considerable. 
However, the strength of party affiliation in Korea is generally weak and the 
endurance of party affiliation is quite problematic. The level of party identification is 
unstable within a relatively short-time period and the voting intention of party identifiers 
is affected by short-term political events in the course of election campaigns. Indeed, 
individual party affiliation is changeable and is affected by performance of political 
parties, in line with the revisionist view of party identification. 
Considering the long-term duration of party affiliation, it is expected that the pattern 
of electoral alignment has continued over time in the new democracy. At the same time, 
when party affiliation is changeable and is affected by short-term factors in the new 
democracy, it is assumed that the pattern of partisan alignment has some extent changed 
in the last 15 years. Change and continuity in partisan alignment in the new democracy 
will be explored in the following chapter, Chapter 6. If we find that most voters are 
aligned with a few political parties and have maintained their affiliation to the parties 
over time, this will confirm the argument discussed in this chapter, Chapter 5, that Korean 
voters have developed party affiliation and that party identification is useful to predict 
Korean electoral behaviour. 
number of cases for other party identifiers is too small to have statistical significance. 
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Chapter 6. The Bases of Partisan Alignment in a New Democracy 
The aim of this chapter is to explore partisan alignment in Korea. First, socio- 
demographic bases of partisan alignment will be explored. Although the regional 
cleavage is the predominant factor to explain the partisan alignment in the new 
democracy, I will argue that some other characteristics of voters, particularly ideology, 
also explain partisan alignment in Korea. 
Second, changes and continuities in the pattern of partisan alignment in the new 
democracy will be explored. Although party politics is unstable in the new democracy, 
most Korean voters are aligned with a few political parties, especially the two major 
political parties, and have maintained their affiliation to the parties over time. I will argue 
that a pattern of partisan alignment under authoritarian regimes has generally been 
maintained in the new democracy, but also that there have been some changes in the 
partisan alignment following social and political changes, such as the split of opposition 
group, the improvement of North and South Korea relations, and the severe economic 
recession in 1997. 
This chapter consists of two main sections. In the first section following a brief 
introductory analysis of partisan alignment, relationships between socio-economic 
characteristics of voters and party alignment will be examined in order to explore changes 
and continuities in the pattern of electoral alignment. In second section, a multiple 
regression analysis will be used and a model of partisan alignment will be examined. 
Electoral Realignment in the New Democracy: A Hypothetical Explanation 
Political and social developments have influenced partisanship and electoral alignment in 
Korea. Following political and social changes, Korean voters have been dealigned and 
realigned. In terms of electoral alignments, the political development of the new 
democracy may be divided into three periods. It is expected that some changes in 
electoral alignments occurred in the 1987 presidential election and when the three parties 
merged in 1990, However, due to a lack of data, my analysis will mainly focus on the 
electoral alignment from the 1992 presidential election. 
The first Period: 1987-1992 
Authoritarian legacy: The first period from 1987 to 1992 is characterised as the 
legal continuation of authoritarian government. In 1987, a direct presidential election was 
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restored, but a military officer-turned politician and the personal friend of former dictator 
won the presidential election in 1987 mainly due to the split between the two leaders of 
pro-democracy opposition groups'. Those who preferred the authoritative ruling party 
maintained this loyalty to the ruling party. Indeed, it is expected that traditional supporters 
for the ruling authoritarian party, such as the less educated, the lower class, those residing 
in rural area, and women, were inclined towards the ruling party in 1992. 
A split in pro-democracy voters: The pro-opposition party voters under the 
authoritarian regime were divided into two main groups in the new democracy. Following 
the split in the opposition camp in the 1987 election, another critical political change 
influenced on partisan alignment. Kim Young Sam, leader of the Reunification 
Democratic Party (RDP) and one of two prominent leaders in the long-time democratic 
movement, joined the authoritarian ruling party in the merger of three political parties in 
1990. Some voters affiliated with the RDP followed Kim Young Sam's political decision, 
but some voters moved to the Peace Democratic Party (PDP) and formed a major new 
opposition party the Democratic Party (DP). Also, some electors, who were disappointed 
with Kim Young Sam, but did not like Kim Dae-jung either, became independent or 
moved to a new third party, such as the Unification National Party (UNP) led by Chung 
Ju-young, or to the New Politics Reform Party (NPRP) led by Park Chan-jong, who was a 
reformist politician in the opposition camp. It is expected that the higher educated voters 
among the pro-opposition electorate, who were more critical of the inability of the Kims 
to agree on a single candidacy in 1987 and were disappointed with the merger of the RDP 
with the authoritarian ruling party, shifted their support to the new political parties or 
became non-party identifiers. 
The Second Period: 1993-1997 
Intensification of regionalism: During the second period from 1993 to 1997, party 
politics again was in turmoil and the regional cleavage of the pro-opposition voters was 
intensified. In 1995, Kim Dae-jung, who retired from politics aller losing the presidential 
election in 1992, returned to politics and formed a new opposition party, the National 
Congress for New Democracy (NCNP). This split the major opposition party, the 
Democratic Party (DP). Most of politicians in the DP moved to the NCNP, and as did 
many partisans. In general, politicians and voters who were from the Jeolla region, Kim's 
home province, followed Kim, while politicians and voters who did not move to the 
NCNP were generally people from non-Jeolla region. 
' For a historical evolution of Korean politics, see Chapter 2 of this dissertation. 
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Dealignment of the pro-ruling voters: It is expected that there was a change in the 
pro-ruing party voters. The ruling party led by Kim Young Sam made steps to disconnect 
the new ruling party from the former authoritarian government. Kim Young Sam 
government prosecuted two former military officers-turned presidents and invited reform- 
minded politicians into the ruling party. Traditional supporters for the authoritarian party 
were disappointed with the ruling party led by President Kim Young Sam, especially 
voters in the Northern Gyeongsang region, the native region of the former three 
presidents. It is expected therefore that this caused changes in the partisanship of pro- 
ruling party voters. 
The economic recession in 1997: Another influential factor in changes in the 
partisan alignment in the new democracy was the economic crisis in 1997. The national 
economy had been ruined in the new democracy. The state capitalist model, which was 
based on cheap labour forces and a few big business companies, failed to adjust to 
changes in domestic and global market conditions, and began to lose its dynamism as 
various social and economic problems were revealed. Eventually, Koreans experienced a 
serious economic crisis in 1997. During this economic deterioration and economic crisis, 
voters who were traditionally supported the authoritarian ruling party were disappointed 
with the performance of the ruling party. Thus, it is expected that there was partisan 
dealignment or realignment during the second period of political development of new 
democracy, 1993-1997. 
The Third Period: 1998-2002 
Continuation of regionalism: During the third period from 1998 to 2002, the 
regional cleavage in the new democracy intensified. Having lost power in the 1997 
presidential election, the new opposition, which, tried to define the new ruling 
government as a government based on Jeolla people in order to gain the unconditional 
support from voters in Gyeongsang. It is expected that partisan alignment based on 
regional cleavage continued and intensified in the third period. 
Changes in ideology: However, in the third period from 1998 to 2002, it is expected 
that ideology became a new factor to explain partisan alignment. Kim Dae-jung, who was 
a long-time supporter of a peaceful relationship between North and South Korea and 
called for the end of the Cold War in the Korean peninsular, was elected in the 1997 
presidential election. Under Kim Dae jung government, the North and South relations 
improved remarkably. The leaders of the two Koreas met in Pyeongyang, the capital of 
North Korea, for the first time in half a century. The summit meeting brought a great 
improvement in the North and South relations. Along with this, ideological rigidity in the 
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new democracy was weakened. The electorate is roughly divided into two groups in 
terms of the government's approach to the communist North. Conservative voters prefer a 
containment policy toward North Korea, which emphasises a cautious approach to the 
North and South relations, while liberals prefer an engagement policy with the North, 
which is pursued by the government. 
The generational division of voters: Considering the ideological division of 
partisans, some changes in the age composition of the electorate should be considered. A 
baby-boomer generation entered to the electorate, and Korean voters as a whole become 
relatively younger than before. Indeed, more than half of the electorate is less than 40 
years old (see Table 6.1). The young who are born after the Korean War of 1950-1952 are 
relatively free from the ideological bias against the left .2 Also, younger voters who have 
lived in a relatively affluent society prefer political democracy to economic growth unlike 
the older who having spent their most lives in a poor society, prefer economic growth to 
political freedom. Younger voters are defined here as voters under 30 years old in 1987 
and under 45 years old in 2002 (more than half of the electorate in 2002). This suggests 
that the difference between older and younger voters should be evident in partisan 
alignments in Korea. 
Table 6.1 Age of the Electorate, 1987-2002 
AGE 
YEAR Total 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60 & over 
1985 100% 34.60% 23.70% 17.80% 12.40% 11.50% 
1990 100% 31.40% 26.60% 17.00% 13.10% 11.90% 
1995 100% 27.70% 27.40% 18.20% 13.10% 13.60% 
2000 100% 24.30% 25.40% 21.30% 13.20% 15.80% 
Data: Calculated based on Korean National Census, 1985,1990,1995, & 2000 from the Korea 
National Statistical Office. 
Mole: The figures are not based on registered voters, but are close to the official numbers of voters. 
Indeed, the National Election Commission officially reported the distribution of the electorate by 
age groups in the 2002 presidential election, and the distribution is almost same with the figures 
for 2000 in this table (i. e., 23.2 per cent for 20-29 years old, 25.1 per cent for 30-39 years old, 22.4 
per cent for 40-49 years old, 12.9 per cent for 50-59 years old, and 16.4 per cent for 60 years old 
and over). 
1. Partisan Alignment and Realignment in New Democracy 
2 For example, a survey conducted by the TNS-Korea shows a post-Cold War electoral change. 
Indeed, most of Korean voters (i. e., 71 per cent of respondents) prefer progressive politicians to 
conservative politicians. `Voters' break from the ideology is obvious', Munhwa Daily Newspaper, 
I1 April 2002. 
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Regionalism and Electoral Alignment 
While class, religion, and ethnic group are the main factors in explaining electoral 
alignment in Western democracies, region and regionalism should be considered as the 
most important factor to explain Korean party alignments' and is the main feature of 
party and electoral politics in Korea. 
Regional Distribution of Votes 
Major contending parties in Korea have been based on a specific regional 
stronghold. 4 In 2002, the opposition Grand National Party (GNP), a descendent of the old 
authoritarian ruling party, has strong support from the Gyeongsang region, while the 
ruling MDP, a successor party of the pro-democracy opposition party, is popular in the 
Jeolla region. Election results clearly show the regional cleavage of the electorate. In 
1987, the DJP and the RDP had strong support from Gyeongsang region, while the PDP 
was well-supported in the Jeolla region. In the 1997 election, the GNP performed well in 
the Gyeongsang region, while the NCNP gained most votes in the Jeolla region. Also, in 
2002, the GNP dominated the Gyeongsang region, but the MDP was strong in the Jeolla 
region (see Table 6.2). 
In parliamentary elections, the same pattern existed. In every parliamentary election 
from 1988 to 2000, the DIP, the DLP, the NKP and the GNP were successful in 
'A geographical cleavage within the electorate is not rare in other democracies. In a comparative 
study, Hearl et at. found that `distinctiveness of regional voting' is common in many European 
democracies. See Derek J. Hearl, Ian Budge, and Bernard Perason, `Distinctiveness of Regional 
Voting: A Comparative Analysis Across the European Community (1979-1993)', Electoral Studies, 
15 (1996), 167-82. Also, regional voting is divided into two distinct types. One type of regional 
voting is disproportionate support for statewide political parties, which exists in recent British 
elections, or in Canadian elections. Another type of regional voting is support for nationalist and 
regionalist parties based on minority nationalist movement, such as the Bloc Quebecois in Canada 
or the Catalan nationalist of Convergence and Union (CiU) and the Basque National Party (PMV) 
in Spain. There is no ethnic minority in Korea and regional voting in Korea is classified as 
differential support for political parties operating at a statewide level. For an assessment of recent 
Canadian elections, see Neil Nevitte et al., Unsteady State: The 1997 Canadian Federal Election 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); L. LeDuc, `The Federal Election in Canada, November 
2000', Electoral Studies, 21 (2002), 655-9. For a brief note on recent Spanish election, Josep M. 
Colomer, `The 2000 General Election in Spain', Electoral Study 20 (2001), 490-5. For regional 
results of the 2001 British General Election, see David Butler and Dennis Kavanagh, The British 
General Election of 2001(Houndsmills: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 262-3. 
4 Hereafter, the major party A and the major party B will be used in order to identify two 
contending major political parties which change their forms and names over time. For instance, the 
major party A refers to the Democratic Liberal Party (DLP) in 1992, and the Grand National Party 
(GNP) in 1997 and in 2002. Also, the major party B refers to the Democratic Party (DP) in 1992, 
the National Congress for New Politics (NCNP) in 1997, and the Millennium Democratic Party 
(MDP) in 2002. Indeed, the major party A has a historical lineage from authoritarian ruling parties 
before a transition to democracy in 1987, while the major party B links to pro-democracy 
opposition parties before democratisation. 
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Gyeongsang region, while the PDP, the DP, the NCNP, and the MDP won in most 
electoral districts in the Jeolla region. Also, in 1996, the ULD, the third party at that time, 
swept every electoral district in the Chungcheong region (see Table A6.1 in Appendix). 
Regional Support: Political Parties vs. Candidates 
Presidential election results show that regional support is more related to political 
parties rather than candidates. Lee Hoi Chang was the 2002 candidate of the GNP from 
the Chungcheong region, but failed to gained more votes in this region than other 
contending candidates. In 1997, Kim Jong-pil who was the dominant political leader in 
the region left the race for the presidency and officially supported Kim Dae-jung as a 
result of an election coalition between the NCNP and the ULD. Many voters in 
Chungcheong region followed their respected leader Kim Jong-pil's decision in the 
election (see Table 6.2). 
Another good example to show that regional support is for the political parties rather 
than the candidates is from the 2002 presidential election. Roh Moo-hyun, who was 
candidate of the MDP, is from the Gyeongsang region, but gained only about 26 per cent 
of votes in this region, compared to approximately 49 per cent of votes in the national 
level. Meanwhile, 93.2 per cent of voters in Jeolla region supported Roh, just about the 
same as the result for Kim Dae-Jung in 1997 (94.4%). The same trend is again visible in 
2002 when Lee Hoi Chang was not especially popular in his home region but attracted 
69.4 per cent of votes in Gyeongsang region. This level of support in the region actually 
exceeded that for Gyeongsang native Kim Young Sam, who was the candidate of the DLP 
in 1992 (68.8%) (see Table 6.2). 
Regional Identification: Beyond Geographical Boundaries 
Geographical domination of political parties in elections may be shown in other 
democracies, though the degree is not so strong as it is in Korea. For example, in British 
parliamentary elections, the geography of the vote has been critical to outcomes. Vote 
gains in 1980s-90s for the Conservatives were concentrated in the South. In 2002, the 
proportion of Conservative votes from the South was 71.6 per cent, while the proportion 
from the North was 28.3 per cent per cent .5 In American elections, southern states were a 
historical strong foothold of the Democratic Party, even though this domination is now 
over. 
S Pippa Norris, `Apathetic Landslide: The 2001 British General Election', in Pippa Norris, ed., 
Britain Votes 2001 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 1-25, at pp. 12-13. 
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Table 6.2 Regional Share of Votes (%) by Political Parties in Presidential Election, 1987- 
2002 
MAJOR MAJOR THIRD MINOR ALL TOTAL 
PARTY A PARTY B PARTY PARTY OTHER 
1987 DJP PDP RDP NDRP 
Total 36.6 27.0 28.0 8.1 0.2 100 
Seoul 30.0 32.6 29.1 8.2 0.1 100 
Gyeonggi 41.0 22.1 28.1 8.7 0.2 100 
Gangwon 59.3 8.8 26.1 5.4 0.3 100 
Chungcheong 33.1 11.9 20.1 34.6 0.3 100 
Jeolla 9.9 88.4 1.2 0.5 0.1 100 
Gyeongsang 49.7 5.0 42.4 2.5 0.3 100 
Je'u 49.8 18.6 26.8 4.5 0.3 100 
1992 DLP DP UNP NPRP 
Total 42.0 33.8 16.3 6.4 1.5 100 
Seoul 36.4 37.7 18.0 6.4 1.4 100 
Gyeonggi 36.6 31.9 22.7 7.2 1.6 100 
Gangwon 41.5 15.5 34.1 6.9 2.0 100 
Chungcheong 36.9 27.8 24.3 8.7 2.3 100 
Jeolla 4.3 91.9 2.3 0.6 0.9 100 
Gyeongsang 68.8 10.1 12.2 7.5 1.4 100 
Jeju 40.0 32.9 16.1 8.8 2.1 100 
1997 GNP NCNP NPP 
Total 38.7 40.3 19.2 1.8 100 
Seoul 40.9 44.9 12.8 1.5 100 
Gyeonggl 35.7 39.1 23.5 1.7 100 
Gangwon 43.2 23.8 30.9 2.1 100 
Chungcheong 27.4 43.9 26.6 2.1 100 
Jeolla 3.3 94.4 1.5 0.8 100 
Gyeongsang 59.1 13.5 25.1 2.4 100 
Je'u 36.6 40.6 20.5 2.4 100 
2002 GNP MDP 
Total 46.6 48.9 4.5 100 
Seoul 45.0 51.3 3.7 100 
Gyeonggi 44.3 50.5 5.2 100 
Gangwon 52.5 41.5 6.0 100 
Chungcheong 41.3 52.5 6.2 100 
Jeolla 4.9 93.2 1.9 100 
Gyeongsang 69.4 25.8 4.8 100 
Je'u 39.9 56.1 4.0 100 
Note: The shaded figure refers to share of the vote in the candidate's home region. 
Data: Computed based on election statistics from the National Election Commission. 
Keys: DJP = Democratic Justice Party; PDP = Peace Democratic Party; RDP = Reunification 
Democratic Party; NRDP = New Republican Democratic Party; DLP = Democratic Liberal Party; 
DP = Democratic Party; UNP = Unification National Party; NPRP = New Political Reform Party; 
GNP = Grand National Party; NCNP = National Congress for New Politics; NPP = New Party for 
People; MDP = Millennium Democratic Party. 
However, in Korean elections, the regional cleavage has been even more significant. 
The regional cleavage is the predominant factor in determining voting choice and partisan 
alignments not only in the electoral districts in two competing regions, but also in almost 
the entire nation. For example, voters in Seoul city, which is composed of people from 
various regions of the nation, are also affected by region. Voters who come from 
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Gyeongsang region are more likely to support the GNP, while voters who come from 
Jeolla region are more likely to support the MDP. 
A Debate on `Regional Party' 
Because of the domination within two regions by the two major parties, the major 
parties in Korea have been recognised and indeed criticised as `regional parties'. This 
perception is widely shared by many scholars, politicians, and journalists in Korea. For 
example, in 2003, the ruling MDP was involved in an internal conflict concerning ways 
to overcome the regional limits of its electoral support, especially, its poor performances 
in the Gyeongsang region. Those looking for a radical change within the party including 
even its dissolution, argued that the MDP is a regional party because of its weakness in 
the Gyeongsang region. On the other hand, those who favoured maintaining the party as it 
is, asserted that the MDP gained parliamentary seats from every region except the 
Gyeongsang region and outperformed all other parties in every region except Gyeongsang 
region in terms of number of seats in the last parliamentary election. In a survey related to 
this controversial argument within the MDP, a majority of the electorate also perceived 
that both major parties, the MDP and the GNP, were regional parties based on support 
from specific regions. Indeed, 56 per cent of respondents perceived that the MDP is a 
regional party based on Jeolla, and 73.1 per cent of them answer that the GNP is a 
regional party based on Gyeongsang region. " 
However, it may be an exaggeration to denounce these major parties as regional 
parties, despite their strong showing in specific regions and from voters originating from 
these areas. Both the MDP and the GNP gained support not only from Gyeongsang or 
Jeolla, but also from the other regions. Approximately half of party identifiers of these 
parties and more than half of their voters who supported these parties in election are not 
related to this regional cleavage (see Table 6.3). It is therefore an overstatement to define 
two major political parties as regional parties due to their regional strength or regional 
weakness, and it is also wrong to assume that regionalism or region factor is the only 
variable which explains partisan alignments in the new democracy. In order to explain 
fully partisan and electoral alignments, it is necessary to explore other factors. 
6 The survey was conducted by a research agency, the Research & Research. See `Jeongchigwon 
inyeome ttala jaepyeondwaeya' (The political circles should be realigned on the basis of ideology), 
The Pressian Internet Newspaper, 7 May 2003. 
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Table 6.3 Crosstab: Party Identification and Regional Identification, 1992-2002 
PARTY R EGIONAL IDENT IFICATION 
IDENTIFICATION N GYEONGSANG JEOLLA OTHER TOTAL 
1992 
DLP identifiers 470 52.1% 3.6% 44.3% 100% 
DP identifiers 324 13.9% 58.6% 27.5% 100% 
UNP identifiers 70 35.7% 1.7% 62.6% 100% 
1997 
GNP identifiers 219 49.8% 1.8% 48.4% 100% 
NCNP identifiers 390 6.4% 56.4% 37.2% 100% 
NPP identifiers 124 45.2% 3.2% 51.6% 100% 
2002 
GNP identifiers 349 53.6% 2.0% 44.4% 100% 
MDP identifiers 400 10.3% 48.0% 41.7% 100% 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992,1997, and 2U02. 
Keys: N= number of cases; DLP = Democratic Liberal Party; DP = Democratic Party; UNP = 
Unification National Party; GNP = Grand National Party; NCNP = National Congress for New 
Politics; NPP = New Party for People; MDP = Millennium Democratic Party. 
Partisan Alisnment based on Regionalism 
As shown in Table 6.4, the relationship between party affiliation and region is 
statistically significant. The value of Pearson's Chi-square is shown to be 389.570 in 
1992,330.735 in 1997, and 272.432 in 2002, and the differences are significant at the 0.5 
level. Thus, for the last 10 years, people in the Gyeongsang and Gangwon regions have 
been more affiliated with the GNP and its ancestor parties, while people in the Jeolla 
region have been inclined to the MDP and its predecessors. However, the 1997 
presidential election was a turning point in the distribution of party identifiers across 
regions. The MDP overtook the GNP in terms of party identifiers in Seoul, Gyeonggi, and 
Chungcheong, and in general, this pattern was continued in 2002. 
As discussed above, the partisan cleavage of region is based on the existing regional 
antagonism mainly between two contending regions - Gyeongsang and Jeolla. Political 
regionalism strongly affects the political behaviour of the voters who came from these 
two regions with very strong support for either the GNP or the MDP in every election. In 
particular, Jeolla people' political support for the MDP is extremely strong. As shown in 
Table 6.4, about 70 per cent and about 80 per cent of voters who came from Jeolla region 
identified themselves with the MDP in 2002 and the NCNP in 1997, respectively. 
Regional Discrimination as the Cause of Political Regionalism 
Why do voters in Jeolla region reveal and maintain a very strong loyalty to the MDP 
- and its old form, the NCNP, the DP, and the PDP -- in elections? The answer can be 
found in the characteristics of Korean regionalism. A key feature of the regionalism is the 
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social `exclusion' of Jeolla people and regional discrimination against Jeolla people in 
Korean society. A detailed discussion about the origin of regional discrimination is 
beyond the scope of this research, but it is useful to describe briefly political events 
related to causes of regionalism in order to understand electoral behaviour. 
Table 6.4 Crosstab: Partisan Alignment and Regional Background, 1992-1997 
N MAJOR MAJOR THIRD TOTAL PEARSONX2 (P) 
PARTY A PARTY B PARTY 
1992 389.570 (0.000) 
Seoul 82 56.1% 29.3% 14.6% 100% 
Gyeonggi 87 58.6% 17.2% 24.1% 100% 
Gangwon 34 55.9% 17.6% 26.5% 100% 
Chungcheong 154 54.5% 27.9% 17.5% 100% 
Jeolla 210 8.1% 90.5% 1.4% 100% 
Gyeongsang 33 74.0% 13.6% 12.4% 100% 
Jeju 1 100.0% - 100% 
the North 9 77.8% 11.1% 11.1% 100% 
Total 908 51.8% 35.7% 12.6% 100% 
1997 330.735 (0.000) 
Seoul 66 31.8% 56.1% 12.1% 100% 
Gyeonggi 60 35.0% 43.3% 21.7% 100% 
Gangwon 36 47.2% 36.1% 16.7% 100% 
Chungcheong 132 24.2% 50.0% 25.8% 100% 
Jeolla 228 1.8% 96.5% 1.8% 100% 
Gyeongsang 190 57.4% 13.2% 29.5% 100% 
Jeju 16 68.8% 12.5% 18.8% 100% 
the North 5 80.0% 20.0% - 100% Total 733 29.9% 53.2% 16.9% 100% 
2002 272.432 (0.000) 
Seoul 87 40.6% 54.0% 100% 
Gyeonggi 89 51.7% 48.3% 100% 
Gangwon 36 63.9% 36.1% 100% 
Chungcheong 98 41.8% 58.2% 100% 
Jeolla 199 3.5% 96.5% 100% 
Gyeongsang 228 82.0% 18.0% 100% 
Jeju 3 - 100% 100% 
the North 9 55.6% 44.4% 100% 
Total 749 46.6% 53.4%1 1 100% 
vuru. r urcan rresiuennai t=cuon btuay, i Z, 1YY /, ana LUU2. 
Keys: N= number of cases; 'Major party A' refers to the Democratic Liberal Party in 1992, and 
the Grand National Party in 1997 and 2002; `Major party B' refers to the Democratic Party in 1992, 
the National Congress for New Politics, and the Millennium Democratic Party in 2002; `Third 
party' refers to the Unification National Party in 1992 and the New Party for People in 1997. 
Political discrimination: Before the transition to democracy in 1987, military- 
backed political leaders of authoritarian states, who came from Gyeongsang, 
discriminated against Jeolla region in social and economic development as well as 
strongly favouring candidates from Gyeongsang in the appointment of high level 
governmental posts. Furthermore, the authoritarian state suppressed Kim Dae-jung, the 
leader of democratic movement who came from Jeolla, and military forces killed civilian, 
pro-democracy Kim supporters in Gwang u, the biggest city in Jeolla region. In these 
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social and political circumstances, Jeolla people have developed a strong regionalism as a 
`resistance to the discrimination', and showed a very strong loyalty to Kim Dae-jung and 
his party as a way to overcome the political and social alienation of the region. In 
particular, regional resistance to the authoritarian regimes and the regional identity of 
Jeolla people intensified after the experience of the `Gwangju massacre' in 1980. 
Under the authoritarian regimes, the Gyeongsang people continued and intensified 
regional discrimination against Jeolla people, a long established public prejudice. During 
this period, regional discrimination against Jeolla functioned as a ruling ideology to 
justify a political domination by Gyeongsang people. In this sense, regionalism in 
Gyeongsang is characterised as a `hegemonic' regionalism. Furthermore, Gyeongsang 
people blamed Kim Dae-jung for the split within the opposition camp and the failure to 
overcome the successor of the authoritarian party in the 1987 presidential election. 
Social discrimination against Jeola people: The regional discrimination in Korean 
society is well-supported by survey data which has confirmed that regional discrimination 
against Jeolla people exists in society. For example, according to survey data, Koreans 
are relatively reluctant to wed or join in business someone from Jeolla. Those from 
Gyeongsang show a particularly strong dislike of Jeolla people (see Table 6.5 and Table 
6.6). A negative perception of Jeolla people exists in society, and people from Jeolla have 
experienced more regional discrimination compared to people from other regions. Table 
6.7 shows a relatively higher level of experience of regional discrimination for Jeolla 
people. 
Table 6.5 Social Discrimination by Region: marriage partner 
AS A MARRIAGE PARTNER 
RESPONDENT'S Seoull Gangwon Chungcheong Jeolla Gyeongsang Jeju the 
HOMETOWN G eon i North 
Seoul 1.29 1.52 1.57 1.81 1.66 1.73 1.73 
Gyeonggi 1.29 1.35 1.47 1.91 1.64 1.59 1.77 
Gangwon 1.57 1.40 1.57 1.97 1.63 1.71 1.92 
Chungcheong 1.53 1.56 1.37 1.90 1.61 1.67 1.80 
Jeolla 1.37 1.52 1.43 1.24 1.63 1.45 1.66 
Gyeongsang 1.57 1.60 1.63 2.07 1.35 1.67 1.93 
Jeju 1.58 1.62 1.67 2.14 1.43 1.76 1.86 
the North 1.55 1.45 1.73 2.00 1.91 1.91 1.45 
Total 1.46 1.52 1.52 1.81 1.55 1.63 1.80 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1997. 
Notes: Question 26A (i. e., `What do you think the following person as a marriage partner for you 
or your family member? ) is used. The figure refers to the average score in a 3-point scale (I = 
agree, 2= no preference, an 3= disagree). A high score means strong opposition to marrying 
people (or family members marrying someone) who came from the region. 
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Table 6.6 Social Discrimination by Region: business partner 
AS A BUSINESS PAR TNER 
RESPONDENT'S Seoul/ Gangwon Chungcheong Jeolla Gyeongsang Jeju the 
HOMETOWN G eon i North 
Seoul 1.37 1.55 1.60 1.88 1.69 1.69 1.68 
Gyeonggi 1.34 1.38 1.46 1.94 1.58 1.56 1.63 
Gangwon 1.69 1.49 1.65 2.07 1.68 1.78 1.99 
Chungcheong 1.52 1.55 1.45 2.04 1.64 1.69 1.76 
Jeolla 1.47 1.60 1.55 1.36 1.70 1.52 1.68 
Gyeongsang 1.68 1.64 1.68 2.18 1.39 1.73 1.96 
Jeju 1.68 1.62 1.67 2.05 1.57 1.81 1.95 
the North 1.36 1.64 1.91 2.27 1.82 1.91 1.45 
Total 1.53 1.57 1.58 1.91 1.58 1.66 1.79 
uara: iorean rreslaennal t iecaon stuay, 1`99 !. 
Note: Question 26B (i. e., `What do you think the following person as your business partner? ') is 
used. The figure refers to the average score in a 3-point scale (I = agree, 2= no preference, an 3= 
disagree). A high score means strong opposition to being involved in business with people 
who came from the region. 
Table 6.7 Experience of Regional Discrimination 
RESPONDENT'S REGIONAL DISCRIMINATION 
HOMETOWN A B C D E Total 
Seoul 1.94 1.98 1.96 1.96 1.92 1.95 
Gyeonggi 1.97 1.91 1.95 1.95 1.97 1.95 
Gangwon 1.92 2.00 1.97 1.97 1.92 1.96 
Chungcheong 1.91 1.96 1.94 1.97 1.95 1.95 
Jeolla 1.70 1.88 1.75 1.87 1.82 1.81 
Gyeongsang 1.94 1.97 1.96 1.97 1.95 1.96 
Jeju 1.83 1.92 1.88 1.96 1.92 1.91 
the North 1.92 1.83 1.92 1.92 1.92 1.90 
Total 1.88 1.94 1.91 1.95 1.92 1.92 
uaru. r orcuui rresiucnuai niecnon zmuay, 1 YY I. 
Keys: A= personal humiliation; B= financial loss; C= disadvantage in employment; D= 
disadvantage in promotion; and D= treated distantly by peer group. 
Notes: Q25 (i. e., `Have you experienced the following regional discriminations? ') is used. The 
figure refers to the average score in a 2-point scale (I = yes, and 2= no). A low score means more 
experience of regional discrimination. 
Candidate's home region in elections: In terms of the influence of a candidate's 
home region on voting choice, Jeolla natives pay more attention to a candidate's regional 
origin in voting choice than other people in other regions (see Table 6.8). Table 6.8 shows 
that the average score for all voters is 2.84 in 4-point scale (i. e., 1= very much consider, 
2= somewhat consider, 3= not much consider, and 4= never consider). Korean voters 
answered that they generally did not pay much attention to a candidate's regional 
background in their electoral choice despite the existence of a strong regional cleavage in 
the electorate. This suggests that the regional cleavage in elections is related to the 
political parties rather than candidates. 
It can be assumed that the existence of regional discrimination against Jeolla and the 
experience of regional discrimination has caused strong support for Jeolla native 
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politicians and the MDP and its predecessor parties. The data shows that voters who 
experienced regional discrimination are more likely to be affected by regional factors in 
their voting choice. More experience of regional discrimination is related to greater 
considerations of a candidate's home region in deciding upon their vote. 
Table 6.8 Consideration of Candidate's Hometown in Voting Choice 
RESPONDENT'S HOMETOWN N MEAN STD. DEVIATION 
Seoul 145 3.07 0.82 
Gyeonggi 115 3.15 0.83 
Gangwon 74 3.04 0.90 
Chungcheong 197 3.10 0.88 
Jeolla 262 2.34 0.93 
Gyeongsang 352 2.80 0.87 
Jeju 25 2.96 0.79 
The North 12 2.92 1.08 
Total 1182 2.84 0.92 
uata: korean ['residential Election Study, 1997. 
Key: N= number of cases; Mean = average score in a 4-point scale (I = very much, 2= somewhat, 
3= not much, and 4= not at all). A low score refers to greater consideration of candidate's 
home region in voting choice. 
Table 6.9 is a summary of regression analysis. Experiences of regional 
discrimination and negative feelings to other regions are used as independent variables. 
The dependent variable is consideration of candidate's home region in voting decision. 
The Stepwise method excluded two independent variables and only the experience of 
regionalism variable fitted the model. The experience of regionalism is related to the 
consideration of a region factor in political activities, while regional bias is not closely 
related to political regionalism. In sum, the difference in the level of experience of 
regional discrimination explains why the regional factor is relatively important in Jeolla. 
It suggests that Jeolla voters strongly support the MDP and its predecessors because they 
have experienced strong regional discrimination. 
Table 6.9 Summary of Regression Analysis: Influence of Regionalism on Electoral Vote 
Decision, 1997 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES BETA T SIGNIFICANT 
Experience of regionalism -0.214 -7.255 0.000 
Regional Bias - business -0.046 -1.576 0.115 
Regional Bias - marriage -0.041 -1.376 0.169 
Adjusted R square 0.045 
uata: iorean rresiaenuai niecuon stuay, 1991. 
Noce: Concerning dependent variable, a high value means less consideration of candidate's home 
region in vote decision; Concerning independent variables, a high value means more experience of 
regionalism or strong regional bias; `Experience of regionalism' is based on a compute of scores in 
five different aspects of regional discrimination. 
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Age and Electoral Alignment 
One of the major empirical research trends in Korea was based on modernisation theory 
focusing on differences in the level of political awareness across various social groups. 
According to the modernisation theory, gender, education, and age were key variables to 
explain electoral behaviour. Women, the less educated, and the old have a relatively low 
level political awareness compared to men, the higher educated, and the young. The 
former groups were more easily mobilised by authoritarian parties, and the difference in 
the level of political awareness also explained why the authoritarian ruling parties 
performed strongly in rural areas in every elections. ' 
Although the mobilisation of voters became more difficult following the democratic 
transition in 1987, it is expected that party identifiers in new democracy continue to feel 
close to the political party that they were affiliated to under the authoritarian regimes. As 
a result of the continuation of old party affiliations, it is expected that there are no critical 
changes in partisan alignment in terms of gender, education, and age. 
Ace and Electoral Alignment 
A linear relationship between age and partisanship has been revealed in the last three 
presidential elections. In these elections, young voters feel close to the major party B and 
the older affiliate with the major party A. Table 6.10 shows that Pearson's correlations for 
each of the three presidential elections are statistically significant. In addition, party 
identifiers for a third party -- the UNP in 1992 and the NPP in 1997 --- were younger 
than party identifiers for the major party B. The average age of third party identifiers was 
lower than those of the other parties in 1992 and in 1997. This difference in average age 
among the political parties in 1997 is statistically significant, though the difference 
between the major party B and third party in 1992 is not statistically significant (see Table 
A6.2 in Appendix). 
Regarding partisan realignment in the new democracy, older pro-opposition party 
supporters under authoritarian regime remained loyal to the two leaders of opposition 
group --- Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae-jung - when the pro-democracy political group 
was divided in new democracy. In contrast, the young, who were disappointed with two 
7 For the modernisation approach to Korean electoral behaviour under authoritarian politics, sec 
Chong Lim Kim, Young Whan Kihl, and Seong-Tong Pai, `The Modes of Citizen Political 
Participation: An Analysis of Nationwide Survey Results', in Chong Lim Kim, cd., Political 
Participation in Korea (Oxford: Clio Press, 1980), pp. 35-55. 
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Kims' political decision and who in any case were relatively weak party identifiers, 
drifted to a new third party, such as the UNP in 1992 and the NPP in 1997. 
Table 6.10 Crosstab: Partisan Alignment and Age, 1992-2002 
N MAJOR MAJOR THIRD TOTAL PEARSON 
PARTY PARTY PARTY CORRELATION 
A B P 
1992 
20-24 90 35.6% 45.6% 18.9% 100% -0.245 (0.000) 
25-34 251 38.2% 43.8% 17.9% 100% 
35-44 222 51.8% 36.5% 11.7% 100% 
45-54 146 58.9% 30.8% 10.3% 1000/0 
55-64 108 73.1% 23.1% 3.7% 100% 
65 and over 91 68.1% 24.2% 7.7% 100% 
Total 908 51.8% 35.7% 12.6% 100% 
1997 
20-24 76 25.0% 55.3% 19.7% 100% -0.189 (0.000) 
25-34 201 20.4% 56.2% 23.4% 100% 
35-44 191 34.0% 46.6% 19.4% 100% 
45-54 150 30.0% 59.3% 10.7% 100% 
55-64 75 33.3% 56.0% 10.7% 100% 
65 and over 41 58.5% 36.6% 4.9% 1000/0 
Total 734 29.8% 53.1% 17.0% 100% 
2002 
20-24 88 30.7% 69.3% 1000/0 -0.110 (0.002) 
25-34 134 39.6% 60.4% 100% 
35-44 191 48.7% 51.3% 100% 
45-54 145 57.2% 42.8% 100% 
55-64 112 55.4% 44.6% 100% 
65 and over 85 37.6% 62.4% 100% 
Total 755 46.4% 53.6% 1 1 100% 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992,1997, and 2002. 
Keys: N= number of cases; `Major party A' refers to the Democratic Liberal Party in 1992, and 
the Grand National Party in 1997 and 2002; 'Major party B' refers to the Democratic Party in 1992, 
the National Congress for New Politics, and the Millennium Democratic Party in 2002; and 'Third 
party' refers to the Unification National Party in 1992 and the New Party for People in 1997. 
Note: In this analysis, three political parties are coded in an ordinal scale (i. e., Major Party A is 
coded 1, Major Party B is coded 2, and Third Party is coded 3). 
Young Voters in the 2002 Presidential Election 
In 2002, partisan differences between the two major parties among the different age 
groups clearly existed with major party B receiving even more support among younger 
voters. It is widely accepted that age was the key factor in explaining electoral cleavage 
in the 2002 presidential election. In general, Roh Moo-hyun, the presidential candidate of 
the MDP, was supported by younger voters and Lee Hoi Chang, the presidential candidate 
of the GNP, was supported by older ones. Also, Roh's victory was possible because a 
possible competitor Chung Mong-joon withdrew from the race. Chung was a leading 
contender in the election for a while, and his early success was largely due to his 
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popularity among the young. Roh and Chung were popular among the same types of 
voters, especially the young, and the electoral coalition between Roh and Chung was a 
key factor in determining the 2002 election result. 
In 2002, it was widely accepted by many pollsters that the key age groups were 
those a few years younger than 45 years old. ' The young, particularly those who had 
started college in the 1980s and those involved in the 1987 People's Uprising, were 
relatively critical of the conservative parties and supported pro-democracy parties and 
liberal parties. The 30-40 year old cohort in the 2002 presidential election was the most 
liberal age cohorts. The survey from Korean Social Science Data Center confirms this 
finding. According to self-identified ideology, where a higher score means strongly 
conservative, the average scores of `liberal/conservative' ideology for all cohorts of over 
45 years old are above the average for all voters while those for all cohorts below 44 are 
smaller than the average score for all voters. In particular, the 30-34 year old cohort is 
most liberal, followed by the 25-29 year old cohort and 34-40 year old cohort (see Table 
A6.3 in Appendix). 
Older Voters and Party Aliennnent 
It is interesting that there were some changes in the party alignment among the 
oldest voters. In 1992 and 1997, voters over 65 years old generally preferred major party 
A, but this pattern changed in 2002. Unlike the previous election, major party B was the 
ruling party in the 2002 election. This may suggest that voters over 65 years old are 
always close to the party in power regardless of the characteristics of the party possibly as 
a result of their lack of political awareness. However, an alternative interpretation may be 
suggested in view of a revisionist perspective on party identification. Changes in partisan 
alignment may be a result of the performance of the ruling party. The ruling MDP has 
emphasised social welfare, and introduced a national pension system, which is the main 
pillar of social security system in Korea. The oldest section of the electorate have 
directly benefited, and are thus sympathetic to the ruling party. 
In 1997, among the 45-65 years old cohort, the proportion of party identifiers for 
major party B, the NCNP, is bigger than that of major party A. the GNP, unlike the 
previous election. A critical deterioration of the Korean economy under Kim Young Sam 
government may be related to this change in party affiliation. It is assumed that voters of 
the age group who were relatively more sensitive to economic conditions and who were 
relatively main victims of a serious national economic crisis in 1997, were much more 
$ `Special Topic: Experts' Round-table Talk on the 2002 Presidential Election', Mfunhwa Daily 
Newspaper, 26 December 2002. 
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disappointed with the ruling party's performance. 
In order to examine the above hypothetical explanation, the difference in evaluations 
of the performance of the incumbent government across different age groups is 
considered. As shown in Table 6.11, one-way ANOVA analysis shows that the older age 
groups evaluated the performance of the government very badly, and the age group 
difference was no longer statistically significant in 1997. Indeed, in 1992, the older 
generations were generally generous to the government compared to younger ones, and 
the difference was statistically significant. However, in 1997, the difference between 
older and younger groups disappeared and the older generations also expressed their 
disappointment with the government. Therefore, it can be suggested that the economic 
recession caused the weak partisans to withdraw their loyalty from the ruling Grand 
National Party. 
However, this does not suggest a switch of party identification from the GNP to the 
NCNP. Indeed, it is noticeable that the proportion of older voters among all partisans 
suddenly decreased in 1997. Many former party identifiers of the GNP, who were 
disappointed with the performance of the ruling GNP, withdrew their party affiliation. It 
is suspected that some of them became independents while others followed Rhee In je 
and switched their partisanship to the New Party for People. 
Table 6.11 ANOVA: Age Groups and Evaluation on Government Performance, 1992 and 
1997 
N Mean Std. D ANOVA 
1992 F= 11.064 
20-24 131 3.66 . 99 Sig. - 0.000 
25-34 336 3.71 . 93 35-44 290 3.50 1.08 
45-54 196 3.28 1.13 
55-64 123 3.14 1.09 
65 and over 111 3.11 1.11 
Total 1187 3.47 1.07 
1997 F=1.030 
20-24 151 4.34 . 70 Sig. =. 399 25-34 337 4.26 . 87 35-44 286 4.32 . 83 45-54 227 4.30 . 85 55-64 126 4.21 . 87 65 and over 75 4.12 . 93 
Total 1202 4.28 . 84 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992 and 1997. 
Keys: N= number of cases; Mean = average score in a 5-point scale (i. e., I- very good, 2- good, 
3= average, 4= bad, 5= very bad). 
Note: The figures for 1992 are based on a transformation of a 4-pint scale to a 5-point scale. 
Therefore, Standard deviation for 1992 is bigger than that for 1997. 
In addition to changes in the partisan alignment of older voters, the average age of 
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party identifiers for major party B increased from 39 years old in 1992 to 43 years old in 
1997, while that of the major party A (at about 45 years old ) did not change between 
1992 and 1997. It is assumed that this increase in the average age of NCNP identifiers 
was a natural increase going together with the maturation of the party while the average 
age of the GNP did not change due the defection of the older identifiers. However, this 
argument is not conclusive due to the lack of data such as panel survey data. 
Education and Electoral Alignment 
In 1992, the pattern of electoral support which existed in the authoritarian regimes was 
repeated. The less educated voters were affiliated with the DLP, the successor party of the 
old authoritarian parties, while the more educated voters felt close to the DP, a pro- 
democracy party. Also, partisans of third party, the UNP, were relatively well educated 
compared to those of two major parties. This confirms our expectation that higher 
educated pro-democratic voters under authoritarianism were disappointed with the split of 
the two Kims, and hoped for a new party. The difference in the level of education among 
three parties is linear and is statistically significant, as shown in Table 6.12. 
In 1997, although the pattern of the relationship between party identification and 
education continued to some extent, for example, third party identifiers recorded 
relatively high levels of education compared to party identifiers for the other parties, the 
difference in the level of education between the two major parties no longer existed. 
Again, in 2002, there was no difference in educational level between party identifiers for 
the two parties. Pearson's correlation coefficient is not statistically significant (see Table 
6.12 and also Table A6.4 in Appendix). 
The change in partisan alignment in terms of the level of education implies that less 
educated voters who were easily mobilised under the authoritarian regimes are no longer 
loyal to the long time ruling party. As discussed above, researchers explained the 
difference in electoral behaviour between less and more educated voters by focusing on 
differences in the level of political awareness. Under authoritarian rule, higher educated 
voters called for democracy first, while less educated voters supported the ruling party, 
emphasising national economic growth and national security at the expense of political 
freedom. The pattern remained in 1992 after the transition to democracy, but in 1997, 
these differences disappeared at least in terms of party affiliation. 
Concerning the change in partisan alignment, it is notable that the proportion of 
less educated voters among all partisans reduced in 1997. Although this decrease may be 
related to an increase of the level of education among the entire electorate, the change in 
the party alignment of less educated voters suggests that former party identifiers of the 
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GNP defected from the party in 1997. Their change in partisanship suggests that party 
identification may vary depending upon changes in the political environment. Moreover, 
their support for the old ruling party under the authoritarian government may not be 
related to the level of political awareness, if it is assumed that the level of political 
awareness is stable over time. Under the authoritarian governments, the support for the 
old ruling party of less educated voters may have been due to their policy preferences or 
evaluation of government performance. Subsequently, the poor performance of the ruling 
party and the decline of the national economy in the new democracy caused them to drift 
from the party. 
Table 6.12 Crosstab: Partisan Alignment and Education. 1992-2002 
N MAJOR MAJOR THIRD TOTAL PEARSON 
PARTY PARTY PARTY CORRELATION 
A B P) 
199 2 
Primary school 195 66.7% 28.2% 5.1% 100% 0.204 (0.000)' 
Middle school 164 61.6% 32.9% 5.5% 100% 0.160 (0.000)" 
High school 340 44.1% 36.8% 19.1% 100% 
College 209 42.6% 43.1% 14.4% 100% 
Total 908 51.8% 35.7% 12.6% 100% 
1997 
Primary school 83 39.8% 54.2% 6.0% 100% 0.088 (0.017)' 
Middle school 85 32.9% 60.0% 7.1% 100% 0.032 (0.426)" 
High school 308 26.3% 50.3% 23.4% 100% 
College 254 30.3% 53.9% 15.7% 100% 
Total 730 30.0% 53.2% 16.8% 100% 
2002 
Primary school 89 44.9% 55.1% 100% 0.020 (0.585)" 
Middle school 106 48.1% 51.9% 100% 
High school 281 48.4% 51.6% 100% 
College 274 43.4% 56.6% 100% 
Total 750 46.1% 53.9% 100% 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992,1997, and 2002. 
Keys: N= number of cases; Major party A= the Democratic Liberal Party in 1992, and the Grand 
National Party in 1997 and in 2002; Major party B= the Democratic Party in 1992, the National 
Congress for New Politics in 1997, and the Millennium Democratic Party in 2002; Third party 
the Unification National Party in 1992, and the New Party for People in 1997. 
Notes: * All three parties are included in the statistical test. Indeed, in this analysis, three political 
parties are coded in an ordinal scale (i. e., Major Party A is coded I, Major Party B is coded 2, and 
Third Party is coded 3). 
** Only two major parties are included in the statistic test. 
Gender and Electoral Alignment 
In general, gender does not explain much electoral behaviour in new democracy. While 
women were relatively more mobilised in elections under authoritarian rule, there is now 
little difference between men and women. However, as full-time housewives, who 
account for a great proportion of all women, remain strong supporters of the successor 
party of the old authoritarian ruling party, it is expected that a difference in partisan 
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alignment between men and women may still exist in the new democracy. 
Table 6.13 Crosstab: Partisan Alignment and Gender, 1992-2002 
N MAJOR MAJOR THIRD TOTAL PEARSON 
PARTY PARTY PARTY CRRELATION 
A B (P) 
1992 
Man 426 50.2% 36.2% 13.6% 100% -0.035 (0.295)' 
Woman 482 53.1% 35.3% 11.6% 100/a -0.020(0.579)0* 
Total 908 51.8% 35.7% 12.6% 100% 
1997 
Man 380 25.5% 54.5% 20.0% 100% -0.1 15 (0.002)' 
Woman 356 34.8% 51.4% 13.8% 100% -0.088 (0.029)" 
Total 730 30.0% 53.0% 17.0% 100% 
2002 
Man 374 47.1% 52.9% 100% 0.0 14 (0.702)" 
Woman 381 45.7% 54.3% 100% 
Total 755 46.4% 53.6% 100% 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, IYY2,1Y9 I, and 1t1U1. 
Note: * Included three parties. Indeed, in this analysis, three political parties are coded in an 
ordinal scale (i. e., Major Party A is coded 1, Major Party B is coded 2, and Third Party is coded 
3); ** Included only two major parties. 
Keys: N= number of cases; Major party A= the Democratic Liberal Party in 1992, and the Grand 
National Party in 1997 and in 2002; Major party B= the Democratic Party in 1992, the National 
Congress for New Politics in 1997, and the Millennium Democratic Party in 2002; Third party = 
the Unification National Party in 1992, and the New Party for People in 1997. 
As shown in Table 6.13, a statistical test shows that gender generally does not 
explain partisan alignment in the new democracy. However, the 1997 presidential election 
study revealed a somewhat different result. Here, there was a statistical difference 
between major party A identifiers and major party B or third party identifiers in terms of 
sex (see also Table A6.5 in Appendix). This may be related to the economic crisis during 
the election year. Koreans faced a critical economic recession in 1997 and many voters 
held the incumbent government and ruling party responsible for the crisis. Men who 
directly suffered from the economic recession might have been more critical to the ruling 
party, while women who were relatively less sensitive to the recession and who 
historically favoured the ruling party might be less critical to the ruling party. This 
explains the fact that the New Party for People (NPP), which was favoured by the former 
identifiers of the Grand National Party and the former independents in urban area, had 
more male partisans rather than female partisans. 
As shown in Table 6.14, a difference between male and female evaluations of 
government performance has existed over time, although the difference has been reduced 
and was not statistically significant in 2002. Men have been relatively more critical of 
government performance. Therefore, it is expected that men were greatly influenced by 
the poor performance of the ruling GNP and defected from the Grand National Party to 
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the NPP or became non-identifiers. 
Table 6.14 T-test for Equality of Means: Gender and Evaluation on Government 
Performance, 1992-2002 
N Mean Std. D Test-statistics 
1992 t=2.340 
Men 582 3.54 1.07 Sig. = 0.019 
Women 605 3.40 1.06 
Total 1187 3.46 1.07 
1997 t=1.898 
Men 614 4.32 . 82 Sig. = 0.058 
Women 590 4.23 . 86 
Total 1204 4.28 . 84 
2002 t=1.178 
Men 739 3.30 1.01 Sig. = 0.239 
Women 761 3.24 1.00 
Total 1500 3.27 1.01 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992,1997, and ZULU. 
Key: N= number of cases. Mean = average score in a 5-point scale (i. e., I= very good, 2= good, 
3= average, 4= bad, and 5= very bad). 
The Urban-Rural Difference and Electoral Alignment 
The urban-rural alignment based on differences in the level of political awareness was a 
key variable in explaining electoral behaviour under the authoritarian regimes. However, 
it is expected that the urban-rural alignment in electoral behaviour is no longer a useful 
explanatory tool in the new democracy because the urbanisation of society has progressed 
very rapidly and because voters in rural area are no longer so easy to mobilise. 
A Reversal of Urban-Rural Differences in Party Alienment 
In 1992, the old pattern, strong rural support for the ruling party and urban support 
for the opposition party, was maintained. The partisanship for major party A was strong 
in rural areas, while third party partisanship was based in urban areas. The difference in 
party identifiers of the three parties in terms of the size of area is statistically significant. 
In 1997 and in 2002, the relationship between rural-urban area and partisanship is 
statistically significant, but the direction of the relationship is reversed i. e., the major 
party A is strong in urban areas and major party B is strong in rural areas (sec Table 6.15 
and also Table A6.6 in Appendix). 
Unequal Urbanisation across Regions 
The reversal of the relationship between the two major parties and the type of 
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residence area may be related to the level of urbanisation across different regions. The 
Gyeongsang region could have become more urbanised compared to Jeolla or 
Chungcheong regions during last 10 years. As people in Gyeongsang are strong 
supporters of the Grand National Party, unequal urbanisation might explain why urban 
voters are now relatively strong supporters of the GNP. 
'Ibble 6.15 Crosstab: Partisan Alignment and Location, 1992-2002 
N MAJOR MAJOR THIRD TOTAL PEARSON Z2 (P) PARTY PARTY PARTY 
A B 
1992 13.146(0.011) 
Big city 449 51.9% 34.7% 13.4% I00% 
Small city 236 43.6% 42.8% 13.6% 100% 
Rural area 223 60.1% 30.0% 9.9% 100% 
Total 908 51.8% 35.7% 12.6% 100% 
1997 9.528 (0.049) 
Big city 346 34.4% 48.8% 16.8% 100% 
Small city 282 28.7% 55.0% 16.3% 100% 
Rural area 108 19.4% 61.1% 19.4% 100% 
Total 736 30.0% 53.0% 17.0% 100% 
2002 14.733 (0.001) 
Big city 360 52.8% 47.2% 100% 
Small city 302 43.0% 57.0% 100% 
Rural area 93 32.3% 67.7% 100% 
Total 755 46.4% 53.6% 1009/0 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992,1991 and 2W2. 
Keys: N= number of cases; Major party A= the Democratic Liberal Party in 1992, and the Grand 
National Party in 1997 and in 2002; Major party B= the Democratic Party in 1992, the National 
Congress for New Politics in 1997, and the Millennium Democratic Party in 2002; Third party = 
the Unification National Party in 1992, and the New Party for People in 1997. 
Table 6.16 shows the relations between voter's hometown and size of residence area. 
More than half of voters who are from Gyeongsang live in a big city, and this proportion 
is greater than that of voters who are from Jeolla. However, the proportion has not 
changed much over time. Consequently, the reversal of the urban/rural partisanship divide 
cannot be explained by an increased urbanisation of the Gyeongsang people. In 1992, 
more than half of Gyeongsang people lived in urban areas, but the partisanship of the 
major party A, the Democratic Liberal Party, was strong in rural areas. 
Politicisation of Voters in Rural Area? 
Another interpretation of a reverse of the relationship between major political party 
and type of residence area is related to a politicisation of voters in rural areas. Voters in 
rural areas are very vulnerable under the global world economic system, and try to 
actively defend their own interests in the new democracy, while rural voters were 
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mobilised under the authoritarian regimes. Farmers may therefore feel close to the major 
party B that has suggested a protection of agriculture under the WTO system rather than 
the major party A which has pursued an economic globalisation at the expense of farmers. 
A change of the partisanship of farmer in the new democracy will be discussed again later. 
Table 6.16 Crosstab: Voter's Hometown and Size of Residence Area. 1992-2002 
N Big city Small Rural Total PEARSON Z' 2 (P) 
ci coun 
1992 114.966 (0.000) 
Seoul 129 85.3% 12.4% 2.3% 100% 
Gyeonggi 131 45.0% 26.7% 28.2% 100% 
Gangwon 63 23.8% 36.5% 39.7% 100% 
Chungcheong 204 41.2% 29.4% 29.4% 100% 
Jeolla 238 39.1% 34.0% 26.9% I00% 
Gyeongsang 419 52.3% 25.3% 22.4% 100% 
Jeju 1 100.0% 100% 
The North 15 86.7% 6.7% 6.7% 100% 
Total 1200 49.5% 26.8% 23.7% 100% 
1997 106.932 (0.000) 
Seoul 149 67.1% 30.9% 2.0% 100% 
Gyeonggi 118 52.5% 34.7% 12.7% 100% 
Gangwon 76 30.3% 31.6% 38.2% 100% 
Chungcheong 198 36.9% 37.9% 25.3% 100% 
Jeolla 266 44.7% 43.2% 12.0% 100% 
Gyeongsang 360 53.9% 34.7% 11.4% 100% 
Jeju 25 72.0% 12.0% 16.0% 100% 
The North 12 83.3% 8.3% 8.3% 100% 
Total 1204 49.8% 35.7% 14.5% 100%o 
2002 131.475 (0.000) 
Seoul 208 76.0% 19.2% 4.8% 100% 
Gyeonggi 175 32.6% 57.1% 10.3% 100/a 
Gangwon 93 36.6% 58.1% 5.4% 100% 
Chungcheong 216 45.8% 39.4% 14.8% 100% 
Jeolla 278 40.3% 40.3% 19.4% 100% 
Gyeongsang 499 51.5% 40.3% 8.2% 100% 
Jeju 6 16.7% 83.3% 100% 
The North 16 56.3% 31.3% 12.5% 100% 
Total 1491 48.8% 40.4% 10.9% 1000/0 
Data: Korean Presidential Election, 1992,1997, and 2002. 
Key: N= number of cases. 
Religion and Electoral Alignment 
Unlike Western democracies where religious conflict has been salient and religion is still 
a key factor to explain social cleavages, Koreans have not experienced any serious 
religious conflicts, and religion has hardly been considered as a factor to explain electoral 
behaviour. However, as shown in Table 6.17, there is a close relationship between religion 
and partisanship, and the relationship is statistically significant. Buddhists are related to 
support for major party A while Protestantism is related to support for major party B. In 
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the division between Buddhists and Protestants, Catholics and atheists are located in the 
middle. 
Table 6.17 Crosstab: Partisan Alignment and Religion, 1992-2002 
N MAJOR MAJOR THIRD PEARSON2 (P) 
PARTY A PARTY B, PARTY 
1992 
Buddhist 299 62.5% 25.1% 12.4% 36.748 (0.000) 
Protestant 212 42.9% 46.7% 10.4% 
Catholic 78 51.3% 30.8% 17.9% 
Other 17 70.6% 29.4% 0.0% 
None religion 302 46.4% 40.1% 13.6% 
Total 908 51.8% 35.7% 12.6% 
1997 
Buddhist 217 45.6% 37.8% 16.6% 49.086 (0.000) 
Protestant 176 23.3% 65.9% 10.8% 
Catholic 65 27.7% 50.8% 21.5% 
Other 23 30.4% 56.5% 13.0% 
None religion 252 21.8% 57.5% 20.6% 
Total 733 30.0% 53.1% 16.9% 
2002 
Buddhist 195 56.4% 43.6% 22.903 (0.000) 
Protestant 223 40.8% 59.2% 
Catholic 78 59.0% 41.0% 
Other 12 16.7% 83.3% 
None religion 247 40.9% 59.1% 
Total 755 46.4% 53.6% 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992,1997, and 2002. 
Keys: N= number of cases; Major party A= the Democratic Liberal Party in 1992, and the Grand 
National Party in 1997 and in 2002; Major party B= the Democratic Party in 1992, the National 
Congress for New Politics in 1997, and the Millennium Democratic Party in 2002; Third party = 
the Unification National Party in 1992, and the New Party for People in 1997. 
Value Difference? 
This division can be interpreted by differences in political attitudes across the 
different religions. Buddhists are more conservative, while Protestants are more liberal 
about religious doctrine. Also, under the authoritarian period, many Protestant religious 
leaders directly participated in social movements for democracy, though some clergymen 
and churches kept a close relationship with authoritarian governments. During 1980s, 
Protestant and Catholic religious leaders influenced by the liberation theology originating 
from Latin America called for democracy and emphasised active participation of religious 
people in social reform. Meanwhile, Buddhist religious leaders were relatively silent on 
political issues. In this cultural context, Protestants feel close to the major party B, while 
Buddhists are more inclined to support major party A. 
Regional Distribution of Relij ion 
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However, the Buddhist-Protestant alignment in party identification is related to 
regional distribution of each religion. Buddhism is strong in the Gyeongsang region while 
Protestantism is strong in the Jeolla region. The regional distribution of religions 
originated in pre-modern society. Historically, the Christian religion flourished in the 
Jeolla region with the introduction of the religion to Koreans, while Buddhism. a 
traditional religion, has been very strong in traditional society of the Gyeongsang. 
The distribution of religion across regions confirms this argument. A great 
proportion of voters from Gyeongsong are Buddhists, while a high percentage of voters 
from Jeolla are Protestants. There is also a relatively high number of Protestants among 
voters from Chungcheong, which was politically close to major party B in the 1997 
presidential election (see Table A6.7 in Appendix). 
Social Class and Electoral Alignment 
In Western democracies, social class has been an important basis of political partisanship 
and class voting is significant, thought many researchers argue that class is no longer 
dominant in politics and new factors such as postmaterial values should be included in 
explanations of electoral behaviour. 9 In general, class affects partisan choice and there is 
a linkage between classes and political parties. Typically, manual workers support left 
wing parties and the non-manual workers support either the centre or right wing parties. 
This linkage between classes and political parties exists even in the United States where 
class-based parties have not emerged. Here, the working class prefers the Democratic 
Party that advocates policies in favour of the working class. 10 
In contrast to Western democracies, it is widely accepted that class is not an 
important factor to explain Korean politics because none of the major political parties 
have been based on the class cleavage. In Korean politics, all major parties have 
identified themselves as a `catch-all' party, and class-based major parties have not 
emerged, though a minor party, the Democratic Labour Party, as formed based on one of 
two national labour unions in 2000. E Under the authoritarian regimes, freedom of 
For a recent discussion on class politics in voting behaviour in Western democracies, see 
Geoffrey Evans, ed., The End of Class Politics?: Class Voting in Comparative Context (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999). 
10 Michael Hout, 'Classes, Unions, and the Realignment of US Presidential Voting. 1952-1992', in 
Geoffrey Evans, ed., The End of Class Politics? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) pp. 59- 
82. 
11 The previous form of the Democratic Labour Party was the People's Victory 21 (PV) in the 
1997 presidential election. As a candidate of the PV, Kwon Young-gil ran for the presidency. Then. 
in 2002, he again ran for the presidency, as a candidate of the Democratic Labour Party. His share 
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expression or freedom of thought was limited and leftist thought was legally condemned. 
During the rapid industrialisation under authoritarian regimes, the labour movement was 
restricted severely, and a class-conscious working class did not develop. In the new 
democracy, labour movements have become more successful, but the movement has 
hardly advanced to political and social issues. In short, researchers generally agree that 
class does not explain much electoral behaviour in Korea. 12 Therefore, it is not expected 
that a significant relationship between class and party affiliation will exist. 
Beginning of Class Politics? 
There is no single universal class scheme in electoral studies in Korea. " Each 
researcher uses a different class framework. In this research, the Goldthorpe five-class 
schema is adopted. 14 As shown in Table 6.18, there were no class differences between the 
partisans of the major parties in 1992 and in 1997, but there is a statistical difference 
between partisans of the political parties in terms of class in 2002. Therefore, it is 
suggested that class is beginning to explain partisan alignments in Korea and that 
regionalism is not the only factor. It also suggests that partisans are beginning to align 
according to economic interests or preferences. One of most notable change is the 
distribution of partisanships among the Petty Bourgeois in 1997. The Petty Bourgeois 
class has historically supported the authoritarian party, but not in 1997. Again, the 
economic recession in the end of 1997 may explain the change in the partisanship of the 
Petty Bourgeois. The class is relatively more sensitive to any economic recession, and 
they withdrew their support for the ruling party. 
of the vote markedly increased between two presidential elections, but he merely gained 3.9 per 
cent of votes in the 2002 presidential election. 
12 For an analysis of class-based electoral behaviour in Korea, see Young-tae Chung, 
`Gyegeupbyeol topyohangtaeleul tonghae bon sipsadae daeseon' (An analysis of the 14"' 
presidential election focusing on class voting), in Nam-Young Lee, ed., Hangugui seongeo 
(Elections in Korea), vol. 1 (Seoul: Nanam, 1993), pp. 139-83. 
13 Chung, `Gyegeupbyeol topyohangtaeleul tonghae bon sipsadae daeseon' (An analysis of the 
14`h presidential election focusing on class voting), p. 140. 
14 The schema includes the following classes: the Salariat (managers, professionals, 
administrators); Routine manual worker (clerks, secretaries); the Petty Bourgeoisie (employer and 
the self-employed); Foremen and Technicians; and the Working Class (rank and file manual 
employees in industry and agriculture). The Goldthorpe class schema is based on employment 
status as well as on occupation. The employment status is important in explaining electoral 
behaviour, and the Goldthorpe class schema is arguably the most influential operationalisation of 
social class in British electoral studies. For a classification of occupations in the Goldthorpe class 
schema, see John H. Goldthorpe and Keith Hope, The Social Grading of Occupations: A New 
Approach and Scale (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974). For the schema in electoral studies, 
Anthony Heath et al., Understanding Political Change (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1991), pp. 66-7. 
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Table 6.18 Crosstab: Partisan Alignment and Class, 1992-2002 
N MAJOR MAJOR THIRD TOTAL PEARSON 
PARTY PARTY PARTY 
x2(P) 
A B 
1992 
the Salariat 91 51.6% 35.2% 13.2% 100% 11.514 
Routine Non-manual Workers 72 45.8% 33.3% 20.8% 100% (0.174) 
the Petty Bourgeois 207 49.8% 40.6% 9.7% 100% 
Foremen and Technicians 13 30.8% 53.8% 15.4% 100% 
the Working Class 132 56.1% 29.5% 14.4% 100% 
Total 515 50.7% 36.1% 13.2% 100% 
1997 
the Salariat 89 31.5% 52.8% 15.7% 100% 15.433 
Routine Non-manual Workers 56 21.4% 53.6% 25.0% 100% (0.051) 
the Petty Bourgeois 232 23.3% 62.5% 14.2% 100% 
Foremen and Technicians 10 20.0% 30.0% 50.0% 100% 
the Working Class 80 23.8% 53.8% 22.5% 100% 
Total 467 24.6% 57.4% 18.0% 100% 
2002 
the Salariat 87 40.2% 59.8% 100% 11.162 
Routine Non-manual Workers 65 44.6% 55.4% 100% (0.025) 
the Petty Bourgeois 158 51.9% 48.1% 100% 
Foremen and Technicians 9 0.0% 100.0% 100% 
the Working Class 80 47.5% 52.5% 100% 
Total 399 46.1% 53.9% 100% 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992,1997, and 2002. 
Keys: N= number of cases; `Major party A' refers to the Democratic Liberal Party in 1992, and 
the Grand National Party in 1997 and 2002; `Major party B' refers to the Democratic Party in 1992, 
the National Congress for New Politics, and the Millennium Democratic Party in 2002; and 'Third 
party' refers to the Unification National Party in 1992 and the New Party for People in 1997. 
Note: Although there are too few foremen and technicians in the survey data, it is assumed that this 
does not much disturb the result of the statistical analysis. 
Level of Income and Electoral Alignment 
The absence of major class-based parties in Korea does not disprove the existence of a 
linkage between partisan affiliation and the economic status of Korean voters. Although 
many journalists and researchers often assume that there is not much difference between 
political parties in terms of policies, the two competing major parties, the descendent of 
the authoritarian party and the successor to the pro-democracy party, have had significant 
policy differences . Major party A has emphasised market freedom and approved of the 
contribution of big business groups (chaebol) while major party B has always preferred 
social welfare and economic justice as well as a balanced development between the 
chaebol and medium or small business companies. Furthermore, each major party has 
identified itself with the representation of either the middle class or the lower class, and 
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many voters have perceived this class identification. Major party A, which has 
emphasised market freedom and economic efficiency, has been perceived as a political 
party for the rich and the upper-middle class, while major party B, which has emphasised 
social security system and economic justice in the market, has been recognised as a 
political party for the poor and the lower-middle class. 
This linkage between political parties and the economic status of voters can be seen 
in election results. For example, election results in every district in Seoul clearly show 
this linkage. Major party A won in every electoral district where the upper or middle class 
live such as the southern part of Seoul, while major party B generally won in the poorer 
areas such as the northern part of the city. 
Electoral AliLnment: the Poor vs. the Rich 
The survey data shows mixed results. As shown in Table 6.19, in 1992, the 
difference in the economic status of party identifiers between political parties is 
statistically significant (i. e., Chi-square =37.150, p= 0.000). However, the relation did 
not fit with previous expectations. The poor were more likely to be aligned to major party 
A while the rich affiliated with third party, the Unification National Party (see Table A6.8 
in Appendix). The relationship between the poor and major party A can be interpreted as 
a continuation of a pattern which existed in the authoritarian regimes. Before the 
transition to democracy, the poor appreciated the economic performance of the 
authoritarian government and also preferred economic development to political 
democracy. Considering the long-term duration of party identification, this continuation 
of partisanship is not unexpected. 
The socio-economic characteristic of third party identifiers may be related to the 
personal qualities of the leader of the party. Chung Ju-young of the Unification National 
Party, owner of Hyundai business group and the most successful businessman in Korea, 
promised better management of the economy, and wealthier voters generally supported 
the party. This suggests that party identifiers consider policies and party platform when 
developing an affiliation with political parties. Also, this implies that party attachment 
with third party is not quit distinguished from partisan support in election because of a 
short life of the third party. 
In 1997 and 2002, the relationship is not statistically significant, but the direction of 
the relationship was reversed. The poor show greater affiliation with major party B in 
1997 and 2002, in contrast to their affiliation with major party A in 1992. This may be 
related to differences in policies pursued by two major political parties for the last 10 
years. For example, major party B, such as the NCNP in 1997, has claimed to stand for 
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the poor and has pledged itself to social welfare and economic justice, while the GNP has 
asserted market freedom and has proposed policies for the rich. It is suggested that two 
major parties have distinctive images, and that this affects party identifiers. Also, this 
implies that the distinction between partisanships of two major parties in terms of 
economic status will be evident in the future, if the political party system is continued. 
Table 6.19 Crosstab: Partisan Alignment and Household Income, 1992-2002 
N MAJOR MAJOR THIRD TOTAL PEARSON %2 (P) PARTY PARTY PARTY 
A B 
1992 37.150 (0.000) 
Low 364 59.9% 31.0% 6.8% 100% 
Middle 495 46.9% 39.2% 11.90/0 100% 
High 49 40.8% 34.7% 21.8% 100% 
Total 908 51.8% 35.7% 12.6% 100% 
1997 2.813 (0.590) 
Low 235 27.7% 55.3% 17.0% 100% 
Middle 375 29.7% 53.1% 15.8% 100% 
High 113 33.0% 48.7% 18.9% 100% 
Total 723 29.9% 53.1% 17.0% 100% 
2002 1.536 (0.464) 
Low 255 45.1% 54.9% 100% 
Middle 328 48.5% 51.5% 100% 
High 132 51.5% 48.5% 100% 
Total 715 47.8% 52.2% 100% 
Data: Korean Election Study, 1992,1997, and 2002. 
Keys: N= number of cases; Major party A= the Democratic Liberal Party in 1992, and the Grand 
National Party in 1997 and in 2002; Major party B= the Democratic Party in 1992, the National 
Congress for New Politics in 1997, and the Millennium Democratic Party in 2002; Third party = 
the Unification National Party in 1992, and the New Party for People in 1997. 
Occupation and Electoral Alignment 
A further feature of Korean elections has been differences in electoral behaviour across 
different occupational categories. In general, full-time housewives, farmers, public 
servants, and unemployed workers have supported the authoritarian ruling parties, while 
students, white-collar workers, and blue-collar workers have preferred the pro-democracy 
opposition parties. Therefore, it is expected that in the new democracy there is a link 
between partisanship and occupations, if the pattern of party preferences under the 
authoritarian regimes remained. 
As shown in Table 6.20, there is a close relation between party affiliation and 
occupational categories in the 1997 and 2002 elections and the differences between the 
two major parties are statistically significant (i. e., Pearson's chi-square is 31.460 with p= 
0.000 in 1997, and chi-square is 23.467 with p=0.000 in 2002). Although the 
distribution of partisans across occupational categories is not statistically significant in 
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the 1992 presidential election (i. e., p>0.05), some categories of occupation followed the 
old pattern of party preferences. 
Table 6.20 Crosstab: Partisan Alignment and Occupation, 1992-2002 
N MAJOR MAJOR THIRD PEARSON 
PARTY PARTY PARTY x2(p) A B 
1992 
Professional & Public servant 70 51.4% 37.1% 11.4% 23.186 
White collar worker 101 46.5% 32.7% 20.8% (0.057) 
Self-employed worker 113 49.6% 38.9% 11.5% 
Blue collar worker 117 49.6% 34.2% 16.2% 
Farmer 114 56.1% 37.7% 6.1% 
Student 53 41.5% 47.2% 11.3% 
Full-time housewife 225 51.1% 37.8% 11.1% 
Unemployed worker & other 115 62.6% 24.3% 13.0% 
Total 908 51.8% 35.7% 12.6% 
1997 
Professional & Public servant 73 31.5% 53.4% 15.1% 43.061 
White collar worker 80 22.5% 53.8% 23.8% (0.000) 
Self-employed worker 188 23.4% 63.8% 12.8% 
Blue collar worker 86 24.4% 51.2% 24.4% 
Farmer 40 22.5% 55.0% 22.5% 
Student 59 23.7% 62.7% 13.6% 
Full-time housewife 145 44.1% 40.7% 15.2% 
Unemployed worker & other 46 50.0% 37.0% 13.0% 
Total 717 30.1% 53.1% 16.7% 
2002 
Professional & Public servant 63 34.9% 65.1% 23.467 
White collar worker 91 . 48.4% 51.6% (0.001) 
Self-employed worker 125 53.6% 46.4% 
Blue collar worker 70 51.4% 48.6% 
Farmer 43 25.6% 74.4% 
Student 70 30.0% 70.0% 
Full-time housewife 142 51.4% 48.6% 
Unemployed worker & other 128 48.4% 51.6% 
Total 732 45.9% 54.1% 
Data: Korean presidential Election Study, 1992,1997, and 2002. 
Note: The classification of occupation follows a common classification used by many social 
research agencies in Korea such as Gallup Korea and TNS Korea. 
Keys: N= number of cases; Major party A= the Democratic Liberal Party in 1992, and the Grand 
National Party in 1997 and in 2002; Major party B= the Democratic Party in 1992, the National 
Congress for New Politics in 1997, and the Millennium Democratic Party in 2002; Third party = 
the Unification National Party in 1992 and the New Party for People in 1997. 
Students and Housewives in New Democracy 
In 1992, students generally were affiliated with major party B, while full-time 
housewives who were loyal supporters of the authoritarian ruling party transferred their 
support to the successor party of the old ruling party. Students and full-time housewives 
showed the same pattern in 1997 and in 2002. Their political values may explain this 
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pattern of party affiliation. In Korean politics, students were always the centre of social 
movements for democracy. For instance, students were the main force in the transition to 
democracy in 1987. In the new democracy, students have supported extensive political 
reforms and have challenged the authoritarian political culture embedded in the society. 
On the other hand, housewives have preferred the status quo and supported only 
incremental reform rather than a rapid social change. Also, housewives have been 
relatively less critical of government performance. 
Farmers in the New Democracy 
Partisan alignment among farmers has changed over time. In 1992, more farmers 
were affiliated with party A than party B. In a sense, the distribution of farmer's 
partisanships in 1992 followed their old pattern. Under authoritarian regimes, farmers 
experienced rapid economic development in the early stage of industrialisation, and 
voters in rural areas strongly supported the authoritarian ruling party. During the rapid 
industrialisation under the authoritarian regime, one of the popular social slogans was 
`building a rich rural area', and voters in rural areas benefited during industrialisation. 
However, in the new democracy, farmers have suffered. During the Kim Yong Sam 
government, Korea joined to the WTO at the expense of farmers' interests in the domestic 
market, while the opposition party firmly supported the protection of the agricultural 
sector. It may be assumed that farmers were very disappointed with the ruling party and 
withdrew their support from the political party. As shown in Table 6.21, in 1992, farmers 
were relatively less critical about the incumbent government's performance, but in 1997, 
farmers were not exceptional in their critical evaluation of the government's poor 
performance. Then, in 2002, farmers were actually more positive about the performance 
of the new ruling party than any other occupational groups. 
However, the reliability of this is limited due to small sample size. Also, this 
explanation is also problematic when we consider a main characteristic of party 
identification -a long-term psychological attachment. It is not expected that a party 
identifier would switch from the major party A to the major party B, even though the 
major party B proposed various policies to attract farmers. A possible alternative 
interpretation focuses on a decrease of farmers among all partisans. As shown in Table 
6.20, the proportion of farmer among all partisans markedly decreased in 1997. This 
suggests that farmers who identified themselves with the major party A in 1992 gave up 
this affiliation in 1997, while most farmers who affiliated in 1992 with major party B 
retained attachment this five years later. 
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Table 6.21 ANOVA: Occupation Groups and Evaluation of Government Performance, 
1992-2002 
N Mean Std. D ANOVA 
1992 F=5.491 
Professionals / Public Servants 95 3.60 1.11 Sig. = 0.000 
White collar workers 161 3.70 . 96 
Self-employed 147 3.53 1.06 
Blue collar workers 150 3.37 1.03 
Farmers 132 3.26 1.16 
Students 75 3.92 . 85 Housewives 272 3.42 1.07 
Unemployed 155 3.23 1.10 
Total 1187 3.48 1.07 
1997 F=2.494 
Professionals / Public Servants 136 4.43 . 82 Sig. = 0.0 15 White collar workers 132 4.36 . 84 
Self-employed 275 4.30 . 85 
Blue collar workers 116 4.22 . 87 Farmers 68 4.26 . 86 Students 121 4.39 . 69 Housewives 229 4.15 . 88 
Unemployed 92 4.10 . 89 Total 1169 4.28 . 84 
2002 F=2.963 
Professionals / Public Servants 126 3.19 . 98 Sig. = 0.004 
White collar workers 197 3.36 . 98 Self-employed 237 3.41 . 99 Blue collar workers 132 3.27 1.02 
Farmers 66 3.00 1.08 
Students 179 3.04 . 85 Housewives 285 3.28 
. 
99 
Unemployed 237 3.27 1.10 
Total 1459 3.26 1.00 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992,1997, and 2002. 
Keys: N= number of cases; and Mean = average score in a 5-point scale (i. e., 1= very good, and 5 
= very bad). 
Ideological Self-Image and Electoral Alignment 
In Western democracies, ideological self-image of the left and the right is useful in 
explaining electoral behaviour, particularly electoral relationships with political parties. '5 
However, in Korea, it is widely accepted that political ideology does not help explain 
voting choice. 16 The authoritarian government always emphasised the military threat 
15 For a detailed analysis of the relationship between party identification and ideology in the 
United Kingdom, see William L. Miller, Annis May Timpson, and Michael Lessnoff, Political 
Culture in Contemporary Britain: People and Politicians, Principles and Practice (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 295-320. 
16 As one of the few studies which emphasises ideology in voting behaviour, see Won-Taek Kang, 
'Yukwonjauijeongchiinyeomgwa sipyukdae chongseon' (Political ideology of voters and the 16'h 
general election: an overlap of regional cleavage and ideological cleavage), in Youngjae Jin, ed., 
Hangugui seongeo (Elections in Korea), vol. 4 (Seoul: Korean Social Science Data Center, 2002), 
pp. 101-32. 
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from the North Korea, and Korean voters who experienced the Korean War had an 
extreme dislike of the left. Indeed, the electorate was extremely skewed to the right in 
terms of ideology and political values, and the left was hardly accepted. Furthermore, in 
terms of ideological characteristics, all major parties have resembled conservative parties, 
although to varying degrees. 
This does not mean that Korean voters are homogenous in terms of political ideology. 
After a transition to democracy in 1987, ideological rigidity has been markedly weakened 
in the society. The high level of tension between North and South has been reduced and 
many Koreans look for a peaceful relationship with the communist North. In addition, 
those who were born after the Korean War have entered the electorate, and now a greater 
percentage of the electorate did not experience the war. These post-war generations are 
less likely to have a bias against the left. Eventually, a democratic socialist party appeared 
in the new democracy and the party took a respectable share of the vote in the 2002 
election. 
Although there have been some changes after the transition to democracy, it may be 
premature to apply the 'left/right' ideological labels to the electorate in Korea where the 
public have a strong bias against socialism and regard the left as socialist. Some 
researchers suggest that rather the American terminology of `liberal/conservative', which 
is relatively independent from economic egalitarianism, may be more appropriate to 
explain ideological distinctions amongst Korean voters. 17 However, in Western 
democracies, the ideological labels of `left/right' is not restricted to economic 
egalitarianism. For example, when both the British public and elite use the ideological 
labels left and right, they have often comprised two distinct but connected dimensions --- 
i. e., the dimension `liberal/authoritarian' and the dimension `egalitarian/inegalitarian'. 
For instance, the left are committed to both liberty and equality, while the right are more 
likely to be both authoritarian and inegalitarian. ' Thus no matter what ideological labels 
are used in the analysis of Korean voters, we may assume that ideological self-image 
comprises at least two distinct dimensions, liberty and equality, and ideological self- 
image is useful to explain electoral behaviour in Korea if there is a degree of coherence in 
voters' values. 19 In the new democracy, voters in Korea show differences in attitudes 
17 Won-Taek Kang, `Yukwonjaui inyeomjeok seonghyanggwa tupyohangtae' (Ideological attitude 
of voters and voting behaviour), in Nam-Young Lee, ed., Hangugui seongeo (Elections in Korea), 
vol. 2 (Seoul: Pureungil, 1998), pp. 47-96, at pp. 48-9. Also, according to a survey, half of Korean 
voters do not have an ideological consistency across various social issues. Only 48.7 per cent of 
respondents have ideology as a belief-system, and 51.3 per cent of voters reveal different 
ideological dispositions depending upon different issues. Sample size is 1,000 and the estimated 
standard error is plus and minus 3% point in the true percentage. See `Ideological disposition of 
Koreans', Hankyoreh Daily Newspaper, 3 June 2002. 
'g Miller, Timpson, and Lessnoff, Political Culture in Contemporary Britain, pp. 295-320. 
19 In this thesis, I apply the words `liberal and conservative' in measuring ideological self-image 
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toward political, social, and economic reform. For instance, some electors prefer the 
status quo, while others support reform. Each voter also has a different position on the 
scope and tempo of reforms. 
Ideological Seif-Image and Partisan Alignment 
It is expected that ideological self-image explains differences in the electorate and 
ideological differences amongst voters explain partisan alignments in Korea. It is 
assumed that those who identify themselves as being conservative are more likely to align 
themselves with the successor of the old authoritarian party, while those who identify 
themselves as being the liberal are more inclined towards the descendant of the old pro- 
democracy party. It is also expected that partisans aligned with third parties took a middle 
position between the positions of the two major parties. 
Table 6.22 Crosstab: Partisan Alignment and Self-Identified Ideology, 1997-2002 
N MAJOR 
PARTY 
A 
MAJOR 
PARTY 
B 
THIRD 
PARTY 
TOTAL PEARSON 
CORRELATION 
p 
1997 
Strong conservative 56 50.5% 42.9% 7.1% 100% 0.262* (0.000) 
Conservative 225 40.0% 44.0% 16.0% 100% 
Centrist 140 28.6% 51.4% 20.0% 100% 
Liberal 188 19.1% 58.5% 22.3% 100% 
Strong liberal 63 11.1% 73.0% 15.9% 100% 
Total 672 29.9% 52.2% 17.9% 100% 
2002 
Strong conservative 39 66.7% 33.3% 100% 0.363 (0.000) 
Conservative 209 70.3% 29.7% 100% 
Centrist 223 47.1% 52.9% 100% 
Liberal 231 27.3% 72.7% 100% 
Strong liberal 53 17.0% 83.0% 100% 
Total 755 46.4% 53.6% 100% 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1997 and 2002. 
Note: * only two major parties are included in the statistical test. 
Keys: N= number of cases; `Major party A' refers to the Democratic Liberal Party in 1992, and 
the Grand National Party in 1997 and 2002; 'Major party B' refers to the Democratic Party in 1992, 
the National Congress for New Politics, and the Millennium Democratic Party in 2002; and `Third 
party' refers to the Unification National Party in 1992 and the New Party for People in 1997. 
This hypothetical notion is corroborated by a statistical test based on survey data of 
because these words are widely used by the public and politicians in Korea. The terminology of 
`progressive and conservative' (jinbo and bosu), which was used in the survey depicted in the table, 
or `reformist and conservative' (gaehyeok and bosu) is also widely used to label ideological 
position of publics and politicians. But the words `left and right' (jwapa and wupa) are very rarely 
used in measuring voter's ideology in Korea. The word `left' connotes pro-communist and 
conservative politicians and journalists often use this word when they attack the progressive 
politicians or intellectuals in Korea. 
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self-identified ideological position. In both the, 1997 and 2002 election studies, party 
identifiers of major party A are relatively conservative and party identifiers of major party 
B are relatively liberal20 Indeed, as shown in Table 6.22, ideology is correlated with 
party identification (i. e., Pearson's correlation coefficient is 0.262 and 0.363 in 1997 and 
2002, respectively) and the relations are statistically significant (i. e., p=0.000). Also, 
contrary to earlier expectations about the ideological position of third party identifiers, 
these voters are almost same with party identifiers of major party B in term of ideology. 
As shown in Table 6.23, the mean scores of the two opposition parties (i. e., major party B 
and third party) are almost identical and the t-test for equality of means rejects ideological 
differences between party identifiers of these two parties (i. e., p=0.956). Finally, 
according to the mean scores, party identifiers of two parties became more liberal 
between the 1997 and the 2002 election. This suggests that Korean voters as a whole may 
be becoming more liberal. 
Table 6.23 T-Test for Equality of Means: Partisan Alignment and Ideology, 1997-2002 
N MEAN STD. 
DEVIATION 
T SIG. 
(2-TAILED) 
1997 
Major party A 201 2.52 1.05 
Major Party B 351 3.16 1.17 
Third party (C) 120 3.15 1.05 
Compare A an B -6.354 0.000 
Compare A and C -5.183 0.000 
Compare B and C 0.055 0.956 
2002 
Major party A 350 2.66 . 94 
Major Party B 405 3.41 . 98 Compare A an B 10.698 0.000 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992,1997, and 2002. 
Note: Mean = average score in a 5-point scale (i. e., 1= very conservative and 5 is very liberal). 
Keys: N= number of cases; `Major party A' refers to the Democratic Liberal Party in 1992, and 
the Grand National Party in 1997 and 2002; `Major party B' refers to the Democratic Party in 1992, 
the National Congress for New Politics, and the Millennium Democratic Party in 2002; and `Third 
party' refers to the Unification National Party in 1992 and the New Party for People in 1997. 
2. A Model of Partisan Alignment in Korea 
As discussed earlier, various social and economic factors are related to partisan alignment. 
In particular, region is the main factor explaining electoral alignments in Korea with some 
other variables also being related to region. For example, religion is related to partisan 
alignment, but it is also related to regional distribution. Moreover, it can be seen that the 
20 A same analysis for the 1992 election is excluded due to a lack of data. 
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ideological distribution of voters is also linked regional patterns. Therefore, it can be 
question whether any factors other than region are necessary to explain partisan 
alignment, even though correlations exits between partisanship and social and economic 
factors. 
Preliminary Explanation of Partisan Alignment: Qualitative Data 
The qualitative data suggests several factors to explain partisanship in Korea. In the in- 
depth interviews, party identifiers were asked about why they feel close to a particular 
political party. Regionalism was the key factor to explain their partisanship, but other 
variables also were influential. 
Regionalism 
First of all, the regional cleavage explains the partisan alignment of the two major 
parties, the Grand National Party and the Millennium Democratic Party. Among the 14 
interviewees who identified themselves with a particular political party, all interviewees 
who have an attachment to the GNP were from the Gyeongsang region. All respondents 
who are from the Jeolla feel close to the MDP. 
Regionalism without regional interest: However, the respondents' affiliation to 
certain political parties based on region was not solely related to regional interests. 
Regionalism was mentioned as the main reason why they have an affiliation to the 
political parties, even though they thought that regionalism was not honourable. For 
example, in answering the question about the reasons why they feel close to a particular 
party, they said, "I lived in Daegu [a big city in Gyeongsang region]. As a Daegu citizen, 
I began to like and prefer the party. I know that people in Daegu still support the Grand 
National Party" (1-210), "Well, I have criticised regionalism [in the early part of this 
interview], but I am not free from the regionalism either due to my age" (I-213), 
"Regionalism is the main reason [why I feel close to the Grand National Party]. I have 
been influenced by regionalism because I lived in Gyeongsang region (1-209), and "Well, 
I know that this is regionalism. My parents are from the Jeolla region. I did not much like 
the Millennium Democratic Party, but my parents influenced my party affiliation. People 
who are from the Jeolla region are influenced by the regionalism" (1-206). 
Overestimation of regionalism: Although there is a clear relationship between party 
identification and region, policy preferences or image of political parties should not be 
ignored in explaining the partisan alignment in Korea. Some interviewees who are from 
either Gyeongsang or Jeolla and identified themselves with the two major parties claimed 
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other reasons for this identification rather than regionalism. For example, in responding to 
a question about why they feel close to a particular party, some respondents who are from 
two rival regions answered, "Every political party pursues power. [I believe] that the 
party will perform well in government if the party formed a government" (1-203), and "I 
am interested in the fall of the authoritarian political party" (1-204) and she did indeed 
support the political party that led the transition to democracy. A participant in a focus 
group interview who is from the Jeolla region and identified with the Millennium 
Democratic Party also suggested another reason. "The old ruling party were in power 
continually for a long time. So, I expected that the party could do something that the old 
ruling party failed to do" (FF1). Another participant in a focus group interview who is 
from Jeolla region and identified with the Millennium Democratic Party also said, "The 
party does not go with the current of the time, and sticks to its original intentions" (FM8). 
In sum, it is noticeable that the relationship between region and partisan alignment is 
more likely overestimated in quantitative survey data. For example, it is not true that all 
voters from Jeolla and affiliated to the Millennium Party are influenced by regionalism 
regarding their partisanship. Most of them identified with the party due to regionalism, 
but some of them did not. Statistical analysis based on a correlation between a 
sociological variable, i. e., home region, and party identification, fails to distinguish the 
identifiers who are affected by regionalism from the identifiers who are free from this, 
and overestimates the influence of regionalism on partisanship. 
Political Leaders 
Respondents who are free from regional constraints suggest several different 
reasons why they feel close to a particular party. Among them, many respondents referred 
to the political leaders of the party, especially the presidential candidates as a reason for 
their party affiliation. Although they mentioned a candidate or a specific political leader, 
it appeared that they made a connection between the image of the politician and the image 
of the political party. For example, again, to the question about the reasons why they feel 
close to a particular political party, respondents answered, "I voted for the incumbent 
president in the [1997] presidential election. I thought that he would do something for 
political democracy. Again, I supported the candidate of the party in the [2002] 
presidential election for the same reason" (1-207), and "I think that the candidate will 
contribute to political democracy and social justice... I like the party because of the 
politician I like" (1-211). 
Long term Policy Preference 
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Respondents identifying with the Democratic Labour Party (DLP) more directly 
mentioned their policy preferences, but they referred to the general image of the party 
rather than specific policies. For example, "Because the party speaks for the poor, the 
workers, and the alienated class... In a sense, their policies are not realistic, but I am very 
interested in their suggestions to social welfare for the ordinary people" (1-212). 
A Model of Partisan Alignment: Multiple Regression Analysis 
Model 
A causal model of partisan alignment is adopted and modified from the renowned 
funnel model of Michigan school in electoral studies. The Michigan model assumed that 
social and economic factors affect party identification, and then party identification 
determines political attitudes including a belief-system. However, as discussed above, 
qualitative analysis suggests that ideology and general policy preferences are one of main 
reasons why voters feel close to a particular political party. Although it is true that voters 
more and more rely on their partisanship to interpret political information and 
partisanship affects voter's political attitudes, qualitative data show that political attitude 
such as policy preferences and ideology also influence the direction of party identification. 
Therefore, unlike the Michigan model, in this study, it is assumed that social and 
economic factors are associated with belief-systems and political attitudes, such as 
ideology. Thus, belief-systems and/or political attitudes affect party affiliation. At the 
same time, it is assumed that some social and economic factors are directly related to 
partisan alignment. The causal relationship is summarised in Figure 6.1. 
Dependent Variable 
As the dependent variable in the regression model, party alignment is measured by 
party identification for the two major parties assuming two-party system (i. e., I= party 
identification for major party A, and 2= party identification for major party B). Major 
party A refers to the Democratic Liberal Party in 1992, and the Grand National Party in 
1997 and in 2002, i. e., those parties tracing a lineage back to the authoritarian ruling party. 
Major party B refers to the Democratic Party in 1992, the National Congress for New 
Politics in 1997, and the Millennium Democratic Party in 2002, i. e., those parties 
historically connected to the pro-democracy opposition party. 
In the study, linear regression models are used in the analysis of a dichotomous 
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dependent variable. In general, it is assumed that the dependent variable is an uncensored 
scale numeric variable in linear regression models. Thus, a logistic regression model 
rather than a linear regression model is the appropriate statistical model in the analysis of 
a binary dependent variable. Nevertheless, in the research, linear regression models have 
been used in the analysis of the dichotomous dependent variable because the results of the 
linear regression model are easier to explain to the less statistically-inclined. Moreover, a 
logistic regression model was also undertaken during the course of the research, but did 
not yield alternative results -- as might be expected, given the range of the dependent 
variable. 
Figure 6.1 A Model of Partisan Alignment 
AB C 
Keys: A= social and economic factors, B= belief-system or political attitudes, and C= party 
identification. 
Independent Variables 
As independent variables in the regression model of partisan alignment, social and 
economic factors such as age, gender, region, class, urbanisation, income, religion, and 
education are included. 
" Region is measured by the respondent's hometown and is recoded into a 3-point 
scale of the two rival regions in Korea (i. e., 1= Gyeongsang, 2= all other region, 
and 3= Jeolla). 
" The Goldthorpe class schema is used. In the Goldthorpe class schema, classes are 
divided into the Salariat, Non-manual workers, the Petty Bourgeoisie, Forman 
and technician, and the working class, and each class is valued from I to 5 in 
order. 21 
" Urbanisation factor is measured based upon size of respondent's residences (i. e., 
I= big city, 2= small city, 3= rural county). 
21 It is assumed that the Goldthorpe class schema is linear. The class schema has been developed 
as an alternative to `non-manual/manual' dichotomy of social class. The Goldthorpe class schema 
is based on employment status as well as on occupation and the Petty Bourgeoisie is an 
intermediate class in the `non-manual/manual' dichotomy. For the schema in British electoral 
studies, Heath et al., Understanding Political Change, pp. 66-7. 
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"A gender variable is included in this regression model, and men are coded as I 
and women are coded as 2. 
" The level of income is based on self-reported household income and is measured 
in a 9-point ordinal scale (i. e., 1= the lowest level, and 9= the highest level). 
" Religion is measured in a 3-point scale regarding their values and orientation 
related to political issues (i. e., 1= Buddhist, 2= other religious people and non 
religious people, and 3= Protestant). 
" The level of education is measured in a 4-point ordinal scale (i. e., I= the lowest 
level, and 4= the highest level). 
" As a key explanatory variable, ideology is included. Self-identified ideological 
position in a 5-point scale from the strong conservative to the strong liberal (i. e., 
1= strong conservative, 2= conservative, 3= centre, 4= liberal, and 5= strong 
liberal). However, ideology is excluded in the regression analysis for the 1992 
presidential election due to the lack of data. 
The Result of Regression Analysis: 1992 
Bivariate regression on party identification: First, a series of bivariate regressions 
of each eight variables on partisan alignment are examined. Table 6.24 shows the 
regression coefficients for eight independent variables. Age, education, region, religion, 
and income variables explain effectively partisan alignment. Younger, more educated, 
people from Jeolla, Christians, and richer voters are more likely to identify with the 
major party B, while older, less educated, people from Gyeongsang, Buddhists, and 
poorer voters are more likely to identify themselves with the major party A. 
Table 6.24 Bivariate Regression Analysis on Partisan Alignment, 1992 
Beta T Sig. 
Age -. 224 -6.469 0.000 
Sex 
. 020 -. 557 0.579 Education 
. 160 4.552 0.000 Location -. 038 -1.070 0.285 Region (hometown) 
. 584 20.272 0.000 Religion 
. 183 5.227 0.000 Income . 109 3.076 0.002 Class -. 044 -. 926 0.355 
Data: &orean rresiaentiai l; lection Study, 1992. 
Note: Ideology is omitted due to a lack of data. 
Multiple regression on party identification: Second, a multiple regression analysis 
is applied to examine the influence of social and economic variables on partisan 
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alignment. The method used in the regression analysis is called stepwise. Only two 
variables, region and education, are related to partisan alignment, according to the result 
of the multiple regression analysis. As shown in Table 6.25, the model including two 
independent variables explains 40.3 per cent of variance in the dependent variables (i. e., 
Adjust R-square = 0.403). The regional variable is the principal factor to explain partisan 
alignment, while education also explains some variation. Some independent variables, 
which are significant in bivariate regression analyses, such as age, income, and religion 
are not statistically significant in the multiple regression analysis. This result suggests that 
age and income variables are correlated with education variables, and religion is related 
to regional distribution. 
Table 6.25 Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis on Partisan Alignment (only social 
and economic variables), 1992 
Model I Model 2 Model 3 
Beta (Sig. ) 
Region . 620 . 625 N/A 
Education . 143 
Adjusted R-S uare . 383 . 403 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992. 
Note: Method is stepwise. Excluded variables are income, gender, location, religion, class, and age. 
The Result ofReeression Analysis: 1997 
Bivariate regression on party identification: First, bivariate regressions of each 
independent variable on partisan alignment are used. As shown in Table 6.26, age, region, 
and religion variables again explain partisan alignment as they did in 1992. Younger, 
people from Jeolla, and Christian voters are associated with the major party B, while 
older, people from Gyeongsang region, and Buddhist voters are related to the major party 
A. Furthermore, the location and sex variables also effectively explain differences in 
party identification in 1997 in contrast to 1992. In 1997, people in rural regions and men 
are more likely to vote for major party B, while people in big cities and women are 
associated with major party A. Furthermore, the relationship between the ideology 
variable and partisan alignment is statistically significant. Liberals identify with major 
party B, while there is also a connection between conservatives and major party A party 
identification. 
Multiple regression on party identification: Second, a multiple regression analysis 
based on stepwise method shows that region and ideology variables together explain 39.6 
per cent of variance in the dependent variables (see Table 6.27). Region is the main 
explanatory variable, but ideology also explains partisan alignment, although its 
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explanatory power is small. 
Table 6.26 Bivariate Regression Analysis on Partisan Alignment, 1997 . 
Beta T Sig. 
Age -. 132 -3.273 . 001 Sex -. 088 -2.187 . 029 Education . 032 . 797 . 426 Location . 121 3.013 . 003 Region (hometown) . 625 19.713 . 000 Religion . 227 5.734 . 000 Income -. 037 -. 916 . 360 Class -. 023 -. 456 . 648 Ideology . 262 6.354 . 000 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1997. 
Table 6.27 Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis on Partisan Alignment, 1997 
Model I Model 2 
Beta (Sig. ) 
Region 0.609 (0.000) 0.595 (0.000) 
Ideology 0.171 (0.000) 
Adjusted R-S uare . 369 . 396 
, uara: r orean rresiaenrnai tiection btuay, ivy i. 
Note: Method is stepwise. Excluded variables are income, gender, education, location, religion, 
class, and age. 
Multiple regression on ideology: Third, the relationship between social and 
economic variables and ideology is examined by multiple regression analysis. Table 6.28 
shows that age and region variables explain ideological differences, although the two 
variables together explain only 3 per cent of variance in ideology variables. Younger 
Koreans and people from Jeolla region are more likely to be liberal, while older voters 
and people from Gyeongsang region are more inclined to be conservative. 
Table 6.28 Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis on Ideology, 1997 
Model I Model 2 
Beta (Sig. ) 
Age -. 158 (0.000) -. 158 (0.000) 
Region 
. 091 0.018 Adjusted R-S uare . 023 . 030 
Data: Korean rreslaential L 1ection study, 1997. 
Note: Method is stepwise. Excluded variables are income, gender, education, location, religion, 
and class. 
The causal-chain of party identification: According to the results of multiple 
regression analyses, the model of partisan alignment is refined, as shown in Figure 6.2. 
Age and region variable explain ideology, and then region and ideology explain 
differences in party identification. Partisan alignment is determined by region, but 
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ideology also explains some partisan alignment while the age variable is indirectly related 
to partisan alignment. 
Figure 6.2 Regression Model of Partisan Alignment, 1997 
-. 158 . 171 Age Ideology 
. 091 
Party 
595 
Region 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1997. 
Note: The figures refer to beta in multiple regression analyses. 
The Result of Rejzression Analysis: 2002 
Bivariate regression on party identification: In 2002, as shown in Table 6.29, 
bivariate regression analysis suggests that age, location, region, religion, and ideology 
variables are related to partisan alignment. In addition, income is associated with partisan 
alignment, and the relationship is statistically significant when the significance level is 
0.1. However, it is noticeable that the direction of the relation has changed compared to 
that in 1992, that is richer voters are more inclined to major party A and poorer voters 
major party B. 
Table 6.29 Bivariate Regression Analysis on Partisan Alignment, 2002 
Beta T Sig. 
Age -. 084 -2.326 . 
020 
Sex 
. 014 . 
382 . 702 
Education . 020 . 
546 . 585 
Location . 140 
3.869 . 000 
Region (hometown) . 591 
20.020 . 000 
Religion . 114 
3.157 . 002 
Income -. 071 -1.910 . 
057 
Class 
. 067 
1.344 . 180 
Ideolo 
. 363 
10.698 . 000 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 2002. 
Multiple regression on party identification: Again multiple regression analysis is 
used, employing the stepwise method. The regression analysis suggests that three 
explanatory variables, region, ideology, and income, are related to partisan alignment. 
Region still remains the most important variable explaining partisan alignment alone 
accounting for 34.4 per cent of variance in partisan alignment, while other two variables 
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explain only 6.9 per cent of variance in the dependent variable. Although 
ideology 
explains only a small amount of variance in partisan alignment, the explanatory power of 
ideology variable has increased somewhat compared to that in 1997 (see Table 6.30). 
Table 6.30 Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis on Partisan Alignment, 2002 
Model I Model 2 Model 3 
Beta (Sip,. ) 
Regionalism 0.588 (0.000) 0.527 (0.000) 0.517 (0.000) 
Ideology 0.258 (0.0(0) 0.268 (0.000) 
Income -. 095 (0.017) 
Adjusted R- Square . 344 . 
405 . 413 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 2UU2. 
Note: Method is stepwise. Excluded variables are education, gender, location, religion, class, and 
age. 
Multiple regression on ideology: The relationship between the social and economic 
variables and ideology are examined in Table 6.31 which shows three social and 
economic variables are related to ideology. Younger people and voters from Jeolla are 
associated with the major party B, as they were in 1992. However, in 2002, education 
also explains differences in ideology, though education explains only 1 per cent of the 
variance in ideology variable. 
Table 6.31 Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis on Ideology, 2002 
Model I Model 2 Model 3 
Beta (Sig. ) 
Age -. 187 (0.000) -. 188 (0.000) -. 
129 (0.002) 
Region . 139 
(0.018) . 139 
(0.000) 
Education . 123 0.002 
Adjusted R- Square . 034 . 
052 . 062 
Data: Korean Presidential Election study, LUU2. 
Note: Method is stepwise. Excluded variables are income, gender, location, religion, and class. 
The causal-chain of party identification: According to the results of two multiple 
regression analyses, the causal model of partisan alignment can be refined. Figure 
6.3 
shows that region is a powerful explanatory variable in terms of the partisan alignment 
in 
Korea. Additionally, income and ideology also help to explain differences in party 
identification, while education and age indirectly explain partisan alignment through 
ideological differences. 
Summary 
The preceding analysis has shown that region is the predominant variable in 
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explaining the partisan alignment in Korea. The explanatory power of region 
has been 
very strong over the past 10 years. Multiple regression analyses has suggested that 
partisan support is mainly based on regional support. Major party A is based on the 
support of people from Gyeongsang, while major party B receives disproportionate 
support from the Jeolla region. 
Figure 6.3 Regression Model of Partisan Alignment, 2002 
Education 
. 123 
Age -. 129 
Ideology 268 00. 
. 139 Party 
. 517 Region 
-. 09 
Income 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 2002. 
Note: The figures refer to beta in multiple regression analyses. 
However, region is not the only factor to explain the partisan alignment in Korea. 
Ideology is another important variable to explain partisan alignment in Korea, although it 
must be conceded that its influence is secondary. Both major parties call themselves 
centrist `catch-all' parties between conservatism and liberalism. News media and scholars 
often ignore the policy differences between the two major parties. However, this 
is 
rejected by partisans. Party identifiers of the major party B are more liberal, while party 
identifiers of the major party A are more conservative. 
Moreover, the regression analysis suggests that younger Koreans are more likely to 
align themselves with major party B because of their greater liberalism, while older 
voters being more conservative tend to be affiliated with major party A. 
22 Finally, 
economic factors have also begun to explain partisan alignments in Korea. In general, 
major party A has pursued policies for the rich, while the major party B had articulated 
u In British political culture, there is a similar relationship among social-demographic variables, 
ideology, and party preference, though the relation is not entirely similar to that in Korea. In the 
United Kingdom, the young, the higher educated, and the working class support liberal or 
egalitarian values. Thus, liberals and voters supporting egalitarianism are associated with the 
Labour Party rather than the Conservative Party in vote preference. See Miller, Timpson, and 
Lessnoff, Political Culture in Contemporary Britain, pp. 295-320 and p. 438. 
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policies for the poor. This may suggest that Korean voters begin to align with political 
parties based upon their economic interests. 
In conclusion, patterns of partisan alignment have continued over the last 15 years under 
conditions of extreme party system instability. But partisan alignment has also changed in 
the new democracy. Indeed, the cleavage based on the distinction between pro- 
government and pro-opposition supporters in authoritarian regimes has weakened and the 
electorate has been aligned along the regional cleavage in the new democracy. The 
change in partisan alignment in the new democracy largely reflects electoral dealignment. 
In the new democracy, fewer voters align with political parties and non-party identifiers 
have increased. Patterns and causes of electoral dealignment in the new democracy will 
be explored in the following chapter, Chapter 7. 
181 
Chapter 7 
Chapter 7. Partisan Decline and Independent Voters 
The aim of this chapter is to examine partisan declined and to explore the nature of the 
increasing number of independents in Korea. As a new democracy, Korea has matured 
very quickly in terms of the level of party affiliation, while other new democracies are 
still at the pre-aligned stage. However, partisan decline is now apparent in Korea. This 
chapter will look at how partisan decline is apparent in the new democracy. Who are the 
independents in Korean new democracy? Are the increasing number of new independents 
different from old independents who are alienated form politics? What are the causes of 
partisan decline? How well do theories of partisan decline developed in mature 
democracies explain partisan decline in Korea's new democracy? 
This chapter consists of three sections. The first section examines partisan decline in 
Korea. The level of party identification in Korea has decreased during the last ten years. 
In addition, the first section examines the weakening of the strength of party affiliation in 
terms of partisan loyalty in voting choice. The second section discusses the social and 
economic characteristics of increasing independent voters. Two types of independent 
voters are identified and are compared with each other in terms of socio-economic 
characteristics and political attitudes. Finally, section three explores the causes of partisan 
decline and the increase in independent voters. Both quantitative and qualitative analyses 
suggest that decreasing voters' interest in politics, largely caused by electoral 
dissatisfaction with political process or political parties, is the main cause of partisan 
decline in Korea. 
1. Partisan Dealignment in Korea 
Mass political parties are still central in democratic politics, but changes in the types and 
roles of political parties have been apparent in mature Western democracies for several 
decades. Even though the disappearance of political parties is hardly anticipated, the 
decay of political parties or the `failure' of political parties is widely recognised in many 
democracies. Partisan dealignment, the reduction or weakening of partisan loyalties, is a 
major symptom of the decay of political parties and is one of the main electoral trends in 
Western democracies. ' 
1 For changes in the types and roles of political parties and partisan dealignment in Western 
democracies, see Scott C. Flanagan and Russell J. Dalton, `Models of Change', in Peter Mair, ed., 
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Korea's democracy is only 15 years old, but has already experienced dealignment. 
Many voters are estranged from political parties, especially the major political parties, 
and voters are sceptical to political parties and party politics. Evidence of partisan 
dealignment includes the rapid decline of the level of party identification. Moreover, 
voters are not stable in their voting patterns, and fewer and fewer voters support the same 
party over a series of elections. Furthermore, only a small percentage of voters consider 
political parties when making their voting decision with other attitudes more important in 
the choice. 
Levels of Party Identification 
The decline of long-term levels of psychological party identification is shown in many 
democracies. For example, since the mid-1960s, the USA has experienced a rapid decline 
of partisans, and nowadays, more than 30 per cent of American voters do not identify 
with one of the two major parties? Additionally, many partisans have switched their party 
identification, and party identification as a valuable guide to electoral behaviour has 
dropped in importance. 3 A comparative study based on electoral changes in nineteen 
mature democracies also shows that many party identifiers have turned to non-party 
identifiers during the last three decades, even though the majority of the voters in the 
democracies still identify themselves with political parties. 4 However, while partisan 
decline is a common phenomenon in mature democracies, it is not universal across all 
democracies. In contrast to the mature democracies, new democracies have experienced 
an increase in the level of party identification. Post-communist societies remain in the 
`pre-aligned' stage in which many voters have still not developed a strong psychological 
attachment to a political party. ' Furthermore, the level of party identification in the new 
democracies of Southern democracies, such as Greece, Spain, and Portugal, is actually 
The Western European Party System (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 232-52. Also, 
as a comprehensive analysis of partisan dealignment in Western mature democracies, Russell J. 
Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg, eds, Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced 
Industrial Democracies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
2 For American independent voters and their voting behaviour, see Martin P. Wattenberg, The 
Decline ofAmerican Political Parties, 1952-1996 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 1998). Also, Bruce Keith et al., The Myth of the Independent Voter (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1992). 
3 S. M. Lipset, `The Elections, the Economy and Public Opinion: 1984', Political Studies, 18 
(1985), pp. 28-38. Cited from Martin Harrop and William L. Miller, Elections and Voters: a 
Comparative Introduction (London: Macmillan, 1987), pp. 141-42. 
` Russell J. Dalton, `The Decline of Party Identifications', in Russell J. Dalton and Martin P. 
Wattenberg, eds, Politics without Partisans (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 19-36. 
s William L. Miller, Stephen White, and Paul Heywood, Values and Political Changes in 
Postcommunist Europe (London: Macmillan, 1998), pp. 167-71 
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increasing. 
In contrast to other new democracies, Korea has already experienced a partisan 
decline and a weakening of partisan loyalties for the past 15 years. The level of party 
identification has declined, and a growing proportion of the electorate describe 
themselves as independents. According to some polls, there are more non-identifiers than 
party identifiers among the electorate. 7 Table 7.1 clearly shows partisan decline in Korea. 
The level öf party identification among Korean voters in presidential elections has 
dropped from 77.3 per cent in 1992 to 59.5 per cent in 2002. The percentage of non-party 
identifiers in the electorate has almost doubled from 22.7 per cent to 40.5 per cent 
between the 1992 presidential election and the 2002 presidential election. 
Table 7.1 Partisan Decline in Korea, 1992-2002 
Year Number of 
cases 
Party Identifiers Non-party 
Identifiers 
Total 
1992 (P) 1,184 77.3% 22.7% 100% 
1995 (L) 1,200 59.2% 40.8% 100% 
1996 (G) 1,200 58.1% 41.9% 100% 
1997 (P) 1,199 63.1% 36.9% 100% 
1998 (L) 1,494 47.9% 52.1% 100% 
2000 (G) 936 27.2% 72.8% 1000/0 
2002 (P) 1,500 59.5% 40.5% 100% 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992,1997 and "1W2; Korean General Election Study, 
1992,1996, and 2000; and Korean Local Election Study, 1995,1998, and 2002. 
Keys: P= presidential election; G= parliamentary election; L= local election. 
Note: Various questions are used in measuring party identification. , "Which political party do you 
feel close to? " (Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992; Korean General Election Study, 1996; 
and Korean Local Election Study, 1995); "Which political party do you prefer? " (Korean 
Presidential Election Study, 1997 and 2002, and Korean Local Election Study, 1998); "What is the 
name of the political party? " in response to the supplementary question, "Do you feel close to a 
particular political party? " (Korean General Election Study, 2000). 
The percentage of non-party identifiers in the electorate is much larger in non- 
presidential elections compared to presidential elections. As shown in Table 7.1, levels of 
party identification in presidential elections were relatively higher than those in 
parliamentary elections or in local elections, and there are more non-party identifiers than 
party identifiers in the 1998 local election and in the 2000 general election. 
A direct comparison of the level of party identification across different level of 
elections is problematic due to limitations of data, i. e., an inconsistency in survey 
questions. We may suspect that this inconsistency in survey question wordings could 
6 Herman Schmitt and Soren Holmberg, `Political Parties in Decline? ', in Hans-Dieter Klingemann 
and Dieter Fuchs, eds, Citizens and State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 95-133, at 
107. 
News media often refer to an increase of non-party identifiers among the electorate as an 
indicator for the failure of political parties in Korea, e. g., Joongang Daily Newspaper, 26 January 
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cause the difference in the level of party affiliation across different presidential elections. 
Indeed, the level of party identification dropped markedly between 1992 and 1997 
presidential election when two different survey question wordings were used. In contrast, 
the level of party identification was relatively stable between the 1997 and 2002 
presidential elections when the same survey question wording was used. 
However, even though two different question wordings were used across different 
presidential elections, there is no difference in the meaning and the nuances of the 
different wordings used in the Korean-language. Also, different surveys conducted at a 
similar time point using different question wordings have seemed to reveal a similar level 
of party affiliation. For example, the question in the 2000 General Election Study in 
particular is very different from questions in other election studies, and reveals a very 
high level of non-party identification compared to the level in other studies. Among a 
total of 1,100 respondents in the 2000 General Election Study, 163 respondents (14.8%) 
answered `don't know', while 256 respondents (23.35%) answered `yes' and 681 
respondents (61.9%) answered `no'. However, this higher level of non-party 
identification is not only explained by difference in the question. A poll conducted by a 
daily newspaper in early 2000 which used a different question wording also revealed that 
71.1 per cent of respondents identified themselves as non-party identifiers. 8 
Party Identification and Interest in Election 
The variation in levels of party identification across different types of elections is 
related to differences in the level of popular interest in elections. Voters are far more 
interested in presidential elections than in parliamentary or local elections. Therefore, 
greater electoral interest in presidential elections is related to the higher level of party 
identification in presidential elections than in different elections. 
Surveys confirm that there are differences in the level of public interest in elections 
depending upon the type of contest. Figure 7.1 shows that the level of party identification 
generally moves together with levels of electoral interest in a specific election. The level 
of electoral interests in parliamentary and local elections is much lower than that in 
presidential elections. Accordingly, the level of party identification is also relatively 
lower in parliamentary and local elections compared to presidential elections. It should 
also be noted that electoral interest in presidential elections has been stable at the same 
level for the last 10 years, while the level of electoral interest in parliamentary and local 
2000. 
" The sample size of the poll was 800. In measuring party identification, "Which political party do 
you support? " is used. Joongahang Daily Newspaper, 26 January 2000. 
185 
Chapter 7 
elections has decreased markedly. The difference in the level of voter's interest across 
different types of election has widened, and this is also reflected in an increasing gap 
between levels of party identification in the different types of election. 
Figure 7.1 Levels of Party Identification and Levels of Interests in Election, 1992-2002 
ý- Interest --f-- Party Identification 
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. 2% 17.1% 
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1992(G) 1992(P) 1995(L) 1996(G) 1997(P) 1998(L) 2000(G) 2002(P) 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Survey, 1992,1997, and 2002; Korean General Election Study, 
1992,1996, and 2000; Korean Local Election Study, 1995 and 1998. 
Keys: P= presidential Election; G= parliamentary general election; L= local election. 
Note: Levels of electoral interest in election are based on the percentage of respondents who say 
`very much interested' in answering the question, "How much were you interested in last 
election? ". 
The Redistribution of Party Identification 
Along with changes in the level of party identification, redistributions of party 
identification between two major parties have taken place. As shown in the bar chart in 
Figure 7.2, the level of party identification with the two major parties has markedly 
decreased between 1992 and 2002. Only a half of Korean voters described themselves as 
party identifiers with the two major political parties in 2002. While the level of party 
identification with the major party B remained at 27 per cent, partisans of the major party 
A dropped from 39.2 per cent to 23.3 per cent between 1992 and 2002. Therefore, 
partisan dealignment has mainly affected major party A, the old ruling party. The margin 
of changes in party identification with major party A is similar to changes in non-party 
identification. Regarding the very low level of party identification of the major party A in 
1997, it can be speculated that the partisan dealignment of the major party A was mainly 
caused by its poor performance in office, such as the critical economic recession at this 
time. 
186 
Chapter 7 
Figure 7.2 Bar Chart: Redistribution of Party Identification, 1992-2002 
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Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992,1997, and 2002. 
Keys: Major party A= Democratic Liberal Party in 1992, and Grand National Party in 1997 and in 
2002; Major party B= Democratic Party in 1992, National Congress for New Politics in 1997, and 
Millennium Democratic Party in 2002. 
The Strength of Party Identification 
A weakening of the strength of party identification is further evidence of partisan decline. 
Some Western democracies have witnessed no decline in levels of party identification, 
but they have still experienced a weakening of the strength of party affiliation. For 
example, the level of party identification in the United Kingdom has remained at a 
relatively very high level, even though there has been a critical redistribution of party 
identification among parties. 9 There has been only a marginal decline in the level of party 
identification over the last thirty years, and about 90 per cent of British voters still 
identify themselves with a political party. 1° However, the U. K. is not an exception from 
partisan decline in terms of the strength of party identification. Although most British 
voters still declare themselves party identifiers, many party identifiers have only a `semi- 
detached preferences' rather than a strong attachment to the political party. Thus, there 
are more `weak' party identifiers than `very strong' party identifiers among British voters, 
9 Ivor Crewe and Katarina Thomson, `Party Loyalties: Dealignment or Realignment? ', in Geoffrey 
Evans and Pippa Norris, eds, Critical Elections: British Parties and Voters in Long-term 
Perspective (London: Sage, 1999), pp. 64-86. 
10 However, the continuing decline in partisanship among British voters should be noted. The 
percentage of non-party identifiers among the electorate increased from 7 per cent to 10 per cent 
during the period of 1997 and 2001. Paul Whiteley et al., `Turnout', in Pippa Norris, ed., Britain 
Votes 2001 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 211-24, at p. 221. 
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in contrast to the electorate of about thirty years ago. " 
It is not possible to examine a weakening of partisan attachment to political parties 
in Korea mainly due to the lack of data. Unfortunately, no election surveys include a 
question about the strength of party identification in Korea. Nevertheless, given the 
instability of party identification over a relatively short time period, it can be suggested 
that party attachments in Korea are not very strong. As discussed in Chapter 5 of this 
dissertation, the level of party identification in Korea is unstable and party affiliation is 
often affected by changes in political circumstances and events. Moreover, some voters 
fail to distinguish between party identification and party preference in a particular 
election. Some voters' affiliation to a particular political party is not an enduring 
predisposition as the Michigan model of party identification assumed. It seems then that 
Korean party identifiers include many party identifiers who have only a semi-detached 
preference. 
Vote Consistency in Consecutive Elections 
Although there is no direct measurement of the strength of party identification, 
changes in voting patterns over a series of elections might indicate a weakening of party 
identification. It is assumed that party identifiers are loyal to the own political party in 
election, and that the degree of the loyalty indicates the strength of party identification. 
Therefore, partisans who voted three times for own political party in three consecutive 
elections are the very strong party identifiers. Fairly strong party identifiers refers to 
partisans who voted twice for their own political party over three consecutive elections. 
Partisans who voted only once for their own political party in three consecutive elections 
are weak party identifiers. Finally, partisans who were never loyal to their own political 
party in a series of three elections are spurious party identifiers. 
Table 7.2 shows a weakening of party identification between 1992 and 1997.64.9 
per cent of the partisans of the two major parties revealed a very strong loyalty to their 
political party in 1992, but this fell to 60.5 per cent of partisans in 1997. Also, the 
proportion of the fairly strong party identifiers decreased from 23.4 per cent in 1992 to 
19.1 per cent in 1997, while the proportion of the weak party identifiers jumped from 8.5 
per cent to 15.4 per cent in 1997. From this data, it is obvious that partisan loyalties 
weakened between 1992 and 1997. 
11 Crewe and Thomson, `Party Loyalties: Dealignment or Realignment? ', pp. 75-6. According to a 
survey, British Election Study 2001, the percentage of the strong party identifiers among British 
voters is only 13.5 per cent while the percentage of the weak party identifiers among the electorate 
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Table 7.2 Changes in the Strength of Party Identification (Vote Consistency in Three 
Consecutive Elections), 1992-1997 
1992 1997 
Party Identification Party A Party B A+B Party A Party B A+B 
Very strong identifiers 66.8% 62.0% 64.9% 66.0% 57.4% 60.5% 
Fairly strong identifiers 26.2% 19.0% 23.4% 23.90/a 16.3% 19.1% 
Weak identifiers 5.3% 13.4% 8.5% 8.5% 19.3% 15.4% 
Spurious identifiers 1.6% 5.6% 3.2% 1.6% 7.0% 5.0% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Number of cases 431 284 715 188 326 514 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992 and 1997. 
Key: Party A= Democratic Liberal Party in 1992, and Grand National Party in 1997 and in 2002; 
Party B= Democratic Party in 1992, Nation Congress for New Politics in 1997, and Millennium 
Democratic Party in 2002. 
Note: Only partisans of two major parties are included. Also, voters who did not have the right to 
vote in any one of two previous elections are excluded. 
It is impossible to examine changes in the strength of party identification between 
1997 and 2002 due to the lack of data. In the 2002 survey, the question about vote choice 
in previous elections was limited to only the last presidential election. Therefore, voting 
consistency in two consecutive presidential elections is examined instead of partisan 
voting patterns over a series of three elections. Here, partisans who voted for their own 
political party in two consecutive presidential elections are strong party identifiers. 
Partisans who voted for their own political party in one of two consecutive presidential 
elections are weak party identifiers and partisans who never voted for their own political 
party in either presidential election are defined as spurious party identifiers. 
Table 7.3 Changes in the Strength of Party Identification (Vote Consistency in Two 
Consecutive Elections), 1992-2002 
1992 1997 2002 
Party Party Party A+B Party Party A+B Party Party A+B 
Identification A B A B A B 
Strong identifiers 79.3% 69.9% 75.6% 77.9% 62.9% 68.4% 63.9% 76.7% 70.5% 
Weak identifiers 17.9% 17.8% 17.9% 19.5% 28.1% 25.0% 28.4% 18.7% 23.4% 
Spurious identifiers 2.8% 12.2% 6.5% 2.6% 9.0% 6.6% 7.7% 4.6% 6.1% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 1000/0 100% 100'/0 100% 
N 435 286 721 195 334 529 324 348 672 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992,1991, and 2UU2. 
Keys: Party A= Democratic Liberal Party in 1992, and Grand National Party in 1997 and in 2002; 
Party B= Democratic Party in 1992, Nation Congress for New Politics in 1997, and Millennium 
Democratic Party in 2002. 
Now Only partisans of two major parties are included and those who did not have vote right in 
previous election are excluded. 
As shown in Table 7.3, a weakening of the strength of party identification between 
1992 and 1997 is again obvious, but no change between 1997 and 2002 is found. 
is 34.7 per cent. 
189 
Chapter 7 
Consequently, while over the last decade, the strength of party identification has 
decreased, there has been little recent change. It is also important to recognise that most 
partisans do still have strong loyalties to a political party. 
The Importance of Political Parties in Vote Decision-Makings 
In voting choice, political parties are of declining importance. Korean voters take less 
consideration of political parties in their electoral choice with the proportion of Korean 
voters who think about parties when reaching their decision decreasing. As shown in 
Table 7.4, voters rely far more on candidate factors rather than political parties when 
making their mind up. 47 per cent and 63.6 per cent of the electorate answered candidate 
as the most important factor in their vote decision in 1992 and in 2002, respectively, 
while a relatively small proportion of the electorate considered the party as the most 
important factor in their vote decision. Furthermore, this proportion is falling. In 1992, 
14.6 per cent of the electorate rated the political party as the most important factor in their 
voting choice, but in 2002, this had fallen to only 8.5 per cent of the electorate. 
Table 7.4 The Most Important Factor in Vote Choice (Presidential Election), 1992-2002 
1992 1997 20 02 
Factors All Partisans All Partisans All Partisans 
Voters Voters Voters 
Political Party 14.6% 16.8% 6.0% 6.9% 8.5% 11.3% 
Policies / Pledges 30.9% 30.5% 13.7% 13.8% 23.5% 23.8% 
Candidate 47.4% 47.3% 75.4% 75.2% 63.6% 61.1% 
Other factors 72% 5.3% 4.9% 4.1% 4.5% 3.8% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Number of cases 1102 861 1192 754 1323 820 
Vala: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992,1997, and 2002. 
Keys: All = distributions based on all voters; Partisan = distributions based on only partisans 
among all voters. 
Note: The following question is used: `Which factor did you most consider in your vote choice? ' 
We may expect that partisans give more weight to political parties compared to 
those who do not have any party identification. However, as shown in Table 7.4, partisans 
are not very different from non-partisans in terms of the weight of political party in their 
electoral choice, although it is relatively more important to partisans than to non-partisans. 
Overall, partisans also rate the candidate factor as much more important in their voting 
decision. 
Compared to presidential elections, a much larger proportion of voters consider that 
political party is the most important factor in their vote choice in parliamentary and local 
elections. Moreover, the decrease of the relative importance of political party in general 
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and local elections is smaller than the decrease in presidential elections. In the 2000 
general election, 22.7 per cent of the electorate still indicated that the political party was 
the most important factor in their electoral choice (see Table 7.5). Nonetheless, the 
candidate factor is overwhelmingly more important in electoral choice, and its importance 
has markedly increased over the last 10 years. Therefore, regardless of the type of 
elections, Korean voters more and more make their decision based on candidate factor 
with parties declining in importance. 
Table 7.5 The Most Important Factor in Vote Choice (Parliamentary and Local Election), 
1992-2000 
Factors 1992 (G) 1995 (L) 1996 (G) 1998 (L) 2000 (G) 
Political Party 28.9% 21.3% 23.0% 18.5% 22.7% 
Policies/election pledges 25.3% 25.3% 21.0% 6.2% 6.3% 
Candidate 31.8% 46.5% 44.0% 52.9% 67.6% 
Other factors 13.9% 6.9% 12.0% 22.4% 3.4% 
Total 100.0% 100% 100.00/0 100% 100% 
Number of cases 1034 1050 974 1017 822 
Data: Korean General Election Study, 1992,1996, and 2000; Korean Local Election Study, 1995 
and 1998. 
Keys: G= Parliamentary election; L= local election. 
Notes: The following question is used: `Which factor did you most consider in your vote choice? '; 
In the 1998 local election study, `other factors' include `regional development', which accounts for 
18 per cent of total respondents. Apart from the 1998 local election study, no election studies 
include `regional development' in the question. 
Reasons of the Difference 
Why is there a difference in the weight of political party in vote decision-making 
across different types of elections? This can be explained through the different amount of 
information available. In presidential elections, voters have a greater amount of 
information compared to parliamentary or local elections where voters often have 
insufficient information. On the one hand, voters are relatively more interested in 
presidential elections and therefore gain a greater amount of information candidates and 
electoral issues. The presidential election campaign is relatively prolonged, and news 
media provide voters more information about candidates and electoral issues. On the 
other hand, voters are less interested in parliamentary and local elections and thus fail to 
get enough information for making their vote decision. The election campaigns for 
general elections and local elections are relatively short and voters do not have enough 
time to gather information about candidates. As a result, voters with insufficient 
information rely more on political parties when making their electoral choice. Therefore, 
voters give more weight to political parties in general and local elections compared to 
presidential elections. 
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In addition to the survey data, qualitative data also shows a clear difference in the 
level of public interest in elections depending upon the type of election. Almost all 
participants in the in-depth interviews and focus group interviews acknowledged that they 
were more interested in presidential elections compared to parliamentary or local 
elections. 
Importance of presidency: Furthermore, in answering a question about why they are 
more interested in presidential elections compared to parliamentary and local elections, 
voters pointed out the importance of presidency in the political system in which president 
has exclusive political powers. '2 Respondents believed that the president is much more 
important than member of the National Assembly or mayor of any city. For example, 
"The President is the man who leads this nation-state, so I am more interested in 
presidential elections compared to general elections or local elections" (FF5). "lt is 
natural for me to be much interested in presidential elections. The President leads this 
society" (FF4). "The President is the head of this state, so the presidential decision greatly 
influences the quality of our lives" (1-107). "My country will be better if we elect a better 
man as president" (1-135). "I think that the president has the power to decide the direction 
my country goes in" (1-214). "I was more interested in this presidential election 
[compared to last local election] because I think that the future of my country depends 
upon the man who wins the election" (1-108). "In the presidential election, we select the 
man who leads this country" (1-125). 
Many interviewees also directly stated that parliamentary and local elections were 
not important. For examples, "To be honest with you, I don't care about parliamentary 
elections and local elections" (1-113). "Somehow I think that all local elections are not 
important" (1-116). "1 was not interested in the local election at all" (1-119). "1 was not 
interested in the local election. I thought that there was no difference regardless of 
whoever won the election" (1-124; 1-133). "I don't have any affection toward the region 
where I am living, so I did not care about the [local] election" (1-128). 
Insufficient information: In answering the same question about why they are more 
interested in presidential elections compared to parliamentary and local elections, many 
respondents referred to insufficient information on candidates or election issues in the 
lower level of elections. For examples, "In the last local election, I had not the slightest 
12 According to the Korean constitution, the principle of checks and balances between the three 
political bodies, which originated in the American presidential system, is embodied in Korean 
politics. However, in practice, presidential power often overwhelms other political bodies, i. e., the 
legislature and judiciary. For example, the president has veto power over any bill passed in the 
National Assembly. In practice, the government does not have any difficulty in gaining the consent 
of ruling party MPs to pass bills in the National Assembly. In relation to the judiciary, the 
president appoints all judges in the Supreme Court although the appointment requires the approval 
of the National Assembly. In Korea, there is an ongoing debate about limiting the dominance of 
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idea about the candidates, and I selected a candidate as a blind man tries to find a door 
handle. So, I did not have any interest in the local election" (FM1). "I got hardly any 
information about candidates in the local election" (I-118). "Candidates in local election 
were unknown to me, and I did not even know what they are going to do [when they are 
elected]. But, presidential candidates were well-known and I thought that the president 
has an influence on our daily lives" (1-127). "I hardly knew about the candidates in the 
general election. There were too many candidates" (1-136). "1 did not greatly consider the 
candidate's [personality or quality] in last local election. I think that I did not have 
enough information [about candidates]" (1-134). 
Several respondents pointed out the lack of interest in parliamentary and local 
elections as the main reason why they had only insufficient information in these elections. 
"I did not know very much about the candidates in the local election. Also, I think that 
local elections are relatively less important compared to presidential election, so I paid 
less attention to the last local election" (1-126). "In general elections, I went to a voting 
booth only with a sense of duty that I have to cast my ballot. So, I went to the poll 
without having any knowledge about candidates. I did not have much interest in the 
election. There were too many candidates, and I did not know about how they were going 
to speak for the people [in local governments or local parliaments]" (1-206). "1 hardly 
even knew the candidates' names in the local elections... I did vote in the local election, 
but I did not want to do it" (FF2). "In general and local elections, candidates were not to 
be trusted. So, I lost interest in the elections" (1-208). 
Differences in news media attention to elections: Interviewees also suggested that 
they are more interested in presidential elections because news media and other people 
pay more attention to presidential elections. For example, "I was more interested in 
presidential election because so many people were talking about the election everywhere" 
(1-139). "Unlike the last local election, there were controversial issues in the last 
presidential election. It was interesting for me to watch the debates on TV" (FM3). "The 
Presidential election received too much coverage in the news media" (FM3). "In the last 
local election, voters hardly knew about candidates. In contrast to the local election, there 
were lots of arguments about Roh Moo-hyun in the Internet and the mass media. Some 
people supported him, and some voters criticised him. I became interested in the election 
after seeing the arguments in the mass media and on the Internet" (FM4). He also said, "I 
did not vote in the last local election. The mass media is important in the presidential 
election. The presidential TV debates were on air during prime time. Therefore, I watched 
all three debates, and even my wife who is not interested in politics also watched the 
presidential power (jewang%eok daetongryeong, king-like president) in the political process. 
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debates" (FM4). "I gained much information from the mass media during this presidential 
election compared to the last local election or general election" (FF6). 
Voters are less interested in parliamentary and local elections and make their voting 
decisions based on insufficient information about the candidates and issues. As a result, 
among several factors to influence on vote choice, political party is relatively important in 
parliamentary and local elections compared to presidential elections. An interviewee 
comes straight to the point. "In the local election, I did not consider candidates or policies, 
but I considered political parties [in my vote choice]" (1-204). 
Political Party and Vole Preference 
Political parties still play an important role in determining Korean voting behaviour, 
even if less and less of the electorate give weight to political parties compared to other 
factors such as candidates. Partisan loyalty measured by consistency between party 
identification and vote choice in the presidential election has remained at a high level, 
though the percentage of party identifiers in Korean voters has decreased and political 
parties become less important in electoral choice. As shown in Table 7.6, in the 2002 
presidential election, 83 per cent of party identifiers voted for the candidate of their own 
political party, while 86 per cent of party identifiers were loyal to own party in their 
voting choice in 1992. This continuation of a high level of partisan loyalty points to only 
marginal decline in the last ten years. 
Table 7.6 Partisan Loyalty in Vote Choice, 1992-2002 
Number of Party Identifiers Non-party Total 
cases Loyal Defectors Identifiers 
Partisans 
1992 
All voters 1080 67.8% 11.0% 21.2% 100% 
Only identifiers 851 86.0% 14.0% 100% 
1997 
All voters 1172 50.1% 13.7% 36.3% 100% 
Only identifiers 747 78.6% 21.4% 100% 
2002 
All voters 1326 51.4% 10.6% 38.0% 100% 
_Only 
identifiers 822 83.0% 17.0% 100% 
Data: Korean Yresidentlal Election Study, 1992,1991, and 2UU2. 
Keys: Loyal partisans = those who voted for own party; Defectors = those who voted for other 
parties. 
Note: Voters who did not vote are excluded. 
In 1997, the level of partisan loyalty was low at 78.6 per cent, but this was also 
affected by the specific electoral competition at that time. During the 1997 presidential 
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election, a relatively high number of party identifiers of the ruling party, the New Korea 
Party (NKP), defected from their own political party in election. In 1997, the NKP was 
involved in a factional conflict within the party and turned into the Grand National Party 
(GNP). In this process, Rhee In je, who came second in the competition for the 
presidential nomination of the party, withdrew from the party and ran for the presidency 
himself. Therefore, some partisans of the party abandoned their party in order to support 
their preferred candidate, Ree In je. 
Party identification still accounts for the voting choice of half of the electorate 
although levels of party identification are dropping. Table 7.6 shows that the majority of 
voters have party identification and most party identifiers vote for the own party. Thus, 
the voting choice of more than half of Korean voters is explained by party identification, 
though the percentage has been declined markedly from 67.8 per cent to 51.4 per cent 
during the last ten years with a decrease of the percentage of partisans in the electorate. 
2. Main Characteristics of Independent Voters in Korea 
Partisan dealignment is a key feature of electoral changes in Korea in the last 10 years, as 
discussed in the previous section. A decrease in party identifiers and an increase of 
independent voters is apparent in Korea. Before explaining the cause of partisan decline 
or patterns of voting behaviour of the increasing independent voters, it is necessary to 
examine the nature of independent voters involved in the process of partisan dealignment 
in Korea. Who are the independents? Are independent voters different from partisans in 
terms of social and economic characteristics or political attitudes? Are the growing 
number of new independent voters different from existing old non-party identifiers in 
terms of social and economic characteristics or political attitudes? 
Two Types of Independent Voters 
Independent voters are simply defined as those who do not identify themselves with any 
political party. However, it cannot be assumed that all voters who do not have an 
attachment to a political party are homogeneous. If we assumed a homogeneous group of 
independent voters, we would fail to grasp the diversity of independent voters. Therefore, 
it is necessary to investigate further this category of independent voter. 
Two Different Interpretations ofIncreasinR Independent Voters 
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`Hidden partisans': Regarding the nature of increasing independent voters in 
advanced democracies, there are two distinct interpretations. One group of researchers 
argues that many independent voters are actually the `hidden' partisans who are similar to 
weak party identifiers in their voting behaviour. 13 According to this conceptualisation of 
independent voters, many independent voters reject identification with any party, but 
nonetheless lean to one of major parties. The true independent voters who do not lean to 
any political party are a relatively small proportion of the electorate. Thus, the increasing 
number of independent voters is the result of a weakening of electoral attachments. These 
researchers examined voting patterns of independents in American elections, and found 
that most of independent voters consistently vote for one of the two major parties in each 
election despite their lack of identification. In this way, independents are similar to weak 
party identifiers. Therefore, an increase of independents can be understood as a 
weakening of the strength of party identification, but not necessarily as an increase in the 
number of true independent voters. They argue that it is a `myth' to interpret the 
independent as a new type of voter whose voting behaviour is different from party 
identifiers. 
However, this interpretation of increasing independent voters is based on the stable 
bi-partisan political system in the USA, but is limited in explaining electoral changes in 
different political contexts. For example, electoral support for a new third party in one 
election, such as support for Ross Perot in the 1992 American presidential election, is not 
adequately explained in this one-dimensional conceptualisation of independent voters. 14 
As Korean party politics is quite different from American stable bi-partisan politics, and 
it is necessary to apply a multi-dimensional conceptualisation of independent voters. 15 
Moreover, independent `leavers' who vote for a political party should not confused 
with party identifiers with an enduring sense of group identity or belonging. 16 It is 
possible that independent `leaners' vote for a political party due to their candidate 
preferences or their policy preferences rather than party affiliation. In some case, voters 
might also consider tactical voting. Party identifiers who have an attachment to a minor 
party often vote for a major party because they do not want to waste their ballots. For 
13 Keith et al., The Myth of the Independent Voter. 
14 For a relation between Ross Perot and independent voters, see Waffenberg, The Decline of 
American Political Parties 1952-1996, pp. 168-98. 
15 For a discussion on the one-dimensional and the multi-dimensional conceptualisation of 
independent voters, see Herbert F. Weisberg, `A Multidimensional Conceptualization of Party 
Identification', Political Behaviour, 2 (1980), 33-60. Students of Korean electoral behaviour also 
suggest a multi-dimensional conceptualisation of the independent voter among Korean voters. For 
example, Lee Hyeon-chul, `Mudangpaui tupyohangtae: l6dae chongseonuiljungsimeuro' (Voting 
behaviour of non-party identifiers: focusing on the 16th general election), 
Hangukjeongchihakhoebo (Korean Political Science Review), 34 (2000), 137-60. 
16 Warren Miller and J. Merrill Shanks, The New American Voter (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
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example, in the 2002 Korean presidential election, a half of Democratic Labour Party 
(DLP) identifiers voted for Roh Moo-hyun, the candidate of the Millennium Democratic 
Party (MDP). Some of them voted for Roh Moo-hyun because they liked Roh, if not the 
MDP. Some of them did not want to waste their votes, and voted for Roh as the second 
best candidate considering the candidate's personal traits and issue stands. Some of them 
wanted to prevent Lee Hoi Chang and the Grand National Party from gaining power, so 
they helped Roh Moo-hyun to win the election. 
`New independents': An alternative interpretation of the growth of independent 
voters in advanced democracies emphasises a change in the nature of non-party 
identifiers. Some researchers reject the theory that independent voters are merely voters 
who do not identify themselves with a political party in American bi-party competition. 
They suggest that the new independent voters should be understood on the basis of a 
multi-dimensional conceptualisation. The decrease of party identifiers is understood as 
following from the emergence over the last few decades of a new type of non-party 
identifier or independent voter among the American electorate as a result of social 
change. '7 Traditional non-party identifiers are alienated from politics and so do not have 
any attachment to a political party. In contrast, the new independents are relatively 
interested in politics and elections in spite of their lack of party affiliation. Also, new 
independent voters have benefited from the news media and higher education. They no 
longer rely on political parties for receiving and interpreting information on political 
affairs. The appearance of the new independents implies a critical change in electoral 
behaviour. The new independents voters are more likely to behave differently from 
partisans at elections and it is expected that there would be changes in patterns of 
electoral behaviour. 
Tho Types of Independent Voters: Attentive and Apolitical Independents 
According to this alternative conceptualisation of independent voters, it is expected 
that non-party identifiers are not homogeneous in terms of social and economic 
characteristics and voting behaviours. The classification and subdivision of independent 
voters is therefore necessary. As suggested in chapter 3 of this thesis, following the 
distinction of the new independent voters from the traditional non-party identifiers, all 
non-partisans are classified into two types of voters focusing on the degree of interest in 
politics. The same dichotomous scheme can be applied to voters who have party 
University Press, 1996), p. 127. 
'7 Wattenberg, The Decline of American Political Parties 1952-1996, pp. 36-49. Also, Arthur H. 
Miller and Martin P. Wattenberg, `Measuring Party Identification: Independent or No Partisan 
197 
Chapter 7 
affiliation. Thus, four types of voters can be identified by this two by two classification: 
(1) the critical partisan; (2) the habitual partisan; (3) the attentive independent, and (4) 
the apolitical independent (see Table 3.1 in Chapter 3 of this thesis). 
According to this classification of voters, the electoral changes in Korea during last 
10 years are summarised in Table 7.7. In 1992, partisans were almost equally divided into 
critical partisans and habitual partisans. Two thirds of independent voters were apolitical 
independents with only one third attentive independents. This pattern was continued in 
2002 although the percentage of partisans in the electorate has decreased markedly. Both 
critical and habitual partisans have decreased and both attentive and apolitical 
independents have increased during last the 10 years. In particular, the increase in 
apolitical independents is remarkable. The proportion of apolitical independents in the 
electorate has almost doubled during the last decade. In short, the increase of independent 
voters in Korea has been mainly caused by the rapid increase of apolitical independent 
voters although the proportion of attentive independents has also grown. 
Table 7.7 Electoral Change in Korea, 1992-2002 
1992 (A) 1997 2002 Difference A-B 
Number of cases 1182 1198 1500 
Critical Partisans 40.3% 44.5% 30.0% -10.3% 
Habitual partisans 37.0% 18.6% 29.5% -7.5% 
Attentive independents 8.2% 17.5% 13.5% +5.3% 
Apolitical independents 14.6% 19.4% 27.0% +12.4% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Data- Korean Presidentia l Election Studv. 1992.1997. and 2 002. 
Note: In this classification of voters, two questions of the surveys are used. One is a question about 
party identification. Those who identify themselves with a political party are recoded as partisans, 
and those who deny identifying themselves with a political party are recoded as independent voters. 
Another is a question about a degree of interest in election. The surveys of 1992 and 1997 do not 
include any question about interest in politics. Therefore, a question about interest in the election 
is used instead of a question about interest in politics. The question is recoded into two values: (1) 
`very much interested' in the election, and (2) `somewhat interested' or `not interested' in the 
election. 
This pattern of change is somewhat different from American electoral changes 
during last two decades. In general, electoral change in the USA was been relatively 
gradual during last 20 years (see Table 7.8). In contrast to Korea, there have been many 
more habitual partisans than critical partisans among American voters. Habitual partisans 
have decreased (i. e., -2.6 per cent point), but critical partisans have increased very 
marginally (i. e., 0.4 per cent point). In the USA, almost three quarters of non-party 
identifiers have been apolitical independents (i. e., 30.5 per cent in 2000) rather than 
attentive independents (i. e., 8.5 per cent in 2000). The proportion of attentive 
Preference? ' American Journal of Political Science, 27 (1983), 106-21. 
198 
Chapter 7 
independents in the electorate has been less than 10 per cent of American voters during 
last two decades except for the 1992 presidential election (i. e., 13.1 per cent in 1992). 
Therefore, there have been relatively more attentive independent and critical partisans in 
Korea with a greater proportion of habitual partisans and apolitical independents in the 
USA. Also, there was little decline in electoral interest in politics and partisan decline has 
been marginal in the USA in the last two decades in comparison to the more evident 
partisan decline in Korea over the last decade. 
Table 7.8 Electoral Change in the USA, 1980-2000 
1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 Difference 
Number of cases 1399 1914 1758 2234 1529 1537 
Critical Partisans 20.2% 21.1% 20.0% 25.9% 21.1% 20.6% 0.4% 
Habitual Partisans 43.0% 43.2% 42.8% 34.9% 45.4% 40.4% -2.6% 
Attentive Independents 9.6% 7.4% 7.9% 13.1% 6.0% 8.5% -1.1% 
Apolitical Independents 27.2% 28.3% 29.3% 26.1% 27.4% 30.5% 3.3% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 1000/0 100% 
Data: American National Election Study, 1980,1984,1988,1992, and 2000. 
Keys: Difference = the change between 1980 and 2000; Critical partisans = partisans who are very 
interested in politics; Habitual partisans = partisans who are not very interested in politics; 
Attentive independents = non-party identifiers who are very interested in politics; Apolitical 
independents = non-party identifiers who are not very interested in politics. 
Note: Two variables are used in this analysis (i. e., vcf0302, party identification, and vcf0310, 
interest in the election). Variable vcf03O2 (party identification) is recorded as 1= party identifiers 
and 2= non-party identifiers or independents. Variable vcf03lO (interest in the election) is 
recorded as I= very much interested in political campaign and 2= somewhat or not very 
interested in political campaign. 
Variable vcf0313 (interested in public affairs) would be a better variable to measure voter's general 
interest in politics, but vcfb130 (interest in the election) is used in this analysis in order to match 
with Korean cases. 
Socio-Economic Characteristics of Independents in Korea 
Independent voters make up a substantial proportion of the electorate in Korea, and a 
better understanding of independent voters is necessary to comprehend electoral changes 
in Korea. An examination of the nature of independent voters may also provide a clue for 
solving the puzzle of partisan decline in Korea. 18 
Agee and Independent Voters 
'a There are a few previous studies of socio-demographic characteristics of independent voters in 
Korea. One of them was based on an election survey in the 1998 local election and another was 
based on an election survey in the 2002 general election. However, considering the 
conceptualisation of independent voters, these studies are not comparable to this research. For 
example, in these studies, independent voters are defined and classified based on vote consistency 
in a series of elections. For example, Lee, `Mudangpaui tupyohangtae: 16dae chongseonull 
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Younger members of the electorate are more likely to be independents compared to 
older voters. As shown in Table 7.9, there are relatively more independent voters among 
the youngest age group compared to older cohorts, while the proportion among the voters 
who are 55-64 years old is relatively small. For example, in 2002,46 per cent of the 
voters who are 20-24 years old are independent, while 32.8 per cent of the voters who are 
55-64 years old are independent, a pattern repeated in 1992 and in 1997. The difference in 
the distribution of independent voters across different age groups is statistically 
significant. 
Table 7.9 Crosstab: Age and Independents, 1992-2002 
Number Party Non-party Total Test statistics 
Age cohort of cases Identifiers Identifiers 
1992 Pearson Chi-Square = 
20-24 132 68.2% 31.8% 100% 16.770 
25-34 335 75.8% 24.2% 100% Sig. = 0.005 
35-44 290 77.9% 22.1% 100% 
45-54 194 75.3% 24.7% 100% Pearson's R=-. 095 
55-64 123 87.8% 12.2% 100% Sig. = 0.00 1 
65 and over 110 82.7% 17.3% 100% 
Total 1184 77.3% 22.7% 100% 
1997 Pearson Chi-Square = 
20-24 151 53.0% 47.0% 100% 14.198 
25-34 336 62.2% 37.8% 100% Sig. = 0.014 
35-44 285 68.4% 31.6% 100% 
45-54 223 68.2% 31.8% 100% Pearson's R=-. 030 
55-64 127 59.1% 40.9% 100% Sig. = 0.292 
65 and over 75 58.7% 41.3% 100% 
Total 1197 63.1% 36.9% 100% 
2002 Pearson Chi-Square = 
20-24 213 54.0% 46.0% 100% 14.987 
25-34 335 53.1% 46.9% 100% Sig. = 0.010 
35-44 365 61.4% 38.6% 100% 
45-54 265 63.4% 36.6% 100% Pearson's R=-. 079 
55-64 177 67.2% 32.8% 100% Sig. = 0.002 
65 and over 145 60.7% 39.3% 100% 
Total 1500 59.5% 40.5% 100% 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992,1997, and 2002. 
Furthermore, there was also a linear relation between age and partisanship, and the 
relationship is statistically significant in 1992 (i. e., Pearson's R= -0.095, p<0.05). 
However, the relationship was not statistically significant in 1997 due to a sudden 
increase of independent voters between 55 and 64 years old. This may be related to a 
sharp decrease of the ruling party identifiers in 1997, as discussed in Chapter 6. Many 
partisans of the ruling party were disappointed with the government performance, 
particularly after a severe economic recession in 1997, and abandoned the party. 
jungsimeuro' (Voting behaviour of non-party identifiers: focusing on the 16th general election). 
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Consequently, partisan decline in 1997 was led by older voters, traditionally a core 
support group for the ruling party. 
Table 7.10 Crosstab: Age and Korean Voters, 1992-2002 
N Critical Habitual Attentive Apolitical Total Test 
Age Partisan Partisan Independent Independent Statistics 
1992 Chi-Square 
20-24 132 34.8% 33.3% 7.6% 24.2% 100% = 34.935 
25-34 334 43.4% 32.3% 6.9% 17.4% 100% Sig. = 0.003 
35-44 290 39.3% 38.6% 9.7% 12.4% 100% 
45-54 194 41.2% 34.0% 10.8% 13.9% 100% 
55-64 123 43.9% 43.9% 6.5% 5.7% 100% 
65 and over 109 33.9% 48.6% 6.4% 11.0% 100% 
Total 1182 40.3% 37.0% 8.2% 14.6% 100% 
1997 Chi-Square 
20-24 151 28.5% 24.5% 13.2% 33.8% 100% = 66.575 
25-34 336 39.0% 23.2% 16.4% 21.4% 100% Sig. = 0.000 
35-44 285 48.8% 19.6% 16.5% 15.1% 100% 
45-54 223 55.6% 12.6% 18.4% 13.5% 100% 
55-64 127 48.8% 10.2% 23.6% 17.3% 100% 
65 and over 74 45.9% 12.2% 23.0% 18.9% 100% 
Total 1196 44.6% 18.5% 17.6% 19.4% 100% 
2002 Chi-Square 
20-24 213 19.2% 34.7% 10.8% 35.2% 100% = 54.858 
25-34 355 22.1% 31.0% 14.3% 32.5% 100% Sig. = 0.000 
35-44 365 32.9% 28.5% 12.9% 25.8% 100% 
45-54 265 32.1% 31.3% 15.8% 20.8% 100% 
55-64 177 40.7% 26.6% 13.6% 19.2% 100% 
65 and over 145 40.0% 20.7% 13.1% 26.2% 100% 
Total 1500 30.0% 29.5% 13.5% 27.0% 100% 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992,1Y9 t, and Luu1. 
Key: N= number of cases. 
There is a clear difference in the average age between partisans and independent 
voters, but the age difference has been reduced over the last 10 years. The difference was 
3.54 years old in 1992 but by 2002, it had dropped to 2.12 years old. The differences are 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level (see Table A7.1 in Appendix). However, the 
relation between age and partisanship is blurred when independent voters are subdivided. 
Attentive independent voters and critical partisans who are interested in politics are 
relatively much older than the apolitical independents and habitual partisans. Table 7.10 
shows the age difference across the four different types of voters. The difference is 
statistically significant in each of the three elections. As shown in Table 7.11, there are 
relatively more the apolitical independents among the youngest age group compared to 
other age groups, while the attentive independents are relatively equally distributed across 
different age groups. There are also relatively more habitual partisans among younger 
voters with relatively more critical partisans among older voters. 
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ANOVA analysis reveals that the difference in average age across the four types of 
voters is statistically significant in each of the three elections. In general, critical partisans 
are the oldest, and apolitical independent the youngest. Also, in terms of average age, the 
attentive independent is similar to the critical partisan, while the habitual partisan is 
similar to the apolitical independent. This pattern is appeared in all three elections (see 
Table A7.2 in Appendix). 
Education 
Using education as a variable can also help to explain independent voters. The 
relation between levels of education and independent voters was statistically significant in 
1992 and in 1997, but not in 2002. As shown in Table 7.11, independent voters are more 
likely have attended higher education. For example, 45.2 per cent of voters who 
experienced college level education were independent voters in 1997, compared to 31.9 
per cent of middle school graduated voters. 
Table 7.11 Crosstab: Education and Independents, 1992-2002 
Number Party Non-party Total Test statistics 
of cases Identifiers Identifiers 
1992 Pearson Chi-square = 
Primary 231 84.4% 15.6% 100% 29.997 
Middle school 202 82.7% 17.3% 100% Sig. = 0.000 
High school 434 78.6% 21.4% 100% 
College 317 66.9% 33.1% 100% Pearson' R= . 146 Total 1184 77.3% 22.7% 100% Sig. = 0.000 
1997 Pearson Chi-square = 
Primary 139 62.6% 37.4% 100% 26.348 
Middle school 124 68.5% 31.5% 100% Sig. = 0.000 
High school 447 70.5% 29.5% 100% 
College 482 54.8% 45.2% 100% Pearson's R= 
. 080 Total 1192 63.0% 37.0% 100% Sig. = 0.006 
2002 Pearson Chi-square = 4.963 
Primary 150 60.0% 40.9% 100% Sig. = 0.175 
Middle school 180 63.9% 36.1% 100% 
High school 560 61.3% 38.7% 100% Pearson's R= . 
042 
College 602 56.1% 43.9% 100% Sig. = 0.106 
Total 1492 59.4% 40.6% 100% 
vara: rorean rreslaennal rlecuon nituay, 1Y"JL, iwo /, ana ZUU2. 
Moreover, in 1992, there was a linear relationship between level of education and 
the proportion of independent voters, but the linear relationship has no longer existed 
since 1997. Many voters with only a low level of education became independent voters in 
1997 and in 2002. For example, 40 per cent of primary school graduated voters were 
independent voters in 2002 compared to 15.6 per cent of voters in 1992. This fact is 
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related to changes in partisan alignment, as discussed in Chapter 6. The defection of less 
educated voters from the old ruling party was a critical part of partisan decline in 1997. 
Table 7.12 shows the distribution of the four types voters across different levels of 
education. The relationship between education level and the four types of voters in each 
election are statistically significant (i. e., p<0.05). In 2002, there was a relatively large 
number of attentive independents with college level education compared to other levels of 
education. Furthermore, there was a high number of critical partisans with primary school 
level of education. Finally, there was a larger proportion of habitual partisans in the group 
of voters with middle level of education compared to those with more and less education. 
The difference in the average level of education across the four types of voters was 
statistically significant in 1992 and 1997, but not in 2002. For example, the average level 
of education of critical partisans was relatively less compared to the average for other 
types of voters, while the average for attentive independents was relatively higher 
compared to the average of other voters (see Table A7.3 in Appendix). 
Table 7.12 Crosstab: Education and Korean Voters, 1992-2002 
Number Critical Habitual Attentive Apolitical Total Test Statistics 
Education of cases Partisan Partisan Independent Independent 
level 
1992 Pearson Chi- 
Primary school 231 35.5% 48.9% 3.9% 11.7% 100% square = 
Middle school 200 45.5% 37.0% 5.5% 12.0% 100% 43.363 
High school 434 42.4% 36.2% 8.1% 13.4% 100% Sig. = 0.000 
College 317 37.5% 29.3% 13.2% 19.9% 100% 
Total 1182 40.3% 37.0% 8.2% 14.6% 100% 
1997 Pearson Chi- 
Primary school 138 52.9% 9.4% 21.7% 15.9% 100% square = 
Middle school 124 48.4% 20.2% 16.1% 15.3% 100% 39.578 
High school 447 49.4% 21.0% 13.9% 15.7% 100% Sig. = 0.000 
College 482 36.5% 18.3% 20.3% 24.9% 100% 
Total 1191 44.5% 18.5% 17.6% 19.4% 100% 
2002 Pearson Chi- 
Primary school 150 37.3% 22.7% 16.0% 24.0% 100% square = 
Middle school 180 30.0% 33.9% 8.3% 27.8% 100% 19.034 
High school 560 29.5% 31.8% 11.4% 27.3% 100% Sig. = 0.025 
College 602 28.9% 27.2% 16.4% 27.4% 100% 
Total 1492 30.1% 29.3% 13.5% 27.1% 100% 
, uara: itorean rresiaennal i iectton Ntuny, 1992,1997, and 2002. 
Size of Residence Area: Urban vs. Rural 
There is no difference in the proportion of independent voters across different sizes 
of residential areas. Although there are relatively more independent voters in urban areas 
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compared to rural areas, the difference is not statistically significant at the 0.05 level. For 
example, as shown in Table 7.13, in 2002, the proportion of independent voters among 
voters in large city was 42.3 per cent, the proportion among voters in small city was 39.4 
per cent, and the proportion among voters in rural area was 36.8 per cent. However, the 
difference is not statistically significant (i. e., p=0.324). 
Table 7.13 Crosstab: Size of Residence Area and Independents, 1992-2002 
Number Party Non-party Total Test statistics 
Residence of cases Identifiers Identifiers 
1992 Pearson Chi-Square = 3.247 
Large city 588 76.9 23.1 100% Sig. = 0.197 
Small city 318 74.8 25.2 100% 
Rural county 278 80.9 19.1 100% 
Total 1184 77.3 22.7 100% 
1997 Pearson Chi-Square = 5.660 
Large city 595 59.8% 40.2% 100% Sig. = 0.059 
Small city 431 66.8% 33.2% 100% 
Rural county 173 65.3% 34.7% 100% 
Total 1199 63.1% 36.9% 100% 
2002 Pearson Chi-Square = 2.252 
Large city 730 57.7% 42.3% 100% Sig. = 0.324 
Small city 607 60.6% 39.4% 100% 
Rural county 163 63.2% 36.8% 100% 
Total 1500 59.5% 40.5% 1000/0 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992,1997, and 2002. 
Table 7.14 Crosstab: Size of Residence Areas and Korean Voters, 1992-2002 
N Critical Habitual Attentive Apolitical Total Test 
Residence Partisan Partisan Independent Independent Statistics 
1992 Pearson 
Large city 586 38.9% 37.9% 8.5% 14.7% 100% Chi-square 
Small city 318 43.1% 31.8% 8.8% 16.4% 100% = 7.191 
Rural county 278 39.9% 41.0% 6.8% 12.2% 100% Sig. = 
Total 1182 40.3% 37.0% 8.2% 14.6% 100% 0.304 
1997 Pearson 
Large city 595 43.0% 16.8% 192% 21.0% 100% Chi-square 
Small city 431 46.2% 20.6% 15.8% 17.4% 100% = 6.266 
Rural county 172 45.3% 19.8% 16.3% 18.6% 100% Sig. _ 
Total 1198 44.5% 18.6% 17.5% 19.4% 100% 0.394 
2002 Pearson 
Large city 730 29.0% 28.6% 14.5% 27.8% 100% Chi-Square 
Small city 607 32.0% 28.7% 13.8% 25.5% 100% = 9.435 
Rural county 163 27.0% 36.2% 8.0% 28.8% 100% Sig. _ 
Total 1500 30.0% 29.5% 13.5% 27.0% 100% 0.150 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992,1997, and 2002. 
Key: N= number of cases. 
As shown in Table 7.14, there is also no difference in the four types of voters across 
different sizes of residential areas, though there are relatively more habitual partisans and 
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fewer attentive independents in rural areas in 2002. The attentive independents tend to 
live in a large city, while the habitual partisans are more likely to reside in a rural area. 
The difference in the average size of residence area across different types of voters is not 
statistically significant (i. e., p=0.725, p=0.250, p=0.221, in 1992, in 1997, and in 2002, 
respectively) though with this caveat in mind, it is still noticeable that the average size for 
attentive independents was relatively smaller than the averages for other types of voter 
and the size of residential area for habitual partisans was relatively bigger than that of the 
other types of voter (see Table A7.4 in Appendix). This pattern is repeated in all three 
presidential elections. 
Gender and Independent Voters 
Introducing a gender variable does not help to explain independent voters. The 
relationsip between sex and independent voters is not statistically significant (i. e., p= 
0.154, p=0.581, and p=0.227, in 1991, in 1997, and in 2002, respectively) (see Table 
A7.5 in Appendix). However, as shown in Table 7.15, the gender variable is significantly 
associated with the four types of voters. Men are more likely to be critical partisans or 
attentive independents than women with a greater proportion of habitual partisans and 
apolitical independents among women. The difference is statistically significant in 1992 
and in 2002 (i. e., p=0.015, and p=0.000, respectively), but not in 1997 (i. e., p=0.641). 
ANOVA analysis shows the same pattern (see Table A7.6 in Appendix). 
Table 7.15 Crosstab: Gender and Korean Voters, 1992-2002 
Number Critical Habitual Attentive Apolitical Total Test. Statistics 
Sex of cases Partisan Partisan Independent Independent 
1992 Pearson Chi-Square 
Men 571 42.9% 32.6% 9.6% 14.9% 100% = 10.504 
Women 611 37.8% 41.1% 6.9% 14.2% 100% Sig. = 0.015 
Total 1182 40.3% 37.0% 8.2% 14.6% 100% 
1997 Pearson Chi-Square 
Men 612 45.3% 18.6% 16.2% 19.9% 100% = 1.682 
Women 586 43.7% 18.6% 18.9% 18.8% 100% Sig. = 0.641 
Total 1198 44.5% 18.6% 17.5% 19.4% 100% 
2002 Pearson Chi-Square 
Men 739 34.1% 26.9% 16.0% 23.0% 100% = 26.340 
Women 761 26.0% 31.9% 11.2% 30.9% 100% Sig. = 0.000 
Total 1500 30.0% 29.5% 13.5% 27.0% 100% 
uara: korean rresiaennat >aection Nruay, 19Yl, 1 YY/, and ZUU2. 
Religion and Independent Voters 
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Religion does not explain independent voters in 1997 and in 2002, but the 
relationship between religion and independent voters was statistically significant in 1992. 
In 1992, there were relatively more partisans among Buddhists compared to other 
religious groups, but the difference between Buddhists and other religious people 
disappeared in 1997 and in 2002. Also, as shown in Table 7.16, voters who do not have 
any major religion or who are non-religious people are more likely to be independents, 
while voters from the major religions in Korea are more likely to be partisans. 
Furthermore, the relationship between the four types of voters and religion is not 
statistically significant in 1997 and in 2002 (i. e., p=0.242, and p=0.333, respectively), 
but is significant in 1992 (i. e., p=0.000) (see Table A7.7 in Appendix). 
The decrease of partisans among Buddhists is related to the increasing number of 
independent voters among partisans of old ruling party. As discussed in chapter 6, 
Buddhists are closely associated with the old ruling party. The decrease of partisanship 
among Buddhists appears to have contributed to partisan decline, in particular of the old 
ruling party, in Korea during last 10 years. 
Table 7.16 Crosstab: Religion and Independents, 1992-2002 
Number Party Non-party Total Test statistics 
of cases Identifiers Identifiers 
1992 Pearson Chi-Square = 21.879 
Buddhists 357 84.3% 15.7% 100% Sig. = 0.000 
Protestants 267 79.8% 20.2% 100% 
Catholics 108 72.2% 27.8% 100% 
Other 26 65.4% 34.6% 100% 
Non-religion 426 71.8% 28.2% 100% 
Total 1184 77.3% 22.7% 100% 
1997 Pearson Chi-Square = 1.464 
Buddhists 335 65.4% 34.6% 100% Sig. = 0.833 
Protestants 285 63.9% 36.1% 100% 
Catholics 114 61.4% 38.6% 100% 
Other 38 60.5% 39.5% 100% 
Non-religion 422 61.6% 38.4% 100% 
Total 1194 63.1% 36.9% 100% 
2002 Pearson Chi-Square = 6.846 
Buddhists 376 60.1% 39.9% 100% Sig. = 0.144 
Protestants 408 63.0% 37.0% 100% 
Catholics 143 61.5% 38.5% 100% 
Other 31 45.2% 54.8% 100% 
Non-religion 542 56.6% 43.4% 100% 
Total 1500 59.5% 40.5% 100% 
vara: &orean rresiaennai tiecuon may, L9YL, IYYJ, and 2Q02. 
Region or Reeiona[ism and Independent Voters 
Independent voters can also be investigated in terms of regional differences. As 
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shown in Table 7.17, there are relatively more partisans amongst voters from Jeolla 
region compared to voters from other regions, while there are relatively more independent 
voters in the Seoul, Gyeonggi, and Gangwon regions. Voters who are from one of regions 
where regionalism is strong are more likely to be partisans and conversely those from 
regions where regional feeling is not so strong are relatively more likely to be 
independents. By looking at the Chungcheong region, further support for this argument 
can be found. Kim Jong-pil and his political party, the United Liberal Democrats (ULD), 
mobilised effectively voters from the Chungcheong region in each election until the 1997 
presidential election, and there were relatively fewer independent voters until 1997 (i. e., 
24.0 % in 1992, and 31.8 % in 1997). By 2002, however, Kim Jong-pil or the ULD no 
longer stood for election, and the proportion of independent voters among voters from the 
region jumped to 45.8 per cent. 
Table 7.17 Crosstab: Region and Independents, 1992-2002 
Number Party Non-party Total Test statistics 
of cases Identifiers Identifiers 
1992 Pearson Chi-Square = 48.712 
Seoul 129 63.6% 36.4% 100% Sig. = 0.000 
Gyeonggi 127 69.3% 30.7% 100% 
Gangwon 58 60.3% 39.7% 100% 
Chungcheong 204 76.0% 24.0% 100% 
Jeolla 237 88.6% 11.4% 100% 
Gyeongsang 414 80.7% 19.3% 100% 
Jeju 1 100.0% 100% 
The North 14 71.4% 28.6% 100% 
Total 1184 77.3% 22.7% 100% 
1997 Pearson Chi-Square = 104.911 
Seoul 148 49.3% 50.7% 100% Sig. = 0.000 
Gyeonggi 117 52.1% 47.9% 100% 
Gangwon 76 55.3% 44.7% 100% 
Chungcheong 198 68.2% 31.8% 100% 
Jeolla 263 87.5% 12.5% 100% 
Gyeongsang 357 53.8% 46.2% 100% 
Jeju 25 64.0% 36.0% 100% 
The North 12 41.7% 58.3% 100% 
Total 1196 63.0% 37.0% 100% 
2002 Pearson Chi-Square = 33.671 
Seoul 208 56.7% 43.3% 100% Sig. = 0.000 
Gyeonggi 175 62.3% 37.7% 100% 
Gangwon 93 48.4% 51.6% 100% 
Chungcheong 216 54.2% 45.8% 100% 
Jeolla 278 73.4% 26.6% 100% 
Gyeongsang 499 55.9% 44.1% 100% 
Jeju 6 50.0% 50.0% 100% 
The North 16 62.5% 37.5% 100% 
Total 1491 59.4% 40.6% 100% 
vara: xorean rresiaennai hiecnon btuay, 1992,1997, and 20U2. 
Nevertheless, among voters from Gyeongsang region, historically strong supporters 
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of the old ruling party, the proportion of independent voters markedly increased in 1997. 
Only 19.3 per cent of voters from the region were independents in 1992, but 46.2 per cent 
and 44.1 per cent of voters from the region were independents in 1997 and in 2002, 
respectively. This change again implies that partisan decline in Korea has been connected 
to the decrease of party identifiers of the ruling party in 1997. The very poor performance 
of the government and the ruling party disappointed its traditional loyal supporters 
causing a drop in party affiliation among core supporters. 
Table 7.18 Crosstab: Region and Korean Voters, 1992-2002 
N Critical Habitual Attentive Apolitical Total Test Statistics 
Region Partisan Partisan Independent Independent 
1992 Chi-Square = 
Seoul 129 31.8% 31.8% 12.4% 24.0% 100% 72.918 
Gyeonggi 127 33.9% 35.4% 11.0% 19.7% 100% Sig. = 0.000 
Gangwon 58 32.8% 27.6% 12.1% 27.6% 100% 
Chungcheong 204 42.6% 33.3% 9.8% 14.2% 100% 
Jeolla 236 54.7% 33.9% 4.2% 7.2% 100% 
Gyeongsang 413 36.3% 44.3% 6.5% 12.8% 100% 
Jeju I 100% 100% 
The North 14 50.0% 21.4% 21.4% 7.1% 100% 
Total 1182 40.3% 37.0% 8.2% 14.6% 100% 
1997 Chi-Square = 
Seoul 148 29.7% 19.6% 23.6% 27.0% 100% 171.502 
Gyeonggi 117 36.8% 15.4% 25.6% 22.2% 100% Sig. = 0.000 
Gangwon 75 33.3% 21.3% 16.0% 29.3% 100% 
Chungcheong 198 49.0% 19.2% 19.7% 12.1% 100% 
Jeolla 263 74.5% 12.9% 8.7% 2.8% 100% 
Gyeongsang 357 31.9% 21.8% 17.9% 28.3% 100% 
Jeju 25 40.0% 24.0% 20.0% 16.0% 100% 
The North 12 33.3% 8.3% 16.7% 41.7% 100% 
Total 1195 44.6% 18.4% 17.6% 19.4% 100% 
2002 Chi-Square = 
Seoul 208 28.8% 27.9% 15.4% 27.9% 100% 65.494 
Gyeonggi 175 33.1% 29.1% 12.6% 25.1% 100% Sig. = 0.000 
Gangwon 93 30.1% 18.3% 20.4% 31.2% 100% 
Chungcheong 216 29.6% 24.5% 19.4% 26.4% 100% 
Jeolla 278 41.4% 32.0% 9.4% 17.3% 100% 
Gyeongsang 499 22.4% 33.5% 11.8% 32.3% 100% 
Jeju 6 33.3% 16.7% 16.7% 33.3% 100% 
The North 16 50.0% 12.5% 12.5% 25.0% 100% 
Total 1491 30.0% 29.4% 13.6% 27.0% 100% 
uara: itorean rresiaennai ttection stuay, 1992,199 /, ana Zä02. 
Key N= number of cases. 
As shown in Table 7.18, the relationship between region and the four types of voter 
in each of the three elections are statistically significant (i. e., p=0.000). Among voters 
from the Jeolla region, there are relatively high proportion of critical partisans, while 
voters from Gyeongsang region relatively more inclined towards apolitical independents 
and the habitual partisans. The relatively high level of apolitical independent voters 
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among voters in Gyeongsang suggests that Gyeongsong people lost their interest in 
politics and party attachment during last the 10 years due to political changes in the new 
democracy unfavourable to the old ruling party. 
Levels of Income and Independent Voters 
In terms of income, there was no significant relationship in 2002 but these two 
variables were associated with each other in 1992 and in 1997. As shown in Table 7.19, 
there are relatively more independent voters among the high earning voters compared to 
the poor in 1992 and in 1997. The percentage of independent voters among low earners 
has markedly increased over time, and the difference in proportion of independent voters 
across different income groups disappeared in 2002. Lower-income voters who were 
traditional supporters for the old ruling party withdrew their support for the party and 
became independent voters during the last 10 years. The t-test for equality of means 
shows differences in the average levels of income between partisans and independent 
voters. Independent voters have relatively higher incomes compared to partisans. The 
difference is statistically significant in 1992 and in 1997, but not in 2002 (see Table A7.8 
in Appendix). 
Table 7.19 Crosstab: Levels of Income and Independents, 1992-2002 
Number Party Non-party Total Test statistics 
Income level of cases Identifiers Identifiers 
1992 Pearson Chi-Square = 17.630 
Low 258 83.2% 16.8% 100% Sig. = 0.000 
Middle 681 79.4% 20.6% 100% 
High 253 65.6% 34.4% 100% Pearson's R= . 137 Total 1184 77.3% 32.3% 100% Sig. = 0.000 
1997 Pearson Chi-Square = 11.810 
Low 339 70.5% 29.5% 100% Sig. = 0.003 
Middle 520 61.2% 38.8% 100% 
High 320 58.4% 41.6% 100% Pearson's R= . 094 Total 1179 63.1% 36.9% 100% Sig. = 0.001 
2002 Pearson Chi-Square = 0.006 
Low 487 59.1% 40.9% 100% Sig. = 0.997 
Middle 670 59.3% 40.7% 100% 
High 278 59.0% 41.0% 100% Pearson's R= . 001 Total 1435 59.2% 40.8% 100% Sig. = 0.979 
uara: r orean rresiaenaai niection btuay, IYYL, ivy/, aria 1UUl. 
As shown in Table 7.20, the income variables and the four types of voters are 
associated with each other. The relation is statistically significant in 1992 and in 1997, but 
not in 2002 (i. e., p 0.000 in 1992, p=0.006 in 1997, and p=0.193 in 2002). In 1992, 
the low-income group contains relatively more critical partisans and habitual partisans 
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with relatively more attentive independents and apolitical independents in the higher 
income group. This pattern continued in 1997, but not in 2002. Also, this pattern is 
confirmed in an ANOVA analysis. In general, attentive independents and apolitical 
independents have higher incomes compared to critical partisans and habitual partisans 
(see Table A7.9 in Appendix). 
Table 7.20 Crosstab: Levels of Income and Korean Voters, 1992-2002 
Number Critical Habitual Attentive Apolitical Total Test Statistics 
Income of cases Partisan Partisan Independent Independent 
1992 Pearson Chi- 
Low 250 42.0% 41.2% 4.0% 12.8% 100% Square = 29.770 
Middle 680 41.9% 37.5% 7.8% 12.8% 100% Sig. = 0.000 
High 252 34.1% 31.3% 13.5% 21.0% 100% 
Total 1182 40.3% 37.0% 8.2% 14.6% 100% 
1997 Pearson Chi- 
Low 183 56.8% 15.8% 15.8% 11.5% 1000/0 Square = 18.069 
Middle 675 42.5% 20.1% 17.0% 20.3% 100% Sig. = 0.006 
High 320 40.9% 17.5% 20.0% 21.6% 100% 
Total 1178 44.3% 18.8% 17.7% 19.3% 100% 
2002 Pearson Chi- 
Low 487 30.6% 28.5% 13.8% 27.1% 100% Square = 8.666 
Middle 670 27.0% 32.2% 12.8% 27.9% 100% Sig. = 0.193 
High 278 33.5% 25.5% 16.2% 24.8% 100% 
Total 1435 29.5% 29.7% 13.8% 27.0% 100% 
uara: &orean rresiaenuai tiecuon muay, r 992, i 99 /, ana LUU2. 
Occupation and Independent Voters 
Independent voters are unequally distributed across occupations. The relationship 
between occupation and independent voters is statistically significant in 1992 and in 1997, 
but not in 2002. As shown in Table 7.21, the percentage of independent voters among 
students and white-collar workers was relatively large, while the proportion among 
farmers or blue-collar workers was relatively small. This pattern is replicated in each of 
the three elections. Meanwhile, the percentage of independent voters among white-collar 
workers is still relatively larger, but increased marginally during last 10 years. 
As shown in Table 7.22, the relationship between occupation and the four types of 
voters is significant in 1992 and in 1997, but not in 2002. In general, farmers and blue- 
collar workers are more likely to be critical partisans, while housewives are more inclined 
to habitual partisanship. The percentage of apolitical independents among students is also 
relatively large, while conversely the percentage of attentive independents among 
professional and public servants is high. 
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Table 7.21 Crosstab: Occupation and Independents, 1992-2002 
N Party Non-party Total Test statistics 
Occupation Identifiers Identifiers 
1992 Pearson Chi-Square 
Professionals & Public servants 92 76.1% 23.9% 100% = 30.850 
White-Collar Workers 160 63.8% 36.3% 100% Sig. = 0.000 
Self-employers 145 78.6% 21.4% 100% 
Blue-Collar Workers 149 79.9% 20.1% 100% 
Farmers 131 88.5% 11.5% 100% 
Students 75 72.0% 28.0% 100% 
Housewives 278 80.9% 19.1% 100% 
Unemployed & other 154 74.7% 25.3% 100% 
Total 1184 77.3% 22.7% 100% 
1997 Pearson Chi-Square 
Professionals & Public servants 137 55.5% 44.5% 100% = 26.956 
White-Collar Workers 132 62.1% 37.9% 100% Sig. = 0.000 
Self-employers 271 70.1% 29.9% 100% 
Blue-Collar Workers 115 75.7% 24.3% 100% 
Farmers 68 60.3% 39.7% 100% 
Students 120 54.2% 45.8% 100% 
Housewives 228 64.9% 35.1% 100% 
Unemployed & other 93 51.6% 48.4% 100% 
Total 1164 63.3% 36.7% 100% 
2002 Pearson Chi-Square 
Professionals & Public servants 126 61.1% 38.9% 100% = 4.377 
White-Collar Workers 197 57.9% 42.1% 100% Sig. = 0.735 
Self-employers 237 60.3% 39.7% 100% 
Blue-Collar Workers 132 63.6% 36.4% 100% 
Farmers 66 66.7% 33.3% 100% 
Students 179 55.3% 44.7% 100% 
Housewives 285 57.9% 42.1% 100% 
Unemployed & other 237 59.1% 40.9% 100% 
Total 1459 59.4% 40.6% 100% 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992,1997, and 2002. 
Key: N= number of cases. 
Social Class and Independent Voters 
Social class is another variable which can be used to analyse independent voters. As 
shown in Table 7.23, the distribution of independent voters across different social classes 
is statistically significant. In general, the percentage of independent voters among non- 
manual workers is larger than the percentage among manual workers. For example, in 
1997, the percentage of independent voters among routine non-manual workers was 32.9 
per cent compared to 15.2 per cent among the manual workers. This pattern was 
replicated in 2002. Furthermore, there was a linear relationship between party 
identification and social class and the relation is statistically significant in all three 
presidential elections. 
Also, the relation between social class and the four types of voters is statistically 
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significant. As shown in Table 7.24, independent voters among the routine non-manual 
workers are more likely to be apolitical independents rather than attentive independents. 
In comparison to routine non-manual workers, independent voters among the Salariat 
included a greater proportion of attentive independents. There are relatively more the 
critical partisans rather than the habitual partisans among the petty bourgeois. The manual 
working class also includes more critical partisans rather than habitual partisans. 
Table 7.22 Crosstab: Occupation and Korean Voters, 1992-2002 
N Critical Habitual Attentive Apolitical Total Test 
Occupation Partisan Partisan Independent Independent Statistics 
1992 Chi-Square 
Professionals & Public 92 46.7% 29.3% 12.0% 12.0% l00% = 49.010 
servants Sig. = 0.001 
White-Collars 160 31.9% 31.9% 11.9% 24.4% 100% 
Self-employs 145 39.3% 39.3% 8.3% 13.1% 100% 
Blue-Collars 149 44.3% 35.6% 6.7% 13.4% 100% 
Farmers 131 52.7% 35.9% 5.3% 6.1% 1000/0 
Students 75 42.7% 29.3% 8.0% 20.0% 1000/0 
Housewives 277 39.4% 41.5% 7.9% 11.2% 100% 
Unemployed & other 153 32.00/6 42.5% 6.5% 19.06/0 100% 
Total 1182 40.3% 37.0% 8.2% 14.6% 100% 
1997 Chi-Square 
Professionals & Public 137 38.0% 17.5% 24.1% 20.4% 100% = 57.648 
servants Sig. = 0.000 
White-Collars 132 41.7% 20.5% 17.4% 20.5% 100% 
Self-employs 271 55.0116 15.1% 14.4% 15.5% 100% 
Blue-Collars 115 53.9% 21.7% 8.7% 15.7% 100% 
Farmers 68 48.5% 11.8% 23.5% 16.2% 100% 
Students 120 31.7% 22.5% 13.3% 32.5% 100% 
Housewives 227 41.9% 22.9% 18.5% 16.7% 100% 
Unemployed & other 93 40.9% 10.8% 23.7% 24.7% 100% 
Total 1163 44.9% 18.4% 17.3% 19.4% 1000/0 
2002 Chi-Square 
Professionals & Public 126 33.3% 27.8% 14.3% 24.6% 100% = 23.800 
servants Sig. = 0.303 
White-Collars 197 26.9% 31.0% 14.2% 27.9% 100V. 
Self-employs 237 30.0% 30.4% 15.2% 24.5% 100% 
Blue-Collars 132 34.1% 29.5% 12.1% 24.2% 100% 
Farmers 66 40.9% 25.8% 15.2% 18.2% 100% 
Students 179 23.5% 31.8% 14.5% 20.2% 100% 
Housewives 285 24.9% 33.0% 12.6% 29.5% 100% 
Unemployed & other 237 35.4% 23.6% 11.4% 29.5% 100% 
Total 1459 29.8% 29.5% 13.5% 27.1% 1006/0 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992,1997, and 2002. 
Key: N= number of cases. 
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Table 7.23 Crosstab: Class and Independents, 1992-2002 
Number Party Non-party Total Test statistics 
Social Class of cases Identifiers Identifiers 
1992 Pearson Chi-Square 
Salariat 126 70.6% 29.4% 100% = 19.314 
Routine non-manual worker 146 67.1% 32.9% 100% Sig. = 0.000 
Petty bourgeois 258 82.2% 17.8% 100% 
Foreman and technician 22 72.7% 27.3% 100% Pearson's R=-. 132 
Manual worker 125 84.8% 15.2% 100% Sig. = 0.001 
Total 677 77.0% 23.0% 100% 
1997 Pearson Chi-Square 
Salariat 176 55.1% 44.9% 100% = 12.670 
Routine non-manual worker 134 70.1% 29.9% 100% Sig. = 0.013 
Petty bourgeois 336 69.6% 30.4% 100% 
Foreman and technician 12 58.3% 41.7% 100% Pearson's R= -0.085 
Manual worker 65 67.7% 32.3% 100% Sig. = 0.002 
Total 723 65.8% 34.2% 100% 
2002 Pearson Chi-Square 
Salariat 195 58.5% 41.5% 100% = 5.333 
Routine non-manual worker 200 57.0% 43.0% 100% Sig. = 0.225 
Petty bourgeois 285 61.1% 38.9% 100% 
Foreman and technician 12 58.3% 41.7% 100% Pearson's R= -0.071 
Manual worker 86 70.9% 29.1% 100% Sig. = 0.049 
Total 778 60.4% 39.6% 100% 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992,1997, and 2002. 
Table 7.24 Crosstab: Class and Korean Voters, 1992-2002 
N Critical Habitual Attentive Apolitical Total Test 
Social Class Partisan Partisan Independent Independent Statistics 
1992 Chi- 
Salariat 126 39.7% 31.0% 14.3% 15.1% 100% Square = 
Routine non-manual 146 30.8% 36.3% 8.9% 24.0% 100% 34.018 
worker Sig. _ 
Petty bourgeois 258 45.0% 37.2% 6.2% 11.6% 100% 0.001 
Foreman/technician 22 36.4% 36.4% 18.2% 9.1% 100% 
Manual worker 125 53.6% 31.2% 6.4% 8.8% 100% 
Total 677 42.2% 34.7% 8.7% 14.3% 100% 
1997 Chi- 
Salariat 176 38.1% 17.0% 25.6% 19.3% 100% Square = 
Routine non-manual 134 46.3% 23.9% 12.7% 17.2% 100% 31.007 
worker Sig. _ 
Petty bourgeois 36 54.8% 14.9% 15.5% 14.9% 100% 0.002 
Foreman/technician 12 41.7% 16.7% - 41.7% 100% 
Manual worker 65 50.8% 16.9% 10.8% 21.5% 100% 
Total 723 48.5% 17.3% 16.7% 17.4% 100% 
2002 Chi- 
Salariat 195 31.8% 26.7% 18.5% 23.1% 100% Square = 
Routine non-manual 200 27.0% 30.0% 11.0% 32.0% 100% 19.867 
worker Sig. = 
Petty bourgeois 285 29.8% 31.2% 14.4% 24.6% 100% 0.070 
Foreman/technician 12 25.0% 33.3% 25.0% 16.7% 100% 
Manual worker 86 44.2% 26.7% 14.0% 15.1% 100% 
Total 778 31.1% 29.3% 14.7% 24.9% 100% 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992,1997, and 2002. 
Key: N= Number of cases. 
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Ideology and Independent Voters 
Ideological differences between partisans and independent voters are statistically 
significant. As shown in Table 7.25, more independent voters take the central position in 
the conservative-liberal spectrum, while partisans are more likely to be either 
conservatives or liberals. 
The distribution of the four types of voters across different ideological positions is 
also statistically significant. Apolitical independent voters tend to be in the centre of the 
political spectrum, while attentive independent voters are more inclined to be liberals. 
Also, critical partisans are more likely to be conservatives or liberals rather than centrists 
(see Table 7.26). 
Table 7.25 Crosstab: Ideology and Independent, 1997-2002 
Ideology 
Number 
of cases 
Party 
Identifiers 
Non-party 
Identifiers 
Total Test statistics 
1997 Pearson Chi-Square = 4.826 
Conservative 448 63.2% 36.8% 100% Sig. = 0.090 
Centrist 241 59.3% 40.7% 100% 
Liberal 391 67.8% 32.2% 100% 
Total 1080 64.0% 36.0% 100% 
2002 Pearson Chi-Square = 24.005 
Conservative 400 66.8% 33.3% 100% Sig. = 0.000 
Centrist 484 51.0% 49.0% 100% 
Liberal 616 61.4% 38.6% 100% 
Total 1500 59.5% 40.5% 100% 
Sara: xorean rresiaenuai tiecnon sway, irn, ivv i, ana LUU2. 
Table 7.26 Crosstab: Ideology and Korean Voters, 1997-2002 
Ideology 
Number 
of cases 
Critical 
Partisan 
Habitual 
Partisan 
Attentive 
Independent 
Apolitical 
Independent 
Total Test 
Statistics 
1997 Pearson 
Conservative 448 44.6% 18.5% 15.4% 21.4% 100% Chi-square 
Centrist 241 41.9% 17.4% 18.7% 22.0% 100% = 12.951 
Liberal 391 47.1% 20.7% 18.9% 13.3% 100% Sig. = 0.044 
Total 1080 44.9% 19.1% 17.4% 18.6% 100% 
2002 Pearson 
Conservative 400 33.3% 33.5% 9.0% 24.3% 100% Chi-square 
Centrist 484 20.7% 30.4% 12.6% 36.4% 100% = 62.199 
Liberal 616 35.2% 26.1% 17.2% 21.4% 100% Sig. = 0.000 
Total 1500 30.0% 29.5% 13.5% 2 7.0% 100% 
uaia: ltorean rresiaemiai Cieccion JLuay, 1992,1`991, ana ZUU2. 
The difference in the average ideological scores between partisans and independents 
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is not significant (see Table A7.10 in Appendix), However, the difference in the average 
scores across the four types of voters is statistically significant. In 2002, attentive 
independent voters as a whole were more liberal compared to the more centrist position 
of habitual partisans and apolitical independent voters (see Table AMI in Appendix). 
3. The Causes of Partisan Decline in Korea 
Why have more Korean voters become detached from political parties during the last 10 
years unlike voters in other new democracies? What are the causes of partisan decline in 
Korea? There are two controversial approaches to the cause of partisan decline in mature 
democracies. '9 The `sociological explanation' focuses on socio-structural changes which 
have changed the nature of electorates including changes in social cleavages, the 
expansion of education, and the emergence of mass media. 20 As a result of the 
modernisation processes in mature democracies, contemporary voters have better skills 
and enough information to understand the complexities of politics, and they no longer 
need political parties as a political cue. 1 They are thus less dependent on political parties 
compared to traditional voters causing partisan decline in mature democracies. Also, 
public values and interests have diversified to include post-material values, which 
emphasise individualism and contradicts the discipline of party politics Therefore, 
partisan decline is very apparent among younger generation. 22 
As another approach to the cause of partisan decline, the `political explanation' 
finds the causes of partisan dealignment in changes in party politics and the `failure of 
parties'. Several scholars argue that popular dissatisfaction with the performance of 
political parties and democratic process is the cause of partisan decline. 23 Also, some 
researchers suggest growing ideological convergence between political parties in mature 
democracies as the cause of partisan decline 24 
19 William L. Miller and Richard G. Niemi, `Voting: Choice, Conditioning, and Constraint', in 
Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G. Niemi, and Pippa Norris, eds, Comparing Democracies 2: New 
Challenges in the Study of Elections and Voting (London: Sage, 2002), pp. 169-88, at pp. 177-8. 
Also, Russell J. Dalton, `The Decline of Party Identification' in Russell J. Dalton and Martin P. 
Wattenberg, eds, Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 19-36, at p. 29. 
20 Harrop and Miller, Elections and Voters: A Comparative Introduction, pp. 139-40. 
21 Russell J. Dalton, `Cognitive Mobilization and Partisan Dealignment in Advanced Industrial 
Democracies' Journal of Politics, 46 (1984), 264-84. Also, Ronald Inglehart, Culture Shift in 
Advanced Industrial Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). 
12 Miller and Shanks, The New American Voter, pp. 151-88. 
23 Carsten Zelle, `Social Dealignment vs. Political Frustration: Contrasting Explanation of the 
Floating Vote in Germany', European Journal of Political Research, 27 (1995), 319-45. 
24 Schmitt and Holmberg, `Political Parties in Decline? '; Larry M. Bartels, `Partisanship and 
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These theories based on electoral changes in mature democracies will be applied to 
explain the causes of partisan decline in Korea. The sources of partisan dealignment in 
Korea will be identified and discussed focusing on five factors; generational patterns, 
cognitive mobilisation, interest in politics, dissatisfaction with political parties and the 
democratic process, and the lack of ideological difference. 
Generational Patterns 
There is a positive relationship between age and partisanship in Korea, as discussed in the 
previous section. Independent voters are disproportionately concentrated among the 
young. According to the model of party identification, the young do not have party 
attachment or have only weak partisanship. Older voters are not only more likely to be 
partisans but the strength of partisanship also increases with age. 
Considering the positive relationship between the young and independent voters, the 
influx of young voters without party attachment into the electorate may help explain 
partisan decline in Korea. However, the influx of young voters cannot fully account for 
the decline in the level of party identification in Korea during the last 10 years. First, the 
percentage of young voters in the electorate did not increase during the last 10 years, but 
decreased continually, although half of the electorate is still below 40 years old. For 
example, the percentage of those between 20-29 years old in the electorate decreased 
from 31.4 per cent to 24.3 per cent during the last 10 years, while the percentage of those 
60 years old or above increased gradually from 11.9 per cent to 15.8 per cent during this 
period (see Table 6.1 in Chapter 6). 
Furthermore, as shown in Table 7.27, voters did not become partisans as they aged 
in contrast to a theme of the party identification model. It is true that there were more 
independents among the young rather than older voters in the last three presidential 
elections. However, the percentage of independent voters in each cohort increased during 
1992-2002, though the margin of change is different in each cohort. The percentage of 
independent voters for cohort X and cohort VII also increased substantially during last 10 
years (i. e., 22.4 per cent). The percentage for the cohort VI and the cohort V also 
markedly increased compared to other cohorts (i. e., 19.2 per cent point and 18.7 per cent, 
respectively). Therefore, not only the young, but also older voters contributed to the 
decline in the level of party identification in Korea. The increase of independent voters is 
apparent in particular among intermediate cohorts rather than among relatively younger 
or older cohorts. 
Voting Behaviour, 1952-1956', American Journal of Political Science, 44 (2000), 35-50. 
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Table 7.27 Non-Party Identifiers (%) by Five-Year Cohorts, 1992-2002 
Percentage who were Non-Party Identifiers 
Cohort 1992 (A) 1997 2002 (B) (B) -A 
X Age 55-59 Age 60-64 Age 65-69 
16.7 43.8 39.1 22.4 
IX Age 50-54 Age 55-59 Age 60-64 
22.0 39.2 29.5 7.5 
VIII Age 45-49 Age 50-54 Age 55-59 
27.2 31.0 36.6 9.4 
VII Age 40-44 Age 45-49 Age 50-54 
21.0 33.0 43.4 22.4 
VI Age 35-39 Age 40-44 Age 45-49 
22.9 30.5 32.1 19.2 
V Age 30-34 Age 35-39 Age 40-44 
23.8 32.5 42.5 18.7 
IV Age 25-29 Age 30-34 Age 35-39 
24.6 42.0 35.1 10.5 
III Age 20-24 Age 25-29 Age 30-34 
31.8 34.4 47.6 15.8 
11 Age 20-24 Age 25-29 
47.0 45.8 
1 Age 20-24 
46.0 
Total 22.7 36.9 40.6 17.9 
z. w[u. hure uº rresiuennai niection ziuay, IYYL, ivy i, ana 2uul. 
Cognitive Mobilisation 
The growth of the independent has been linked to rising political sophistication in the 
electorate in mature democracies. Voters who achieve a high level of educational 
attainment are less reliant on political parties to comprehend the complexity of politics. 
Thus, it is assumed that an increase in the electorate's educational levels during the 
modernisation process causes a decline in party-reliant partisans. 
Educational Attainment 
An improvement of educational attainment: The educational attainment of Korean 
voters has increased markedly. Table 7.28 shows the distribution of educational levels 
across different age cohorts. The percentage of voters who have college level education 
among 20-24 years cohort is 70.3 per cent, while among the over 60 years cohort it is 
only 6.9 per cent. This difference between a better-educated younger generation and less 
educated older voters is statistically significant (i. e., Chi-square = 751.616, p=0.000). 
Also, ANOVA analysis shows a difference in the degree of educational attainment across 
different cohorts (see Table A7.12 in Appendix). The average education level of the 
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youngest cohort is 3.70 and the average of the oldest cohort is 1.72 where I is the lowest 
educational level to 4 is the highest education level. The relationship between age and 
educational attainment is also linear (i. e., Pearson's Correlation Coefficient = -0.611, p= 
0.000). In conclusion, it would seem quite possible that the substantial increase of the 
level of education among the voters has contributed to the increase of independent voters 
in Korea. 
Education and partisanship: Furthermore, as discussed in the previous section of 
this chapter, educational attainment is associated with partisanship. The difference in the 
percentage of independent voters across different educational groups was statistically 
significant in 1992 and in 1997, but not in 2002 (see Table 7.11 in section two of this 
chapter). A change in partisanship among voters who have only primary school education 
accounts for why the relation is not significant in 2002. The relationship between the 
level of education and partisanship is not linear. On the one hand, the percentage of 
independent voters among voters with higher education is relatively high and this pattern 
was replicated in the last three presidential elections. On the other hand, the percentage of 
independent voters among electors with the lowest level of educational attainment was 
relatively small in 1992, but was larger in 1997 and in 2002. Thus, the growth of new 
independent voters cannot simply be attributed to rising levels of political sophistication. 
The increase in independent voters among those who have only the lowest level of 
education has to be explained by other factors. 
Table 7.28 Crosstab: Levels of Education and Age, 2002 
umbe Levels of Education Test Statistics 
ge of cases Primary Middle High College Total 
School School and the 
above 
20-24 209 0.0% 0.5% 29.2% 70.3% 100% Pearson Chi-square = 
25-34 335 0.6% 2.7% 38.8% 57.9% 100% 751.616 
35-44 354 1.4% 7.4% 48.9% 42.3% 100% Sig. = 0.000 
45-54 263 7.2% 22.1% 44.9% 25.9% 100% 
55-64 177 24.3% 29.9% 29.4% 16.4% 100% Pearson's R= -0.611 
65 and over 144 56.3% 22.2% 14.6% 6.9% 100% Sig. = 0.000 
Total 1492 10.1% 12.1% 37.5% 40.3% 100% 
Data: Korean Presidential Election, 2W2 
Education and understanding the complexity of politics: Although independent 
voters have a relatively higher level of education compared to partisans, it is debatable 
whether a higher level of education results in greater political sophistication. Is it true that 
voters with a college education do not need political parties in order to comprehend the 
complexity of politics? 
While it is expected that college educated voters would show greater political 
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sophistication and have relatively less difficulties in understanding politics, many college 
university students confessed that they have difficulties in understanding politics. 
Moreover, the young generally find it difficult to understand the complexity of politics 
compared to older voters. In qualitative data, many respondents who have college level 
education and who are generally young expressed their difficulties in understanding the 
complexity of politics. For example, "I think that it is difficult for me to understand 
political affairs. I hardly understood the political process before I had a college education. 
Then, I graduated from university, but 1 still do not really understand politics" (1-140). 
"Politics is too complicated for ordinary people to comprehend" (1-124). "To be honest 
with you, it seems to me that politics is so complicated" (1-123; 1-130; 1-128). 
Table 7.29 shows that there is difference in the degree of understanding politics 
across age cohorts among voters who have college education. In general, the younger, 
college-educated voters have relatively more difficulties in understanding politics 
compared to older voters with a college education. Therefore, education explains some 
political sophistication, but does not fully explain it. Some other factors should be 
included in measuring political sophistication. 
Table 7.29 T-test for Equality of Means: Understanding Politics by Age Cohorts (only 
voters who have college education), 2002 
Age Number of 
cases 
Mean Std. Deviation Test Statistics 
20-24 147 3.90 1.31 F=6.187 
25-34 194 4.16 1.35 Sig. = 0.000 
35-44 154 4.26 1.40 
45-54 68 4.49 1.24 Pearson's R=0.210 
55-64 29 4.86 1.19 Sig. = 0.000 
65 and over 10 5.70 1.16 
Total 602 4.22 1.36 
Data: Korean Pres idential Election Studv. 2002. 
Keys: Mean = average score in a 7-point scale (i. e., 1= lowest level to 7= highest level). 
The young and partisanship: Among younger voters, the level of education cannot 
effectively distinguish partisans from independent voters. The percentage of voters who 
achieve a college level of education among younger generations in Korea is very high at 
more than 70 per cent. In order to test this argument, the relation between college 
education and independent voters is examined only for voters below 35 years old. The 
level of education is recoded into college level and below college level because there are 
only a few voters with education below high school level. As shown in Table 7.30, there 
is no difference in partisanship between the two educational levels among young voters. 
Therefore, educational attainment is not a perfect indicator for political sophistication. 
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Table 7.30 Crosstab: Independent Voters and Education (only voters who are below 35 years 
old), 2002 
Number Party Non-party Total Test statistics 
Education level of cases Identifiers Identifiers 
Non-college education 203 55.2% 44.8% 100% Pearson Chi-Square = 
College education 341 52.2% 47.8% 100% 0.452 
Total 544 53.3% 46.7% 100% Sig. = 0.534 
Data: Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 2002. 
Note: Understanding politics is measured in a 7-point scale where I is the lowest level and 7 is the 
highest level. In the 2002 presidential election study, Question 21 ("Do you think that you have a 
better knowledge and a good deal of understanding of politics or elections compared to other 
people? ") is used. 
Understanding politics 
Partisans vs independents: As an alternative indicator for the level of political 
sophistication, the degree of difficulty in understanding politics is used. It is assumed that 
the sophisticated do not find it difficult to understand the complexity of politics compared 
to the unsophisticated. The difference in the degree of difficulties in understanding 
politics between partisans and independent voters is not statistically significant in 1997, 
but is significant in 2002 (see Table A7.13 in Appendix). 
Table 7.31 T-Test for Equality of Means: Understanding Politics by Partisanship, 1997-2002 
Number of 
cases 
Mean Std. 
Deviation 
t Sig. (2-sided) 
1997 
Party identifiers 750 2.56 . 89 -1.018 0.309 Non-party identifiers 435 2.62 . 88 2002 
Party identifiers 892 4.14 1.50 5.313 0.000 
Non-party identifiers 608 3.73 1.36 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1997 and 2002. 
Keys: Mean in 1997 = average score in a 4-point scale (i. e., I= `very difficult' to 4= `not at all 
difficult'); Mean in 2002 = average score in a 7-pont scale (i. e., 1= 'very little understanding' to 
7= `very high understanding'). 
Note: In 1997, Question 30-6 (i. e., "Do you agree with the statement that politics is too difficult 
for you to understand? ") is used to measure the level of understanding politics. In 2002, Question 
21 (i. e., "Do you think that you have a better knowledge and a good deal of understanding of 
politics or elections compared to other people? ") is used in the measurement. 
However, it should be noted that independent voters have relatively more difficulties 
in understanding politics compared to partisans, contrary to the thesis of the cognitive 
mobilisation theory that assumes an increase of cognitive sophistication has caused 
partisan decline in mature democracies during last several decades. As shown in Table 
7.31, the T-test for equality of means also suggests that independent voters have relatively 
more difficulties in understanding the complexity of politics. This fact suggests that an 
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increased level of politically sophisticated voters cannot account for the increase of 
independent voters in Korea during the last 10 years. It also backs up one of the 
arguments of this thesis that a relatively large number of lowly educated partisans have 
become independents in this decade. 
Attentive independents vs. apolitical independents: The pattern of the relationship 
between levels of understanding politics and partisanship is mixed when independent 
voters are subdivided into attentive independents and apolitical independents. Attentive 
independent voters have a relatively better understanding of politics compared to 
apolitical independents (see Table A7.14 in Appendix). Furthermore, the level of 
understanding politics among attentive independent voters is similar to the level among 
critical partisans, while the level of understanding apolitical independent voters is similar 
to the level among the habitual partisans (see Table 7.32). As discussed in the early part 
of this chapter, there are more apolitical independent voters than attentive independent 
voters among all independent voters, and the number of apolitical independents has 
grown more substantially during last 10 years compared to attentive independent voters. 
The increase of independent voters and the decrease of party identifiers has been led by 
apolitical independent voters with relatively less political sophistication rather by 
politically sophisticated attentive independent voters. 
Table 7.32 ANOVA: The Degree of Understanding Politics by Korean Voters, 1997-2002 
Number of cases Mean Std. Deviation ANOVA 
1997 
Critical partisan 527 2.59 0.92 F=0.961 
Habitual partisan 222 2.51 0.83 Sig. = 0.4 10 
Attentive independent 208 2.66 0.92 
Apolitical independent 227 2.58 0.83 
Total 1184 2.58 0.89 
2002 
Critical partisan 450 4.64 1.44 F= 65.638 
Habitual partisan 442 3.64 1.40 Sig. = 0.000 
Attentive independent 203 4.28 1.34 
Apolitical independent 405 3.46 1.29 
Total 1500 3.98 1.46 
Data: Korean rresiaentiat t section Study, 1997 and 2002. 
Keys: N= number of cases; Mean in 1997 = average score in a 4-point scale (i. e., I= `very 
difficult' to 4= `not at all difficult'); Mean in 2002 = average score in a 7-pont scale (i. e. I= `very 
little understanding' to 7= 'very high understanding'). 
Note: In 1997, Question 30-6 (i. e., "Do you agree on the statement that politics is too difficult for 
you to understand? ") is used to measure the level of understanding politics. In 2002, Question 21 
(i. e., "Do you think that you have a better knowledge and a good deal of understanding of politics 
or elections compared to other people? ") is used in the measurement. 
Understanding politics and interest in politics: Qualitative data shows that there is 
no clear relation between independent voters and understanding politics. There is also no 
221 
Chapter 7 
difference between independent voters and partisans in terms of their understanding of 
politics nor between attentive independents and apolitical independents. Neither was a 
clear pattern evident amongst partisans also did not show a clear pattern regarding 
difficulties in understanding politics. Furthermore, there is no difference in political 
understanding between men and women, between highly educated voters and voters with 
a lower level of education, and between the young and the old. 
Many respondents suggested a lack of interest in politics as a reason why they had 
some difficulties in understanding it. For example, "In a sense, it is true that I have some 
difficulties in understanding politics, but I think that a lack of interest in politics is the 
reason why I find it difficult" (1-118). "As an ordinary person who is not interested in 
politics, I don't really understand politics" (1-133). "I think that it is natural for me to 
have some difficulties in understanding politics because I am not interested in politics" (I- 
142). "You can get enough information about politics from mass media as long as you are 
interested in politics" (1-105; 1-211). 
Many voters also argued that politics itself is relatively easy to understand, but 
unpredictable political process and Korean politicians make it difficult for voters to 
understand politics. For example, "Politics itself is not so complicated to understand, but 
politicians mess it up" (1-114; 1-120; 1-127). "The public has difficulties in understanding 
politics because politicians block public access to political affairs" (1-106; 1-122; I-208). 
Interest in Politics 
Traditional non-party identifiers are alienated from politics and so have no party 
attachments. In contrast to the traditional non-party identifiers, a growing body of 
independent voters in mature democracies during the last few decades are relatively 
interested in politics. According to this argument, it is expected that the proportion of 
politically interested voters among the part of the electorate who do not identify 
themselves with a political party has increased over time, and that it is a rise in the 
number of attentive independent voters which has brought about the increase in the 
independent voters among the electorate in Korea. 
Partisan Decline and Indifference to Politics 
Survey data shows that the argument based on experience of the voters in mature 
democracies does not fit with electoral change in Korea. As discussed in the previous 
section, the increase of apolitical independents rather than attentive independents mainly 
contributed to the increase of independent voters in the Korean voters (see Table 7.7). 
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Also, independent voters in Korea are more likely to be less interested in politics 
than partisans. Survey data confirms the relationship between the degree of interest in 
politics and independent voters. Table 7.33 shows that partisans are relatively more 
interested in politics than independent voters. Also, the T-test for equality of means also 
backs up this difference in the degree of interest between partisans and independent 
voters (see Table A7.15 in Appendix)25 For example, in 2002, the degree of interest in 
politics among partisans is 4.23 and the degree among independent voters is 3.68 where I 
is the lowest level of interests and 7 is the highest level of interest in 7-point scale. The 
result of analysis of survey data implies that a decrease of interest in politics has caused 
partisan decline in the new democracy. 
Table 7.33 Crosstab: Independent and Interest in Politics, 1992-2002 
Number Party Non-party Total Test statistics 
of cases Identifiers Identifiers 
1992 Pearson Chi-Square = 8.766 
Interested 1037 78.6% 21.4% 100% Sig. = 0.004 
Not interested 145 67.6% 32.4% 100% Pearson's R =. 086 
Total 1182 77.2% 22.8% 100% Sig. = 0.003 
1997 Pearson Chi-Square = 24.475 
Interested 1076 65.4% 34.6% 100% Sig. = 0.000 
Not interested 122 42.6% 57.4% 100% Pearson's R= 
. 
143 
Total 
J 
1198 63.1% 36.9% 100% Sig. = 0.000 
2002 Pearson Chi-Square = 15.379 
Interested 1268 61.6% 38.4% 100% Sig. = 0.000 
Not interested 232 47.8% 52.2% 100% Pearson's R=0.101 
Total 1500 59.5% 40.5% 100% Sig. = 0.000 
vara: r orean rrestaennai mecnon muay, i9Z, t#Y/, ana LUUZ. 
Losing Interest in Politics: Qualitative Data 
A lack of interest in politics as a cause of partisan decline: Qualitative data also 
confirms that a lack of interest in politics is the most important factor in explaining a lack 
of party attachment. In answering a question about the reasons why they do not feel close 
to any political party, many independent voters who were generally young mentioned a 
lack of interest in politics. For example, "1 am not interested in any political party because 
I am not interested in politics" (1-109; 1-137; 1-139; 1-123; 1-118; 1-112). "A lack of 
interest in politics is the fundamental reason why I do not feel close to any political party" 
(1-138). "I am not interested in politics, though I heard about politics [from my parents]. I 
u In this analysis, interest in a specific election is used instead of interest in politics due to the 
limitation of survey data. However, in the 2002 survey, there was a question to measure 
respondent's general interest in politics. So, it is possible to examine again the difference in 
interest in politics between partisans and independent voters based on the question about interest in 
politics. The result shows a same pattern with the result of analysis based on the question about 
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think that it is meaningless for me to support a political party" (1-113). "Well, I think that 
I am not interested in politics. I did not pay attention to any political party" (1-117). 
Young voters and a lack of interest in politics: The relation between the level of 
interest in politics and the strength of partisanship also explains why more young people 
are independent voters compared to older voters. New voters entering the electorate are 
relatively less interested in politics and have poor knowledge of politics. Political interest 
and partisan attachments typically only develop later on in life. 
The qualitative data confirms that young people develop more interest in politics 
with age. In answering to a question about interest in politics and any changes in the level 
of the interest during the last 10 years, many young voters referred to an increase of 
interests in politics with age, even though the degree of interests was still low. For 
example, some of them explained that they are not interested in politics because they are 
too young to be concerned with politics. "I am very young, and I haven't thought about 
politics" (1-133). "I am young, and I don't have any knowledge on politics" (1-201). "Still 
I do not really understand the importance of politics" (1-123). Others confessed that their 
interests in politics had increased with age. "I recently become interested in politics. The 
presidential election is one of the causes. Age is another cause" (1-211). "As I grow older, 
I have expanded my mental horizons about life" (1-104; 1-208; 1-136; FM3). Older voters 
also said that ageing affected their interests in politics. A party identifier directly referred 
to the age effect. "Now I am getting more and more interested in politics unlike I was 
young" (1-213). 
Causes of falling interest in politics: Why did voters lose their interest in politics? 
The qualitative data suggest that electoral disappointment with politics is a significant 
reason why voters lost interest in politics. For example, in answering a question about 
why they lost their interests in politics during the last 10 years, independent voters 
referred to their dissatisfaction with politics. "All politicians are pitiful, and politics is 
very distressing to me. So, I don't want to think about politics, and then I no longer have 
any interest in politics" (1-135). "I am not interested in politics because nothing has been 
changed in politics during the past few years" (1-124; FF5). "I was fairly interested in 
democracy. However, I am sick and tired of politics in my country nowadays, and I have 
lost all my interest in politics" (I-131; FM1; FM5; FM6). One partisan also expressed her 
negative feelings about contemporary politics. "I found that there was no change in 
politics under Kim Dae-jung government [compared to politics under the old 
governments]" (1-210). 
Also, several voters who continued to be indifferent to politics during the last 10 
interest in a specific election. 
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years pointed out a lack of political development as the reason they were not interested in 
politics. "Nothing has been changed. Political corruption is still prevalent. People are not 
interested in politics" (1-109). "Because I think that all politicians are bastard" (1-125). 
"Why do I need to pay attention to politics? Political parties always quarrel with each 
other about small matters" (1-142). 
Dissatisfaction with Political Parties and Democratic Process 
The new democracy in Korea has been consolidated since the transition in 1987. Despite 
political developments in the new democracy, public dissatisfaction with politics and/or 
politicians is increasing. High expectation has turned toward deep disappointment with 
the democratic process. Korean voters who were eager for democracy in 1987 despair of 
the continuation of older patterns of party politics and feel contempt toward politicians in 
the new society. This high level of dissatisfaction with politics among the voters may 
explain partisan decline in Korea. 
Dissatisfaction with political parties and politicians 
Feelings toward political parties: In general, almost all voters are dissatisfied and 
distrust incumbent politicians and the present political parties. Qualitative data shows that 
there is no difference in dissatisfaction with political parties between partisans and 
independent voters. Both attentive independent voters and apolitical independent voters 
expressed their dissatisfaction with political parties, though the most restrained voters 
were the apolitical independent voters indifferent to politics. 
In answering questions about their feelings to political parties, most interviewees 
referred to negative words -- factionalism and bossism, political disputes, party interest 
put first, meeting and parting of political parties and defections, corruption, and a lack of 
different policies and ideas. For example, "They are childish. I don't think that political 
parties are looking after the interests of the nation. Political parties always indulge in 
political disputes" (1-206; 1-108; 1-205; 1-213; 1-120; 1-116; I-115). "1 think that all 
political parties are bad. Political parties pursue party interests too much at the expense of 
those of the nation" (1-139; 1-134; 1-119; FF3). "They usually ignore compromise and 
negotiation" (1-138). "Political parties are similar to organised gangs who fight against 
enemy frantically for their own organisational interests. Political parties in Korea are only 
looking for power, but don't speak for the nation" (I-131; I-124; FM8). "They always 
speak ill of each other" (1-207; 1-133; 1-128; 1-117). "I don't trust many political parties 
because they are often formed and demolished according to their political interests in 
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elections" (1-137; 1-204; 1-123). "Political parties are formed and demolished depending 
upon politician's interests. I think that they have no sense of honour" (1-201) "Politics is 
corrupted" (1-202; 1-141). "Political parties remind me of political corruption" (1-204; I- 
135). "A minority opinion is totally ignored within political parties" (1-130; 1-113). 
"Political parties in Korea are not democratic organisations. They are similar to one-man 
dictatorships" (1-209; 1-208; 1-142; FF4). 
An increase in dissatisfaction with political parties and politicians: Survey data 
confirms that electoral dissatisfaction with politician or political parties has increased in 
Korea. As shown in Table 7.34, in 1992, the percentage of voters who were satisfied with 
politicians among the electorate was 25.6 per cent, while the percentage was 10.3 per cent 
in 1997. Also, the level of voter dissatisfaction with political parties was very high at 
roughly the same level of dissatisfaction with politicians in 1997. 
Table 7.34 Dissatisfaction with Politicians and Political Parties, 1992-1997 
Dissatisfaction Number of cases Frequency Mean 
1992 Very good 9 0.8% 2.89 
Politicians Good 282 23.8% 
Bad 730 61.5% 
Very bad 166 14.0% 
Total 1187 100% 
1997 Very good 18 1.5% 3.27 
Politicians Good 106 8.8% 
Bad 609 50.5% 
Very Bad 463 38.4% 
Total 1196 100% 
1997 Very Good 8 0.7% 3.23 
Political Parties Good 157 13.1% 
Bad 570 47.7% 
Very bad 459 38.4% 
Total 1194 100% 
Data: icorean Yreslaentnai i section Ntuay, IWL and 1997. 
Keys: Mean = average score in a 4-point scale (1= very good to 4= very bad). 
Note: The following questions are used. In 1992, Question 27, "Are politicians carrying out their 
job well? ". In 1997, Question 30-2, "Do you agree that politicians (President and Congressman) 
do not keep their election promises? ", and Question 30-3, "Do you agree that political parties are 
interested only in votes? ". 
Distrusting political parties and a lack of party affiliation: Independent voters are 
dissatisfied with politics and political parties in Korea. Qualitative data shows that 
electoral dissatisfaction or disappointment with politics and politicians is one of the three 
main reasons why voters do not feel close to any political party. There is no difference in 
this regard between attentive independents and apolitical independents. Also, voters who 
referred to dissatisfaction included many relatively older voters. For example, "I don't 
feel close to any particular political party. I can't trust any political parties. I don't care 
about political parties, though I care about the politicians who belong to the political 
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parties" (1-105; 1-120). "1 think that there is no political party doing what a party should" 
(I-108; FF4). "Politicians often move from one party to other party as migratory birds do" 
(I-I 10; I-112) 26 "I feel that political parties are like dressing rooms [because politicians 
often change their ideological position]. Politicians often switch their party memberships 
from one party to other party [without considering a party line]" (FF6). "Both the ruling 
party and the opposition party only look for their own party interests [rather than interests 
of the nation]" (1-115; 1-119; 1-136; FF4). "No political parties speak for the public" (1- 
130). "1 was interested in political parties when they led the democratic movement in 
Korea. However, now I think that all political parties in Korea are the same as a group of 
gangsters these days" (1-131). "1 know that political parties always fight against each 
other, so I began to dislike all political parties" (FM6; FM4). "How can I feel close to a 
political party? Each political party may disappear soon" (FF8). 
Considering the relationship between dissatisfaction with politics and independent 
voters, it is expected that partisans who are disappointed with politics during the last 10 
years have lost their party attachment. Of the in-depth interviewees, only three 
respondents admitted that they had had party attachment for a while, and then become 
independent voters. All of them referred to their disappointment with their political party 
as the reason they gave up their partisanship. For example, "I had party affiliation in the 
past. However, the political party took power and became corrupt. So, I am disappointed 
with the party" (1=115; 1-125). "1 supported the ruling party in the past. However, I realise 
that every ruling party is involved in political corruption. I feel that party attachment is 
meaningless" (1-113). 
Independent voters vs partisans: Survey data also shows the relationship between 
dissatisfaction with contemporary politics and independent voters. Independent voters 
were relatively less satisfied with politics compared to partisans. The relationship 
between independent voters and the degree of dissatisfaction with politics is statistically 
significant in 1992, but not in 1997 (see Table A7.16 in Appendix). Table 7.35 also shows 
that independent voters have a relatively negative perception of politicians or political 
parties compared to partisans. It is likely that electoral dissatisfaction with politics was 
intensified in 1997 in view of the critical economic recession at that time. The extremely 
high level of dissatisfaction with politics at this point included not only independent 
voters, but also many partisans, so the difference in the level of dissatisfaction between 
independent voters and partisans disappeared in this year. This confirms that former 
partisans of the old ruling party contributed to the process of partisan decline in 1997, as 
discussed in the first section of this chapter, resulting in a redistribution of party 
26 The term `migratory birds' (Cheolsae) is often used to describes politicians' negative habit of 
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identification. 
The relationship between dissatisfaction and the four types of voters is also 
statistically significant in 1992, but not in 1997. Habitual partisans were relatively 
satisfied with politics, while attentive independent voters were relatively dissatisfied with 
politics (see Table A7.17 and Table A7.18 in Appendix). 
Quantitative analysis probing the relationship between electoral dissatisfaction and 
partisan decline is not conclusive due to the lack of data. The 2002 presidential election 
study did not include any question about popular dissatisfaction with politics. Therefore, 
voter perceptions towards the overall performance of the incumbent government are used 
in order to explore changes in the relationship between dissatisfaction with politics and 
independent voters. 
Table 7.35 T-Test for Equality of Means: Independents and Satisfaction with Politics, 1992- 
1997 
Number of cases Mean Std. 
Deviation 
t Sig. (2-sided) 
1992 
Party identifiers 905 2.86 . 62 3.091 0.002 Non-party identifiers 267 2.99 
. 67 1997 
Party identifiers 750 2.21 . 71 1.694 0.091 Non-party identifiers 436 2.28 . 68 
Data: Korean Yreslaential Gtectlon btuay, 1992,199/, anti 1002. 
Keys: Mean = average score in a 4-point scale. 
Note: In the 1992 presidential election study, Question 27 ("Are politicians carrying out their job 
well? ") is used (i. e., I= `very satisfied' to 4= 'very dissatisfied'); In the 1997 presidential election 
study, Question 30-3 ("Do you agree that political parties are interested only in votes? ") is used 
(i. e., I= `strongly disagree' to 4= `strongly agree'). 
Dissatisfaction with Overall Performance of Government 
Effects of partisanship on government performance evaluation: It can be assumed 
that independent voters are more critical of the performance of the incumbent government 
compared to partisans if dissatisfaction with politics and the democratic process has been 
a cause of partisan decline. However, it should be noted that according to the model of 
party identification partisans take quite different positions in evaluating the performance 
of incumbent government depending upon the direction of partisanship. Partisans who 
feel close to the ruling party are relatively generous in evaluating the performance of 
incumbent government, while partisans attached to opposition parties are more negative. 
Empirical survey data supports this argument. As shown in Table 7.36, there is a 
changing their party membership in Korea. 
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wide difference in perception of the incumbent government's performance between ruling 
party identifiers and major opposition party identifiers. Moreover, independent voters are 
less negative about government performance compared to voters aligned to opposition 
parties, but more negative than those partisans who identify themselves with the ruling 
party. For example, in 1992, the average score for government performance of given by 
ruling party identifiers was 2.53, while the average score given by opposition party 
identifiers was 3.04. This difference in average score between the ruling and the 
opposition party identifiers is statistically significant. The average score awarded by 
independent voters is similar to the score given by third party identifiers. The score for 
independent voters is larger than the score for the ruling party, and the difference is 
statistically significant. Independent voters are more favourable in their assessment of 
government performance than opposition party identifiers, and the difference is 
statistically significant. This pattern of difference is replicated in 1997 and in 2002. 
Table 7.36 ANOVA: Performance of Incumbent Government by Party Identification, 1992- 
2002 
Number Mean Std. ANOVA 
of cases Deviation 
1992 F= 50.020 
Party identifiers (ruling party) 462 2.53 0.60 Sig. = 0.000 
Party identifiers (opposition party) 323 3.04 0.59 
Party identifiers (Third and small party) 121 2.93 0.57 
Non-party identifiers 266 2.85 0.63 
Total 1172 2.78 0.64 
1997 F= 10.131 
Party identifiers (ruling party) 220 4.08 0.85 Sig. = 0.000 
Party identifiers (opposition party) 388 4.44 0.75 
Party identifiers (Third and small party) 146 4.14 0.92 
Non-party identifiers 442 4.29 0.86 
Total 1196 4.28 0.84 
2002 F= 101.022 
Party identifiers (ruling party) 405 2.63 0.91 Sig. = 0.000 
Party identifiers (opposition party) 350 3.75 0.95 
Party identifiers (Third and small party) 137 3.47 0.92 
Non-party identifiers 608 3.36 0.90 
Total 1500 3.27 1.01 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992,1997, and 2002. 
Keys: Mean = average score in a 4-point scale in 1992 (i. e., I= `very good' to 4= `very bad'), and 
average score in a 5-point scale in 1997 and in 2002 (i. e., I ='very good' to 5= `very bad'). 
Independent voter's perception toward government performance: How do Korean 
voters perceive the performance of the incumbent government? In general, independent 
voters are relatively more negative towards the performance of incumbent government 
compared to partisans, as shown in Table 7.37 (see also Table A7.19 in Appendix). The 
relation between independent voters and dissatisfaction with the performance of 
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government is statistically significant in 2002, but not in 1992 nor in 1997. 
There is a difference in perception of the performance of the government across the 
four types of voters. As shown in Table 7.38 (also Table A7.20 in Appendix), attentive 
independent voters are relatively negative to government performance compared to other 
types of voters. Furthermore, habitual partisans are relatively more positive to the 
performance of government compared to other types of voters although in 2002 critical 
partisans were more favourable. 
Table 7.37 T-test for Equality of Means: Satisfaction with Performance of Government and 
Independents, 1992-2002 
Number of 
cases 
Mean Std. 
Deviation 
t Sig. (2-sided) 
1992 
Party identifiers 906 2.77 0.64 -1.770 0.077 
Non-party identifiers 266 2.85 0.63 
1997 
Party identifiers 754 4.28 0.83 -0.156 0.876 
Non-party identifiers 442 4.29 0.86 
2002 
Party identifiers 892 3.20 1.07 -3.070 0.002 
Non-par! y identifiers 608 3.36 . 90 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992,1997, and 2002. 
Keys: Mean = average score in a 4-point scale in 1992 (i. e., 1= `very good' to 4= 'very bad'), and 
average score in a 5-point scale in 1997 and in 2002 (i. e., 1= 'very good' to 5= 'very bad'). 
Table 7.38 ANOVA: Satisfaction with Performance of Government and Korean Voters, 
1992-2002 
Number of Mean Std. ANOVA 
cases Deviation. 
1992 F=4.325 
Critical partisan 473 2.82 0.69 Sig. = 0.005 
Habitual partisan 431 2.71 0.58 
Attentive independent 97 2.93 0.73 
Apolitical independent 169 2.80 0.57 
Total 1170 2.79 0.64 
1997 F=4.108 
Critical partisan 531 4.34 0.82 Sig. = 0.007 
Habitual partisan 222 4.12 0.85 
Attentive independent 210 4.34 0.92 
Apolitical independent 232 4.24 0.80 
Total 1195 4.28 0.84 
2002 F=4.779 
Critical partisan 450 3.12 1.11 Sig. = 0.003 
Habitual partisan 442 3.28 1.01 
Attentive independent 203 3.34 
. 94 Apolitical independent 405 3.37 . 88 Total 1500 3.27 1.01 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992,1997, and 2002. 
Keys: Mean = average score in a 4-point scale in 1992 (i. e., I= `very good' to 4= `very bad'), and 
average score in a 5-point scale in 1997 and in 2002 (i. e., I= 'very good' to 5= 'very bad'). 
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Voter Perceptions of Political Development and Democracy in Korea 
A strong belief in the democratic idea: A very high level of dissatisfaction with the 
present politics does not imply public disappointment with principles of democracy or 
democratic political system. Although most respondents in in-depth interviews were 
dissatisfied with the present political parties and party politics in Korea, most of them 
firmly believed that political parties are a necessary institution in a democracy. In 
particular, every partisan agreed that political parties are necessary for democracy. For 
example, "I think that political parties are the best system to check the power in a 
democracy" (1-108; 1-107; 1-206). "Good politics will be realised when people are able to 
speak various opinions" (1-118; 1-139). "1 think that political development cannot be 
expected without political parties"(1-128). "Without political parties, there is no 
democracy" (1-126) "I don't know any alternative system for replacing political parties in 
democratic political process" (1-203). "It will be a dictatorship if there is no political 
party" (1-207; FF6). "Political parties are indispensable because political parties check 
government" (FF5). "I don't oppose a political party system, although the present 
political parties are very bad" (I-122). 
Public perception of contemporary democracy in Korea: While Korean voters are 
not fully satisfied with political developments in Korea, they recognised positive changes 
in democracy during the last 10 years. Almost every voter agreed that Korea is a 
democracy, if not a full democracy. Partisans do not differ from independents in 
evaluating the new democracy. For example, many interviewees argued that Korea is 
certainly a democratic country, but falls somewhat short of mature democracies in 
Western countries. "Korea is a democratic country, but is not equivalent to advanced 
democracies" (1-207). "Korea is a middle level country in terms of political democracy" 
(1-204; 1-202; 1-209; 1-108; 1-115; 1-132; 1-134; 1-137). Some interviewees werecritical of 
Korean democracy, though they agreed that Korea is a democratic country. "Korea is in a 
transitional stage to a full democracy" (1-121). "Korea is only a procedural democracy, 
[but not a substantial democracy]" (1-124; 1-130: I-131; 1-129; 1-110; 1-123). Some 
interviewees pointed out "vestiges of authoritarian political culture" (1-122), "the 
existence of social groups that maintained vested interests" (1-106; I-211), or "social and 
political corruption" (1-125) as reasons why they cannot fully support Korean democracy. 
Positive perception of democratic development for last 15 years: Although most 
interviewees were not fully satisfied with Korean democracy, most of them also 
appreciated the political developments made in Korea during the last 10 years. Many 
pointed out a strengthening of popular political awareness as evidence for political 
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development. For example, "Compared to 10 years ago, people pay attention to politics 
and politicians should be aware of peoples' criticism" (1-102; 1-103). "Peoples' political 
consciousness is much stronger than before, but politicians do not act in accordance with 
the change in peoples' consciousness" (1-117; 1-129; 1-133; 1-135). "In these days, 
politicians changed to some extent and are aware of public opinion" (1-107; 1-139; 1-207; 
I-212; 1-213; FM8) 
A few respondents said that Korean democracy had regressed during the past decade. 
They blamed politics for falling living standards during the last 10 years. For example, 
"Because the poor get poor and the rich get rich, [I think that politics has become worse 
during last 10 years]" (1-135) "Unlike 10 years ago, popular living standards have 
severely suffered due to politics these days" (1-141). "The poor people are getting worse 
due to the high level of inflation" (1-205). "Ordinary peoples' living conditions have 
hardly changed" (FF4). 
Summary: The voters questioned recognised political progress in Korea during the 
last decade, though they are not fully satisfied with the present politics or democracy in 
Korea. Moreover, voters still saw the virtues of a democratic political system. They 
believe that political parties are a key institution in the democratic process despite their 
criticism of present politics and parties. Considering their positive evaluation of changes 
in Korean's democracy, it is difficult to argue that their dissatisfaction with the 
democratic process and system has increased during the last 10 years. It is also not likely 
that popular disappointment with democracy and the democratic system has caused an 
increase of independent voters and partisan decline. 
The Lack of Differences between the Political Parties 
In Korean politics, the lack of differences amongst political parties is cause of the failures 
of political parties. Many voters perceive that most political parties are the same in terms 
of policies and behaviour. When all political parties are similar in terms of their policies 
and activities, it is logical that voters have little preference for one party over another. 
However, as argued in Chapter 6, partisans do recognise differences in ideology and 
policies between the major parties and feel close to the party that shares their policy and 
ideological preferences. On the other hand, it is expected that independent voters are less 
able to see the differences between political parties compared to partisans. 
Qualitative data shows that Korean voters perceive that there is no difference in 
policies across political parties. In answering a question about differences in policies 
between the parties, most respondents did not see a clear difference. For example, "In 
overall, there is no large difference in policies across political parties. Some differences 
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may exist, but the differences are merely by-products of political quarrels" (1-130). "They 
merely change words and phrases. Policies are not different in substance" (1-129; I-113; 1- 
107). "Most policies suggested by political parties are for show only" (1-125). 
Furthermore, many independent voters referred to the similarity of all existing 
political parties in terms of ideology, policies, and behaviour, and as a result of this lack 
of distinctiveness had no attachment to a party. In answering a question about the reasons 
why they do not feel close to any political party, roughly one third of independent voters 
pointed out the lack of distinctiveness among political parties. Attentive independents and 
apolitical independents were alike in this regard. For example, "All political parties are 
fairly similar to each other. They do not have a clear party line. So, I do not feel close to a 
particular political party (1-133; 1-101; 1-106; 1-128). "Every politician is similar to each 
other, and every political party is similar to each other" (1-101; 1-104; 1-132). "1 cannot 
find anything to distinguish one party from another" (1-103; 1-140). "I cannot find any 
difference among political parties, so I don't have any party that I feel close to" (1-125; 
FM4). 
Multiple Regression Analysis of Partisan Decline in Korea 
Many factors undoubtedly contributed to the increase of independent in Korea. However, 
it seems that the sociological explanation based on changes in characteristics of voters 
does not accurately fit the process of partisan decline in Korea. This chapter has shown 
that independent voters are more likely young, but that the age factor cannot explain the 
fact that many older partisans have become independents during the previous decade. In 
addition, education is associated with partisanship, but education does not explain the 
lack of partisanship among the highly educated young generation nor was education 
strongly related to cognitive sophistication in understanding politics. 
Qualitative data generally supported the political explanation rather than the 
sociological explanation. According to qualitative data, a lack of interest in politics, the 
similarities of political parties, and disappointment or dissatisfaction with political parties 
and/or politics were the three main reasons why independent voters had become detached 
from political parties. Obviously, these factors are related to each other. Voters become 
indifferent to politics because they are disappointed with politics. Also, voters were 
dissatisfied with politics because they cannot see differences among political parties in 
terms of policies or behaviours. In order to examine the relationship between these 
variables and the explanatory power of these factors, a multiple regression model of 
partisan decline is employed. 
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The Model 
The dependent variable of this model is party identification, and is recoded into a 
dichotomous variable (i. e., I= party identifiers, and 2= non-party identifiers). Four 
independent variables - age, education, interest in politics, and dissatisfaction with 
politics -- are included in the regression model. The lack of distinctiveness among 
political parties is a potential independent variable to explain independent voters, but is 
excluded due to the lack of data. Age in years is used. Education is coded with 4 values 
(i. e., I= lower level of education to 4= high level of education). Interest in politics is 
measured in a 4-point scale (i. e., I= low level of interest to 4= high level of interest), but 
in a 7-point scale in 2002 (i. e., 1= low level of interest to 7= high level of interest). 
Dissatisfaction with politics is measured by public perception of government performance, 
and is coded in a 5-point scale (i. e., 1= low level of dissatisfaction to 5= high level of 
dissatisfaction), but in a 4-point scale in 1992. 
The Result 
Overall, the regression model is not especially useful in explaining independent 
voters in Korea. As shown in Table 7.39, the model explains only a small proportion of 
variance of " the dependent variable. For example, in 2002, interest in politics and 
dissatisfaction with politics together explain only 3.4 per cent of variance. Although the 
model does not explain much about independent voters, interest in politics is the most 
powerful explanatory variable. Education, which was the most powerful explanatory 
variable in 1992, does not explain independent voters in 2002. 
In conclusion, as has been often found in country specific case studies of partisan 
decline in mature democracies, the `political explanation' rather than the `sociological 
explanation' is more appropriate in accounting for partisan decline in Korea. In the new 
democracy, fewer and fewer voters identify with political parties not because they lost the 
need to rely upon parties for information about politics as a result of higher education and 
the increased role of the media but because political interest has dropped in part because 
of dissatisfaction with party politics in the new democracy. 
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Table 7.39 Multiple Regression Analysis Predicting Partisanship: Partisan Decline, 1992- 
2002 
Model I Model 2 Model 3 
1992 
Education . 
148 (0.000) . 
173 (0.000) 
Interest in politics . 162 (0.000) 
Dissatisfaction with politics 
Age 
Adjust R- square 0.021 0.046 
1997 
Interest in politics . 221 (0.000) . 215 (0.000) Education . 056 (0.050) Dissatisfaction with politics 
Age 
Adjust R-S ware 0.048 0.050 
2002 
Interest in politics -. 173 (0.000) -. 172 (0.000) -. 171 (0.000) 
Dissatisfaction with politics . 074 
(0.004) 
. 
074 (0.004) 
Age -. 070 (0.006) 
Education 
Adjust-R- square 0.029 0.034 0.038 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992,1997, and 2002. 
Note: The figures are Beta (standardised coefficients) and significant; Method is called stepwise; 
Dependent variable is recoded in a 2-point scale (i. e., I= party identifiers, and 2= non-party 
identifiers); Dissatisfaction with politics is based on a question about performance of incumbent 
government (i. e., Question 24 in 1992, Question 18 in 1997, and Question in 36 in 2002: "How do 
you rate the performance of incumbent government); Interest in politics is based on Question I in 
1992 and Question 1 in 1997 ("How much were you interested in the last election? "); Interested in 
politics is based on Question 27 in 2002 ("In general, how much are you interested in politics or 
elections? "). 
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THE VOTING BEHAVIOUR OF INDEPENDENT VOTERS 
Chapter 8 
Chapter 8. Independent Voters and Volatile Election: 
Are Independents Floating Voters? 
The aim of next three chapters is to explore the voting behaviour of independent voters 
and contrast it with the voting behaviour of partisans. In next three chapters, I will 
compare the voting behaviour of independent voters with the voting behaviour of 
partisans in terms of turnout, timing of vote decision, consistency in voting choice across 
different elections, change in voting intention within an election, response to election 
campaigns, and determinants of voting choice. 
While a key concept to explain the voting behaviour of partisans is `loyalty', the 
term for independent voters is `choice'. ' On the one hand, the voting behaviour of 
partisans who have enduring psychological attachment to political parties is restrained by 
their psychological commitment to the party. Partisans also rely on political parties as an 
`information shortcut' in understanding the complexity of politics, and they are not 
responsive to election campaigns. Their vote choice is constrained, and is strongly tied to 
their political parties. Their voting behaviour is stable between elections and within an 
election. On the other hand, independent voters, who are free from party constraints, rely 
on short-term considerations such as issues, candidates, or government performance, 
when they make vote decisions. In the absence of party cues, independent voters are 
responsive to election campaigns. Their voting behaviour is relatively unstable and 
changeable depending upon short-term considerations compared to partisans who are 
anchored to political parties. Independent voters are often described as `floating voters'. 
But is it true that independent voters cast their ballot based on rational calculation 
compared to partisans restrained by party loyalty? Is there any difference in the voting 
behaviour between attentive independents and apolitical independents? 
This chapter explains the voting behaviour of independent voters focusing on turnout 
and the timing of vote decision. This chapter consists of two sections. The first section 
examines changes in turnout over the last decade in Korea and differences in turnout 
between independents and partisans. In this section, it will be argued that party affiliation 
explains turnout to some extent in Korea, but a voter's interest in the election is the most 
powerful variable in explaining turnout in Korea. The second section examines the voting 
behaviour of independents focusing on the timing of vote decision, vote swing, and 
1 Martin Harrop and William L. Miller, Elections and Voters: A Comparative Introduction 
(London: Macmillan, 1987), pp. 99. Also, for a general overview on voting theories, see William L. 
Miller and Richard G. Niemi, `Voting: Choice, Conditioning, and Constraint', in Lawrence LeDuc, 
Richard G. Niemi, and Pippa Norris, eds, Comparing Democracies 2: New Challenges in the Study 
of Elections and Voting (London: Sage, 2002), pp. 169-88. 
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change in voting intention within an election. In this section, it will be confirmed that 
independent voters make late voting decisions compared to partisans. But at the same 
time, it will also be argued that many independent voters make voting decision before the 
official campaigns begin and hardly change their early vote decision. 
1. Turnout and Independents: `Vanishing Voters'? 
There are two different approaches to explain voter turnout. 2 One approach explains 
turnout focusing on sociological variables with the civic voluntarism model being an 
example of this kind of approach. In this, the socio-economic status of voters is related to 
turnout. For example, voters who have a higher education are more likely to vote 
compared to voters who have a low level of education. Modernisation theory which 
explained electoral behaviour under the authoritarian regimes in Korea as `conformity 
voting' also belongs to this theoretical tradition. Voters who have a relatively high level 
of social and economic status vote voluntarily, while voters who have a low level of 
social and economic status either do not vote or require mobilisation to vote. 
The other approach is derived from the rational choice model. According to the 
model, voters go to the poll based upon a rational calculation. In this way, voters compare 
the cost of voting with the benefit of voting, and go to the polls when the benefit is 
greater than the cost. ' The simple version of the utility model cannot account for voters 
who vote without seeing the benefit of voting, and the model began to include a wide 
variety of incentives in order to explain turnout within the paradigm 6 Now this approach 
incorporates many psychological variables such as subjective feelings of political efficacy. 
The relationship between partisanship and turnout is explained within this paradigm. 
Voters who have an attachment to a particular political party are satisfied with themselves 
when they express their loyalty to a political party in voting. 7 More partisans turn out 
2 Paul Whiteley et al., `Turnout', in Pippa Norris, ed., Britain Votes 2001 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), pp. 211-24. 
3 Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie, Jae-On Kim, Participation and Political Equality: a Seven- 
Nation Comparison (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978). 
° Wook Kim, 'Tupyochamyeowa gigwon' (Vote turnout and abstention), in Nam-Young Lee, ed., 
Hangugui seongeo (Elections in Korea), vol. 2 (Seoul: Pureungil, 1998), pp. 199-254, at pp. 202-8. s Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Low, 1957). 
William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook, `A Theory of the Calculus of Voting', American 
Political Science Review, 62 (1968), 25-43. 
6 For the `paradox of voter turnout' and a critique of rational choice theory, see Donald P. Green 
and Ian Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political 
Science (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1994), chapter 4. 
7 Morris P. Fiorina, `The Voting Decision: Instrumental and Expressive Aspects', Journal of 
Politics, 38 (1976), 390-415. 
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compared to independent voters who cannot expect to have this kind of satisfaction. 
Decline in Voter Turnout in Korea 
Voter turnout has continually dropped in recent elections in Korea, and the 2002 
presidential election was not an exception. The turnout of 70.8 per cent in 2002 was the 
lowest in a presidential election since the direct presidential election was introduced in 
1952. This percentage is almost 10 per cent lower than the percentage in 1997. 
Furthermore, as shown in Figure 8.1, turnout in parliamentary and local elections is much 
lower compared to that in presidential elections. For example, in the 2002 local election, 
more than a half of voters did not go to the polls. It was first time that turnout rate was 
below 50 per cent in any elections except by-elections. 
Figure 8.1 Decline of Turnout in Korean Elections. 1987-2002 
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Source: Formulated based on the National Election Commission, Je 15dae 
daetongryeongseongeo tupyoyul bunseok (An analysis of turnout in the 15th presidential election) 
(Seoul: National Election Commission, 1998), and the National Election Commission, Je 16dae 
daetongryeongseongeo tupyoyul bunseok (An analysis of turnout in the 16th presidential election) 
(Seoul: National Election Commission, 2003). 
Voter turnout has dropped in many mature democracies! For example, voter turnout 
$ For a comparative analysis of declining turnout in mature democracies, see Mark N. Franklin, 
`The Dynamics of Electoral Participation', in Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G. Niemi, and Pippa 
Norris, eds, Comparing Democracies 2: New Challenges in the Study of Elections and Voting 
(London: Sage, 2002), pp. 148-68. 
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for the 2000 American presidential election was as low as 51 per cent, and turnout for the 
2002 mid-term congressional election was 39 per cent. Also, turnout for the 2001 British 
parliamentary election was 59.2 per cent. 9 Therefore, turnout for the 2002 Korean 
presidential election was still high compared to voter turnout in mature democracies, but 
turnout for the 2000 Korean parliamentary election was lower than turnout for the 2001 
British parliamentary elections. 
Actual Account of Turnout 
The National Election Commission in Korea reported that some socio-economic 
variables such as age, occupation, and region are related to voter turnout for both the 
1997 presidential election and the 2002 presidential election. '° For example, Table 8.1 
shows that the old are more likely to vote compared to the young. This pattern has been 
evident throughout the last 10 years, but the percentage of turnout in every age cohort has 
declined. Indeed, turnout does not seem to be increasing as voters age. The turnout rate of 
30-34 years old voters in 2002 was 64.3 per cent, while the turnout rate of 20-24 years old 
voters in 1992 was 69.8 per cent. Also, in general, turnout among younger voters has 
been falling faster than among older ones. The turnout of 25-29 and 30-34 years old 
voters has decreased substantially during the last 10 years. However while the turnout 
rate of the youngest group was generally the lowest compared to all other age groups, but 
it was not in 2002. In this year, the turnout rate of 20-24 years old voters was higher than 
the turnout rate of 25-29 years old voters. Also, the turnout gap between age groups has 
widened. For example, the margin of differences between the highest turnout and lowest 
turnout was 20.1 per cent point in 1992,23.5 per cent point in 1997, and 28.5 per cent 
point in 2002. 
Socio-economic variables that often explained electoral behaviour under the 
authoritarian regimes such as sex or urban-rural difference do not account for voter 
turnout in the new democracy. " The turnout rate of young women (i. e., 20-24 years old 
age group) is much lower than turnout rate of young men, but the difference between all 
9 For voter turnout in recent British elections, see Whiteley et al., 'Tlnnout'. 
10 National Election Commission, Je 15dae daetongryeongseongeo tupyoyul bunseok (An analysis 
of turnout in the 15th presidential election) (Seoul: National Election Commission, 1998), and 
National Election Commission, Je 16dae daetongryeongseongeo tupyoyul bunseok (An analysis of 
turnout in the 16th presidential election) (Seoul: National Election Commission, 2003). The 
National Election Commission estimated turnout rate based on a very large size of sample (i. e., 4.8 
per cent of about 32,300,000 voters) in the 1997 presidential election, and counted actual turnout 
based on all voters in the 2002 presidential election. 
11 National Election Commission, Je I6dae daetongryeongseongeo tupyoyul bunseok (An analysis 
of turnout in the 16th presidential election). Kim, 'Tupyochamyeowa gigwon' (Vote turnout and 
abstention). 
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men and women is not statistically significant-1,2 The difference in turnout between urban 
voters and rural voters, which was one of main pattern of voter turnout under 
authoritarian regimes, no longer exist in Korea. This suggests that `conformity voting' or 
`mobilised voting' no longer prevails in the new democracy. 
Table 8.1 Vote Turnout by Age in Presidential Election, 1992-2002 
Age 1992 (A) 1997 2002 (C) A- (C) 
20-24 years old 69.8% 66.4% 57.9% -11.9% 
25-29 years old 73.3% 69.9% 55.2% -18.1% 
30-34 years old 82.1% 80.4% 64.3% -17.8% 
35-39 years old 85.9% 84.9% 70.8% -15.1% 
40-49 years old 88.8% 87.5% 76.3% -12.5% 
50-59 years old 89.9% 89.9% 83.7% -6.2% 
60 and over 60 years old 83.2% 81.8% 78.7% -4.5% 
Total 81.9% 80.7% 70.8% -11.1% 
Source: National Election Commission, Je 13dae daetongryeongseongeo tupyoyu1 bunseok (An 
analysis of turnout in the 15th presidential election) (Seoul: National Election Commission, 1998), 
and National Election Commission, Je 16dae daetongryeongseongeo tupyoyu! bunseok (An 
analysis of turnout in the 16th presidential election) (Seoul: National Election Commission, 2003). 
Turnout in Post-Election Surveys 
The National Election Commission provided actual turnout with only a few socio- 
economic variables. In order to examine other sociological variables and psychological 
variables, individual level survey data from the Korean Presidential Election Study is 
used. 13 Table 8.2 shows the relationship between turnout and various sociological 
variables in survey data from the Korean Presidential Election Study. 
12 National Election Commission, Je 16dae daetongryeongseongeo tupyoyul bunseok (An analysis 
of turnout in the 16th presidential election). 
13 There is a potential problem related to using the survey data. In the survey, respondents who 
voted were over-sampled and respondents who did not vote were under-sampled. The official 
turnout rate was 70.8 per cent in 2002, but the percentage in the survey data from Korean 
Presidential Election Study was 88.4 per cent. There was therefore an overestimate of 17.6 per 
cent nnint in the survey data (tee Table the helowl_ 
1992 1997 2002 
Turnout in the post-election survey (A) 92.5% 93.4% 88.4% 
Official Turnout (B) 81.9%' 80.7% 70.8% 
The difference (A-B) 10.6% 12.7% 17.6% 
The overestimation of the turnout rate in election survey research is common m Korea, though the 
cause of the overestimation has not been explained. However, it can be assumed that the under- 
sampling of non-voters does not greatly affect statistical analyses because the samples are 
randomly selected. 
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Table 8.2 Turnout by Social and Economic Characteristics of Voters, 1992-2002 
1992 1997 2002 
N Turnout N Turnout N Turnout 
Age 
20-24 132 86.4% 152 81.6% 213 81.7% 
25-34 341 92.4% 337 90.5% 335 84.8% 
35-44 292 95.5% 287 94.1% 365 88.8% 
45-54 199 97.0% 227 96.9% 265 91.7% 
55-64 124 93.5% 127 97.6% 177 94.4% 
65 and over 112 92.9% 75 94.7% 145 92.4% 
Total 1200 93.4% 1205 92.4% 1500 88.4% 
Chi-square 17.616 40.554 24.891 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.003 0.000 0.000 
Gender 
Men 582 94.2% 614 92.0% 739 89.7% 
Women 618 92.7% 593 92.9% 761 87.1% 
Total 1200 93.4% 1207 92.5% 1500 88.4% 
Chi-square 1.010 0.349 2.459 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.315 0.555 0.117 
Location 
Big city 594 92.4% 601 92.5% 730 87.5% 
Small or medium city 322 93.8% 431 91.9% 607 88.6% 
Rural county 284 95.1% 175 93.7% 163 91.4% 
Total 1200 93.4% 1207 92.5% 1500 88.4% 
Chi-square 2.287 0.606 2.007 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.319 0.739 0.367 
Education 
Primary School 236 93.2% 140 98.6% 150 95.3% 
Middle School 205 95.1% 125 96.0% 180 87.8% 
High School 439 92.7% 450 90.9% 560 87.3% 
College 320 93.4% 485 91.1% 602 87.7% 
Total 1200 93.4% 1200 92.4% 1492 88.3% 
Chi-square 1.340 12.495 7.974 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.720 0.006 0.047 
Region 
Seoul 129 93.0% 149 84.6% 208 87.0% 
Gyeonggi 131 95.4% 118 89.8% 175 89.7% 
Gangwon 63 87.3% 76 92.1% 93 86.0% 
Chungcheong 204 92.6% 198 91.9% 216 83.3% 
Jeolla 238 97.1% 266 96.6% 278 92.1% 
Gyeongsang 419 91.9% 360 93.3% 499 89.4% 
Jeju 1 100.0% 25 100.0% 6 33.3% 
The North 15 100.0% 12 91.7% 16 93.8% 
Total 1200 93.4% 1204 92.4% 1491 88.3% 
Chi-square 12.773 23.576 28.783 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.078 0.001 0.000 
Income 
Low 253 95.3% 340 93.8% 487 88.1% 
Middle 692 93.4% 642 91.9% 670 88.5% 
High 255 91.8% 204 92.2% 278 86.1% 
Total 1200 93.4% 1186 92.5% 1435 88.0% 
Chi-square 2.529 1.225 0.619 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.282 0.542 0.734 
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(Continued) 
1992 19 97 20 02 
N Turnout N Turnout N Turnout 
Occupation 
Professionals / Public servants 96 96.9% 137 92.0% 126 89.7% 
White-collar workers 162 95.1% 132 91.7% 197 85.3% 
Self-employers 147 91.2% 275 94.2% 237 89.9% 
Blue-collar workers 151 86.8% 116 90.5% 132 84.8% 
Farmers - 134 97.0% 69 95.7% 66 98.5% 
Students 75 86.7% 121 86.0% 179 87.2% 
Housewives 279 96.1% 229 96.1% 285 87.7% 
Unemployed / Other 156 93.6% 93 91.4% 237 88.6% 
Total 1200 93.4% 1172 92.7% 1459 88.2% 
Chi-square 26.246 15.061 10.950 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.035 0.141 
Class 
Salariat 130 96.9% 176 92.6% 195 90.3% 
Non-manual workers 148 88.5% 134 89.6% 200 82.0% 
Petty-bourgeoisie 261 92.7% 341 94.1% 285 91.6% 
Foreman 23 95.7% 12 75.0% 12 91.7% 
The Working class 128 94.5% 66 97.0% 86 90.7% 
Total 690 93.0% 729 92.9% 778 88.7% 
Chi-square 8.437 10.527 12.223 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.077 1 1 0.032 0.016 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992,1997, and 2002. 
Key N= number of cases. 
Sociological characteristics of turnout In the 2002 Korean Presidential Election 
Study, age, gender, and urban-rural variables explained different rates of turnout in the 
electorate, as these variables did in the analysis based on actual account of turnout 
provided by the National Election Commission. The turnout of the youngest age group 
remained reasonably stable while the turnout of other age groups decreased. There is a 
statistically significant relationship between education and turnout. A low level of 
education is related to high turnout. This runs contrary to a well-known comparative 
study of electoral participation, which suggested a relationship between a high level of 
education and a high level of turnout. 14 The high level of turnout for the voters who have 
low level of education may be related to the age of voters. Voters who have only primary 
school education are relatively old. In the survey, 85.8 per cent with only primary school 
education were 50 years old or over. In order to estimate the net effects of education on 
turnout, both the Pearson correlation and partial correlation are examined. The Pearson 
correlation shows that there is a positive relationship between lower educational 
attainment and higher turnout. The relationship is statistically significant in 1997 and 
2002. However, the partial correlation suggests that there is a negative relationship 
between lower educational attainment and higher turnout, but the relationship between 
education and turnout controlling for age is not statistically significant in any of the three 
14 Verba, Nie, and Kim, Participation and Political Equality: a Seven-Nation Comparison. 
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elections (see Table 8.3). 
Table 8.3 Correlationship and Partial Correlationship between Education and Tarnout, 
1992-2002 
1992 1997 2002 
Pearson Correlationship 0.008 0.089 0.052 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.785 0.002 0.046 
N 1200 1200 1492 
Partial Correlationship -0.030 -0.003 -0.034 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.302 0.936 0.187 
N 1200 1199 1492 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992,1997, and 2002. 
Note: Partial correlationship = partial correlationship between education and turnout controlling 
for age variable; Education variable is coded as I= primary school, 2= middle school, 3= high 
school, and 4= college; Turnout variable is coded as I= vote and 2= not vote; Age variable is 
based on actual age. 
Regional difference in turnout: In 2002, voter turnout varied across the different 
regions. A higher proportion of voters from the Jeolla region went to the polls compared 
to voters from other regions. A high level of politicisation among Jeolla people may 
explain the difference in turnout. As discussed in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, people from 
Jeolla are highly politicised compared to people from other regions on account of their 
strong regionalism. They are interested in politics, and are more likely to have party 
affiliation compared to people from other regions. 
Concerning the relation between region and turnout, it is interesting that turnout for 
voters from Chungcheong region dropped substantially compared to voters from other 
regions, which was confirmed in the analysis based on the actual account of turnout 
provided by the National Election Commission. The drop in turnout among people from 
Chungcheong may be related to a weakening of regionalism in this area. As discussed 
elsewhere in this study, people from the Chungcheong region were relatively free from 
the regional competition that has dominated electoral behaviour in the new democracy. 
However, regionalism among voters in the Chungcheong region increased suddenly from 
the 1995 local election and in the 1997 presidential election, the Chungcheong region was 
one of three main axes of the `politics of region' in Korea. However, regionalism in the 
region has weakened since the 2000 general election. For example, the United Liberal 
Democrats (ULD), which articulates the regional pride of Chungcheong people, won all 
seats in the region in the 1996 general election, but only won about one third of electoral 
districts in the region in the 2002 general election. If it is assumed that regionalism 
encourages and mobilises voters to go to the poll, a weakening of regionalism would 
cause a sharp decline of turnout for Chungcheong people. 
Economic characteristics of turnout: The economic status of voters does not 
explain voter turnout. There is no significant difference in turnout across different income 
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groups in 2002. However, social class and occupation do explain variance in turnout. In 
last three presidential elections, farmers were more likely to vote compared to other 
occupational groups of people. Turnout for housewives was relatively high in 1992 and in 
1997, but not in 2002. In contrast, turnout among students was lower compared to other 
people in 1992 and in 1997, but higher in 2002. This is related to a relatively high turnout 
for the youngest cohort (i. e., 20-24) in the 2002 presidential election compared to 
previous presidential elections. Finally, a lower proportion of non-manual workers voted 
compared to other classes or occupational groups of people, and this pattern was 
continued in the last three presidential elections. 
Summary 
Although some socio-economic variables are associated with turnout, these variables 
do not account for the declining turnout in new democracy because such sociological 
variables have not changed enough to explain the drop in turnout during the previous 
decade. 15 For example, the proportion of young voters has not increased during the last 
10 years, though the young still make up more than half of the electorate. As sociological 
variables cannot explain the decline of voter turnout in Korea, the causes of the decline of 
turnout will be sought in changes in electoral attitudes and preferences, such as a decrease 
in feelings of political efficacy, an increase in dissatisfaction with politics, or a weakening 
of partisanship in Korea. 
Declining Turnout and Increasing Independent Voters 
Difference in Turnout between Independents and Partisans 
Have an increase of independent voters contributed to the decline of turnout in 
Korea? Empirical survey evidence shows that fewer independent voters turn out to vote 
compared to partisans with a psychological attachment to a political party. As shown in 
Table 8.4, the difference in turnout between partisans and independent voters is 
statistically significant in the last three presidential elections. Also, turnout rate for 
independent voters has dropped substantially from 89.6 per cent to 82.9 per cent during 
the last 10 years, while the turnout rate for partisans has decreased marginally from 94.5 
per cent to 92.2 per cent. Thus, the difference in turnout rate between partisans and 
15 British researchers also argued that sociological variables do not account for decline of voter 
turnout for recent British elections because sociological variables do not change enough to explain 
the drop in turnout. See Whiteley et al., `Turnout', pp. 211-2. 
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independent voters has widened last 10 years. The difference in turnout between partisans 
and independent voters was 4.9 per cent point in 1992,7 per cent point in 1997, and 9.3 
per cent point in 2002. Therefore, party identification does explain turnout in Korea and 
its explanatory power has increased over the last 10 years. 
Table 8.4 Crosstab: Vote Turnout by Party Identification, 2002 
1992 1997 2002 
N Turnout N Turnout N Turnout 
Partisans 913 94.5% 756 95.0% 892 92.2% 
Independents 269 89.6% 442 88.0% 608 82.9% 
Total 1182 93.4% 1198 92.4% 1500 88.4% 
Chi-square 8.259 19.336 30.219 
Sig. (2-sided) 0.004 0.000 0.000 
uara: icorean rresiaentiai Liection stuay, vow, i9r, ana zuul. 
Key: N= number of cases. 
However, the relationship between independents and a low level of turnout is not 
sustained when the independents are divided into attentive independents and apolitical 
independents. More attentive independent voters go to the polls compared to habitual 
partisans, while turnout for apolitical independent is relatively lower than any other types 
of voters. This pattern is repeated in the last three presidential elections (see Table 8.5). 
This implies that the change in political attitudes such as the decrease in the level of 
interest in politics and partisan decline have contributed to a decrease in turnout during 
the last 10 years. 
Table S. 5 Turnout Rate by Four Types of Voters, 1997-2002 
1992 1997 2002 
N Turnout N Turnout N Turnout 
Critical Partisans 476 97.9% 533 97.4% 450 96.0% 
Habitual Partisans 437 90.8% 223 89.2% 442 88.2% 
Attentive Independents 97 95.9% 210 97.6% 203 91.6% 
Apolitical Independents 172 86.0% 231 79.3% 405 78.5% 
Total 1182 93.4% 1198 92.4% 1500 88.4% 
Chi-square 36.310 86.742 65.983 
Sig. (2-sided 0.000 0.000 0.000 
uara; r urcan rresiaennal nievnon biuay, 1r/L, 1 #J / ana zuuz. 
Keys: N= number of cases. 
Although a greater proportion of partisans voted compared to independents, there are 
differences in turnout across partisans of different political parties. The turnout for small 
party identifiers is low compared to that of major party identifiers (see Table 8.6). Why 
are partisans of minor parties more likely to abstain from voting compared to partisans of 
major parties? We may assume that age explains the difference, that is minor party 
identifiers are relatively young compared to major party identifiers. As discussed in 
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Chapter 6 of this thesis, party identifiers for the old ruling party (major party A) are 
relatively old, while party identifiers for minor parties are relatively young. However, in 
1992, turnout among partisans of the UNP, a minor party, was as high as the turnout of 
major party partisans despite this age difference. Indeed, we need to consider another 
factor to explain the difference in turnout between major party partisans and minor party 
partisans. With a very aggressive campaign in the presidential election, the UNP 
effectively mobilised their loyal partisans in the election. On the other hand, in 2002, the 
election was a competition between the two major parties. Party identifiers with an 
attachment to the non-major parties either had no presidential candidate from their own 
party or did not see any possibility of wining the election. This may explain the difference 
in turnout between major party partisans and non-major party partisans. 
In conclusion, party identification is associated with voter turnout. Independents are 
less likely to vote compared to partisans. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
independent voters have increased substantially in Korea during last 10 years. This 
implies that partisan decline has contributed to declining turnout in Korea. However, the 
pattern of turnout between partisans and independents is not clear when independent 
voters are divided into apolitical and attentive independents. A greater percentage of 
attentive independents turned out to vote compared to apolitical independents or even 
habitual partisans. 
Table 8.6 Abstention by Party Identification, 1992-2002 
1992 1997 2002 
N Abstention N Abstention N Abstention 
Party Identification 
Major Party A 470 6.2% 221 4.1% 350 5.7% 
Major Party B 324 5.6% 390 4.6% 405 7.9% 
All other Parties 121 2.5% 146 7.5% 137 13.1% 
Non-party identification 269 10.4% 442 12.0% 608 17.1% 
Total 1184 6.6% 1199 7.6% 1500 11.6% 
Chi-square 10.396 21.026 35.513 
Sig. (2-sided) 0.015 0.000 0.000 
Data: r orean ? residential Election Study, 1992,1997, and 2102. 
Keys: N= number of cases; Major Party A= Democratic Liberal Party in 1992, Grand National 
Party in 1997 and 2002; Major Party B= Democratic Party in 1992, National Congress for New 
Politics in 1997, and Millennium Democratic Party in 2002. 
Why do Independent Voters Abstain from Voting? 
There are two distinct causes of abstentions - i. e., `indifference' and `alienation'. 16 
16 Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy; Richard Brody and Benjamin Page, `Indifference, 
Alienation, and Rational Decisions: The Effects of Candidate Evaluation on Turnout and Vote', 
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`Abstention due to indifference' means that voters cannot make a voting choice because 
they do not see any differences between candidates. `Abstention due to alienation' means 
that voters do not vote because they are dissatisfied with all candidates or democratic 
politics. In this type of abstention, voters do not feel that elections offer political efficacy 
due to the failure of democratic politics or political parties. The dichotomous 
classification of abstention does not comprise all types of abstentions and another type of 
abstention can be added. Some voters are not interested in politics regardless of their 
satisfaction with politics. Thus, another cause of abstentions is apathy, which is 
distinguished from alienation abstention based on dissatisfaction with politics. 
The Korean Presidential Election Study included a question about self-identified 
reasons why voters did not go to the poll, though it is not possible to do a statistical 
analysis due to the small number of cases of absentees in the survey. Survey evidence 
suggests that more than half of Korean non-voters did not go to the polls due to non- 
political reasons, i. e., private matters (see Table 8.7). Apathy is only a minor reason. 
Excluding abstentions due to non-political reasons, more partisans cited the lack of 
differences between candidates as a reason why they did not vote in the 2002 presidential 
election than independents, while more independent voters referred to a lack of political 
efficacy of voting. Therefore, alienation was a main reason for abstentions in the 2002 
presidential election, and was especially true for independents. 
Table 8.7 Reasons for Abstention from Voting by Party Identification, 2002 
N Partisans Independents Total 
Reasons for abstention from voting 
No difference between candidates 26 17.1% 13.5% 14.9% 
No political efficacy of voting 30 12.9% 20.2% 17.2% 
No interest in politics or election 12 5.7% 7.7% 6.9% 
Due to private matters / no answer 106 64.3% 58.7% 60.9% 
Total 174 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 2002. 
Keys: N= number of cases. 
In the in-depth interviews and focus group interviews, non-voters were not included. 
Therefore, there is no direct question about why they did not vote or why they went to the 
polls. Although there was no direct measurement of abstentions from election, 
interviewees indirectly suggested the reasons why they did not vote in other elections, 
e. g., previous presidential elections, parliamentary elections, or local elections, in 
answering a question about their different levels of interest in various types of election. 
This may suggest reasons for abstentions, if we assume a positive relationship between 
Public Choice 15(1973), 1-17. 
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interest in election and vote turnout. " 
Feelings of political efficacy: Interviewees suggested two main incentives to vote, 
i. e., feelings of political efficacy and the candidate factor. In the interviews, voters stated 
they had a strong feeling of the significance of presidential elections compared to 
parliamentary and local elections. Therefore, they vote in presidential elections because 
they believe that the presidency is important and felt a stronger sense in the political 
efficacy of voting. Conversely, they did not vote in lower levels of elections because they 
did not have this feeling. For example, "I hardly participate in any local elections. 
Somehow I think that local elections are not important" (1-116). "I was not interested in 
the local election. I believed that there was no difference regardless of whoever won the 
election" (1-124; 1-133; 1-139; 1-128). "1 am fed up with Korean politics ... I am not 
interested in any kind of election. I am not interested in casting a ballot" (1-131). 
Candidates: Many respondents suggested that candidates affected the level of their 
interest in election. When they are able to distinguish one candidate from the other 
candidates, they are more interested in the election. They did not vote in lower levels 
elections or previous presidential elections because they did not see a clear difference 
among the candidates. In the 2002 presidential election, Korean voters who were fed up 
with political corruption expected that Roh Moo-hyun would carry out political reforms 
and get rid of political corruption in Korea. For example, "I had not been interested in any 
elections, but was interested in last presidential election... A new politician ran for the 
presidency. In previous presidential elections, there were no new politicians. Always the 
same politicians ran for the presidency again and again. So, I was not interested in these 
elections" (1-105; FM9). "There was no difference among the candidates. So, I began to 
lose interest in earlier elections" (1-118). "1 looked forward to the end of the `three Kims' 
domination' over Korean politics. I hoped that a new candidate would bring better 
politics" (1-121; 1-120; 1-110; 1-134; 1-30; I-138; 1-121; I-212; 1-214; FM5; FF7; FFS). 
Lack of information: Some respondents suggested that they give up voting if they 
do not have enough information about candidates or the election. For example, "In the 
last local election, voters hardly know even the candidates' names ... 
So, I did not vote in 
last local election" (FM 4; FF2) "In the last general election, I did not know anything 
about the candidates who ran for a seat in my electoral district" (I-127; 1-136). 
Feeling of `civic duty': 'Finally, some respondents referred to a feeling of `civic 
duty' as an incentive of participation in election, which is an important independent 
variable suggested by the rational choice model of turnout. For example, "In general 
elections, I went to the voting booth only with a sense of duty that I have to cast my ballot 
17 In Chapter 7,1 have partially used this part of the interview data. So, I will discuss this data 
briefly in order to avoid a repetition. 
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anyway" (1-206; 1-137). "I am very much disappointed with all politicians. I think that 
all politicians are the same [bad]. I truly did not want to vote this time, but I did, because 
of my children. I thought that my children would not go to the polls either, if I gave up 
exercising my voting right" (FF3). They turned out to vote because they feel that they 
should cast a ballot anyway, even though they were not interested in the election nor did 
they have a strong preference for any candidate. To some extent, turning out to vote based 
on a feeling of `civic duty' implies irrational behaviour as they are casting their ballot 
without actually having any preference. 
The Model of Individual Turnout Behaviour 
How does party affiliation explain turnout compared to other social psychological 
variables such as electoral interest in politics? In order to uncover the key factors 
affecting turnout in Korea, a multiple regression model of turnout is employed. 
The Model of Repression Analysis 
Considering the two distinctive approaches to voter turnout, two sociological 
variables and six psychological variables are included in the regression model. 18 As 
social psychological variables, `party identification', `feeling of political efficacy', 
`interest in politics', `interest in election', 'government performance evaluation', and 
`insufficiency of election information' are examined in the regression analysis. 
Party identification: Party identification is recoded into a dichotomous variable --- 
i. e., partisans or independents. Voters aligned to political parties confirm their loyalty to a 
political party and feel satisfaction through supporting their own political parties in 
elections. Therefore, it is assumed that partisans will have more incentive to participate in 
voting compared to independent voters. 
Political efficacy of election: Feelings of political efficacy are measured in a 4-point 
scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree. 19 It is assumed that voters who feel 
political efficacy at elections are more likely to vote compared to voters who do not feel 
this. 
Interest in politics and interest in election: Although interest in politics may not be 
1g In a British electoral study, researchers suggested three incentives for electoral participation --- i. e., individual values and beliefs such as subjective feelings of efficacy, attitudes toward political 
parties and leaders of party, and the context of the election such as the degree of competition. 
However, due to a lack of data, the context of the election is not included in this analysis of turnout 
in Korea. See Whiteley et al., `Turnout', pp. 216-20. 
19 The following question is used: `Do you agree that voting can change government policies? '. 
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clearly distinct from interest in election, it is assumed here that interest in politics does 
differ from interest in election. `Interest in politics' is a relatively long-term attitude to 
politics while `interest in election' is a short-term attitude to a specific election. The level 
of interest in election is related to the interest in politics, but is also influence by the 
context of election, such as the degree of competition and the candidate. Because the 
survey data does not include any variables to measure the context of election, the `interest 
in election' variable has been included as an alternative. 
Information: The adequacy of election information is measured in a 3-point scale 
from sufficiency to insufficiency based on a survey question (i. e., "Did you have 
sufficient information when you made vote decision? "). This variable is included in order 
to examine `mobilised voting' in Korea 2° According to modernisation theory, voters go 
to the poll as a result of mobilisation, though they do not have sufficient information or 
knowledge about the election. Under the authoritarian regimes, the voting turnout of less 
educated, older, rural and female voters is often explained by mobilised voting. However, 
it is assumed that mobilised voting is no longer useful to explain turnout in Korea. If the 
sufficiency of information does explain turnout, then mobilised voting is no longer useful 
to explain turnout in Korea. 
Perception toward government performance: Government performance evaluation 
is measured in a 5-point scale from very good to very poor performance. It is assumed 
that this variable is related to voter satisfaction with politics and/or democracy and that 
those satisfied with politics and/or democracy are more likely to vote, while those who 
are not satisfied with politics or democracy are more likely to abstain. Because the survey 
data does not include any question about satisfaction with politics or democracy, voter 
satisfaction with government performance has been used as a proxy measurement of 
satisfaction with politics. 
Controlling variables and dependent variable: Finally, two sociological variables, 
`age' and `education', are included as controlling variables. Age is measured in years. 
Education is measured in a 4-point scale from the lowest level of education through to the 
highest level. The dependent variable is individual turnout. Those who voted in the 
election are coded 1 and those who did not vote are coded 2. 
The Result of Regression Analysis 
The method used in this multiple regression analysis is called stepwise. As shown in 
Table 8.8, five independent variables explain turnout in the 2002 presidential election. 
20 Kim, `71upyochamyeowa gigwon' (Vote turnout and abstention), pp. 228-30. 
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Interest in election, feeling of political efficacy, and age explained variations in turnout 
well, but insufficiency of information and party identification explained only a small 
amount of variance in the dependent variable. This result is generally similar to the 
research on turnout in the 1997 presidential election in which the elector's interest in 
election and party affiliation were the key factors in explaining vote turnout. 21 
Table 8.8 The Multiple Regression Model of Thrnout (stepwise method), 2002 
Variables Model I Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Interest in election 0.246 0.210 0.198 0.177 0.169 
Political efficacy of election 0.133 0.138 0.127 0.122 
Age -0.113 -0.110 -0.106 
Information on candidates 0.091 0.082 
Party identification 0.077 
Interest in politics 
Performance of incumbent government 
Education 
Adjusted R-s uare 0.060 0.075 0.087 0.094 0.099 
Data: Korean ? residential Election study, 2UU2. 
Note: The method is called stepwise. The figures refer to standardised coefficients (beta). 
Variables that do not display beta in this table are excluded variables in the regression model. 
In conclusion, independent voters were relatively more likely to abstain compared to 
partisans. This relationship is statistically significant, though the explanatory power of 
party identification in a multiple regression model is relatively not strong compared to 
other explanatory variables. Furthermore, among independent voters, attentive 
independents are different from apolitical independents in terms of turnout. Unlike 
apolitical independents, attentive independents are more inclined to actually vote. 
Attentive independents interested in politics also were more likely to vote compared to 
the habitual partisans without a great interest in voting. A voter's interest in the election 
was a key factor to determine turnout in the 2002 presidential election. 
2. Volatile and Late Vote Decision: Floating Voters? 
Partisan dealignment is related to an increasing electoral volatility in mature 
democracies. 22 According to the party identification model, voters who have an enduring 
psychological attachment to a particular political party are not greatly affected by short- 
21 Kim, `Tupyochamyeowa gigwon' (Vote turnout and abstention), pp. 232-6. 
22 For British electoral dealignment and electoral volatility, Bo Sarlvik and Ivor Crewe, Decade of 
Dealignment: The Conservative Victory of 1979 and Electoral Trends in the 1970s (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983). 
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term considerations such as issues or political events. Their voting choice is mainly 
constrained by their commitment to a particular political party. Partisans are stable in the 
voting behaviour as party attachments are stable. In contrast to partisans, independent 
voters who are responsive to the impacts of short-term factors are unstable in the voting 
behaviour. Independents swing from party to another party at different elections. The 
voting intentions of independent voters are also changeable during an election. 
Independent voters hesitate when making their electoral choice and their vote decision is 
delayed compared to partisans. 
In this section, the difference between partisans and independents in voting 
behaviour will be examined in three aspects - i. e., vote consistency between elections, 
hesitancy in making a voting decision during an election, and change in voting preference 
within an election. 
Swing Vote and Independents 
Partisans who have an enduring party affiliation express their loyalty to political parties 
by voting for their parties in elections. Partisans who are anchored to political parties are 
not affected by short-term factors, and the voting of partisans is based on psychological 
commitment rather than `choice'. Thus, partisans vote for the same political party in most 
elections and their voting choice is stable over time. In contrast, independents are affected 
by short-term factors in their vote choice, which is different depending on conditions of 
each election. As a result, their electoral choice is inconsistent across different elections. 
Voting Consistence in Consecutive Elections 
More than 60 per cent of all voters in Korea consistently voted for a party in two 
consecutive presidential elections (the 1997 and the 2002 presidential elections). 
Considering the institutional instability of the party system in Korea, this figure is 
relatively big. Also, the voting consistency rate for major parties is higher than that for 
the minor parties. Approximately 75 per cent of voters who voted for one of two major 
parties in 1997 again voted for that party in 2002. On the other hand, only 47.4 per cent of 
voters who voted for Democratic Labour Party (DLP) in 1997 returned to the party in the 
2002 presidential election (see Table 8.9). Tactical voting may explain the relatively low 
consistency in voting choice among DLP partisans. Compared to major party partisans, a 
minor party's partisans are more likely to defect from their own political party in voting 
choice. In the 2002 presidential election, some liberal voters favourable to Kwon Young- 
gil actually voted for Roh Moo-hyun. 
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When we convert these figures to the percentage of all voters, 61.1 per cent of the 
electorate voted for the same party in two consecutive presidential elections. 23.9 per cent 
of the electorate voted for the Grand National Party, 36.5 per cent of the electorate 
supported the Millennium Democratic Party (or the National Congress for New Politics in 
1997), and 0.7 per cent of the electorate voted for Democratic Labour Party. Also, 2.7 per 
cent of the voters did not go to the polls in the two presidential elections. If we assume 
abstention is another form of political choice, about 63.8 per cent of the electorate 
showed voting consistency in the two consecutive presidential elections. Furthermore, if 
the New Party for People that gained a substantial support in the 1997 election had not 
dissolved, the percentage of voters who voted consistently in a series of elections would 
have increased (see Table 8.9) 23 
Table 8.9 Flow of the Vote between Presidential Elections of 1997 and 2002 
Vote Choice in 20 02 
N GNP MDP DLP Abstention Total 
Vote GNP All Voters 414 73.7% 15.0% 3.4% 8.0% 100% 
in Partisans 259 83.0% 8.9% 2.7% 5.4% 100% 
1997 Independents 155 58.1% 25.2% 4.5% 12.3% 100% 
NCNP All Voters 617 14.1% 75.5% 1.8% 8.6% 100% 
(-ý MDP) Partisans 391 11.8% 80.1% 2.3% 5.9% 100% 
Independents 226 18.1% 67.7% 0.9% 13.3% 100% 
NPP All Voters 102 36.3% 45.1% 5.9% 12.7% 100% 
Partisans 51 43.1% 41.2% 5.9% 9.8% 100% 
Independents 51 29.4% 49.0% 5.9% 15.7% 100% 
PV21 All Voters 19 10.5% 36.8% 47.4% 5.3% 100% 
(-ý DLP) Partisans 15 0.0% 33.3% 60.0% 6.7% 100% 
Independents 4 50.0% 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100% 
Abstention All Voters 125 29.6% 36.0% 7.2% 27.2% 100% 
Partisans 57 38.6% 36.8% 10.5% 14.0% 100% 
Independents 68 22.1% 35.3% 4.4% 38.2% 100% 
Total All Voters 1277 36.6% 49.0% 3.8% 10.5% 100% 
Partisans 773 38.5% 49.5% 4.4% 6.6% 100% 
Ind endents 504 32.3% 48.2% 3.0% 16.5% 100% 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 2UUl. 
Keys: N= number of cases; GNP = Grand National Party; NCNP = National Congress for New 
Politics; MDP = Millennium Democratic Party; NPP = New Party for People; PV21 = People' 
Victory 21; DLP = Democratic Labour Party. 
Note: The estimated is based on how voters in 2002 recalled voting in 1992. Constant voters are 
highlighted in shade. A few voters supported minor party's candidates are excluded. Also, the 
voters who did not have a voting right in 1997 are excluded. 
Swinji Voters: Independents vs. Partisans 
Are partisans different from independents in terms of voting consistency? Empirical 
2' In the 1997 presidential elections, Rhee In je, presidential candidate of the New Party for 
People (NPP), shared 19.2 per cent of valid votes. But, in the survey, Rhee gained about 8 per cent 
of votes. 
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survey evidence shows that independent voters lack consistency in electoral choice 
between two presidential elections compared to partisans. Table 8.10 shows that 83 per 
cent of partisans who voted for Lee Hoi Chang in 1997 supported Lee Hoi Chang again in 
2002, while 80.1 per cent of partisans who voted for Kim Dae-jung in 1997 voted for Roh 
Moo-hyun in 2002. The percentage of consistent independent voters was much lower 
compared to the percentage of consistent partisans. In the two presidential elections, 
58.1% of independent voters who voted for Lee Hoi Chang voted again for Lee Hoi 
Chang in 2002 while 67.7 per cent of independent voters who supported Kim Dae-jung in 
1997 voted for Roh Moon-hyun in 2002. If we convert the figures to the percentage of all 
voters, 70.5 per cent of partisans voted repeatedly for a particular party in two 
consecutive presidential elections while 53.3 per cent of independent voters were 
consistent in electoral choice in the two presidential elections. 
In conclusion, partisans were more consistent in voting choice between two 
consecutive presidential elections compared to independents. Moreover, critical partisans 
were much more consistent compared to habitual partisans, while attentive independents 
were more consistent than apolitical independents. The difference is statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level (see Table 8.9). 
Table 8.10 Vote Consistency between 1997 and 2002 
Number Voting Choices in two presidential elections Chie-square 
of cases Consistency Inconsistency Total (Sig. ) 
Total 1277 63.7% 36.3% 100% 
Partisan 773 70.5% 29.5% 100% 38.742 
Independents 504 53.4% 46.6% 100% (0.000) 
Critical partisans 403 75.4J% 24.6% 100% 
Habitual partisans 370 65.1% 34.9% 100% 49.635 
Attentive independents 181 57.5% 42.5% 100% (0.000) 
Apolitical independents 323 51.1% 48.9% 100% 
uara: &orean t"resiaenvai t ection may, zuuL 
Note: The estimated is based on how voters in 2002 recalled voting in 1992. A few voters 
supported minor party's candidates in either one of two presidential elections are excluded. The 
voters who did not have a voting right in 1997 are excluded. Also, abstentions are considered as a 
type of vote choice, and so are included in this analysis. 
Although the proportion of independent voters who voted repeatedly for a political 
party in a series of presidential elections is much smaller than the proportion of partisans, 
it should be noted that more than half of independent voters voted consistently for a 
particular political party in presidential elections. This may suggest that actually half of 
independent voters lean towards a political party, even if they do not consider themselves 
party affiliated. Consequently, it might be suggested that they are `hidden' partisans or 
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independent `Ieaners'24 However, it is possible that independent voters might vote for a 
political party in a series of presidential elections due to other reasons than `hidden' party 
attachment. For example, independents might vote for the same party in every 
presidential election due to particular policies or public pledges promised by a political 
party. They might vote for a particular party continually due to their candidate preference, 
even though they do not have an enduring psychological attachment to a particular 
political party. 
Hesitancy in Vote Decision 
In terms of the timing of vote decision, there is a difference between partisans and 
independent voters. Making a decision about voting is relatively simple and 
straightforward for voters with an attachment to political parties. Their voting choice is a 
confirmation of a candidate of their party and as such is almost fixed. In contrast to 
partisans, independent voters, who do not have information shortcut, may try to 
understand the complexity of politics without any guide. To do this, independent voters 
need to spend a long time accumulating information on presidential candidates. Therefore, 
the voting decision of independents is later than that of partisans. 
The Tming of Voting Decision: Independents vs. Partisans 
Election survey data confirms that independent voters decide upon their vote later 
than partisans. The same pattern of the relationship between partisanship and vote 
decision timing is repeated in each of the three elections and the difference in the timing 
of voting choice between partisans and independent voters is also statistically significant 
in each election. For example, in 2002, more than half of the electorate made their voting 
choice more than one month before the day of election. The percentage of partisans who 
made vote decision more than one month before the day of election was 56.9 per cent, 
while the percentage of independent voters doing likewise was 44.4 per cent (see Table 
8.11). 
Although independents made a comparatively late voting choice, it should be noted 
that almost a half of independent voters (i. e., 44.4 per cent in 2002, but 20.3 per cent in 
1992) made their vote decision before the official election campaign began in the 2002 
presidential election. This suggests that many independent voters are actually relatively 
stable in their electoral preference. Thus, it is not possible to describe most independent 
24 Bruce E. Keith et al., The Myth of the Independent Voter (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1992). 
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voters as floating voters. Some of them were available during the campaign, but many of 
them were not. 
Table 8.11 The Timing of Voting Decision by Party Identification, 1992-2002 
N Vote Decision Time Test 
Over 30 15-30 8-14 4-7 1-3 Election Total statistics 
days days days days days day 
before before before before before 
e-day e-da e-day e-day e-da 
1992 Chi-square 
Partisans 864 43.4% 10.4% 12.5% 11.6% 14.5% 7.6% 100'/0 = 51.456 
(43.4) (53.8) (66.3) (77.9) (92.4) (100) Sig. Independents 241 20.3% 13.7% 12.9% 18.7% 18.3% 16.2% 100% 000 0 0 
(20.3) (34.0) (46.9) (65.6) (83.9) (100) . 
Total 1105 38.4% 11.1% 12.6% 13.1% 15.3% 9.5% 100% 
(38.4) (49.5) (62.1) (75.2) (90.5) (100) 
1997 Chi-square 
Partisans 718 59.5% 9.7% 7.5% 11.0% 8.1% 4.2% 100% = 69.438 
(59.5) (69.2) (76.7) (87.7) (95.8) (100) Si 
Independents 389 37.0% 9.3% 9.0% 16.5% 15.9% 12.3% 100% 0 000 
(37.0) (46.3) (55.3) (71.8) (87.7) (100) . 
Total 1107 51.6% 9.6% 8.0% 12.90/6 10.8% 7.0% 1000/0 
(51.6) (61.2) (69.2) 82.1 (92.9) (100) 
2002 Chi-square 
Partisans 821 56.9% 10.2% 7.9% 9.4% 8.6% 6.9% 100% = 25.172 
(56.9) (67.1) (75.0) (84.4) (93.0) (100) Sig. 
Independents 504 44.4% 11.3% 7.7% 14.3% 13.9% 8.3% 100% 0 000 (44.4) (55.7) (63.4) (77.7) (91.6) (100) . 
Total 1325 52.2% 10.6% 7.8% 11.2% 10.6% 7.5% 1000/0 
(52.2) (62.8) (70.6) (81.8) (92.4) 100 
vara: r orean rresiaenuai t iecnon btuay, i vvz, i vv i, ana zuuz. 
Key: e-day = election day. 
Note: The figures in parentheses are the accumulated percentage for each row. 
The following question is used: "How long ago did you decide that you would vote the way you 
did? " 
Critical partisans generally made their voting decision earlier than other types of 
voters. The difference in the timing of vote decision across the four types of voters is 
statistically significant, and this pattern was continued in last three presidential elections. 
For example, in the 2002 presidential election, 64.5 per cent of critical partisans made 
their voting decision before the official campaign begin, while 43.7 per cent of apolitical 
independents made an early choice. The difference can also be seen by looking at the 
proportion making their choice just before the election. Only 7.5 per cent of critical 
partisans made their voting choice within the 3 days prior to the day of election, while 
25.5 per cent of apolitical independents did made their voting choice in this period (see 
Table 8.12). 
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Table 8.12 Crosstab: The Timing of Vote Decision by Four Types of Voters, 1992-2002 
N . 
Vote Decision Time Test statistics 
Over 30 15-30 8-14 4-7 1-3 Election Total 
days days days days days day 
before before before before before 
e-da e-day e-da e-da e-da 
1992 Chi-square = 
Critical P 465 52.7% 10.1% 12.9% 9.0% 10.1% 5.2% 100% 107.093 
(52.7) (62.8) (75.7) (84.7) (94.8) (100) Sig. = 0.000 
Habitual P 397 32.2% 10.8% 12.1% 14.6% 19.6% 10.6% 100% 
(32.2) (43.0) (55.1) (69.7) (89.3) (100) 
Attentive 1 93 24.7% 17.2% 11.8% 16.1% 11.8% 18.3% 100% 
(24.7) (41.9) (53.7) (69.8) (81.6) (100) 
Apolitical 1 148 17.6% 11.5% 13.5% 20.3% 22.3% 14.9% 1000/0 
(17.6) (29.1) (42.6) (62.9) (85.2) (100) 
Total 1103 38.3% 11.2% 12.6% 13.1% 15.3% 9.5% 1000/0 
(38.3) (49.5) (62.1) (75.2) (90.5) (100) 
1997 Chi-square = 
Critical P 518 66.0% 7.3% 7.3% 9.7% 5.8% 3.9% 100% 128.990 
(66.0) (73.3) (80.6) (90.3) (96.1) (100) Sig. = 0.000 
Habitual P 199 42.7% 16.1% 8.0% 14.6% 14.1% 4.5% 100% 
(42.7) (58.8) (66.8) (81.4) (95.5) (100) 
Attentive 1 205 43.9% 10.7% 10.2% 13.7% 12.2% 9.3% 100% 
(43.9) (54.6) (64.8) (78.5) (90.7) (100) 
Apolitical 1 184 29.3% 7.6% 7.6% 19.6% 20.1% 15.8% 1000/0 
(29.3) (36.9) (44.5) (64.1) (84.2) (100) 
Total 1106 51.6% 9.6% 8.0% 12.9% 10.8% 7.0% 100% 
(51.6) (61.2) (69.2) (82.1) (92.9) 100 
2002 Chi-square = 
Critical P 431 64.5% 10.9% 6.3% 8.8% 5.3% 4.2% 100% 75.207 
(64.5) (75.4) (81.7) (90.5) (95.8) (100) Sig. = 0.000 
Habitual P 390 48.5% 9.5% 9.7% 10.0% 12.3% 10.0% 100% 
(48.5) (58.0) (67.7) (77.7) (90.0) (100) 
Attentive 1 186 45.7% 14.0% 6.5% 17.2% 14.0% 2.7% 1000/6 
(45.7) (59.7) (66.2) (83.4) (97.4) (100) 
Apolitical ! 318 43.7% 9.7% 8.5% 12.6% 13.8% 11.6% 100% 
(43.7) (53.4) (61.9) (74.5) (88.3) (100) 
Total 1325 52.2% 10.6% 7.8% 11.2% 10.6% 7.5% 100% 
(52.2) (62.8) (70.6) (81.8) (92.4) (100 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992,199/, and 2WJ2. 
Keys: N= number of cases; Critical P= Critical Partisans; Habitual P= Habitual Partisans; 
Attentive I= Attentive Independents; Apolitical I= Apolitical Independents. 
Note: The figures in parentheses are the accumulated percentage for each row. 
The following question is used: "How long ago did you decide that you would vote the way you 
did? ". 
Table 8.13 is a summary of the difference across four types of voters. The result of 
ANOVA analysis suggests differences in the average score for the timing of voting 
decision across the four different types of voters. Critical partisans made an early choice 
about their vote, while apolitical independents made a late voting choice compared to 
other types of voters. In terms of the timing of making their electoral choice, habitual 
partisans and attentive independents behaved similarly. The differences across different 
types of voters are statistically significant. It is noticeable that voters who are interested in 
elections such as the critical partisans or the attentive independents made an early vote 
decision compared to voters uninterested in elections such as habitual partisans or 
apolitical independents. 
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Table 8.13 ANOVA: The Timing of Vote Decision by Four Types of Voters, 1992-2002 
1992 1997 2002 
N Mean Std. D N Mean Std. D N Mean Std. D 
Critical Partisan 465 4.71 1.63 518 5.07 1.50 431 5.08 1.49 
Habitual Partisan 397 3.90 1.81 199 4.45 1.67 390 4.42 1.83 
Attentive Independents 93 3.72 1.84 205 4.33 1.80 186 4.52 1.64 
Apolitical 148 3.37 1.70 184 3.59 1.88 318 4.22 1.88 
Independents 1103 4.15 1.80 1106 4.57 1.74 1325 4.60 1.75 
Total 30.972 (0.000) 38.617 (0.000) 18.054 (0.0(0) 
F (sig. ) 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992,1997, and 2002. 
Key: Mean = average score in a 5-point scale (i. e., 1= late vote decision to 5= early vote decision). 
Note: In 1992, the mean difference between the critical partisans and three other types of voters, 
and between habitual partisans and apolitical independents are statistically significant at the 0.05 
level. 
In 1997, the mean difference between critical partisans and three other types of voters, between 
habitual partisans and apolitical independents, and between attentive independents and apolitical 
independents are statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 
In 2002, the mean difference between critical partisans and three other types of voters is 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 
Overall, more voters made an early vote decision in 2002 than in 1997. The average 
score for the timing of voting decision was 4.15 point in 1992, but 4.60 point in 2002 (see 
Table 8.13). This is related to a change in elections over the last 10 years. In 2002 and 
1997, each political party nominated presidential candidate relatively early through a 
presidential primary or a competition within the parties. For example, the presidential 
primary in the early part of the year gave Roh Moo-hyun the opportunity to become 
widely known amongst the public. Lee Hoi Chang, leader of the Grand National Party, 
had ran for the presidency in 1997 and was the party's de facto candidate. After each 
party's presidential candidates was nominated, public appearances provided the 
presidential candidates with the chance to publicise their candidacy. For example, from 
the 1997 presidential election, candidates were invited to various types of TV interviews 
and debates. Before the official election campaign began, candidates and political parties 
were nonetheless actively involved in campaigning. Voters could gain much information 
about candidates before the official election campaign began, and were thus able to make 
an early decision about their choice. 
Why Did Independents Make Late Decision? 
Many voters made very late voting decisions close to the day of election. In 2002, 
almost 30 per cent of all voters made their decision very close to the day of election, i. e., 
within 3 days. A third of independent voters (i. e., 36.5 per cent) made their vote choice as 
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late as 3 days before the day of election, and as well as a quarter of all partisans (i. e., 24.9 
per cent). The high percentage for partisans implies that a substantial proportion of 
partisans hesitated before making their decision and did chose their own party only after 
careful consideration of other factors such as candidates and policies. Qualitative 
interview data generally confirms that partisans made an earlier decision than 
independent voters. In the in-depth interviews, interviewees were asked about why they 
made an early or late vote decision. In the qualitative data, of a total of 56 respondents, 9 
out of 14 partisans and 15 out of 42 independents made their decision before the official 
election began. All partisans had made their mind up at least one week before the day of 
election but 9 out of 42 independent voters only decided in the 3 days before the day of 
election. 
Lack of interest in election: Why did voters make their vote decision so late? 
Qualitative interview data suggest that partisans made a late choice because they were not 
very interested in the election. They did not follow the election campaign, but eventually 
felt that they could not delay making a decision when the day of election approached. For 
example, "I was not interested in the election at all. I thought that I should make vote 
decision before it was too late" (1-210; 1-208). Independent voters made an early vote 
decision when they were paying attention to election events, such as the presidential 
primary. Some of them suggested that they began to support a candidate immediately 
after the presidential primary or the official nomination. Independent voters interested in 
politics gathered information about candidates through political events, and were able to 
come to an early decision. For example, "I began to support Roh Moo-hyun immediately 
after he won the presidential primary" (1-106). "I made my voting decision about one or 
two months before the election.. .1 thought that I had enough information for making a 
voting decision"(I-140). "I had enough knowledge about what candidates had done as 
politicians. I could made a voting decision [so early]" (1-115; 1-107; 1-119). 
Lack of difference among candidates: Some independents voters made late voting 
decisions because they could not see a clear difference among candidates. For example, "1 
did not have a clear preference for any candidates because I could not see great 
differences among the candidates. But I thought that a decision was inevitable, so I made 
it" (1-103; 1-138; 1-109; 1-101). "I made a late voting decision because I did not like any 
of the candidates. When I made my decision, I did not have any particular reasons why I 
voted for him. I just voted him" (1-112; 1-123). "1 could not make my voting decision. 
The day before the election, I overheard that some labour workers having a conversation 
about Kwon Young-gil. At that moment, I made my decision" (1-128). 
Lack of confidence: Some independents made a late voting decision because they 
were not sure about a particular candidate who they liked to some extent. For example, "I 
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was not sure about his qualities or abilities as a presidential candidate. [So, I made a late 
decision]" (1-104; I-141). "1 considered Roh Moo-hyun for a long time, but I could not 
made a final decision [until it was close to the day of election]" (1-128). Some of them 
voted tactically. For example, "I could not make a choice between two candidates [Roh 
Moo-hyun and Kwon Young-gil]. I leaned towards Kwon. But, I voted for Roh when I 
heard that Chung Mong-joon had broken off his electoral coalition with Roh" (1-126; 1- 
102; FM I; FM4; FM5). 
Changing Vote Intention: Volatile Voters? 
According to the party identification model, partisans who are firmly anchored to a 
political party are less likely to be influenced by a `political storm', while independent 
voters who do not have the party anchor are more inclined to change their electoral 
preference depending upon political events within a prolonged campaign. The long-term 
loyalty of partisans and their reliance on parties for information about politics means that 
they are relatively less affected by short-term political affairs and their vote preferences 
are relatively stable. Unlike partisans, independent voters without a long-term party 
attachment and unconstrained by partisanship are more affected by a transitory events, 
and change their electoral preferences depending upon their reconsideration of short-term 
factors such as candidates or policies. 
Changes in Voting Intention: Independents vs Partisans 
Table 8.14 shows that independent voters were more likely to change their mind 
about their electoral preference compared to partisans. The difference between partisans 
and independents was relatively large in 1997 compared to the difference in 2002.33 per 
cent of independent voters changed their voting decision in 1997, but this fell to 22.2 per 
cent in 2002, while the percentage for partisans was unchanged at about 15 per cent. The 
difference between partisans and independent voters in terms of a changed voting 
intention remains when four types of voters are examined. Attentive independents and 
apolitical independents are more inclined to change their voting decision than critical 
partisans and habitual partisans. In particular, in 2002, a quarter of attentive independents 
changed their voting intention. This implies that attentive independents were more 
responsive to campaigns or short-term issues than other types of voters in the 2002 
presidential election. 
The reason why attentive independents were more likely to alter their electoral 
preference in 2002 is related to the political context of the election. In 2002, two leading 
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candidates, Roh Moo-hyun and Chung Mong-joon, agreed on a single candidacy against 
the other leading candidate, Lee Hoi Chang, one month before the day of the election. 
Consequently, it was unavoidable that voters who supported Chung Mong-joon change 
their voting intention because Chung Mong-joon stopped running for presidency just 
before the official campaign began. 25 Voters who made an early voting decision before 
the official campaign began were more likely to be attentive independents rather than 
apolitical independents. Thus, independent voters who had to change their vote decision 
due to the withdrawal of Chung Mong-joon were more likely to be attentive independents 
rather than apolitical independents. 
Post-election survey data shows that 21.2 per cent of voters experienced a change in 
their electoral preference in the 1997 presidential election, while 17.9 per cent of the 
voters did so in 2002 (see Table 8.14). This percentage is actually large, but is not so great 
compared to the wide gap between the highest and lowest point of the individual 
candidates' popularity during the election year. As discussed in Chapter 5, each 
candidate's popularity rose and fell considerably during the year before the shorter 
official campaign began. This fluctuation of voting preference at the aggregate level data 
implies a shift in individual vote preferences during the election year. For example, in 
2002, Roh Moo-hyun, the ruling party's candidate, fluctuated between about 60 per cent 
to about 20 per cent. In 1997, Lee Hoi Chang also experienced a similar degree of a 
vacillation in his popularity during the election year. 
The difference in the degree of changing voting intention between pre-election 
surveys and the post-election survey implies that fluctuation of candidate preference 
during the year was largely affected by changes in the strength of voting intentions from 
one candidate to non-preference rather than changes from one candidate to another 
candidate. In other words, it seems that voters began to support one candidate, but 
experienced a weakening of voting intention depending upon political events during the 
prolonged election campaign. This was reflected in changes in candidate preference in the 
pre-election surveys. Voters supported a particular candidate in a poll, but turned to non- 
preference in the next poll. Also, it seems that voters eventually voted the candidate 
whom they preferred initially rather than switch to another candidate. Therefore, in the 
post-election survey, they did not report changes in their vote intention during the election 
year. 
25 The Korean Presidential Election Study shows that about 35 per cent of voters who changed 
vote decision cited the single presidential candidacy of Roh Moo-hyun and Chung Mong-joon as 
the reason why they changed their vote choice. 
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Table 8.14 Changing Vote Preference during an Election, 1997 and 2002 
1997 2002 
Vote C hange Vote Chan e 
N Change No Total N Change No Total 
change change 
Partisans 716 14.8% 85.2% 100% 892 15.0% 85.0% 100% 
Independents 388 33.0% 67.0% 100% 608 22.2% 78.8% 100% 
Total 1004 21.2% 78.8% 100% 1500 17.9% 82.1% 100% 
Pearson Chi-square 49.821 12.670 
Sig. (2-sided) 0.000 0.000 
Critical Partisans 517 14.9% 85.1% 100% 450 13.6% 86.4% 100% 
Habitual Partisans 198 14.6% 85.4% 100% 442 16.5% 83.5% 100% 
Attentive Independent 204 31.9% 68.1% 100% 203 25.6% 74.4% 100% 
Apolitical Independent 184 34.2% 65.8% 100% 405 20.5% 79.5% 100% 
Total 1103 21.2% 78.8% 100% 1500 17.9% 82.1% 100% 
Pearson Chi-square 49.903 16.408 
Sig. (2-sided) 0.000 0.001 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1997 and 2002. 
Key: N= number of cases. 
Note: Question 2-4 in 1997 and Question 15 in 2002 (i. e., "Did you change your mind before you 
voted the way you did? ") are used in this analysis; Data for 1997 is not available. 
Why Did Voters Change Their Initial Choice? 
In the in-depth interviews, there were not very many voters who changed their 
decision based on a re-evaluation of the candidates during the election year. In particular, 
independents delayed making their vote decision, but once made, they maintained it as 
much as partisans did. Among the 56 interviewees, 13 respondents changed their voting 
decision at least once during the year. Of this group, there were 4 out of the 14 partisans 
and 9 out of the 42 independents, but only 6 of them changed their vote decision after re- 
evaluating the candidates. 4 independents were forced to change their vote choice because 
Roh Moo-hyun and Chung Mong-joon agreed on an election coalition and Chung stopped 
running for presidency. For example, "I initially supported Chung Mong-joon, but I had 
to change my voting decision due to the electoral coalition" (1-109; I-123; 1-125; 1-134). 
Also, one independent voter and two partisans changed their decision based on 
tactical thinking. They preferred Kwon Young-gil to the other candidates, but changed 
their mind because they knew that Kwon did not have any chance of winning. When 
Chung Mong-joon declared a breach in the election coalition the day before the day of 
election, voting intentions were particularly affected26. Voters who did not want to see 
26 In the day before the election day, Chung suddenly declared his withdrawal from the election 
coalition with Roh. Roh's supporters and those who did not want to let a conservative candidate, 
Lee Hoi Chang, win were worried that Roh might lose the election if Chung's supporters changed 
their vote intention following Chung's decision. Thus, voters who expected an easy victory for 
Roh suddenly worried about the possibility of him losing the election. Therefore, many voters who 
originally intended to vote for Kwon Young-gil, a candidate of Democratic Labour Party, changed 
their voting intention and finally voted for Roh rather than Kwon. Also, among Roh's supporters, 
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Lee Hoi Chang win the election changed their voting decision and went for Roh Moo- 
hyun. For example, "I anticipated that Roh Moo-hyun could win the election. I made my 
vote decision for Kwon Young-gil, but the change in coalition over night forced me vote 
for Roh Moo-hyun" (1-212; I-126). 
Among those who did not change their vote decision, some interviewees stated that 
their decision was not totally firm for a while. For example, "Well, I did not change my 
decision eventually, but I was thinking about changing my voting intention" (1-132; I- 
202; 1-102; 1-104). 
those who did not have a strong desire to go to the polls before the event changed their mind and 
participated in the election in order to secure Roh's victory. 
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Chapter 9. Independent Voters and Election Campaigns: 
Are Independents Responsive to Campaigns? 
The aim of this chapter is to examine whether independents are responsive to campaigns 
compared to partisans. In this chapter, it will be argued that TV campaigns, particularly 
TV debates, influence voters in shaping political attitudes, but that the impact of the TV 
debates on voting choice is not strong enough to change pre-existing voting decisions. In 
addition, it will be argued that the impact of the Internet on voting choice in the 2002 
presidential election was insignificant, contrary to a common belief. 
Do campaigns matter? Do campaigns affect voting choice? This is an ongoing 
debate in study of election campaigns. ' Researchers have concluded that as voters make 
their choice before the official election campaign begins and subsequently maintain this 
throughout the election campaigns, election campaigns have only `minimal effects' on 
voting choice. ' Unlike the assumption of the mass propaganda model of political 
communication, the minimal effects model assumes that voters are not entirely passive 
recipients, but pay attention to only the information they agree with. In this `selective 
exposure' to campaigns and the mass media, partisans mainly reinforce their party 
support and rarely change their voting intention. Thus, the main feature of the effect of 
campaigns is reinforcement, not change. Campaigns fail to lead to changes in voting 
choice. 3 
The debate on campaign effects has been reopened in the last two decades with the 
increase of voters without close ties to political parties. A growing body of evidence 
based on more sophisticated research approaches such as experimental methods suggests 
that campaigns do fundamentally affect vote choice. 4 Campaigns affect agenda setting 
' For a succinct summary of theories about impacts of political communication accompanying 
campaigns on voters, see William L. Miller, Media and Voters: The Audience, Content, and 
Influence of Press and Television at the 1987 General Election (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1991), pp. 1-9, and Pippa Norris et al., On Message: Communicating the Campaign (London: Sage, 
1999), pp. 1-19. William L. Miller recognised three models of media influence: the propaganda 
model, the minimal effects model, and the consumer model. Pippa Norris identified three schools 
of thought in study of influence of political communication: theories of mass propaganda, theories 
of partisan reinforcement, and theories of cognitive, agenda-setting and persuasion effects. 2 Steven Finkel, 'Re-examining the Minimal Effects Model in Recent Presidential Campaigns', 
The Journal of Politics, 55(1993), 1-21. 
3 Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, The Peoples Choice: How the Voter 
Make Up His Mind in a Presidential Campaign (New York: Columbia University Press, 1944). 
Beranard Berelson, Paul Lazarsfeld, and W. N. McPhee, Voting (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1954). 
° Pippa Norris, 'Campaign Communication', in Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G. Niemi, and Pippa 
Norris, eds, Comparing Democracies 2: New Challenge in the Study of Elections and Voting 
(London: Sage, 2002), pp. 127-47, at pp. 132-3. For research emphasising campaign effects in the 
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and shape perceptions with subsequent changes in attitudes eventually influencing voting 
choice. 5 
Regardless of these debates on campaign effects, many researchers generally agree 
that some people are more responsive to campaigns compared to others. Researchers 
suggest that political awareness, partisan intensity, prior political knowledge, and interest 
in politics determine the susceptibility of individuals to campaigns 6 Therefore, party 
identification and partisan disposition is a key variable to explain campaign effects. 
Theorists advocating the `minimal effects' model argue that partisans who are anchored 
to a political party are not greatly influenced by election campaigns, so the voting 
behaviour of partisans is less likely to be influenced by election campaigns compared to 
independent voters. Furthermore, researchers who argue for campaign effects find that 
there are considerable variations among the electorate, and suggest that the campaign 
effect on vote choice is conditional on partisan dispositions or previous preference. ' 
Campaigns do not indiscriminately impact on the electorate, but are more likely to affect 
independent voters or undecided voters compared to partisans or voters who have vote 
preference. 
The `cognitive consonance' theory also suggests a psychological mechanism to 
explain differences in campaign impacts across various groups of voters. According to 
this theory, people do not alter, but strengthen their attitudes and values when they are 
exposed to information that is incongruous with attitudes or perceptions they hold! 
Therefore, voters with a feeling of attachment to a political party are likely to resist 
changing their previous attitudes and perceptions, and campaigns rarely change their 
voting choice. On the other hand, voters who do not have party affiliation or do not have 
last two decades, see Miller, Media and Voters; Shanto Iyengar and Donald R. Kinder, News That 
Matters: Televisions and American Opinion (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1987); Shanto 
Iyengar and A. F. Simon, `New Perspective and Evidence on Political Communication and 
Campaign Effects', Annual Review of Psychology, 51 (2000), 149-69. 
s Norris et al., On Message. Also, an on-line model of candidate evaluation process argues that 
voters immediately adjust their overall evaluation of the candidate when they are exposed to 
campaign events and information, even though they forget most campaign information over time 
and hardly recollect campaign information in post-election surveys. Milton Lodge, Marco R. 
Steenbergen, and Shawn Brau, `The Responsive Voter: Campaign Information and Dynamics of 
Candidate Evaluation', American Political Science Review, 89 (1995), 309-326. 
6 James A. Thurber, Candice J. Nelson, and David A. Dulio, `Introducation', in James A. Thurber, 
Candice J. Nelson, and David A. Dulio, eds, Crowded Airwaves: Campaign Advertising in 
Elections (Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), pp. 1-9, at p. 5. John Zaller, The 
Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
1 Stephen Anlsolabehere and Shanto Iyengar, Going Nagative: How Political Advertisements 
Shrink and Polarize the Electorate (London: Free Press, 1995). D. Sunshine Hillygus and Simon 
Jackman, `Voter Decision Making in Election 2000: Campaign Effects, Partisan Activation, and 
the Clinton Legacy', American Journal of Political Science, 47 (2003), 583-596. 
$ Milton Lodge and Ruth Hamill, `A Partisan Schema for Political Information Processing', 
American Political Science Review, 80 (1986), 505-520. Pamela Conover and Stanley Feldman, 
`How People Organize the Political World: A Schematic Model', American Journal of Political 
Science, 28 (1984), 95-126. 
266 
Chapter 9 
vote preference are potentially open to campaign effects. 
Do campaigns have a powerful impact upon the electorate in Korea where 
independent voters are increasing and partisan loyalty is weakening? And are campaigns 
a significant determinant of the outcome of Korean presidential election? The first section 
of this chapter examines the effects of election campaigns on voting choice focusing on 
TV presidential debates. The TV presidential debate is the most influential source of 
information for elections. If we fail to find even a modest impact of TV presidential 
debates on voting choice, we can expect other sources of information to have an even 
weaker effect. The second section of this chapter discusses the impact of the Internet 
campaign on voting choice. This new form of electioneering was thought to have 
particularly affected the young. 
1. TV Presidential Debates and Independent Voters 
Mao Tse-tung who led Chinese communist revolution said, "Political power grows out of 
the barrel of a gun". As a journalist said, if Mao were a politician living in the present 
Korean democracy, he might rephrase this to political power grows out of the tube of a 
television set. Political parties, candidates, and campaigners believe that TV presidential 
debates greatly affect voting choice and TV presidential debates determine the outcome 
of elections in Korea. Every political party, candidate and campaigner spent a great deal 
of effort and campaign moneys preparing for the TV presidential debates. For example, in 
the 1997 presidential election, the campaign camp of candidate Kim Dae-jung believed 
firmly that the TV presidential debates could influence voters, and that Kim's better 
performance in TV debates was one of the key factors contributing to his victory in the 
election .9 
There were three TV presidential debates both in 1997 and in 2002.10 In each TV 
presidential debate, the three major candidates appeared together and debated various 
issues. It is estimated that a maximum of 20 million electors watched each TV debate. 
The TV debate is the only campaign event to attract so many voters' attention at one time. 
9 For example, according to my personal recollections, MP Park Sang-cheon often emphasised the 
impacts of TV debates on the outcome of the 1997 presidential election. As the floor leader of the 
National Congress for New Politics, Park introduced TV presidential debates in the 1997 
presidential election. Park also charged the party's media campaign committee during the 1997 
presidential election campaign. 
° Here I focus on TV presidential debates that were held during the official campaign period and 
in which three major contenders appeared together. Many TV debates, in which one candidate 
appeared and debated with the panel before the official campaign began, are excluded in my 
analysis. 
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The press promptly reported the campaign event in detail, and many voters often had 
talked with family members, friends, and colleagues about the debates at the end of each. 
Therefore, it might be guessed that the influence of the TV debates was considerable. 
Television: the most Important Source of Information 
WeiehinR TV Camp aijns 
The TV campaign, such as TV debates or TV speeches, was the most important 
source of information about candidates and issues. In answering a survey question about 
the source of information affecting their vote decision, 82.7 per cent of all voters cited 
that the television campaign was the most influential information source among various 
types of election campaigns. Apart from the TV campaign, the news media was next 
important with 48.8 per cent of respondents referring to news from mass media and a 
further 21.3 per cent of respondents cited family members or other people (see Table 
9.1). " 
Table 9.1 Frequency Table: The Source for the Information that Voters Concerned in 
Presidential Election, 2002 
I" Answer 
A) 
2 Answer Total 
(A+B) 
N % N % N % 
TV (interviews, debates, and speeches) 1223 82.7 13 1.0 1236 43.5 
Campaign poster, letters, and books 61 4.1 152 11.2 213 7.5 
The Internet or telephone 43 2.9 128 9.4 171 6.0 
Public speeches, or canvass 34 2.3 114 8.4 148 5.2 
News reports by TV, radio, or newspaper 96 6.5 664 48.8 760 26.8 
Family members or other people 21 1.4 290 21.3 311 11.0 
Total 1478 100.0 1361 100.0 2839 100.0 
uara: xorean rresiaennai tiection Maury, zuuz. 
Key: N= number of cases. 
Note: Cases of `no answer' in the survey are excluded. Question 19 ("Which was the most 
important source for the information on candidates that you concerned? ") is used in this analysis. 
There was no difference in attaching weight to television between partisans and 
" This generally confirms the results of a pre-election survey conducted by a civil activist group, 
People's Coalition for Media Reform. In the pre-election survey, voters perceived that television 
(i. e., TV news or TV debates) was the most influential information medium. In answering a survey 
question about the most influential information medium affecting vote decision, 28.4 per cent, 28.0 
per cent, 22.6 per cent, and 7.8 per cent of respondents cited TV debates, TV news, newspapers 
and magazines, and political websites, respectively. In the survey, the old were more dependent 
than other age groups on newspapers and magazines, while the young relied on TV debates and 
TV news, at http: //www. pcmr. or. kr. 
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independent voters. However, there was a difference across four types of voters. Critical 
partisans and attentive independents attached greater weight to TV debates and TV 
speech compared to other types of voters (see first answer in Table 9.2). In second answer, 
critical partisans and attentive independent relied more on news from the mass media 
compared to other types of voters, while habitual partisans and apolitical independents 
were significantly more likely than critical partisans or attentive independents to rely on 
family members and other people, though they too relied more on the media than on these 
personal contacts (see Table 9.2). 
Table 9.2 Important Source of Information by Four 'Iypes of Voters, 2002 
Four of Voters 
N C-P H-P At-I AI Total 
' Answer 
TV (interviews, debates, and speeches) 1233 84.8% 80.5% 84.4% 82.0% 82.7% 
Campaign poster, letters, and books 61 2.9% 4.6% 5.0% 4.5% 4.1% 
The Internet or telephone 43 3.8% 2.3% 4.5% 1.8% 2.9% 
Public speeches, or canvass 34 2.3% 3.4% 0.0% 2.3% 2.3% 
News reports by TV, radio, or newspaper 96 5.4% 7.1% 5.5% 7.5% 6.5% 
Family members or other people 21 0.7% 2.1% 0.5% 2.0% 1.4% 
Total 1478 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Pearson Chi-square = 22.403 
Si (2-sided) = 0.098 
2 Answer 
TV (interviews, debates, and speeches) 13 1.0% 1.5% 1.6% 0.0% 1.0% 
Campaign poster, letters, and books 152 11.9% 13.2% 8.0% 9.8% 11.2% 
The Internet or telephone 128 7.3% 9.5% 10.2% 11.1% 9.4% 
Public speeches, or canvass 114 8.6% 7.5% 7.5% 9.5% 8.4% 
News reports by TV, radio, or newspaper 664 51.9% 44.5% 57.2% 45.9% 48.8% 
Family members or other people 290 19.2% 23.9% 15.5% 23.6% 21.3% 
Total 1361 1000/0 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Pearson Chi-square = 25.497 
Sig. (2-sided) = 0.044 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 2002. 
Keys: N= number of cases; C-P = critical partisan; H-P = habitual partisan; At-I = attentive 
independent; Ap-I = apolitical independents. 
Why Did Voters Rely on TV Campaigns? 
Why do voters, both partisans and independents, rely so heavily on TV campaigns in 
gathering information about candidates and election issues? In in-depth interviews and 
focus group interviews, respondents revealed several reasons why they relied on TV 
campaigns, particularly TV presidential debates, compared to other ways of campaigns. 
Most interviewees referred to the strengths of TV debates compared to other types of 
information source. 
Direct evaluation: First, many interviewees suggested that the TV debates were the 
only part of the campaign in which they could know and evaluate candidates by 
themselves. Voters want to get primary sources rather than secondary sources in 
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evaluating candidates. As a Korean proverb puts it, "seeing something once is much 
better than hearing it from other people one hundred times". For example, "Unlike other 
information sources, such as campaign pamphlets, candidates engage in dialogue with 
other candidates in TV debates. I can understand candidates better when I see directly 
what they are saying. The TV debates helped me a lot to know about the candidates" (I- 
139; 1-125). "The TV debates greatly affected me because I can directly see the 
candidates" (1-104; 1-108; 1-114; 1-123). "In the TV debates, the candidates have to 
answer a question that they do not anticipate. In answering this question, candidates 
sometimes give an unvarnished account of what they think" (I- 105; 1-107; 1-118). "News 
reports are written by reporters and campaign pamphlets were produced by someone... In 
the TV debates, candidates themselves have to speak [to other contender]. TV debates are 
useful for me to judge each candidate's capability" (1-102; 1-107). 
Some voters even perceived that newspapers, as a secondary information source, are 
not impartial and discredited information from newspapers. For example, "In the TV 
debates, candidates are themselves involved in a discussion. [So TV debates are better 
than newspapers]... All newspapers have a different perspective on the candidates 
depending on their political inclination" (1-209). "1 think that newspapers are not 
impartial. So I do not read the newspaper [politics section]" (FM2). 
Convenience: Second, TV debates are convenient for voters to compare all major 
candidates at a time. Voters can see differences in policies and issue preferences among 
the candidates without extra effort. For example, "To be honest, it is difficult to know the 
various policies offered by each political party if we do not have a strong interest in 
election. In the TV debates, we can get a summary of each party's policies. This is very 
useful for me" (1-130; 1-124). "In a TV speech or speech in the streets, one person speaks 
alone. But, in the TV debates, we can easily compare each candidate with the other 
candidates when we see a dispute between the candidates" (1-139; 1-201; 1-1027; 1-208). 
Minimum efforts: Third, minimum effort is required to watch the TV debates. 
Without some interest in politics or elections, voters do not read newspapers or use the 
Internet. Some voters do not read newspapers, particularly the politics section, and many 
voters do not use the Internet to gather election information. Compared to other campaign 
methods, voters can watch the TV without a strong intention to watch the debates and 
without much interest in the election. For example, "We just need to turn on the power, 
and then we can get information from the major candidates" (1-124). "It is much more 
convenient for me to watch the TV debate than to read newspapers because I am old" (I- 
135). "The TV debates were very useful for me [to know candidates]. It was convenient 
for me to see the candidates on television. It was good because I could get information 
about policies in detail" (I-101). 
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Entertainment: Fourth, the TV debates are enjoyable and easily understandable. 
Some voters may feel that TV debate is similar to a ping-pong game. A candidate raises a 
question and other candidates defend themselves. The candidates also know that they are 
fighting with each other in the debates, but they actually talk to the public through the TV. 
The candidates tried to make any dull topics simple enough for ordinary citizens to 
understand without difficulty. For example, "I expected that candidates would abuse each 
other in the debates... However, I realised that it was fun to watch debates" (FF8). 
Initiating other campaigns: Finally, the running time of each TV debate is about 
two hours, but the TV debates initiate other types of campaign activity. News media 
report on the TV debates in detail. Many voters chat with other people about the TV 
debates after watching the debates. Roughly more than one third of the respondents in the 
in-depth interviews revealed that they had discussed them with other people, such as 
family and friends. For example, "I chatted with many people. We were talking about 
which candidate was better in debates" (1-106; 1-124; 1-126; 1-122; 1-116; 1-140; 1-203). 
"Unfortunately, I did not watch the TV debates, but I heard about them from other 
people" (1-113). 
However, it is noticeable that some voters are more likely to have a conversation 
with others after watching debates than others. Most women participants in the focus 
group interviews did not discuss the debates with others. Most women in the focus group 
had watched the TV debates with their husband and had talked with them while watching 
the debates, but they did not have a chance to talk with other people after watching 
debates. For example, "I did not discuss the election with other people [after watching the 
TV debates]. We [housewives] hardly talk about politics" (FF7). "I chatted a little bit with 
my husband [during watching TV debates]. But, I did not talk about the election with my 
neighbours. " (FF5; FF2; FF7; FF8). Half of the men in the focus group interviews had a 
chance to talk about the TV debates with their colleagues in their work place. In the in- 
depth interviews, respondents who had discussed the TV debates with others were 
generally men rather than women. In addition, the old were relatively less likely to have 
talked about the debates with others compared to younger interviewees, and they were 
even reluctant to talk about the election with neighbours who have a different opinion. 
For example, "I do not talk about politics with neighbours as much as possible. Most of 
them come from the Jeolla region [while I am not from Jeolla region]. " (1-141). 
Watching TV Debates: How and Who? 
Watching TV Debates without Much Attention 
271 
Chapter 9 
A huge number of voters watched TV presidential debates during the election period. 
According TV audience measurement research companies, half of all voters watched the 
debates in 1997 when the TV debate was first introduced into the Korean presidential 
election. The popularity rating of TV debates dropped in 2002. Although the number of 
voters who watched TV debates was still enormous, only one third of the electorate 
watched each three debate in 2002 (see Table 9.3). 
Table 9.3 Popularity Rating of TV Presidential Debates, 1997-2002 
I' Debate 2 Debate 3 Debate 
1997 
Date I December 1997 7 December 1997 14 December 1997 
Topic Economy Politics Social & Cultural issues 
Popularity rating 55.7% 52.5% 51.0% 
2002 
Date 3 December 2002 10 December 2002 16 December 2002 
Topic Politics & Foreign Policy Economy & Science Social & Cultural issues 
Popularity rating 33.8% 32.3% 36.6% 
Source: TV audience measurement by Media service Korea (MSK) in 1997, and by INS-Media 
Korea in 2002, at http: //www. tnsmk. co. kr/compamy/main. htnil. 
Note: The audience measurement companies selected about 1,000 or 1,200 households in Korea 
and installed a special device ('Peoplemeter') in the homes of each panel member. A computer 
system automatically records and counts the average audience rate throughout the broadcasting. 
Pre-election surveys from TNS-Korea show that the percentage of voters who 
watched each TV debate in 2002 was much bigger than the popularity rating found by the 
TV audience measurement research companies. The proportion of respondents who 
watched the first TV debate in the electorate was 71 per cent. The percentages for the 
second and the third TV debate were 66.5 per cent and 63.4 per cent, respectively (Table 
9.4). In the surveys, voters who watched the debates for a minimum of 15 minutes were 
counted as viewers, so the percentages were relatively large. '2 Considering the popularity 
rating measured by TV audience measurement system was relatively low, these relatively 
high percentages in surveys imply that a large proportion of viewers watched the TV 
debates for only a limited amount of time. 13 
Qualitative data largely confirms that most independent voters watched the TV 
debates only briefly or cursorily. Almost all women in focus group interviews reported 
that they watched only a part of the debates or watched them with interruptions. For 
12 Also, the potential overestimation of watching debates maybe related to the `self-selection 
effect' in surveys as turnout is usually overestimated in surveys. 
13 TNS-Korea conducted these telephone surveys immediately after the end of each TV debates. 
The results of these TNS-Korea surveys were partly reported by a newspaper, Munwhallbo. 
However, due to the Election Act in Korea, it is prohibited to reveal candidate popularity in polls 
during the official campaign period. Thus, the newspaper did not report the outcome of these 
surveys in detail. 
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example, "During watching TV debates, I often went to the kitchen to do something. [So 
I could not watch TV debates continually]" (FF4; FF6; FFl) "I only watched some part of 
the debates intermittently when my husband watched them" (FF3). All male participants 
also watched only part of the TV debates and some of them watched the debates without 
paying much attention. For example, "I could not watch the first debate because I was 
busy at work. I watched the second debate for last 30 minutes. I watched only the third 
debate" (FM3; FM4; FMS; FM I) "I watched one of the debates, but I watched it under 
the influence of drink" (FM6). 
In the in-depth interviews, many respondents also confessed that they watched the 
debates inattentively. Among 56 respondents, 8 voters did not watched the TV debates at 
all. Roughly half of respondents watched at least one of three debates thoroughly and the 
rest watched the debates for only a limited time or intermittently. Also, among the 
respondents who watched at least most part of one debate, some revealed that they did not 
watch it with much attention. For example, "I watched all three debates without much 
consideration. I already made my voting decision before watching the TV debates" (1- 
111). "1 skimmed most of them. I already knew a lot about the candidates and issues 
before watching the TV debates. [So, I did not expect anything new]" (1-114). 
Who Watched the TV Presidential Debates? 
Social and economic characteristics of viewers: Table 9.4 shows who watched the 
TV debates in the 2002 presidential election. In general, there are relatively strong 
relationships between viewing the TV debates and sociological characteristics of voters. 
For example, there is a liner relation between age and watching TV debates. The old were 
more likely to watch the debates than younger voters. The difference was relatively large, 
and the pattern was repeated in all three debates. Men were more likely to watch the TV 
debates than women. There was no difference in watching the TV debates across voters 
who have different levels of educational attainment, though in the third presidential 
debate, those who have only lower education were actually more likely to watch the 
debate than those with higher level of education. Although the relationship between 
watching the debates and voters from different regions did not have a clear pattern, voters 
who from Jeolla were more likely to watch the programmes than voters from Seoul and 
Gyeonggi. The economic characteristics of voters also are associated with watching the 
candidate debates. Wealthier voters were less inclined to watch the TV debates compared 
to poorer ones. In terms of occupation, students and blue-collar workers were not 
relatively disinclined to view the debates, whereas farmers were more likely to watch the 
TV debates than any other occupational groups. As a result of these socio-economic 
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characteristics of viewers, we may presume that those with a pre-existing vote preference 
were more likely to watch the TV debates than those voters still undecided. For example, 
as discussed in a previous section of this chapter, older voters tended to made early voting 
decision before the official election campaign compared to more youthful voters. 
Vote intention: Survey evidence from TNS-Korea confirms that those with a 
candidate preference (or voting intention) were more likely to watch the TV debates than 
those who without this. For example, 72.9 per cent of voters who had a candidate 
preference watched the first TV debate, while 57 per cent of voters who did not have a 
preference watched it. In the third debate, 64.1 per cent of voters with a preferred 
candidate watched the broadcast compared to 59.1 per cent of those voters without such a 
preference (see Table 9.4). Thus, voters who were potentially open to the impact of the 
TV campaign did not watch the debates as much as others. Therefore, the impact of the 
TV debates on voter's voting choice and the election outcome was attenuated by the fact 
that those most open to influence were less likely to watch, if it is assumed that viewers 
who have strong vote intention were less likely to change their vote intention regardless 
how much they were exposed by election campaigns. 
Partisans vs independents: The voters who watched the TV debates the most were 
loyal partisans who had a firm voting intention rather than the weak partisans and 
independents who were potentially open to the impacts of the debates. For example, pre- 
election survey evidence from TNS-Korea shows that 72.4 per cent of party identifiers 
watched the first TV debate, while 67.2 per cent of independent voters watched it. Also, 
69.0 per cent and 65.5 per cent of partisans watched the second and third debates 
respectively compared to 60.3 per cent and 58 per cent of independent voters (see Table 
9.4). 
The post-election survey also shows the same pattern. As shown in Table 9.5, the 
survey evidence suggests that the percentage of partisans who watched all or most of TV 
debates in 2002 was 76.9 per cent, while the percentage of independent voters who 
watched all or most of TV debates was 68.8 per cent. There is clear difference in the 
average score of watching TV debates in a 4-point scale (i. e., I= watching all of them to 
4= never watch TV debate) for partisans and independent, and the difference is 
statistically significant. 
However, the difference between partisans and independents is blurred when the 
difference among the four types of voters is considered as there is no difference between 
critical partisans and attentive independent voters. In terms of the average score in the 4- 
point scale, critical partisans and attentive independents watched the debates more 
compared to habitual partisans and apolitical independents. This implies that watching the 
TV debates is related to the level of individual interest in the election rather than party 
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affiliation (see Table 9.6). 
Table 9.4 Watching TV Presidential Debates, 2002 
The Is t Debate The 2nd Debate The 3rd Debate 
N % N % N % 
All 1000 71% 1000 66.5% 1000 63.4% 
Age 
20-24 116 52.5% 102 46.4% 116 46.3% 
25-29 123 67.9% 136 57.0% 123 59.4% 
30-34 134 64.1% 134 63.8% 134 54.2% 
35-39 124 71.8% 122 67.2% 124 61.3% 
40-44 124 75.9% 133 63.7% 124 56.3% 
45-49 94 67.7% 88 71.7% 94 60.0% 
50 and over 50 285 81.6% 285 79.1% 285 81.6% 
Gender 
Men 492 74.6% 493 68.3% 492 63.8% 
Women 508 67.4% 507 64.8% 508 63.0% 
Education 
Middle school 221 70.9% 215 65.5% 230 72.9% 
High school 366 70.8% 351 67.3% 370 63.2% 
College 409 71.1% 425 66.5% 398 58.2% 
Hometown 
Seoul /Gyeonggi 123 68.5% 152 65.8% 144 56.5% 
Chungcheong 167 73.0% 193 66.1% 179 62.7% 
Jeolla 247 74.0% 231 63.6% 234 68.2% 
Gyeongsang 338 68.4% 307 68.3% 315 63.7% 
Gan on /Je'u / other 112 72.0% 105 68.9% 112 64.4% 
Income 
Low 324 73.0% 314 67.1% 312 68.6% 
Medium 292 69.4% 301 63.9% 262 63.4% 
High 306 72.1% 309 67.9% 319 59.3% 
Occupation 
White-collar workers 166 68.3% 171 68.1% 157 57.3% 
Self-employed 176 72.3% 173 73.4% 195 64.4% 
Farmers 72 78.5% 64 73.8% 72 71.2% 
Blue-collar workers 88 68.6% 70 53.5% 87 54.2% 
Full-time Housewives 314 73.4% 331 66.6% 328 66.7% 
Students 80 57.2% 83 49.3% 77 49.8% 
Unemployed / other 103 73.5% 104 70.7% 81 76.0% 
Vote intents 
Vote 811 74.0% 800 71.3% 863 66.1% 
Not vote (= abstention) 189 582% 200 42.5% 137 46.7% 
Candidate Preference* 
Lee Hoi Chang (GNP) 364 73.7% 373 71.7% 371 66.3% 
Roh Moo-hyun (MDP) 456 72.1% 434 68.4% 437 63.9% 
Kwon Young-gil (DLP) 59 73.8% 69 N/A 60 52.3% 
No reference / other 121 57.0% 124 N/A 132 59.1% 
Party Identification 
Grand National Party 330 70.4% 352 71.7% 339 69.7% 
Millennium Democratic Party 297 71.1% 268 68.4% 271 62.2% 
Democratic Labour Party 69 84.1% 67 63.3% 72 64.2% 
All other parties 38 78.9% 28 53.6% 37 40.5% 
Independent voters 266 67.2% 285 60.3% 281 58.0% 
Data: TNS-Korea Presidential Election Survey on 4 December 2002, on 11 December 2002, and 
on 16 December 2002. 
Keys: N= number of cases; %= percentage of voters who watched the debates more than 15 
minutes; The Ist Debate = TV presidential debate on 3 December 2002; The 2nd Debate = TV 
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presidential debate on 10 December 2002; The 3rd Debate = TV presidential debate on 16 
December 2002. 
Note: *= based on combined answers to a question about candidate preference and answers to a 
follow-up question for respondents who did not identify any candidate in the first question. 
Table 9.5 Watching TV Presidential Debates and Independent Voters, 1997-2002 
Number of Watchin TV President ial Debates Average score 
cases All ' Most Almost Not Total 
not at all 
1997 
Partisans 753 31.1% 57.4% 10.2% 1.3% 100% 1.82 
Independents 441 22.2% 55.8% 20.2% 1.8% 100% 2.02 
Total 1194 27.8% 56.8% 13.9% 1.5% 100% 1.89 
Pearson Chi-square 28.227 
Sig. (2-sided) 0.000 
2002 
Partisans 892 21.4% 55.5% 20.9% 22% 100% 2.04 
Independents 608 13.3% 51.5% 30.9% 4.3% 100% 2.26 
Total 1500 18.1% 53.9% 24.9% 3.1% 100% 2.13 
Pearson Chi-square 33.711 
Sig. (2-sided) 0.000 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1997, and 2002. 
Key: Average score = average in a 4-point scale from 1 ='watching all' to 4= `not watching at all'. 
Table 9.6 Watching TV Presidential Debates by Four Types of Voters, 1997-2002 
Number Watching TV Presidential Debates Average 
of cases All Most Almost Not at Total score 
not all 
1997 
Critical Partisans 529 35.9% 56.0% 7.4% 0.8% 100% 1.73 
Habitual Partisans 223 19.7% 60.5% 17.0% 2.7% 100% 2.03 
Attentive Independents 210 33.3% 56.7% 9.0% 1.0% 100% 1.78 
Apolitical Independents 231 12.1% 55.0% 30.3% 2.6% 100% 2.23 
Total 1193 27.8% 56.7% 13.9% 1.5% 100% 1.89 
Pearson Chi-square 113.503 
Sig. (2-sided) 0.000 
2002 
Critical Partisans 450 31.8% 55.8% 10.9% 1.6% 100% 1.82 
Habitual Partisans 442 10.9% 55.2% 31.0% 2.9% 100% 2.26 
Attentive Independents 203 24.1% 57.6% 16.7% 1.5% 100% 1.96 
Apolitical Independents 405 7.9% 48.4% 38.0% 5.7% 100% 2.41 
Total 1500 18.1% 53.9% 24.9% 3.1% 100% 2.13 
Pearson Chi-square 179.217 
Sig. (2-sided) 0.000 1 1 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1997, and 2002. 
Key: Average score = average in a 4-point scale from I= 'watching all' to 4= 'not watching at all'. 
Note: In 1997 and in 2002, mean difference between critical partisans and attentive independents 
in one side and habitual partisans or apolitical independents in other side is statistically significant 
at the 0.05 level. Mean difference between habitual partisans and apolitical independents is 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 
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What Did They Get from the TV Presidential Debates? 
In the in-depth and focus group interviews, respondents were asked about what kind 
of information they were interested in or they expected to get from watching the televised 
debates. Respondents talked about anything that they got from watching the debates and 
what they spoke about with other people afterwards. 
Image, personal traits, and style: Many respondents referred to the image of a 
candidate rather than their policy and issue preferences. For example, "In the TV debates, 
a candidate's image is important. I did not see any difference in their policies, but saw 
some differences in their image... I discussed with my friends about the candidate's 
appearance and personality [after watching TV]" (1-140). "I felt that one candidate was a 
narrow-minded man and other candidate is relatively reckless" (1-206; 1-122). "I had a 
talk with other people about which candidate would lead the nation with strong 
leadership" (1-135). "I read his character by his face. I began to know about his qualities" 
(1-132). "He [Kwon Young-gil] did not offer realisable policies, but he showed us his 
dignified manner" (FM5). "I felt that Lee Hoi Chang was refined, but hypocritical. I felt 
that Roh Moo-hyun was not refined, but open" (FM8). 
Some respondents referred to a candidate's personality and qualities. For example, "I 
felt that one candidate was not refined and another candidate was calm and at ease" (I- 
114). "I tried to understand the personality of each candidate" (I-123). "1 tried to find out 
which candidate is firm in his convictions" (1-108). Some respondents pointed to a trivial 
thing such as candidate's speaking talent. "I think that an eloquent speaker has a great 
advantage in TV debates" (I-141). "I think that political leaders should be fluent" (1-111). 
"I tried to see who led the discussion well" (125). "1 tried to evaluate the candidates' 
speaking talent and their general knowledge" (1-133). "I thought that Roh Moo-hyun 
spoke convincingly in the debates. I only remember that he spoke fluently" (FF1; FF3). 
Some viewers watched the debates focusing on candidate performance in TV 
debates. For example, "We had a talk about who was better in the debates" (I-102). "1 had 
a chat with colleagues in the company: Who was better? Did he well reply to other 
candidate's response? Did they match each other's performance? " (FM l ). Finally, a few 
respondents mentioned that they tried to get information about policies, but their interest 
in policies was largely related to the candidates' reliability. For example, "I had a talk 
with my friends about whether the candidates would keep their election pledges" (1-107; 
I-127; 1-209). 
Why image?: Why did viewers take more notice of image rather than policy or issue 
preference of candidates? Many voters are more interested in candidate's personality 
rather than candidate's policy preference. They want to get information about candidate 
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personality and quality. They believed that a candidate's personality and competence is 
more important rather than the policies they offered. Some argued that candidate 
evaluation should be based on personality and the candidate's qualities rather than the 
policies they offered. For example, "I became familiar with their personality, qualities, 
and personal appearance by watching the TV debates... I assumed that only the candidate 
with a better personality or qualities can offer better policies and will keep his public 
pledges" (1-132). Some of them assumed that there were no major differences in policy 
between the candidates. For example, "Because I assumed that there were no differences 
in policy direction between the major candidates, I was more interested in personality" (I- 
214). 
The viewing behaviour of voters is related to why viewers get hardly any 
information about policies and issues from the TV debates. As discussed above, many 
voters watched the TV debates briefly or cursorily. Voters who watched the debates 
cursorily might fail to totally follow them. They might look only at appearances, such as 
speaking style or facial expression, rather than substance, such as policy and issue 
preferences. For example, "In the TV debates, candidates discussed their policies, but it 
seems to me that there was nothing memorable. I did not watch the debates without 
interruptions. During the TV debates, my husband asked for something to eat and I went 
to the kitchen for a while" (FF 1). 
Also, the format of TV debate is related to why viewers get information about 
candidate personality and image rather than policies. Candidates answered each question 
within one or one and half minutes. They were allowed to reply or object to another 
candidate's comments a couple of times. Therefore, candidates hardly explained their 
issue positions in detail. Some viewers were aware of the limits of the TV debates. For 
example, "The TV debate is a debate without much substance. I think that we can get 
much better information from newspapers. I think that the TV debate is no better [than 
other types of information source]" ([-129; 1-211; 1-214). "1 did not get much information 
from the debates. Candidates did not have enough time to speak. One candidate said 
something very briefly and another candidate reply, but did not finish what he tried to 
speak. I could not understand well what they said" (I-FF2). 
Impact of TV debates 
Response to TV Campaign: Are Independents Voters more Impressionable? 
Who are affected by TV campaigns such as TV debates or televised speeches? Were 
the impact of TV debates conditional on partisanship, that is was there any difference in 
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impacts of TV campaigns on voting choice between partisans and independents? It was 
assumed that independent voters are responsive to TV campaigns compared to partisans. 
More partisans have already made their vote decision before the official campaign began 
compared to independent voters. Also, partisans were constrained by their party 
affiliation when watching the television coverage, while independents were free from 
such constraints when they watched coverage of the election. 
Contrary to initial expectations, the post-election survey data suggests that there is 
no significant difference between partisans and independents in terms of the self- 
perceived impact of the TV campaign upon vote decision. For example, the average score 
of influence of TV campaigns in a 4-point scale (i. e., 1= very much influenced to 4= not 
at all influenced) for partisans is almost identical to the average score for independents in 
2002 (see Table 9.7). 
Table 9.7 Influence of TV Campaign on Vote Decision and Independent Voters, 1997-2002 
Number of Influence of TV Campaign Average 
cases Very Some- Almost Not at Total score 
much what none all 
1997 
Partisans 665 48.9% 38.0% 10.8% 2.3% 100% 1.66 
Independents 344 43.9% 40.1% 13.7% 2.3% 100% 1.74 
Total 1009 47.2% 38.8% 11.8% 2.3% 100% 1.69 
Chi-square (sig. ) 2.992 (0.393) 
t (Sig. ) -1.565 0.118 
2002 
Partisans 672 28.1% 49.9% 14.1% 7.9% 100% 2.02 
Independents 390 24.1% 56.9% 13.3% 5.6% 100% 2.01 
Total 1062 26.6% 52.4% 13.8% 7.1% 1000/0 2.01 
Chi-square (sig. ) 5.729 (0.126) 
t (Sig. ) 0.241 (0.804) 
uora: tcorean Presidential Election Study, 1991, and LuuZ. 
Note: Voters who did not watch TV debate at all or who hardly watch TV debates are excluded 
in 
this analysis. 
However, there are some across the four types of voters. Critical partisans and 
attentive independents were more inclined to recognise the influence of the TV campaign 
on their electoral choice compared to apolitical independents and habitual partisans 
(see 
Table 9.8). This conforms to the earlier finding discussed above that critical partisans and 
attentive independents are more reliant on television in gathering information about 
candidates and the election compared to habitual partisans and apolitical independents 
(see the above Table 9.2). It seems natural that those who relied on TV campaigns for 
their information felt a greater influence of television on their electoral preference. 
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Table 9.8 Influence of TV Campaign on Vote Decision by Four Types of Voters, 
1997-2002 
Number of Influence of TV Campaign Average 
cases Very Some- Almost Not at Total score 
much what none all 
1997 
Critical Partisans 485 54.0% 34.0% 9.7% 2.3% 100% 1.60 
Habitual Partisans 179 35.2% 49.2% 13.4% 2.2% 100% 1.83 
Attentive Independents 189 54.5% 30.7% 13.2% 1.6% 100% 1.62 
Apolitical Independents 155 31.0% 51.6% 14.2% 3.2% 100% 1.90 
Total 1008 47.2% 38.8% 11.7% 2.3% 100% 1.69 
Chi-square 42.923 
(Sig. ) (0.000) 
F 8.548 
(Sig. ) (0.000) 
2002 
Critical Partisans 389 31.4% 45.5% 14.1% 9.0% 100% 2.01 
Habitual Partisans 283 23.7% 55.8% 14.1% 6.4% 100% 2.03 
Attentive Independents 165 30.9% 50.9% 13.3% 4.8% 100% 1.92 
Apolitical Independents 225 19.1% 61.3% 13.3% 6.2% 100% 2.07 
Total 1062 26.6% 52.4% 13.8% 7.1% 100% 2.01 
Chi-square 21.570 
(Sig. ) (0.011) 
F 1.042 
Sig. ) 0.373 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, IWt, ana zuuz. 
Key. Average score = average in a 4-point scale where `much influence' is I and `no 
influence at 
all' is 4. 
Note: In 1997, the mean difference between critical partisans and attentive independents on one 
side and apolitical independents and habitual partisans in the other side is statistically significant at 
the 0.05 level. 
Influence of the TV Debates on the Outcome of Election 
In the post-election survey, most voters cited the TV campaign as the most 
important 
source of information that affected their vote choices. Moreover, most voters 
felt that the 
TV coverage of the election affected their voting decision. Despite this, 
it can still be 
questioned whether the debates directly impacted upon their electoral choice and thus 
determined the outcome of election when many viewers had already made up their mind 
by the time they watched the debates. There are two different types of 
influence of 
campaigns on voters regarding the outcome of election. If the TV debates only reinforced 
the voting preference of viewers, the debates did not greatly affect the outcome of 
election. In this way, TV debates, which is the most important part of the campaign, 
produced only minimal effects. If voters made up or changed their electoral choice after 
watching the TV debates, the three programmes might affect the election result. 
In the post-election survey, it is difficult to measure the direct impact of the televised 
debates on voting choices. Respondents can hardly even remember what was 
discussed in 
the TV debates. Furthermore, respondents are not likely to distinguish reinforcement 
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effects from change effects. For example, the effect of the programmes on someone who 
watched the programmes with a strong voting intention might only be reinforcement of 
voting choice, but he or she might have feel that the debates did influence his or her vote 
decision. In order to examine the direct impact of the candidate debates on voting 
decision, it is necessary to measure shifts in voting preference immediately after the end 
of each TV debate. By examining changes in candidate preference in pre-election surveys 
before and after TV debates, Gallup-Korea concluded that TV debates did not greatly 
affect vote change in the 1997 presidential election. 14 However, this verdict was 
inconclusive. Although there were some changes in voting intention before and after the 
TV debates at aggregate level, it is difficult to argue that the TV debates directly brought 
about changes in vote preference as change might have occurred for other reasons rather 
than the debates. 
Changing vote intention or making vote choice after watching TV debates: In 2002, 
TNS-Korea included in their surveys questions to measure the direct influence of the 
debates conducted immediately after the end of each programme. The surveys revealed 
that 8.2 per cent of voters who watched the first TV debates changed their voting 
preference or decided upon a candidate after watching the TV debate (see Table 9.9). The 
percentage for the second TV debate was 6.6 per cent, and the percentage for the third TV 
debates was 8.3 per cent. Therefore, the average percentage of voters directly influenced 
by the three TV debates after watching the debates was 7.7 per cent. Each TV debate 
affected on average 5 per cent of all voters, i. e., approximately one million voters, so we 
might argue that the potential impact of TV debates on the outcome of election was 
immense. 
However, in view of the flows of voting preference among candidates, the impact of 
each TV debate on the outcome of election was limited. Table 9.10 shows the flow of 
voting choice influenced by the TV debates. After the first TV debate, 1.2 per cent of all 
voters began to support Lee, but 0.9 per cent of all voters switched to other candidates 
from Lee. Thus, Lee added only 0.3 per cent of all voters by his participation in the first 
debate. Roh Moo-hyun gained only 1.0 per cent, while Kwon Yong-gil gained 2.3 per 
cent of all voters. The relative success of Kwon Young-gil confirmed previous research 
" According to Gallup-Korea, the support for the major candidates changed before and after the 
debates in the 1997 nresidential election in the fnI1nwinu wav 
The First Debate The Second Debate The Third Debate 
Lee Hoi Chang -3.0% -0.7% -1.0% Kim Dae jung -0.2% +1.0% -0.9% Rhee In-je +3.1% +0.9% +1.6% 
See Gallup-Korea, Jesipodae daetongryeongseongeo tupyohangtae (Voting behaviour in the 15`h 
presidential election) (Seoul: Gallup-Korea, 1998), pp. 194-95. 
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results that the televised presidential election debates mainly affect voting choice for third 
party or relatively unknown candidates. " 
Table 9.9 TV Presidential Debates and Change in Vote Preference, 2002 
N Influence of TV residential debates 
Change Make Total 
(A) decision (B) (A + B) 
The 1st Debate 
All voters 1000 2.8% 3.0% 5.8% 
Among voters who watched TV debate 710 4.0% 4.2% 8.2% 
The 2nd Debate 
All voters 1000 2.6% 1.8% 4.4% 
Among voters who watched TV debate 665 3.9% 2.6% 6.6% 
The 3rd Debate 
All voters 1000 3.3% 2.0% 5.3% 
Among voters who watched TV debate 634 5.2% 3.2% 8.3% 
Data, TNS-Korea Presidential Election Survey on 4 December 2002, on 11 December 2002, and 
on 16 December 2002. 
Note: The following question is used: "Did you change your preference for a candidate or begin to 
support a candidate after watching the TV presidential debate? ". 
Table 9.10 TV Presidential Debates and Vote Decision, 2002 
Total Lee Roh Kwon Other No answer 
candidates / don't 
know 
Ist Gain (A =a+ b) 5.8% 1.2% 2.1% 2.4% 0.1% 
Make decision (a) 3.0% 0.5% 1.4% 1.0% 0.1% 
Switch (b) 2.8% 0.7% 0.7% 1.4% 
Lose (B) 2.8% 0.9% 1.1% 0.1% 0.7% 
Net change (A - B) 0.3% 1.0% 2.3% 
2nd Gain (A =a+ b) 4.4% 1.0% 1.7% 1.4% 0.3% 
Make decision (a) 1.8% 0.2% 0.8% 0.5% 0.3% 
Switch (b) 2.6% 0.8% 0.9% 0.9% 
Lose (B) 2.6% 0.4% 1.4% 0.3% 0.5% 
Net change (A - B) 0.6% 0.3% 1.1% 
3rd Gain (A =a+ b) 5.3% 1.4% 2.2% 0.8% 0.9% 
Make decision (a) 2.0% 0.6% 0.7% 0.2% 0.5% 
Switch (b) 3.3% 0.8% 1.5% 0.6% 0.4% 
Lose (B) 3.3% 1.2% 1.0% 0.7% 0.4% 
Net char e (A - B) 0.2% 1.2% 0.1% 
Data: TNS-Korea Presidential Election Survey on 4 December 2002, on 11 December 2002, and 
on 16 December 2002. 
Note: percentage refers to proportion in all voters including both those who watched TV or those 
who did not watch. 
15 A study on the impact of the TV debates on voting choice in the 1997 Korean presidential 
election suggested that Rhee In je, third party candidate, benefited from the TV debates. See 
Seoung-chan Yang, `Television seongeotoron bangsongui yeonhangryeok yeongu' (The impacts of 
televised debates in the Korean presidential election), Bangsongyeongu, 48(1999), 284-322. For a 
similar research finding in American electoral studies, J. S. Trent and R. V. Friedenberg, Political 
Campaign Communication (New York: Preager, 1991), p. 235. 
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Considering the election was basically a competition between the two major parties' 
candidates, Lee and Roh, the first TV debate affected only very marginally the outcome 
of election. The outcome of the second and the third TV debates did not differ greatly 
from the first TV debate. In terms of the net change, the difference between Lee and Roh 
was very small. Lee gained a total of 1.1 per cent of all voters through his participation in 
the three TV debates, while Roh gained in total 2.5 per cent. Therefore, the margin 
between the two contending candidate was only 1.4 per cent. Roh won the TV debates 
over Lee, but winning the TV debates did not greatly determine the outcome of the 
election. 
Impacts of TV debates on voting choice -- independents vs. partisans: Independent 
voters were more inclined to change or make their voting decision after watching the TV 
debates compared to partisans, though the difference is marginal. For example, 7.9 
percent of partisans were affected by the first TV debate, while 9.1 per cent of 
independents were affected. After watching the second TV debate, 6.1 per cent of 
partisans and 7.9 per cent of independent voters changed or made their vote decision. In 
the third TV debate, 8.1 per cent of partisans and 9.1 per cent of independents were 
affected by TV debates (see Table 9.11). 
Table 9.11 TV Debates and Vote Change by Party Identification, 2002 
Chang ing or Makin Vote Decision 
N Yes No Don't Total 
know 
Ist Total (= A+ B) 710 8.2% 89.4% 2.3% 100% 
Partisans (A =a+b+c+ d) 531 7.9% 89.8% 2.3% 100% 
Grand National Party (a) 233 6.0% 92.1% 1.9% 100% 
Millennium Democratic Party (b) 211 6.0%. 90.1% 3.6% 100'/0 
Democratic Labour Party (c) 58 14.5% 85.5% 0.0% 100% 
Other parties (d) 29 24.0% 76.0% 0.0% 100% 
Independent Voters 179 9.1% 88.0% 2.8% 100% 
2nd Total (= A+ B) 665 6.6% 92.1% 1.3% 100°/a 
Partisans (A =a+b+c+ d) 493 6.1% 93.1% 0.8% 100% 
Grand National Party (a) 252 4.1% 95.6% 0.3% 100% 
Millennium Democratic Party (b) 183 7.3% 92.7% 0.0% 100% 
Democratic Labour Party (c) 42 113% 83.9% 4.8% 100% 
Other parties (d) 16 12.5% 81.3% 6.2% 100% 
Independent Voters (B) 172 7.9% 88.8% 3.3% 100% 
3rd Total (= A+ B) 634 8.3% 91.7% 100% 
Partisans(A=a+b+c+d) 471 8.1% 91.9% 100% 
Grand National Party (a) 236 5.9% 94.1% 100% 
Millennium Democratic Party (b) 168 7.3% 92.7% 100% 
Democratic Labour Party (c) 46 15.0% . 85.0% 100% 
Other parties (d) 16 23.8% 76.2% 100% 
Independent Voters (B) 163 9.1% 90.9% 100% 
Data: TNS-Korea Presidential Election Survey on 4 December 2002, on 11 December 2002, and 
on 16 December 2002. 
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Among partisans, voters who were affiliated with minor parties were more 
responsive to the televised debates compared to partisans of major parties. For example, 
after watching the first TV debate, 14.5 per cent of the Democratic Labour Party's 
partisans and 24.5 per cent of the voters aligned to other minor parties changed or made 
vote decision (see Table 9.11). The same pattern was shown in the second and the third 
TV debate. This implies that partisans who have an affiliation with minor parties cast a 
ballot on the basis of `tactical voting'. 
Whp Did the TV Debates Have Only A Minimal Impact on Vole Choice? 
The pre-election surveys from TNS-Korea, which directly measured the influence of 
the TV debate on individual voting decisions, revealed that the programmes did not 
greatly affect individual voters' decisions nor therefore the outcome of election in spite of 
the many respondents who felt the TV coverage of the campaign had affected their choice 
of candidate. What was the reason for this limited impact? 
Watching TV debates with a voting intention: First, most voters had made their 
voting decision before watching the TV debates. As discussed above, more than half of 
voters made their decision before the official campaign began, and also most voters did 
not change their preference during election. According to the TNS-survey, about 90 
percent of the voters who watched the first TV debate had a candidate preference before 
the programme. 16 In third TV debate, about 94 per cent of the voters who watched the 
debate had a candidate preference. Therefore, only 10 per cent and 6 per cent of voters 
who watched first and third TV debate respectively were potentially open to influence. 
Many voters watched the debates and gathered information from them, but most voters 
did not change their vote decision. 
Watching TV debates through partisan eyes: Second, voters do not watch the 
debates without preconceptions. Most viewers are not impartial examiners in a contest, 
but are similar to sports fans watching their favourite team's game. Voters who had strong 
political attitudes, such as party affiliation and candidate preference, are more likely to 
feel that their preferred candidate has performed well in TV debates, which thus 
consolidates their preference. In answering a survey question about who performed well 
in the debates, more than half of all partisans thought that their preferred candidate had 
done well compared to other candidates. Only a small percentage of partisans felt that a 
rival party's candidate had performed well. In contrast to partisans, independents voters 
16 In the surveys, TNS-Korea repeatedly asked respondents who did not reveal candidate 
preference in first question about individual candidate preference. Therefore, the proportion of 
respondents who did not have candidate preference was relatively small, i. e., about 12 per cent of 
all respondents in each survey. 
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free from party constraints were divided equally across candidates in estimating 
candidate's performance in the debates (see Table 9.12). 
Meanwhile, a quarter of partisans and a third of independents who watched TV 
debates answered that there was little to choose between them in terms of evaluating 
debate performance. Voters may change or make their voting decision after watching the 
debates if they feel that one of candidate was good at debates compared to others. When 
voters feel no difference across candidates in terms of candidate performance in debates, 
voters will not change or make vote decision according to what they learn from TV 
debates (see Table 9.12). 
Table 9.12 Perception toward Each Candidate's Performance in Debate, 2002 
N Lee Roh Kwon No Don't Total 
Partisanship difference know 
1S` Total 710 21.1% 27.5% 24.0% 23.3% 4.2% 100% 
GNP 233 46.4% 11.8% 17.6% 21.2% 3.0% 100% 
MDP 211 2.6% 50.1% 22.8% 19.4% 5.1% 100% 
DLP 58 11.1% 25.5% 49.6% 11.6% 2.2% 100% 
Independents 179 14.4% 21.5% 23.4% 35.2% 5.5% 100% 
2 Total 665 28.1% 29.0% 17.5% 22.4% 3.1% 100% 
GNP 252 54.2% 9.7% 13.3% 19.6% 3.2% 100% 
ADP 183 4.9% 59.2% 14.0% 17.8% 4.1% 100% 
DLP 42 14.0% 30.2% 39.3% 13.8% 2.7% 100% 
Independents 172 20.1% 23.5% 21.4% 32.7% 2.3% 100% 
3 Total 634 24.6% 28.4% 15.8% 27.1% 4.1% 100% 
GNP 236 51.4% 8.1% 10.5% 26.4% 3.6% 100% 
MDP 168 4.4% 54.5% 14.5% 22.5% 4.1% 100% 
DLP 46 4.6% 27.5% 4&4% 13.1% 6.3% 100% 
Independents 163 13.5% 31.1% 14.4% 36.7% 4.2% 100% 
Data: TNS-Korea Presidential Election Survey on 4 December 2002, on II December 2002, and 
on 16 December 2002. 
Note: Partisans who are loyal to their party candidates are highlighted in bold. 
The following question was used in this analysis: "Who performed best in the debate? " 
A few other party identifiers who watched TV debates are not displayed in this table, but are 
included in total number. 
Impacts of TV Debates on Vote Choice: Qualitative Data 
Qualitative interview data generally confirms the result of quantitative analysis. In 
the in-depth interviews, few interviewees perceived an effect of the debates on their vote 
decision. Among 36 respondents in the in-depth interviews who watched the debates at 
least once, 7 respondents believed that TV debates affected to some extent their vote 
decision. It is interesting that all 7 affected independent voters except one were young 
women, a half of them fulltime housewives. In the focus group interviews, 2 participants 
among the 13 independent voters felt that TV debates affected to some extent their vote 
choice. These two participants were coincidently also young housewives. Some male 
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participants in focus group interviews referred to the impact of the debates on their vote 
decision, but they also agreed that the influence was not strong enough to cause a change 
or bring about a vote decision. However, this does not suggest that women are more 
responsive to the TV debates compared to men. Rather, it implies that someone who is 
not interested in elections and who does not have a firm preference, such as Korean 
housewives, is relatively more responsive to TV debates. 
There is a clear difference between those already with a candidate preference and 
those without one in terms of the impact of the televised debates on voting choice. Those 
who were affected by the programmes either had a weak voting preference or none at all 
before watching. In the qualitative interview data, among those who were influenced by 
TV debate on their vote choice, half of them had a weak vote preference and half of them 
did not have a voting preference before watching the debates. 
Confirming vote intentions: Those who made a firn vote decision before watching 
TV debates did not watch them in order to gather new information, but instead tried to 
confirm their decision. Those who had a voting preference before watching the debates 
believed that their preferred candidate had done well in the debates. For example, "Before 
watching the TV debate, I made my vote decision based on some information that I had 
gathered from news media and the Internet. After watching the debates, I was convinced 
that I made the right decision" (1-115). "Because I was convinced that I made the right 
choice, [I did not change my decision after watching TV debates]" (1-130; 1-142). "My 
beliefs about my preferred candidate were confirmed after watching the TV debate" (I- 
107; 1-133). "1 watched the TV debate in order to confirm my voting decision. I thought 
that he had done well in the debates" (1-134; FM4). 
Focusing on a preferred candidate: Additionally, those who had a voting preference 
before watching the debates focused on their preferred candidate when watching the 
television. For example, "I only paid attention to one [of three participant in the debates]. 
Therefore, I think that it did not have any impact on my vote choice" (1-123). "1 got some 
useful information [from TV debate]... But, I did not change my vote decision [after 
watching TV debate]. I have supported him [Roh Moo-hyun] since he participated in the 
presidential primary. I was only interested in whether he was firm in his convictions" (I- 
106). "I made my vote decision before watching the TV debate. I focused on whether he 
is flexible in dealing with the situation that he faced in the debates" (I-125). 
Changing weak vote intentions: A few interviewees who did not have a firm vote 
preference before watching the debates reported that they changed their voting intention 
after watching the debates. For example, "I had supported Lee Hoi Chang because he is 
the opposition party's candidate. But, I realised that Roh Moo-hyun will be a good 
president [even though Roh is the ruling party's candidate] after watching the TV 
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debates" (1-104; 1-121). 
Gathering information: Most respondents who did not have any vote preference 
reported that they gathered some useful information from TV debates, but that they did 
not make their vote decision immediately after watching the debates. Therefore, TV 
debates affected voters to some degree, but the impact was not strong enough to make 
voters choose a candidate. For example, "Yes, I was to some extent affected by the TV 
debates... However, I could not make my decision. I could not conclude that one 
candidate was better than the others. It was very difficult for me to choose one" (FF8). "I 
got some information from TV debates, but I already knew most of them" (1-105; 1-I 11). 
No influence: Finally, most respondents watched the debates inattentively or 
watched only a small part of the debates answered that the programmes did not affect 
their vote decision at all. For example, "I did not watch the debates closely. So, I cannot 
say that I got some useful information from them" (I-112). "I did not take the TV debates 
seriously. I watched only a small part of one of the debates... I don't think that 1 was 
affected by the debate" (FF7; 1-109). "1 could not follow the debate well. I don't think 
that I gathered useful information from TV debates" (FF2). 
The Gap between Results in Pre-election and Post-election Studies 
Although the reinforcement process explains the minimal effects of the TV debates, 
one puzzle still is unsolved. In the post-election survey, many respondents perceived that 
they had been strongly influenced by the TV campaigns. Why is the result of the post- 
election survey so different from the result of pre-election surveys? 
Other TV debates: First, in the post-election survey, respondents might not 
distinguish the impacts of the TV debates held during the official election campaign 
period from the potential impacts of televised debates held before the official election 
campaign began. Each candidate appeared several dozen times in television debates 
during the election year. In these debates, each candidate discussed various issues with a 
panel. This type of TV debate was more like a press conference. In the in-depth 
interviews, some respondents referred to the impacts of these debates before the official 
campaign began. For example, "I was not affected by the televised presidential debates. I 
made this voting decision a long time ago after watching a TV debate held before the 
official campaign began" (I-111; 1-120). Considering the accumulated impact of all of 
these TV debates on voters, it is true that the debates were the most important source of 
information and voters relied on them to gather information affecting their voting 
decision. 
The most salient aspect of the campaign: Second, the TV debate is the most popular 
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information source in elections, and also probably the most memorable event among the 
various election campaigns. Not only those enthusiastic about the election watch the 
debates, but also those less interested pay attention to the debates. Those who gather 
information from other sources, such as newspaper or the Internet, are more likely to get 
nothing new from the debates, and instead see their pre-existing preference reinforced. In 
the post-election survey, they may believe that they were affected by the TV debates, 
even though they did not change their vote decision. Meanwhile, those who do not pay 
much attention to elections also probably watch the debates because this format of 
campaign is convenient and requires only minimum effort, as discussed above. They rely 
solely on the TV debates in gathering information about candidates and issues, and it is 
natural that they feel impact of TV debates on their vote decision. For example, "I did not 
have enough chance to gather information from other sources. So, I would say that the 
TV debates were useful for me to gather information" (1-116). 
Indirect impacts: Third, voters did not change or make vote decision immediately 
after watching TV debates, but they might have done later. TV debates occupied the 
attention of most of the electorate for a while. News media fully reported the events, and 
the issues raised became significant aspects in the election. As revealed in the qualitative 
interview data, roughly half of voters who watched the presidential debates talked with 
others about the programmes. Someone who saw some differences between candidates 
might re-evaluate the TV debates after reading or watching the news media's reports or 
after finding out other people's opinions. In this case, it is arguable that a clear-cut 
distinction between the influence of the TV debates themselves and the impact of the 
news media is almost impossible. But, at least, it is certain that the televised debates 
between the candidates were a central part of the campaign and the accumulated impact 
of the three programmes on the election cannot be totally ignored. 
2. The Internet Campaigns and Independent Voters 
The Internet campaign is no longer new in many democracies. In the 2002 Korean 
presidential election, one of the key features of the campaign was the widespread use of 
the Internet. In terms of Internet use, Korea ranks very highly in the world. For example, 
in terms of broadband penetration, Korea is ranked first in the world with approximately 
21 subscribers for every 100 inhabitants in 2002. " According to a survey in 2000,53 per 
cent of Korean adults go online and Korea is third, while the USA and Canada are first 
17 `International Telecommunication Union (ITU) national reports in 2002'. Cited from 
http: //isis. nic. or. kr, the official web site of the Korea Network Information Center (KRNIC). 
288 
Chapter 9 
and second, respectively. " The number of Korean voters who go online was 
approximately 16 million in 2002 compared to 1.6 million Internet users in 1997. 
After the significant increase in the number of Internet users, all political parties and 
candidates recognised the potential effects of the Internet as an information medium and 
very actively used the Internet in electioneering. Roh Moo-hyun, who was supported by 
the young, non-manual workers, and liberals in urban area, particularly took advantage of 
the opportunities for a cyberspace election campaign. Supporters of Roh Moo-hyun came 
together on-line and made a contribution to Roh's winning the presidential primary. '9 
Many people believed that Roh Moo-hyun's victory was possible because he could 
effectively mobilise strong supporters through a very successful piece of Internet 
electioneering. 20 Roh Moo-hyun, who won the election, even was acclaimed as the 
`world's first Internet president'. 2 
How did the Internet campaigns affect voters in the 2002 presidential election? Was 
the Internet important in electioneering compared to other types of campaigns? Who were 
responsive to the Internet campaigns? Were independent voters more responsive to the 
Internet campaigns than partisans? 
Potential Influence of Campaigns in the Internet 
The Internet campaigns included various activities in cyberspace. E-mails and the 
websites started by candidates and political parties are very common forms of the Internet 
campaigning. Election campaign adverts on non-campaign websites were to some extent 
attempted in the 2002 presidential election. Voters read newspapers on the Internet. 
Online newspapers are to some extent different from traditional off-line newspapers. For 
example, on the Internet, readers read news, but also make comments and leave their 
opinions. Most of all, people look at bulletin boards. In cyberspace, people not only 
simply gather information, but also participate in innumerable debates. Readers of online 
newspapers are not mere consumers of information, but are `prosumers' who produce 
information and share information with others. 22 
The potential of the Internet as an information medium is considerable. Campaigners 
18 The survey conducted by Ipsos-Reid, a marketing research firm based in the USA, on 6,600 
adults in twelve countries. See `Around the World, Gains in Internet Use', The New York 77mes, 16 
February 2003. 
19 'Internetui him jeongchileul baggunda' (Power of the Internet changes politics), Hankyoreh 
Daily Newspaper, 15 May 2002. 
20 Andrew Ward, `Netizens wooed in South Korea poll', Financial Times, 18 December 2002. 21 Jonathan Watts, `World's first internet president logs on', The Guardian, 24 February 2003. 22 The term `prosumer' is coined by the futurist Alvin Toler in his book The Third Wave. He 
combined two terms, `producer' and `consumer'. Alvin Tof tier, The Third Wave (London: Pan 
Books, 1981), pp. 275-295. 
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can reach many voters at a time and deliver information to voters swiftly and at minimal 
cost. Voters can gather much information from various websites, but also peruse bulletin 
boards. Some of them actively participate in debates, and articulated their opinions to 
others via the Internet. Many people appreciate these strengths of the Internet as an 
information medium, and have no doubt that the influence of the Internet campaign on 
voters was considerable. 
However, as a result of a number of features of the Internet as information medium, 
the potential influence of Internet campaigns is limited. First, the `digital divide', a 
division between information `haves and have-nots', is one limit of the Internet campaign. 
Although voters are connected to the Internet, many voters, particularly amongst the older 
and poorer sections of the electorate, still cannot access the Internet. Therefore, it is 
inevitable that Internet campaigns target only some voters rather than all. Second, Internet 
campaigns require voters who are willing to spend time and effort to gather information. 
For example, voters can gather information from the TV or newspapers without real 
effort. In the Internet, voters must have more intention to gather information. Without a 
relatively strong intention, people do not go to political websites. Some voters go to only 
specific websites, such as the sites offered by their preferred political party. Some voters 
do not open e-mails sent by candidates or political parties that they do not like. Thus, only 
voters who have a strong interest in the election and politics are exposed by the Internet 
campaigns. Participation in debates in cyberspace requires a strong political interest. In 
addition, such users tend to have strong political attitudes and select the information they 
are exposed to. 
The Effects of the Internet Camaaisn on Voting Choice: a Schema 
How do Internet campaigns affect voters? Figure 9.1 is a schema of the impact of the 
Internet campaigns on voters focusing on the degree of individual interest in the election 
and the strength of political attitudes. The fast box on the left hand side of the diagram 
depicts passive Internet campaigns, such as e-mail and the Internet adverts. In the passive 
Internet campaigns, voters are indiscriminately exposed to information, although some 
voters may delete e-mails from candidates without reading them. Voters do not need 
much effort to be exposed to this type of Internet campaign. At this stage, Internet 
campaigns are not very different from traditional campaigns such as mailing campaign 
pamphlets. 
The next box of the diagram is active Internet campaigns. In this stage, only voters 
who look for information are exposed to the Internet campaigns. There are several 
different types of actively gathering information from the Internet. These activities are 
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arranged from the bottom to the top in terms of differences in the degree of required effort 
to gather the information. Reading the Internet newspapers requires a minimum amount 
of effort but a strong interest in elections and strong political attitudes are prerequisites 
for voters to participate in debates and write opinions on bulletin boards. In such activities, 
voters are not only recipients of information, but they also transmit and produce 
information. The next two boxes refer to the effects of the Internet campaigns on voters. 
Voters who are exposed to information change or reinforce their attitudes and values, and 
then change or make vote choice. 
In sum, the form of transmission of information through the Internet varies 
depending upon the level of the voter's interest in the election and the strength of their 
political attitudes. Those who are not interested in politics are more likely to only be 
affected by the passive Internet campaigns whereas voters with a strong political interest 
reach to the upper level of the `ladder' of active Internet campaigns. Clicking the website 
of a particular political party is a choice. Without already having a political preference, it 
is unlikely that voters will visit party websites. It is assumed that the degree and nature of 
the impact of the Internet on voters differs depending on the types of activities. Passive 
users of the Internet who are not interested in election are not likely to be affected by 
these campaigns. Low level active users who read other people's opinions and 
newspapers are relatively responsive to campaigns. Active users of the Internet who have 
strong political attitudes reinforce their attitudes and values when they are exposed to 
Internet election campaigns. 
Figure 9.1 Schema of the Impacts of the Internet Campaigns on Voters 
Passive Internet campaigns Active Internet campaigns: a ladder Impacts on Voters 
Campaign 
E-mail 
Campaign Ads 
4 (5) Debates / Writing opinions 
(4) Forwarding information to 
family, friends, and colleagues 
(3) Visiting campaign websites 
(2) Reading reader's opinions 
(1) Reading Newspapers in the 
Internet 
4 
Change in 
attitudes / 
Vote 3 
values choice 
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The Internet Campaigns in the 2002 Election: Aggregate Data 
How many voters collect information from the Internet during the election campaign? 
How often were the voters connected to the Internet for acquiring information about 
candidates and the election? These questions are related to estimating the potential 
influence of the Internet on voters at the aggregate level. It is assumed that the more 
voters exposed to Internet information, the bigger the potential impact of the Internet on 
the electorate is. In short, the scale of the Internet campaigns in the 2002 election was 
large, but was not as great as people said. 
E-mail 
Every political party regularly sent e-mails to a large numbers of recipients. For 
example, the Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) sent campaign e-mails at least once 
per week to about 100,000 voters before the official campaign began. During the early 
part of the official campaign period, the political party sent a campaign e-mail every day 
to about 200,000 recipients, but twice per a week during the later part of the official 
campaign period 23 It is expected that recipients forwarded the e-mail to their friends, so 
real number of recipients might be more than 200,000. 
However, the MDP found that many recipients did not open the e-mail, and 
consequently, reduced the frequency of e-mails. The total number of voters who were 
exposed to the e-mail including voters who received the e-mail from the first recipients 
might be less than 200,000. Considering this number is less than I per cent of the 
electorate, the potential influence of the e-mail campaign on the outcome of the election 
was very small. Also, the mailing list was not carefully constructed. The MDP hurried to 
gather e-mail addresses very close to the beginning of official campaign and little 
information was known about the recipients' political attitudes. It can be reasonably 
supposed that as a result of this haste, most voters in the mailing list were supporters for 
Roh Moo-hyun or the MDP. If most recipients were supporters of the MDP or the 
candidate, the e-mail campaign could reinforce their voting preference, but would not 
change their voting intention or cause them to make their electoral choice. 
Websites 
All political parties started up websites during the election campaign. The Internet 
23 Millennium Democratic Party, Je I6dae daetongryeong seongeo baeLseo (A white paper on the 
16th presidential election) (Seoul: Millennium Democratic Party, 2003), p. 208. 
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became a central means of delivering information to voters during the campaign. For 
example, the MDP started an official campaign website by combining the party website 
and a previous candidate's personal website two months before the official campaign 
began. The record for the number visiting the website in one day was 860,855 on the 
voting day, and the daily average number visiting the site during the official election 
campaign period was 316,307. The average number reading each piece of news, article, 
or letter in the bulletin board in the websites was about 200, and the total number reading 
on the site over the 30 days before the voting day was 5,611,869. The website also 
provided video files, and the number of voters who watched the most viewed video clip 
in the website was 1,624,338.2' Therefore, given the number of voters who visited the 
website, the potential influence of the Internet is enormous. 
However, it might be speculated that the number of voters who clicked the websites 
included many loyal supporters of the party and the candidate. For example, the website 
of the Democratic Labour Party was brought down once because so many voters (about 
80,000) suddenly visited the website. Many voters who visited the website at that time 
were strong supporters of the candidate of the MDP. They visited the website and tried to 
leave a memo to persuade Kwon Young-gil, presidential candidate of the DLP, to 
withdraw from the running for presidency. This seems to suggest that there were more 
than 100,000 loyal supporters for Roh Moo-hyun or the MDP, who actively participated 
in the Internet campaigns. It can be inferred that these loyal supporters accounted for a 
large proportion of those visiting the website of the MDP. 
Internet Newspapers 
In discussing the Internet campaigns in the 2002 Korean presidential election, online 
newspapers, such as Ohmynews, cannot be ignored. This new type of newspaper has 
grown rapidly with an increase in the number of Internet users. For example, the 
Ohmynews recorded a maximum of one million people visiting the website in one day 
during the 2002 presidential election. These Internet newspapers challenged the 
conservative newspapers that dominate the newspaper market in Korea, and potentially 
influenced the outcome of the election . 
2' According to research in mature democracies, 
24 Millennium Democratic Party, Je 16dae daetongryeong seongeo baekseo (A white paper on the 
16th presidential election), pp. 217-220. However, this video clip was an exceptional case. The 
video clip showed the party convention and caused a quarrel among voters. In the convention, Roh 
Moo-hyun cried, and the rival election camp raised doubts about the truth of his tears. So, voters 
tried to find out the truth by watching the video from the website. The number of viewers who 
watched second most viewed video clip was about a half million. 
u Howard W. French, `Online Newspaper Shakes Up Korean Politics', The New York Times, 6 
March 2003. 
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the press affect voters in shaping their attitudes and values. 6 Before the appearance of 
the Internet newspapers, three conservative newspaper, Chosun Daily Newspaper, 
Joongang Daily Newspaper, and Dong-A Daily Newspaper, dominated the Korean 
newspaper market, and the potential influence of the three conservative newspapers on 
voters and on the outcome of the election was enormous. Furthermore, a tension between 
the reformist government and these conservative newspapers reached a peak when the 
government prosecuted these newspapers for tax evasion. 
The domination of these conservative newspapers was weakened by entrance of the 
`alternative newspapers', the online newspapers. At the same time, the `war' between the 
government and the press weakened the credibility of these conservative newspapers. The 
online newspapers often directly criticised the conservative newspapers, and took an 
opposing stance on many political and social issues. In doing so, the online newspapers 
challenged the potential power of the conservative newspapers in agenda setting, which is 
the main means by which the press can influence an election outcome. For example, the 
online newspapers reported intensively about an accident related to American military 
forces in Korea and led the growing feeling of anti-Americanism during the election 
campaign period, while the conservative newspapers emphasised the traditional alliance 
relationship between Korea and the USA and were hostile to the spread of anti-American 
sentiment within society. 
Frequent readers of the online newspapers tend to be liberal or progressive. For 
example, many readers write their own opinions on each report in online newspapers, and 
the number of opinions added to each report is often around a hundred. Most opinions 
added by readers supported the tone of online newspapers and criticised the tone of the 
conservative press. Thus, the online newspapers became an online forum for discussing 
and propagating liberal positions of political and social issues, and effectively challenged 
the press domination of the conservative newspapers in Korea. 27 
Also, liberal voters actively participated in discussions in on-line forums, but were 
also very active in real off-line political movements, such as anti-American 
demonstrations during the official election campaign period. In view of the balance the 
online news sources provided to the conservative dominance within the printed press, the 
Internet newspapers played an important role in the election, and might have affected the 
outcome of the election. 
26 For example, William L. Miller's research on British electoral behaviour in the 1987 general 
election revealed that the press affected voters, though TV did not. Miller, Media and Voters. 
2' In an empirical study of the political characteristics of American Internet users, "people who 
used the Internet for political activity are actually more liberal or Democrats than the public at 
large". See Kevin A. Hill and John E. Hughes, Cyberpolitics: Citizen Activism in the Age of the 
Internet (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998), p. 4 and pp. 27-46. 
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The `Digital Divide' in Election Campaigns 
Who Gathered Information from the Internet? 
Empirical survey data from the Korea Social Science Data Center provides 
information about the socio-economic characteristics of voters who acquired information 
from the Internet during the 2002 presidential election. The Internet was not the main 
source of information on candidates or election during the election compared to other 
sources of information, such as TV debates, news media, and campaign pamphlets and 
posters (see Table 9.1). In answering a question about the most important source for 
information on candidates or election, only 2.9 per cent of respondent chose the Internet 
as their first choice, and 9.4 per cent of respondents cited the Internet in their second 
choice. Therefore, a total of 12.3 per cent of the electorate relied on the Internet for 
finding out information about the election. 28 
The Social Characteristics of `Neozen': In terms of sociological variables, voters 
who depended on the Internet for gathering information during the election tended to be 
the young, the high educated, urban residents, and non-manual workers rather than the 
old, the less educated, rural residences, and manual workers (see Table 9.13). Other 
sources of information except campaign pamphlets and posters were not associated with 
socio-economic characteristics of the voters. Campaign pamphlets and posters, which 
were traditional medium of campaigns, were useful for voters among the old, less 
educated, rural residents, and manual workers. Thus, voters who relied on the Internet 
contrasted with those depending upon campaign pamphlets and posters. A further 
difference was that women were more inclined to gather information from family 
members, friends, and other people compared to men. 
28 It is noted that the percentage does not mean 87.7 per cent of the voters did not get any 
information from the Internet. The percentage is based on the relative importance of the Internet in 
collecting information compared to other mediums of election campaigns. Thus, it is expected that 
a larger percentage than 12.3 per cent of the electorate used the Internet and gathered information 
from the Internet. 
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Table 9.13 Correlation between Source of Information and Sociological Variables, 2002 
Sources of Information about Candidates or Election. 
Internet News Family / Pamphlet Meeting TV 
friend / poster /speech debate 
Age Pearson's R -0.180 -0.014 0.012 0.103 0.025 0.023 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.602 0.657 0.000 0.366 0.403 
N 1361 1361 1361 1361 1361 1361 
Education Pearson's R 0.139 -0.019 -0.011 -0.070 -0.029 0.011 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.489 0.672 0.010 0.287 0.679 
N 1353 1353 1361 1361 1353 1361 
Sex Pearson's R -0.026 -0.030 0.077 0.038 -0.002 -0.024 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.330 0.269 0.005 0.165 0.955 0.379 
N 1361 1361 1361 1361 1361 1361 
Urban/rural Pearson's R -0.065 0.033 -0.015 0.055 0.025 -0.029 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.017 0.226 0.571 0.041 0.363 0.286 
N 1361 1361 1361 1361 1361 1361 
Income Pearson's R 0.051 -0.028 -0.001 0.006 -0.003 -0.018 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.064 0.314 0.962 0.842 0.920 0.526 
N 1305 1305 1305 1305 1305 1305 
Class Pearson's R -0.182 -0.008 -0.068 0.079 0.014 0.045 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.028 0.822 0.069 0.034 0.712 0.229 
N 715 715 715 715 715 715 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 2002. 
Note: Correlations which is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) is highlighted in bold. 
Age refers to age in year; Education is coded from I= primary to 4= college; Sex is coded as l 
male and 2= female; Urban/rural is coded from 1= big city to 3= rural county; Income is coded 
from I= the lowest level to 9= the highest level; Class is coded from I= professional, 2= non- 
manual worker, 3= petty-bourgeoisie, 4= foreman and technician, and S= manual working class. 
Source of information is based on a question, i. e., "Which was the most important source for the 
information on candidates and the election that you concerned? Select two sources of information". 
Each source of information is recoded as 0= those who did not gather information from the source, 
I= gathered information from each source (the 2" answer), 2= gathered information from the 
source (the 1" answer). 
Political Attitudes of `Netizen': In terms of the relationship between political 
attitudes and sources of information, the Internet users are distinct from non-users. Voters 
who gathered information from the Internet were interested in politics, had a relatively 
strong understanding of politics, were liberal, felt the political efficacy of elections, and 
relatively distrusted the news media. Again, in terms of political attitudes, voters who 
depended on the Internets in gathering information contrasted with voters who relied on 
other people or campaign pamphlets and posters. In view of the high level of tension 
29 A study on the impact of the Internet on Korean voters in the 2000 general election suggests 
that there are differences in voting behaviour between those who actively use the Internet and 
those who do not. Also, voters who are interested in politics off-line are relatively more interested 
in politics in online too. See Yong-cheol Kim and Seongi Yun, `Internetui jeongch jeok 
hwaryonggwa 16dae chongseon' (Political use of Internet and the 16th general election)', 
Hangukjeongchihakhoebo (Korean Political Science Review), 34 (2000), 129-47, at pp. 140-44. 
The same pattern is also found in mature democracies. In American politics, people who are active 
in on-line politics are also active in off-line politics. "The mobilization of public expression will 
still largely be the creation of groups and individuals who currently dominate the political 
landscape". See Richard Davis, The Web of Politics: The Internet's Impact on the American 
Political System (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp 1-8, at p. 5. 
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between the government and the conservative press, which was discussed above, it is 
noticeable that voters who relied on the Internet in gathering information showed less 
trust towards the news media compared to voters who did not gather information from the 
Internet (see Table 9.14). 
Table 9.14 Correlation between Source of Information and Political Attitudes, 2002 
Internet News Family / Pamphlet Meeting TV 
friend / poster /speech debate 
Interests in Pearson's R 0.097 -0.007 -0.075 -0.064 0.000 0.030 
politics Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.783 0.010 0.018 0.986 0.266 
N 1361 1361 1361 1361 1361 1361 
Understanding Pearson's R 0.084 -0.050 -0.063 -0.063 0.050 0.049 
politics Sig. (2-tailed) 0.002 0.064 0.020 0.019 0.066 0.069 
N 1361 1361 1361 1361 1361 1361 
Ideology Pearson's R -0.135 -0.024 0.059 0.003 -0.014 0.064 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.380 0.030 0.904 0.613 0.018 
N 1361 1361 1361 1361 1361 1361 
Political Pearson's R -0.067 0.002 0.064 0.059 0.062 -0.066 
efficacy of Sig. (2-tailed) 0.014 0.936 0.019 0.031 0.022 0.015 
election N 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 
Trust news Pearson's R 0.115 0.001 0.067 -0.028 -0.074 -0.049 
media Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.968 0.016 0.314 0.008 0.077 
N 1302 1302 1302 1302 1302 1302 
Party Pearson's R 0.007 0.031 -0.012 -0.020 -0.021 0.004 identification Sig. (2-tailed) 0.804 0.260 0.648 0.457 0.429 0.882 
N 1361 1361 1361 1361 1361 1361 
data; rorean rresiaenuai tiecuon mwuy, zuuz. 
Note: Correlation which is significant at the 0.05 level is highlighted in bold. 
Interest in politics is coded in a 7-point scale from I= not at all to 7= very much interested in 
politics; Understanding politics is coded in a 7-point scale from 1= very little understand to 7= 
very well understand; Ideology is coded in a 5-point scale from I= very liberal to 5= very 
conservative; Political efficacy of election is coded as I= very high to 4= very low; Trust in news 
media is coded as 1= very trust to 4= very distrust; Party identification is recoded as I= party 
identifiers and 2= non-party identifiers. 
The source of information is based on the question, i. e., "Which was the most important source for 
the information on candidates and the election that you concerned? Select two sources of 
information". Each source of information is recoded as 0= those who did not gather information 
from the source, I= gathered information from the source (the 2od answer), 2= gathered 
information from the source (the I' answer). 
Independents vs partisans: There is no difference between partisans and 
independents in using the Internet for gathering information on candidates and election 
issues. However, as shown in Table 9.15, the difference in gathering information from the 
Internet across different party idenitfiers is statistically significant (i. e., Chi-square = 
35.621, p=0.000 at the 0.05 level). Those who identify themselves with the Grand 
National Party (GNP) hardly relied on the Internet compared to those who with 
attachment to the Millennium Democratic Party and in particular minor party identifiers. 
This difference may be related to the difference in the main characteristics of party 
identifiers of each political party. For example, as discussed in Chapter 6, partisans who 
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have attachment to the Grand National Party are old compared to partisans who feel close 
to other parties. 30 In sum, the Internet was important in the 2002 presidential election 
campaign for some voters, but not for every voter. 
Table 9.15 Crosstab: the Internet by Party Identification and Four Types of Voters, 2002 
- Gatherin information from the Internet Chi-s uare q N No To some Very Total (Sig. ) 
extent much 
Total 1361 87.6% 9.4% 3.0% 100% 
Party Identification (1) 3.022 
Partisans 797 88.2% 8.4% 3.4% 100% (0.221) 
Independent Voters 574 86.7% 10.8% 2.5% 100% 
Party Identification (2) 35.621 
Grand National Party 309 94.2% 5.2% 0.6% 100% (0.000) 
Millennium Democratic Party 366 85.8% 10.7% 3.6% 100% 
Other parties 122 80.3% 9.8% 9.8% 100% 
Independent Voters 564 86.7% 10.8% 2.5% 100% 
Four types of voters 9.314 
Critical Partisans 395 88.4% 7.3% 4.3% 100% (0.157) 
Habitual Partisans 402 88.1% 9.5% 2.5% 100% 
Attentive Independents 187 85.6% 10.2% 4.3% 100% 
Apolitical Independents 377 87.3% 11.1% 1.6% 100% 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 2UU2. 
Note: Gathering information from the Internet is based on a question, i. e., "Which was the most 
important source of information on candidates and the election? Select two sources of 
information". Those who did not gather information from the source are recoded as 'No', those 
who referred to the Internet in the 2°d answer are recoded as `To some extent', and those who 
chose the Internet in the I" answer are recoded as `Very much' in this table. 
Also, considering their political attitudes and socio-economic characteristics of the 
voters who are more likely to use the Internet, it was assumed that they were more likely 
to be critical partisans or attentive independents rather than habitual partisans or apolitical 
independents. Table 9.15 shows that attentive independents are more likely to gather 
information from the Internet compared to other types of voters, though the difference in 
gathering information from the Internet across four types of the electorate is not 
statistically significant. 
Active Users or Passive Users?: Qualitative Data 
Qualitative interview data also confirms that the majority of respondents did not use 
the Internet for gathering information on the election. Among a total of 73 interviewees in 
30 A survey conducted by a civil activist group, People's Coalition for Media Reform, during the 
election campaign period yielded the same result. The Internet was relatively important for the 
young and the voters who support Roh Moo-hyun while the old relied on newspapers for acquiring 
information compared to the young. See `Daeseon bodoe daehan icha yeolonjosa gyeolgwa' (The 
results of the second survey on election reports), http: //pcmr. or. kr. 
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focus groups and in-depth interviews, 18 respondents reported that they used the Internet 
for this purpose. This percentage is higher than the percentage in the quantitative survey 
data discussed the above (i. e., 12.4 per cent). However, it should be noted that all 
interviewees resided in highly urbanised area and many participants were non-manual 
workers or students and young, who were more likely to use the Internet compared to 
other groups. 
Who relied on the Internet?: There was no clear difference between partisans and 
independents in terms of using the Internet. However, over two thirds of respondents 
exposed to the Internet campaigns were generally interested in politics, while the others 
were relatively uninterested in politics. Independent voters who were relatively less 
interested in politics were not willing to expend any effort to visit the websites. Therefore, 
the Internet campaigns were not for everyone, but only those who were interested in the 
election. For example, "I use the Internet all day for various tasks, but I am reluctant to go 
to political websites" (FM6; 1-102). "1 often use the Internet, but I did not go to the 
[election] websites because that would annoy me" (1-101). "1 did not go to the official 
websites of candidates. I was reluctant to go there. I assumed that the websites always 
boast about their own candidate (1-125). 
The `digital divide' was apparent in the age difference of Internet users in the 
election campaign. Almost all respondents who gathered information from the Internet 
were young, i. e., below 30 years old. Some young respondents even believed that most of 
their peer group actively used the Internet for gathering information on the candidates and 
issues. For example, "Almost all voters of age 20-30s including me use the Internet [for 
gathering information on candidates and issues]. We can get information from the Internet 
quickly and easily" (1-20 1; I-111). In contrast to the young, the old hardly use the Internet 
for any purpose. Old respondents were even cynical about acquiring information from the 
Internet. For example, "Someone even asserted that the Internet had a bad influence on 
voters. My peer group voters [late 50s] do not think that the Internet campaigns are 
beneficial" (1-203). "I heard about `Rohsamo' [in the Internet]. I did not want to be one of 
Rohsamo. I feared a bad influence from them" (I-106). 31 
Did the Internet influence on vote choice?: What did respondents get or try to get 
from the Internet? Most of them answered that they were interested in other voters' 
opinions on candidates and election issues. For example, "The young often use the 
Internet. As a young voter, I want to know what other young people think [about election 
" 'Rohsamo' (a group for people who love Rho Moo-hyun) was organised spontaneously by some 
supporters. The number of memberships reached to about 100,000 voters. A young supporter 
initiated this organisation through sending e-mails to some potential supporters from an Internet 
cafes in a local city. 
299 
Chapter 9 
issues]" (1-117). "1 did not search for information [on candidates or policies] from the 
Internet. I went to the Internet in order to see other people's opinions about the election 
issues" (I-115; 1-119; I-126; 1-204; 1-211). "Mostly, I want to know what loyal supporters 
for Roh Moo-hyun think about election issues" (I-113). 
There was a wide gap between Internet users and non-users concerning perceptions 
about the worth of information in the Internet. As one of reasons why they relied on the 
Internet, some of Internet users stated that they did not trust major newspapers which 
were not impartial and critical to the ruling party. For example, "I trust information on the 
Internet presented by ordinary people compared to information from the mass media 
which is bias to one side [the right]" (1-124). However, some respondents who did not 
rely on the Internet raised questions about the credibility of information gathered from the 
Internet. Some thought that users gathered rumours or gossip rather than valuable 
information. For example, "I think that I cannot trust the Internet as an information 
source" (1-130). "I usually got rumours and gossip from the Internet [rather than 
information of policies]" (FM2; FM5). 
In general, respondents who were exposed to Internet campaigns believed that the 
Internet was useful and to some extent affected their voting choice. They believed that 
Internet campaigns enhanced the level of interests in election among young voters. For 
example, "The Internet campaign was very important in the last election. Young voters 
were able to use the Internet [rather than the old], and I think that this affected the 
outcome of election" (1-115). "I realised that young voters strongly supported Roh Moo- 
hyun. I was influenced [by this]" (1-122). "I think that Internet campaigns increased 
interest in the election among the young voters" (1-206). 
In conclusion, voters were relatively passive rather than active in the Internet 
campaigns. Most of voters who gathered information from the Internet answered that they 
read bulletin boards in other to know about other people's thinking on candidates or 
issues. Nobody said that he or she presented their own opinion on Internet bulletin boards. 
Only a few respondents went to the official website of candidates or political parties. In 
addition, only a few interviewees answered that they received campaign e-mails. 
Therefore, most voters were not exposed to the Internet campaigns of the parties and only 
a few were active in the Internet campaigns of the parties. Thus, the significance of the 
Internet campaigns in the 2002 presidential election should not be overestimated. 
Summary 
Internet campaigns caught the attention of many voters in the 2002 presidential election. 
The young who were usually alienated from politics suddenly came together on-line and 
300 
Chapter 9 
articulated their opinion about politics. It seems true that the Internet activities were 
related to the higher turnout for the youngest age cohort, i. e. 20-24 years old age cohort, 
compared to that of the 25-29 age cohort, which occurred for the first time in Korean 
elections. However, it is doubtful that the Internet significantly affected voting choice in 
the 2002 election or indeed the eventual outcome of the election. Although the potential 
influence of the Internet on voters was considerable, online campaigning was relatively 
limited in the 2002 presidential election contrary to many people's perception. 
Furthermore, for those active in the online campaigns who were more likely to be 
interested in politics and have a viewpoint, the impact of the Internet campaign on voting 
choice was limited. The Internet campaigns did not indiscriminately affect voters, and its 
potential influence was restricted to only certain types of voters. Those relying upon the 
Internet tended to be predominantly young, non-manual workers, and students. However, 
a considerable proportion of the electorate was not able to use the Internet and many 
voters among those who are able to use the Internet did not use the Internet for gathering 
information. Furthermore, those who are less likely to use the Internet, such as the old, 
are more interested in election and are more likely to go to the poll compared to those 
who are more likely to use the Internet, such as the young. Also, voters who are very 
interested in elections, such as strong partisans rather independent voters, visited websites 
to acquire information. These types of voters who have strong political attitudes, such as 
party affiliation and ideology, hardly changed their vote preference, and instead, had their 
attitudes reinforced by the Internet campaigns. In sum, the actual impact of the Internet 
campaigns on voting choice was limited. 2 
Although the effects of the Internet campaigns on voters in the 2002 presidential 
election should not be overestimated, this is not to claim that the Internet campaigns had 
no influence on the outcome of the election. In the 2002 election, the Internet might have 
contributed to the victory of Roh Moo-hyun because of the `digital divide' favouring him. 
Those who are active in the Internet were more likely to support Roh Moo-hyun. Strong 
loyal supporters for Roh were mobilised through the Internet. They dominated the 
cyberspace election campaign where Lee Hoi Chang and his supporters were barely 
noticeable. Based on the almost one-sided domination in the Internet campaigns, Roh's 
campaign effectively mobilised young voters sensitive to peers' opinions. 
32 In a post-election survey of 1,000 voters, it was revealed that impact of online campaigns on 
voting choice was minimal. Only 7.7 per cent of the respondents answered that they were 
influenced by information gathered from party websites. Also, 44.5 per cent of the respondents felt 
no influence of the Internet campaigns, and 47.8 per cent of the respondents answered some 
influence. The researcher, Won-Taek Kang, concluded that impact of Internet campaigns had been 
exaggerated to some extent in Korea. Won-Tack Kwang, Hangugui seongeo jeongchi (Electoral 
Politics in South Korea: Ideology, Region, Generation and Media) (Seoul: Pureungil, 2003), pp. 
385-415. 
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Chapter 10. Independent Voters and Making Voting Choice: 
Are Independents Rational Voters? 
The aim of this chapter is to examine how independent voters make their voting choice. 
This chapter focuses on short-term and long-term factors affecting voting choice. The 
voting choice of independent voters will be compared to that of partisans. In doing so, it 
will be argued that the voting choice of independent voters is not rational, nor is it very 
different from the electoral choice of partisans. 
There is no doubt that various factors explain individual voting choice. Factors 
explaining individual voting preference include both long-term factors, such as party 
identification and values, and short-term factors, such as candidates, issues, and 
performance evaluation. ' Moreover, it is expected that the voting behaviour of 
independent voters is different from voting behaviour of partisans. The voting behaviour 
of partisans is largely determined by long-term predispositions. In particular, an enduring 
psychological attachment to political parties is the most significant factor to explain 
partisan voting behaviour. Party affiliation is emotional and similar to a religious belief. 
The voting choice of partisans is constrained by this psychological commitment to parties, 
and their electoral choice is a manifestation of this loyalty. Partisans are relatively 
immune from short-term influences on voting choice such as candidates, government 
performance evaluation, and issues. It could argued that the voting behaviour of partisans 
is irrational because they heavily rely on their emotional attachment to parties in their 
voting choice. 
On the other hand, independent voters are free from party constraints in making the 
voting decision. Independents who do not have the enduring psychological attachment to 
political parties are relatively responsive to short-term influences on voting choice. In 
contrast to partisans, independent voters may make their decisions based on a rational 
calculation of candidates, government performance evaluation, and issues. What is the 
key factor to explain the voting choice of independent voters? Is it true that independent 
voters are more rational voters compared to partisans? Are partisans free from all short- 
term influences when making their voting choice? 
1. Making Voting Choice 
' For a summary of contending models and theories of voting choice, see William L. Miller and 
Richard G. Niemi, `Voting: Choice, Conditioning, and Constraint', in Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G. 
Niemi, and Pippa Norris, eds, Comparing Democracies 2: New Challenges in the Study of 
Elections and Voting (London: Sage, 2002), pp. 169-88. 
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Determinants of Voting Choice in Korea 
Party Identification and Voting Choice 
Party identification accurately predicts voting choice in Korea. Although political 
parties have been institutionally underdeveloped and the party system has not been stable, 
majority voters have developed party identification and voted for that party in elections. 
Partisan loyalty to the Grand National Party (GNP) was generally very strong, while 
partisan loyalty to the Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) was strengthened in 2002. 
The degree of partisan loyalty may be explained by partisan dissatisfactions with 
presidential candidates of the party. Although partisans generally vote for their own party 
candidate, partisans are able to defect from their party when they are dissatisfied with 
candidates? In 1992 and 1997, Kim Dae-jung, who was an experienced leader of the pro- 
democratic movement, was a strong contender, but at the same time, many voters had 
very strong negative feelings towards him. Indeed, the so called `anti-Kim Dae-jung' 
sentiment was pervasive among Korean voters. In 1992,8.2 per cent of Democratic Party 
partisans voted for Kim Young Sam, who had been another political leader in the 
democratic movement. In 1997,10.9 per cent of National Congress for New Politics 
partisans voted for Rhee In je, the third party candidate and a defector from the Grand 
National Party (GNP) rather than their own party candidate, Kim Dae-jung (see Table 
10.1). 
In 2002, Lee Hoi Chang faced a similar situation to that which Kim Dae-jung had 
experienced in 1992 and 1997. Many voters were hostile towards him. Pre-election 
surveys often suggested that half of all voters were strongly against him. The electoral 
pact between Roh Moo-hyun and Chung Mong-joon aiming at one candidacy was largely 
based on the large number of voters who did not want to allow Lee to win the election. At 
the same time, people in Gyeongsang, the main stronghold of the GNP, had more positive 
feelings about Roh Moo-hyun who came from the region. The partisan loyalty of the 
GNP dropped and 8.8 per cent of GNP partisans voted for Roh Moo-hyun in the 2002 
presidential election (see Table 10.1). 
Partisan loyalty to third party or minor parties was substantially weaker than the 
loyalty shown to major parties by their partisans. The difference in the degree of partisan 
loyalty is related to the partisan's expectation of their party winning the election. In 1992, 
Chung Ju-young, owner of Hyundai company, formed the Unification National Party and 
2 G. B. Markus and P. E. Converse, `A Dynamic Simultaneous Equation Model of Electoral 
Choice', American Political Science Review, 73(1979), 1055-70. 
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achieved a remarkable success in the 1992 general election held about eight months 
before the presidential election. Chung never led the race, but was nonetheless a relatively 
strong candidate in the 1992 presidential election. In 1997, Rhee In je defected from the 
Grand National Party after he failed to be nominated as the presidential candidate in the 
GNP convention. He formed the New Party for People just before the official campaign 
began. He launched an aggressive election campaign, but Rhee was not a strong 
contender compared to Chung in 1992. In the 2002 presidential election, Kwon Young-gil 
was not a real contender. His party, the Democratic Labour Party, did not have a single 
seat in parliament at that time, and he openly stated that he aimed to gain a maximum of 5 
per cent of the valid votes. 
Table 10.1 Loyalty Rate: Party Identification and Voting Choice, 1997-2002 
Party Identification 
1992 N DLP DP UNP Non Total 
Vote for Kim Young Sam (DLP) 528 93.8% 8.2% 6.3% 59.1% 55.3% 
Vote for Kim Dae jung (DP) 314 2.6% 88.1% 7.9% 22.7% 32.9% 
Vote for Chung Ju-young (UNP) 112 3.6% 3.8% 85.7% 18.2% 11.7% 
Total 954 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
1997 N GNP NCNP NPP Non Total 
Vote for Lee Hoi Chang (GNP) 401 95.1% 3.0% 15.5% 51.4% 39.2% 
Vote for Kim Dae-jung (NCNP) 437 3.4% 86.1% 14.6% 28.6% 42.8% 
Vote for Rhee In je (NPP) 184 1.5% 10.9% 69.9% 19.9% 18.0% 
Total 1022 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
2002 N GNP MDP DLP' Non Total 
Vote for Lee Hoi Chang (GNP) 501 90.5% 4.1% 11.7% 36.1% 39.4% 
Vote for Roh Moo-hyun (MDP) 715 8.8% 94.9% 44.2% 60.4% 56.2% 
Vote for Kwon Young-gil (DLP') 57 . 6% 1.1% 44.2% 3.4% 4.5% Total 1273 100% 10 0% 100% 100% 100% 
r. lara: &orean rresiaenuai tiection atuay, t YYL, i 9Y i, and Luu2. 
Note: loyalty rate is highlighted in bold. 
Keys: N= number of cases; DLP = Democratic Liberal Party; DP = Democratic Party; UNP = 
Unification National Party; GNP = Grand National Party; NCNP = National Congress for New 
Politics; NPP = New Party for People; MDP = Millennium Democratic Party; DLP' = Democratic 
Labour Party; Non = non-party identifiers. 
Ideological Self-Imaee and Voting Choice 
The ideological orientation of individual explains voting choice. In particular, 
ideologies or values may provide a basis for voting choice in new democracies where 
political parties are not based on strong social cleavages or where long-term party 
identification is not well developed. Unlike electoral studies in mature democracies, 
3 Miller and Niemi, `Voting: Choice, Conditioning, and Constraint', p. 173. Also, William L. 
Miller, Stephen White, and Paul Heywood, Values and Political Change in Postcommunist Europe 
(London: Macmillan, 1998). 
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Korean electoral studies often ignore ideology and values in explaining voting choice. 
Researchers argued that political parties are not based on social cleavages and there are 
no ideological differences between political parties in Korea. 4 However, as discussed in 
Chapter 6 of this thesis, Korean voters do perceive an ideological difference between 
political parties. Although regionalism is the dominant explanatory variable in terms of 
electoral alignments, ideology is also a key factor. When political parties are historically 
associated with particular values and voters recognise ideological distinctions between 
the parties, ideology can explain voting choice. 
Table 10.2 The Mean Scores of Self-identified Ideology by Voting Choice, 1997-2002 
1997 2002 
N Mean Std. D N Mean Std. D 
Vote for Party A 362 3.38 1.02 509 3.24 . 95 Vote for Party B 398 2.90 1.15 741 2.56 
. 93 Vote for Party C 180 2.85 1.14 62 2.37 
. 83 Total 940 3.07 1.12 1312 2.81 . 99 
uata: Korean Yreslaentlal t iectton Study, i i9 / and luul. 
Note: Mean = average score in a 5-point scale (i. e., I= very liberal to 5= very conservative); The 
1992 presidential election is excluded due to lacks of data. 
Keys: N= number of cases; Std. D = standardized deviation; Party A= Grand National Party (Lee 
Hoi Chang) in 1997 and in 2002; Party B= National Congress for New Politics (Kim Dae-jung) in 
1997, and Millennium Democratic Party (Roh Moo-hyun) in 2002; Party C= New Party for 
People (Rhee In je) in 1997, and Democratic Labour Party (Kwon Young-gil) in 2002. 
Empirical survey evidence shows that voter's self-identified liberal-conservative 
ideology explains voting choice in Korea. 5 The self-identified conservatives voted for 
Lee Hoi Chang of the Grand National Party, the successor party of the old ruling 
authoritarian party. The self-identified liberals voted for Roh Moo-hyun of the 
Millennium Democratic Party (or Kim Dae-jung of the National Congress for New 
Politics in 1997), historically the pro-democracy party. Table 10.2 shows that there is a 
clear difference in the average score of ideology, which is measured in a 5-point scale (i. e., 
1= strong liberal to 5= strong conservative), across voting choice. For instance, in 1997, 
the average score for those who voted for Lee Hoi Chang was 3.38, while the average 
4 Recently, there are a few studies on the relationship between ideology and voting choice in 
Korea. For example, Won-Taek Kang, `Yugwonjaui inyeomjeok seonghyanggwa tupyohangtae' 
(Voter's ideological attitude and voting choice), in Nam-Young Lee, ed., Hangugui seongeo 
(Elections in Korea), vol. 2 (Seoul: Pureungil, 1998), pp. 47-96. 
S According to the spatial theory, voters consider each political party's placement on an 
ideological spectrum and vote for the party that is closest to the voter's individual ideological 
orientation. Ideological `proximity' between individual voters and political parties determines 
voting choice. Ideological proximity may be a better independent variable because each individual 
voter perceives the placement of each political party in ideological spectrum differently. However, 
in my analysis, ideological proximity is not used due to a lack of data. For the spatial theory, see 
Melvin Hinich and Michael Munger, Ideology and the Theory of Political Choice (Ann Arbor. The 
University of Michigan Press, 1994). 
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score for those who voted for Kim Dae jung was 2.90. The difference is statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level. In 2002, the average score for Lee Hoi Chang was 3.24, 
while the average score for Roh Moo-hyun was 2.56 and again the difference is 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level. It is noticeable that the average score for those 
who voted Kwon Young-gil was 2.37 point. Kwon was a presidential candidate of the 
Democratic Labour Party, which is considered a progressive party in Korean political 
context. Voters who supported Kwon were liberal compared to voters who voted for the 
two major party candidates in the election. 
Issues and Voting Choice 
In an era of partisan decline, voters depend on `policy issues' or `non-policy issues' 
in their voting choice. In an `issue voting' model, voters are similar to consumers who 
look for the product fitted to their preferences. In this model, it is assumed that voters 
recognise the salient issues in the election. Voters have their own issue positions, know 
each candidate's issue position and are able to distinguish each candidate issue position 
from the positions of other candidates. Voters then cast their ballot to the candidate who 
offers the best match with their issue preferences. ' 
The relationships between voting choice and voters' issue positions on four different 
salient issues in the 2002 presidential elections are examined. First, foreign policy toward 
North Korea was a key issue in the election. In general, conservative voters and the major 
opposition party, the Grand National Party (GNP), argued for the containment policy 
toward North Korea focusing on military force, while liberal voters and the ruling party, 
the Millennium Democratic Party (MDP), supported an engagement policy toward North 
Korea, which emphasised an improvement of North-South Korea relations. 
Second, the question of the Korean-USA alliance was another important issue during 
the 2002 presidential election. Voters who recognised that the alliance relationship is 
unequal sought a revision of the relationship, while other voters opposed anything 
detrimental to relationship. Roh Moo-hyun stressed Korean sovereignty, while Lee argued 
for the consolidation of the alliance relationship during the election year. 
Third, voters' position on market reforms was another key issue. Roh Moo-hyun 
emphasised the role of government in market reforms, while Lee asserted market freedom 
and the minimal role of government. Finally, the expansion of the social welfare system 
was another significant issue in the election. Roh Moo-hyun was sympathetic to the 
6 Hilda T. Himmelweit, P. Humphreys, and M. Jaeger, How Voters Decide (Milton Keynes: Open 
University Press, 1985). 
Angus Campbell et al., The American Voter (New York: John Wiley & Son, 1960), p. 180. 
306 
Chapter 10 
position of the working class and demanded an expansion of the welfare system and 
greater economic justice in society. Lee Hoi Chang represented the interests of business 
companies and advocated providing better market conditions for investors. 
As shown in Table 10.3, in general, the voters who took a conservative position on 
each issue tended to vote for Lee Hoi Chang, while those who took a liberal position on 
each issue were more inclined to support Kwon Young-gil, the candidate of the 
Democratic Labour Party. The difference is maintained when we focus on the candidates 
of the two major parties. There is a difference in issue positions between those who voted 
Lee Hoi Chang and those who voted Roh Moo-hyun, and the mean difference between 
those who voted Lee and those who voted Roh is statistically significant on every issue 
except issue on market freedom. 
Table 10.3 The Mean Scores of Issue Position by Voting Choice, 2002 
Issue I the North-Sout h relations Issue 2 (Korea-USA relations) 
N Mean Std. D N Mean Std. D 
Vote for Lee 486 2.92 . 88 475 1.83 . 97 Vote for Roh 716 2.19 . 85 702 1.66 . 84 Vote for Kwon 61 2.36 . 91 61 1.64 . 86 Total 1263 1.48 
. 93 1238 1.71 . 90 
Issue 3 (market freedom Issue 4 welf are 
N Mean Std. D N Mean Std. D 
Vote for Lee 450 2.52 . 85 485 2.37 . 95 Vote for Roh 670 2.44 . 89 718 2.16 . 93 Vote for Kwon 61 2.39 1.04 58 2.33 1.13 
Total 1181 2.47 . 88 1261 2.25 . 95 
uara: e. orean rresiaennai t iecuon may, zuuz. 
Keys: N= number of cases; Mean = average score in a 4-point scale (i. e., I= very agree to 4= 
very disagree). Std. D = standardized deviation. 
Note: In issue one, the mean difference between Lee and Roh and between Lee and Kwon is 
significant at the 0.05 level. In issue two, the mean difference between Lee and Roh is significant 
at the 0.05 level; In issue four, the mean difference between Lee and Kwon is significant at the 
0.05 level; In issue 3, any mean difference is not significant at the 0.05 level. 
The following questions are used: Issue 1: "Even though North Korea developed nuclear weapons, 
the South Korean government should provide economic aid to North Korea in view of Korean 
nationalism. Do you agree or disagree with this statement? "; Issue 2: "The SOFA (Status of Forces 
Agreement) should be revised, even though the alliance relationship between Korean and the USA 
may be endangered. Do you agree or disagree with this statement? "; Issues 3: "The government 
should not interfere in business economic activities, though business companies do not carry out 
rationalisation of enterprises by themselves. Do you agree or disagree with this statement? " 
(Recoded as I= very disagree to 4= very agree); Issue 4: "The government should expand social 
welfare even though this means we pay more tax. Do you agree or disagree with this statement? ". 
Government Performance and Voting Choice 
Voters may cast their ballot in response to government performance. Voters may 
approve or disapprove what an incumbent government accomplished and cast their ballot 
accordingly. Those who think the incumbent government has done well vote for the 
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ruling party's candidate, while those who evaluate the incumbent government's 
performance negatively vote for the opposition party's candidate. According to the 
`retrospective voting' theory, voters do not carefully examine various policies. Voters are 
not interested in policies, but are interested in performance 8 In the `retrospective voting' 
model, voters develop a party identification, which is not an emotional attachment, but is 
based on all experiences with competing parties. Party identification is enduring, but is 
influenced by the rational assessment of the performance of the incumbent government .9 
Thus, partisans are not always loyal to their political party in voting choice. Partisans do 
not vote for their political party if they disapprove of the performance of their party in 
government or if they approve of a different party's government performance. 
Independent voters free from party constraints are more responsive to their evaluation of 
government performance compared to partisans. 10 
Table 10.4 The Mean Scores of Government Performance Evaluation by Voting Choice, 
1992-2002 
1992 1997 2002 
N Mean Std. D N Mean Std. D N Mean Std. D 
Vote for Party A 534 3.11 1.10 403 4.13 . 86 509 3.77 . 91 Vote for Party B 327 3.83 . 96 446 4.41 . 80 741 2.87 . 93 Vote for Party C 114 3.65 . 98 189 4.19 . 87 62 3.55 . 90 Total 975 3.42 1.09 1038 4.26 
. 85 1312 3.25 1.02 
Data- Korean Presidential Election Study 199 2- 1997 and 7007. Noma 
Note: In 1992 and 2002, `Party A' was ruling party, and in 2002, `Party B' was ruling party; Mean 
for the ruling party is highlighted in bold; In 1992, scores of government performance 
evaluation are recoded from a 4-point scale to a 5-point scale. 
Keys: N= number of cases; Mean = average score in a 5-point scale (i. e., l= very good to 5= 
very bad); Std. D = standardized deviation; Party A= Democratic Liberal Party (Kim Young Sam) 
in 1992, Grand National Party (Lee Hoi Chang) in 1997 and in 2002; Party B= Democratic Party 
(Kim Dae jung) in 1992, National Congress for New Politics (Kim Dae-jung) in 1997, and 
Millennium Democratic Party (Roh Moo-hyun) in 2002; Party C= Unification National Party 
(Chung Ju-young) in 1992, New Party for People (Rhee In je) in 1997, and Democratic Labour 
Party (Kwon Young-gil) in 2002. 
There is a relationship between evaluation of government performance and voting 
choice in the last three Korean presidential elections. As shown in Table 10.4, those who 
voted for the ruling party's candidate rate incumbent government performance positively 
compared to those who voted for other party's candidate. At the same time, those who 
0 Moms Fiorina, Retrospective Voting in American National Elections (New Heaven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1981). 
9 For a brief assessment of Fiorina's retrospective voting, see Harrop and Miller, Elections and 
Voters, pp. 149-51. 
10 Shanto Iyengar and John R. Petrocik, `Basic Rule Voting: Impact of Campaigns on Party-and- 
Approval Voting', in James A. Thurber, Candice J. Nelson, and David A. Dulio, eds, Crowded 
Airwaves: Campaign Advertising in Elections (Washington. D. C.: Brookings Institution Press, 
2000), pp. 113-48, at p. 119. 
308 
Chapter 10 
voted for the major opposition candidate rate the incumbent government's performance 
negatively compared to those who voted for other party's candidate. This pattern is 
repeated in every presidential election. In particular, it is interesting that this pattern was 
maintained in the 1997 presidential election, in which a critical economic recession was 
the key issue and the performance of the incumbent government was rated as very poor. 
Candidate and Votive Choice 
It is widely recognised that out of the three main factors to explain voting choice (i. e. 
party identification, issue preferences, and candidate evaluation), candidate evaluation is 
the most important factor in explaining voting choice in Korea. " In the post-election 
survey from the Korea Social Science Data Center, more than 60 per cent of all voters 
reported that candidate evaluation was the most important factor on their own decision 
among the various factors which might affect voting choice. In particular, this is true in 
presidential elections rather than parliamentary or local elections in Korea, as discussed in 
chapter 7 of this thesis. 
Table 10.5 Candidate Evaluation and Voting Choice, 1997-2002 
Candidate who is best able to so lve the nation's urgent roblems 
1997 N Lee H. Kim D. Rhee I. other Total 
Vote for Lee Hoi Chang 392 96.2% 15.0% 15.7% 63.6% 38.3% 
Vote for Kim Dae-jung 445 2.3% 72.2% 8.2% 20.5% 43.5% 
Vote for Rhee In je 187 1.5% 12.8% 76.1% 15.9% 18.3% 
Total 1024 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
2002 N Lee H. Roh M. Kwon Y. other Total 
Vote for Lee Hoi Chang 506 95.5% 8.0% 23.5% 36.4% 38.8% 
Vote for Roh Moo-hyun 736 3.4% 90.2% 27.1% 54.5% 56.4% 
Vote for Kwon Young-gil 62 1.1% 1.8% 49.4% 9.1% 4.8% 
Total 1304 100% 100% 100% l00% 100% 
vara: r orean rresiaennai t iecnon muay, i r, ana zuuz. 
Key: N= number of cases. 
In general, there is a very strong association between candidate evaluation and 
voting choice in both the 1997 and 2002 presidential elections. For example, 96.2 per cent 
and 95.5 per cent of the voters who believed in Lee Hoi Chang's competence to solve the 
nation's urgent issues voted for him in 1997 and 2002 respectively. The relation between 
11 Kil Soong-hoom, `Hanguginui jeongchiuisikbyeonhwa' (Changes in Korean political values), 
Hangugjeongchihakhoibo (Korean Political Science Review), 26(1993), 133-52. Myoung-soon 
Shin, `Hangugui jeongchi chamyeowa jeongchi baijeon' (Political participation and political 
development in Korea), in Hangug%eongchihaghoi (Korean Political Science Association), ed., 
Hangug jeongchi balcheonui tuegseonggwa jeonmang (Features and prospect for political 
development in Korea) (Seoul: Korean Political Science Association, 1984). 
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candidate competence and voting choice is relatively weak for voters who evaluate the 
third candidate highly. While they believed that the third party's candidate is the most 
competent person, they nonetheless voted for one of major party candidates. For example, 
in 2002, among voters who rate Kwon Young-gil highly, only 49.4 per cent of voters 
voted Kwon Young-gil (see Table 10.5). 
It is interesting that those who rate Kim Dae-jung highly were relatively less loyal to 
the candidate in voting choice. In 1997, many voters believed that Kim Dae-jung, a very 
experienced politician and a man of profound learning, was the most competent candidate 
who would be able to manage the economic recession effectively. However, Kim Dae- 
jung failed to convert this high evaluation into votes. 27.8 per cent of voters who 
recognised Kim Dae-jung's competence voted for other candidates. Many voters 
recognised that Kim Dae-jung was a man of great abilities, but still thought him 
untrustworthy. This implies that candidate evaluation is based on a number of dimensions 
rather just a single dimension. 
Correlations between Independents and Short-term Considerations 
Do independent voters depend on short-term considerations in making their voting choice 
compared to partisans? In order to examine the difference in the impact of short-term 
considerations on the voting choice of partisans and independents, Pearson's correlation 
coefficients are examined. Only the two major candidates are included and voting choice 
is coded as a dichotomous variable. Thus, those who voted Roh Moo-hyun are coded I 
and those who voted Lee Hoi Chang are coded 2. 
The set of correlation coefficients suggests that voting choice is strongly associated 
with each variable, i. e., party identification, ideological self-image, government 
performance evaluation, candidate evaluation, and issue preferences concerning North- 
South Korea relations (see Table 10.6). The correlation coefficients are examined against 
two separated subgroups, i. e., partisans and independents. There is some difference 
between the correlation coefficients for partisans and for independents. Correlation 
coefficients for partisans are generally bigger than for independents. Again, the 
correlation coefficients between voting choice and the explanatory variables are examined 
against four subgroups, i. e., critical partisans, habitual partisans, attentive independents, 
and apolitical independents. The correlation coefficients for the critical partisans are 
generally bigger than other correlation for other subgroups. 
Although the correlation coefficients for partisans, particularly the critical partisans, 
are bigger than correlations for independents, we cannot conclude that partisans cast their 
ballots based on short-term considerations compared to independents. The correlation 
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coefficients suggest that a variable is associated with another variable, but do not suggest 
the causal relationship between two variables, that is correlations measure association, but 
correlations are not the same as causation. In the relationship between voting choice and 
short-term factors, party identification affects both voting choice and short-term factors 
such as issue, candidate, and government performance, so the relationship between these 
variables are strongly associated. Thus, `spurious' relationships are observed. Partial 
correlation coefficients between voting choice and short-term factors, controlling party 
identification, confirm the spurious relationship. Partial correlation coefficients, 
controlling party identification, are much smaller than the correlation coefficients, and 
some of the partial correlations are not statistically significant. Therefore, it is not true 
that partisans are more affected by short-term factors in voting choice compared to 
independents, when we control the spurious variable, i. e., party identification (see Table 
10.7). 
Table 10.6 Correlation Coefficients between Voting Choice and Explanatory Variables, 
2002 
Explana tory Variables 
Party Identification Ideology Performance Candidate Issue 
Subgroups of sample 
All voters . 673 . 335 . 432 . 849 . 385 Partisans only . 873 . 351 . 495 . 861 . 401 Independents only N. A. . 300 . 338 . 827 . 361 
Critical Partisans only . 859 . 437 . 544 . 871 . 465 Habitual Partisans only . 885 . 231 . 431 . 848 . 312 Attentive Independents only N. A. . 324 . 332 . 807 . 345 Apolitical Independents only N. A. . 277 . 343 . 837 . 366 
vata: Korean Presidential election Jtudy, 1uuz. 
Note: Figures are Pearson's correlation coefficients between voting choice and each variable. All 
correlations in this table are significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Each variable is coded as the follow: Voting Choice: 1= Roh Moo-hyun, and 2= Lee Hoi Chang; 
Party Identification: I= Millennium Democratic Party, 2= Other parties, and 3= Grand National 
Party; Ideological Self-image: I= very liberal to 5= very conservative; Government 
Performance: I= very good to 5= very poor, Candidate Evaluation: I= Roh Moo-hyun, 2- 
neiter Roh nor Lee, and 3= Lee Hoi Chang (based on the question of "Who is the best candidate 
to solve the nation's urgent problem that you most concern? "); Issue Position: I= very agree to 4 
= very disagree (based on the question of "Even though North Korea developed nuclear weapons, 
South Korean government should provide economic aids to North Korea in view of Korean 
nationalism. Do you agree or disagree with this statement? "). 
Although Pearson's correlation coefficients and partial correlations suggest a strong 
association between each explanatory variable and voting choice, the effects of each 
explanatory variable on the dependent variable is likely to be overestimated, as discussed 
above, i. e. because of spurious relationships for partisans. In order to estimate the net 
effects of each explanatory variable on voting choice, it is necessary to control for the 
effects of other variables on the same dependent variable. Multiple regression analysis is 
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one way this can be achieved. 
Table 10.7 Partial Correlation Coefficients between Voting Choice and Explanatory Variables, 
2002 
Ex plan ato Variables 
Subgroups of sample Ideology Performance Candidate Issue 
All voters . 202** . 218** . 736** . 328** Partisans only . 
105** 
. 162** . 603** . 
085* 
Critical Partisans only 
Habitual Partisans only 
. 131* 
. 080 
. 163** 
. 172** 
. 589** 
. 629** 
. 096 
. 073 
uara. tsorean rresiaentiai t iectHon Study, 1001. 
Note: The figure is partial correlation coefficients between voting choice and each variables 
controlling party identification. 
*= Correlations is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed); ** = Correlations is significant at the 
0.01 level (2-tailed). 
The Regression Model of Voting Choice: Partisans vs. Independents 
The Resression Model 
A multiple regression model of voting choice in the 2002 presidential election is 
constructed and tested. In the regression model, the dependent variable is voting choice in 
the 2002 presidential election. To simplify this analysis, only two major candidates are 
included in the regression model. The election was basically a competition between the 
two major parties, and the two candidates shared about 95 per cent of valid vote. It will 
not impair the regression model that the third candidate, Kwon Young-gil who polled less 
than 4 per cent of valid votes, is excluded. Therefore, voting choice is a dichotomous 
variable. Someone who voted for Roh Moo-hyun of the Millennium Democratic Party is 
coded I and someone who voted Lee Hoi Chang of the Grand National Party is coded 2. 
Six independent variables are included in the specification of the regression model. 
It is assumed that three long-term factors and three short-term factors explain voting 
choice. Economic perception is another potential independent variable, but is excluded 
from the regression model due to a limitation of data. Although economic voting is not 
included in the regression model, it is expected that government performance evaluation 
largely reflects the economic performance of the incumbent government. Therefore, it is 
assumed that the government performance evaluation variable includes retrospective 
economic perception. 
Party affiliation: One of the long-term predisposition explaining voting choice is 
party affiliation. A partisan who has party affiliation with the Millennium Democratic 
Party is coded 1, independent voter is coded 2, and partisan affiliated with the Grand 
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National Party is coded 3. 
Ideological self-image: As another long-term factor explaining voting choice, self- 
assessments of liberal-conservative ideology are included in the model specification. 
Individual ideological orientation is measured in a 5-point ordinal scale. A strong liberal 
is coded 1 and a strong conservative is coded S. 
Regionalism: As another long-term factor, regionalism is included in the regression 
model. It is widely accepted that regionalism is the predominant factor to explain 
electoral behaviour in Korea. As described in Chapter 2 of this thesis, in Korean politics, 
Jeolla people have always strongly supported the new ruling party, the Millennium 
Democratic Party, while Gyeongsang people have supported the old ruling party Grand 
National Party. In this analysis, regionalism is measured by a respondent's home region. 
In view of the rivalry between two regions, Gyeongsang and Jeolla, regionalism is 
recoiled in a 3-point ordinal scale. Voters from Jeolla are coded 1, those from 
Gyeongsang are coded 3, and all others are coded 2. 
Government performance evaluation: First, government performance evaluation is 
included in the regression model. It is assumed that those who evaluate government 
performance positively vote for the ruling party's candidate, and those who evaluate 
government performance negatively vote for the opposition party's candidate. 
Government performance is measured by an individual voter's perception of how the 
incumbent government is generally performing. Government performance is coded in a 5- 
point ordinal scale. A very good performance is coded I and a very bad performance is 
coded 5. 
Candidate evaluation: As another short-term consideration affecting voting choice, 
candidate evaluation is included in the regression model. Candidate evaluation is 
measured by a voter's perception toward the candidate's competence to solve the nation's 
urgent problems identified by the voter. Someone who considered Roh Moo-hyun the best 
man to manage the nation's urgent problems is coded 1, while voters who perceived Lee 
Hoi Chang as the best candidate to handle the nation's urgent problems are coded 3. All 
others are coded 2. 
Issue preference: Finally, as another short-term factor to explain voting choice, 
individual position on a key issue is added in the regression model. The issue position is 
based on the electoral split of North-South Korean relations. To simplify this analysis, 
some other potential issues that were discussed above, such as economic reform, 
expansion of welfare, and Korea-USA alliance relationship, have been excluded in the 
regression analysis. The differential position in the issue of North-South Korea relations 
explains voting choice in the 2002 presidential election more than other key issues. The 
issue position is measured in a 4-point ordinal scale. Someone who prefers an 
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improvement of peaceful relationship, i. e., engagement policy toward North Korea, is 
coded 1 and someone who opposes the engagement policy toward North Korea is coded 4. 
The Causal-Chain 
In the regression model, it is assumed that these independent variables affect each 
other, while each independent variable affects the dependent variable separately. Figure 
10.1 is a summary of the causal-chain in the voting choice model. First, it is assumed that 
two long-term factors, i. e., regionalism and ideology, influence party identification. As 
explored in Chapter 6 of this thesis, regionalism and ideology are two key factors in 
explaining the partisan alignment in Korea. Voters feel close to a particular party due to 
the regional and ideological characteristics of the party. Liberals and voters from Jeolla 
are more likely to have affiliation with the Millennium Democratic Party, while the 
conservative or voters from Gyeongsang are more inclined to feel close to the Grand 
National Party. 
Figure 10.1 The Causal Model of Voting Choice in the 2002 Presidential Election 
L -- -- ---------- 
Regionalism )( Ideology 
y 
Party 
Identification 
S Government Candidate 
Performance 
D 
r 
VOTE 
Keys: L= long-term factors; S= short-term factors; D= dependent variable. 
Second, it is assumed that party identification and regionalism impact upon 
government evaluation. Partisans affiliated with the ruling party are more likely to 
evaluate government performance positively, while partisans affiliated with the 
opposition party are more likely to be critical of government performance. It is assumed 
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that regionalism is also associated with government performance. Voters from 
Gyeongsang are more likely to be disappointed with the government led by president Kim 
Dae-jung who came from the rival Jeolla region. 
Third, it is assumed that candidate evaluation is affected by three long-term 
predispositions. Voters from Jeolla are more likely to rate the candidate of the 
Millennium Democratic Party highly, while voters from Gyeongsang are inclined to 
evaluate highly the candidate of the Grand National Party. Also, partisans are more likely 
to see their own party's candidate as the best candidate. Ideological orientation also 
affects candidate evaluation. Liberals perceive a reformist candidate is better at running 
the government, white conservative voters would highly evaluate the more conservative 
candidate. 
Finally, party identification and ideology affect a voter's issue position. Partisans are 
more likely to take positions on issues in line with their party's position on the issue. 
Individual ideological orientation is associated with individual issue position. Liberals 
will take a liberal position on each issue, while the conservative will take the opposite 
position on the same issue. 
The Result of Refressions: All Voters 
The regression model offers a convincing explanation of voting choice in Korea. As 
shown in Table 10.8, all six explanatory variables together explain 76.1 per cent of 
variance in the dependent variable (i. e., adjusted R2 = . 761). Also, the regression model of 
voting choice shows that every independent variable in the model except regionalism 
affected voting choice controlling for all other variables. Considering the sizes of the 
coefficients (Beta) and t-ratio, the candidate factor and party affiliation are the most 
significant explanations of voting choice. In particular, the effects of the candidate factor 
on voting choice are much bigger than that of other explanatory variables. This result 
corresponds with voter's perception of their voting choice. In a survey question about 
what the most important factor affecting their voting choice, more 60 per cent of voters 
cited candidate factors rather than party, policy, and issues. Elections in Korean can 
therefore be accurately described as `candidate-centred'. The effects of the candidate 
factor on voting choice are stronger in a presidential election than in a parliamentary or 
local election. 
Although the direct effects of other explanatory variables cannot compete with the 
effects of the candidate factor, long-term variables affected voting choice not only directly, 
but also indirectly. A set of additional regressions for estimating indirect effects of the 
long-term factors on voting choice was examined. First, a regression on party affiliation 
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highlighted that the regionalism and ideology variables together explained 26.8 per cent 
of variance in party identification (i. e., RZ = 0.268). The result of regression analysis 
suggests that regionalism is the key factor to explain party affiliation among Korean 
voters, but ideology cannot be ignored in explaining partisan alignment in Korea, as 
discussed in Chapter 6. 
Table 10.8 Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis on Voting Choice in the 2002 
Presidential Election: All Voters 
Standardized Coefficients 
(Beta) 
t-ratios Sig. (2-sided) 
(Constant) 9.771 
. 000 Regionalism . 033 1.908 . 057 Ideology . 038 2.424 . 016 Party identification . 192 9.424 . 000 Government performance . 040 2.349 . 019 Candidate . 671 33.621 . 000 Issue . 049 3.011 . 003 
Adjusted R2 . 761 F-ratio (Sig. ) 591.554 (. 000) 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, ZUUZ 
Note: Dependent variable is voting choice; the Method is called `Enter'. 
These three long-term factors affected short-term factors. All three long-term factors 
affected candidate evaluation, together explaining 39.2 per cent of variance in candidate 
evaluation (i. e., R2 = 0.392). In particular, the effect of party affiliation on candidate 
evaluation, controlling for regionalism and ideology, were sizeable (i. e., Beta = 0.489). 
Additional regression analyses also showed that regionalism and party affiliation 
explained voters' government performance evaluation while ideology and party affiliation 
affect on voters' issue positions. The effects of regionalism and ideology on government 
performance evaluation and issue position were relatively modest, while effects of party 
affiliation on these dependent variables were relatively large (see Figure 10.2). 
Separate Subgroups Regressions: Partisans vs. Independent voters 
In order to examine the different effects of the explanatory variables on voting 
choice for partisans and independent voters, the sample was split into partisans and 
independent voters, with the regression model of voting choice estimated for each 
subgroup. As shown in Table 10.9, two separate subgroup regressions showed that 
independent voters solely depend on short-term considerations in their voting choice, 
while partisans rely on long-term factors. Indeed, in the result of subgroup regression for 
partisans, coefficients of government performance and issues are very small and are not 
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statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 
Figure 10.2 The Causal Path of Voting Choice in the 2002 Presidential Election: All Voters 
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Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 2002. 
Keys: L= long-term factors; S= short-term factors; D= dependent variable. 
Note: figures = standardized coefficients (Beta). 
Table 10.9 Summary of Separate Subgroup Regressions on Voting Choice in the 2002 
Presidential Election: Partisan vs. Independents 
Sample Subgroup - Partisans Sample Sub ro u- Inde ndents 
Standardized t-ratios Sig. Standardized t-ratios Sig. 
Coefficients Coefficients 
(Beta) (Beta) 
(Constant) 12.909 . 000 5.411 . 
000 
Regionalism . 049 
2.503 
. 
013 
. 017 . 608 . 544 Ideology . 
018 1.053 . 
293 
. 055 1.955 . 
051 
Party identification . 
432 15.061 
. 
000 n/a n/a n/a 
Government performance . 030 
1.579 . 115 . 
067 2.335 
. 
020 
Candidate . 
475 18.017 . 000 . 
753 24.983 
. 
000 
Issue . 
010 
. 
546 
. 
585 
. 
073 2.505 
. 
013 
Adjusted R2 . 841 . 680 
F-ratio 579.989 193.923 
(Sig. ) . 000 . 000 
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Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 2002. 
Note: Dependent variable is voting choice. 
In the result of subgroup regression for independent voters, the effects of 
regionalism and ideology on voting choice are small and not statistically significant. The 
choice of candidates significantly affects voting choice for both partisans and independent 
voters. In particular, independent voters are more heavily affected by the candidate factor 
in their voting choice, while partisans are largely influenced by both party affiliation and 
candidate factor. The two separate subgroup regressions are visually summarised in 
Figure 10.3 and Figure 10.4. 
Figure 10.3 The Causal Path of Voting Choice in the 2002 Presidential Election: Partisan 
only 
( 
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Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 2002. 
Keys: L= long-term factors; S= short-term factors; D= dependent variable. 
Note: figures = standardized coefficients (Beta). 
* Beta which is not significant at the 0.05 level is not displayed. 
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Figure 10.4 The Causal Path of Voting Choice in the 2002 Presidential Election: 
Independents only 
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Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 2002. 
Keys: L= long-term factors; S= short-term factors, D= dependent variable. 
Note: figures = standardized coefficients (Beta). 
* Beta which is not significant at the 0.05 level is not displayed. 
Separate Sub-croup Regressions: Four Types of Voters 
The sample is divided again and the regression model of voting choice is estimated 
against the four subgroups, i. e., critical partisans, habitual partisans, attentive 
independents, and apolitical independents. Four separate subgroup regressions yield 
outputs somewhat different from that in two separate subgroup regressions, i. e., partisan 
vs. independent voters. 
Firstly, concerning the determinants of voting choice, the separate subgroup 
regressions show that candidate evaluation is the most important determinant of voting 
choice. But party identification is more important than candidate evaluation in the case of 
habitual partisans. Habitual partisans rely more on party loyalty in voting choice rather 
than the candidate factor, while critical partisans consider candidate quality first in voting 
choice, though they are also constrained by party loyalty (see Table 10.10). 
Secondly, issue positions, which affect the voting choice of independent voters as a 
whole, do not determine the voting choice of both attentive and apolitical independents. 
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Furthermore, the voting choice of both attentive and apolitical independents is determined 
by long-term considerations, although the impact of such factors is small. Ideological 
self-image affects the voting choice of attentive independents while regionalism 
influences the voting choice of apolitical independents (see Table 10.10). 
Thirdly, we can see some differences in the relations between long-term factors and 
short-term factors in the causal-chain. In the case of the critical partisans, regionalism 
does not influence their evaluation of government performance, and in the case of 
habitual partisans, the relations between self-identified ideology and issue position is not 
statistically significant. Also, the effects of party identification on short-term factors are 
greater for critical partisans than for habitual partisans (see Figure 10.5). 
Table 10.10 Summary of Separate Subgroup Regressions on Voting Choice in the 2002 
Presidential Election: Four Types of Voters 
Sample Subgroups 
Critical Habitual Attentive Apolitical 
Variables Partisan Partisan Inde dent Independent 
Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sir. Beta sip'. 
(Constant) . 000 . 000 . 000 . 000 Regionalism . 075 . 006 . 005 . 853 -. 064 . 141 . 072 . 030 Ideology . 039 . 117 . 007 . 741 . 093 . 040 . 036 . 287 Party identification . 369 . 000 . 524 . 000 n/a n/a n/a n/a Government performance . 038 . 179 . 029 . 229 . 144 . 001 . 019 . 596 Candidate 
. 478 . 000 . 444 . 000 . 749 . 000 . 783 . 000 Issue 
. 026 . 298 . 013 . 
551 
. 039 . 397 . 065 . 058 
Adjusted R2 . 823 . 864 . 677 . 706 F-ratio 281.415 339.288 77.028 141.505 
Si 
.) . 0001 1 . 000 . 000 . 0001 i 
uara: r ocean rresiaennai i iection sway, 2(11)2. 
Note: Dependent variable is voting choice (i. e., I= Roh Moo-hyun, and 2 =Lee Hoi Chang). 
Finally, there are some differences in the effects of self-identified ideology and 
regionalism on party identification between the critical partisan and the habitual partisan. 
The effect of ideology on party identification is greater for the critical partisan than for 
the habitual partisan, while the effect of regionalism on party identification is greater for 
the habitual partisan than for the critical partisan (see Figure 10.5). 
The results of the series of regressions suggest that the choice of candidates is the 
key factor in determining voting choice, and this is true particularly for independent 
voters. This result matches with voters' perceptions about their voting choice. In a survey 
question about the factor that they concerned most in their vote decision, most voters 
cited the importance of candidates. This is particularly apparent in presidential elections 
rather than parliamentary elections or local elections, as discussed in chapter 7. However, 
although we cannot deny the strong relationship between voting choice and candidate 
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evaluation, we may argue that an individual's voting choice may affect their candidate 
evaluation. For example, in the post-election survey, respondents may think that a 
particular candidate is best qualified to deal with national issues because they had already 
voted for that candidate in the recent election. Therefore, voters may justify their voting 
choice by making a favourable evaluation of the candidate they cast their ballot for. 12 
Also, it is arguable that selecting the most able candidate is similar to choosing a 
candidate to vote for, and so it is difficult to measure these two concepts separately. 
Party identification accurately explains voting choice in Korea. Although political 
parties are institutionally underdeveloped and the party system is unstable, many voters 
have developed party identification which constrains their voting choice, as argued in 
Chapter 5. Furthermore, Korean political parties are not based on social class cleavages 
and the partisan alignment is largely based on regionalism. But, the regression results 
show that ideology is another key factor to explain party attachments. Contrary to the 
widely shared perception about political parties in Korea, voters align based on ideology. 
We may speculate that other explanatory variables that are not included in the model 
specification may also affect voting choice. Age might be a good example. In the 2002 
presidential election, pollsters and campaigners suggested that age differences were 
important in voting choice. Younger voters strongly supported Roh Moo-hyun while older 
Koreans supported Lee Hoi Chang. To examine the effects of age differences on voting 
choice, age variable was added in the regression model. The result of the regression 
model including the age variable suggests that age differences did not affect voting choice, 
controlling for other explanatory variables. The coefficient of the age variable is very 
small and is not statistically significant (i. e., Beta = 0.024, t=1.571, andp = 0.116). 
Also, in order to estimate the indirect effect of age on voting choice, a set of 
supplementary regression models was examined. Age did not affect party identification, 
but was strongly associated with ideology. The young were more likely to be liberal and 
older voters conservative (i. e., Pearson R= . 228). Age did not affect government 
performance evaluation, but did affect candidate evaluation and issue positions. However, 
the effect of age on candidate evaluation and issue positions was smaller than the effects 
of other variables, such as party identification and ideology although the coefficients were 
statistically significant. Moreover, the regression models were not greatly improved by 
adding age variable. To achieve parsimony of the model, therefore, the age variable was 
excluded in the model specification. 
12 Young-tae Kim, `Hangugeseoui gyeonjetupyo' (Economic voting in Korea), in Nam-Young Lee, 
ed, Hangugui seongeo (Elections in Korea), vol. 2 (Seoul: Pureungil, 1998), pp. 99-150, at pp. 129- 
30. 
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Figure 10.5 The Causal Chain of Voting choice in the 2002 Presidential Election: Four 
Types of Voters 
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Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 2002. 
Keys: L= long-term factors, S= short-term factors, and D= dependent variable; ý1) = Critical 
Partisan, (k)= Habitual Partisan, (3ý = Attentive Independent, @) = Apolitical Independent. 
Note: Figures = standardized coefficients (Beta); R2 = Adjusted R-square; "= Beta which is not 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 
A Statistical Examination on the Difference in Effects for Subxroups 
Partisan-independent difference: In a separate groups analysis, we found 
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differences in the coefficients of each explanatory variable for partisan and independent 
voters. Although differences in the causal path of voting choice for partisans and 
independent voters were found, we may ask whether the effect of each explanatory 
variable on voting choice in the regression model varies by partisan and independent 
voters, that is whether the difference is statistically significant. In order to test the 
different effects of each explanatory variable on voting choice for partisans and 
independent voters, interaction terms are added into the regression model of voting 
choice. 13 The regression prediction equation is as follows and the model allows us to test 
for the differential effects of each explanatory variable by partisan-independent 
difference: 
Y (VOTE) =a+ b1(REGIONALISM) + b2(IDEOLOGY) + b3(PARTY) + 
b4(PERFORMANCE) + b5(CANDIDATE) + b6(ISSUE) + 
b7(REGION*ID) + bg(IDEOLOGY*ID) + b9(PARTY*ID) 
+b1o(PERFORMANCE*ID) + b11(CANDIDATE*ID) + 
b12(ISSUE*ID) 
In the model, `ID dummy variable' is coded as partisan =1 and independent voters = 0. 
Also, REGION*ID, LDEOLOGY*ID, PARTY*ID, PERFORMANCE*ID, 
CANDIDATE*ID, and ISSUE*1D are interaction terms (i. e., multiplying each 
explanatory variable by ID dummy variable). 
The coefficients for the interaction term estimate the extent to which the effects of 
explanatory variables differ for the partisan and independent voters sample subgroups. ' 
The regression model yields effects of these six explanatory variables, i. e., 
REGIONALISM through ISSUE, on voting choice for independent voters. The effects of 
these six independent variables on the voting choice of partisans can be estimated by 
summing coefficients. For example, the coefficients of the candidate variable for 
partisans are the sum of coefficients of candidate variable for independent voters and 
coefficients of its interaction term. 
Estimating the coefficients of the interaction term, the effects of each explanatory 
variable on voting choice for independent voters are greater than the effects of each 
explanatory variable for partisans apart from the regionalism variable (see Table 10.11). 
" Melissa A. Hardy, `Regression with Dummy Variables', in Michael S. Lewis-Beck, ed., Regression Analysis (London: Sage, 1993), pp. 69-158, at pp. 101-16. 14 Where partisan =I and independent voter = 0, the regression prediction equation for partisans 
is like the following: 
Y (VOTE) =a+ (b1+ b7 )(REGIONALISM) + (b2+ b8)(IDEOLOGY) + (b3+ b9XPARTY) + 
(b4+ blo)(PERFORMANCE) + (bs+ bl, XCANDIDATE) + (b6+ b12XISSUE) 
Also, the regression prediction equation for independent voters is like the following: 
Y (VOTE) =a+ b1(REGIONALISM) + b2(IDEOLOGY) + b3(PARTY) + 
b4(PERFORMANCE) + bs(CANDIDATE) + b6(ISSUE) 
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However, the coefficients of each interaction term except candidate and party 
identification are not statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Party affiliation is only 
important to those who have party identification, so it is unnecessary to compare the 
effects of party affiliation on voting choice for partisans to the effects for independents. 
Therefore, the regression prediction equation shows that only the effect of the candidate 
factor on voting choice for independent voters is greater than the effect of the candidate 
factors for partisans. The difference is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Partisans 
cast a ballot based on party affiliation and the candidate, while independent voters who do 
not have party affiliation heavily depend on the candidate factor in making voting choice 
along with other short-term considerations. 
Table 10.11 Summary of Regression Model of Voting Choice Adding Interaction Terms: 
Partisan-Independent Difference 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T-ratios Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
(Constant) . 378 . 059 11.075 . 000 Regionalism 
. 012 . 017 . 018 . 
715 
. 475 Ideology . 029 . 013 . 059 2.300 . 022 Party identification -031 . 036 -. 049 -. 886 . 376 Government performance . 035 . 013 . 073 2.747 . 006 Candidate . 396 . 013 . 764 29.391 . 000 Issue . 038 . 013 . 071 2.947 . 003 Regionalism*ID . 020 . 023 . 048 . 900 . 368 Ideology*ID -. 021 . 016 -. 070 -1.328 . 184 Party identification*ID 
. 215 . 017 . 335 6.021 . 000 Government performance*ID -. 021 . 016 -. 076 -1.306 . 192 Candidate*ID -. 152 . 021 -. 360 -7.343 . 000 Issue*ID -. 038 . 017 -. 095 -1.944 . 052 
Adjusted R2 
. 779 F-ratio 328.430 
Sig. (2-sided) . 000 
uata: Korean Yrestaentlai i section Study, LUU2 
Note: Dependent variable is voting choice. 
Attentive-apolitical independent difference. - As shown above in Table 10.10 and 
Figure 10.5, there are differences in the coefficients of each explanatory variable for 
attentive independents and apolitical independents. In separate subgroup regressions, the 
effects of candidate variable, government performance variable, and ideology variable for 
attentive independents are statistically significant at the 0.05 level, whereas the effects of 
candidate variable and regionalism variable for apolitical independents are statistically 
significant. 
In order to examine whether the difference in the effects of each explanatory 
variable on voting choice for attentive independents and apolitical independents is 
324 
Chapter 10 
statistically significant, another regression model with interaction terms is undertaken. 
The regression prediction equation is as follows: 
Y (VOTE) =a+ b1(REGIONALISM) + b2(IDEOLOGY) + 
b3(PERFORMANCE) + b4(CANDIDATE) + bs(ISSUE) + 
b6(REGION*INTEREST) + b., (IDEOLOGY*INTEREST) + 
bg(PERFORMANCE*INTEREST) + 
b9(CANDIDATE*INTEREST) + b, o(ISSUE*INTEREST) 
In the model, `INTEREST' dummy variable is coded as `having strong interest in 
politics' =I and `not having strong interest in politics' = 0. Also, REGION* INTEREST, 
IDEOLOGY* INTEREST, PERFORMANCE*INTEREST, CANDIDATE* INTEREST, 
and ISSUE*INTEREST are interaction terms (i. e., multiplying each explanatory variable 
by INTEREST dummy variable). 
Table 10.12 Summary of Regression Model of Voting Choice Adding Interaction Terms: 
Attentive-Apolitical Independent Difference 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T-ratios Sig. 
B Std. Beta 
Error 
(Constant) . 363 . 035 10.443 . 000 Regionalism . 076 . 015 . 112 5.145 . 000 Ideology . 011 . 011 . 023 1.054 . 292 Government performance . 018 . 011 . 038 1.592 . 112 Candidate . 394 . 012 . 758 31.792 . 000 Issue . 041 . 012 . 079 3.460 . 001 Regionalism*INTEREST -. 052 . 021 -. 122 -2.566 . 010 Ideology*INTEREST . 025 . 014 . 080 1.796 . 073 Government performance* INTEREST . 026 . 015 . 095 1.740 . 082 Candidate*INTEREST -. 008 . 019 -. 018 -. 453 . 651 Issue*INTEREST -. 014 . 017 -. 042 -. 884 . 377 
Adjusted R2 . 736 F-ratio 332.010 
Sig. (2-sided) 
. 000 
Data: Korean t resldentlal blectlon Stuay, LUU2 
Note: Dependent variable is voting choice. 
Estimating the coefficients of the interaction terms, the effects of each explanatory 
variable on voting choice for attentive independent voters are not different from the 
effects of each explanatory variable on voting choice for apolitical independent voters 
apart from the regionalism factor (see Table 10.12). Indeed, the regression prediction 
equation shows that only the effect of the regionalism factor on voting choice for 
apolitical independent voters is greater than the effects of the regionalism factor for 
attentive independent voters. In sum, we may conclude that in general, attentive 
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independents are not very different from apolitical independents in terms of voting 
behaviour, even though apolitical independent voters consider regionalism in voting 
choice and attentive independent voters do not. 
2. Independents and Voting Choice: Rational Voters? 
According to the quantitative survey data above, independent voters are more affected by 
short-term considerations on voting choice compared to partisans. Independent voters cast 
a ballot for a candidate who has the competence to solve the nation's urgent problems. 
The voting choice of independents is more responsive to the influence of government 
evaluation and issue preference. We may conclude that independent voters cast their 
ballots based on rational calculation, and thus are more rational voters compared to 
partisans. However, qualitative interview data suggests that independent voters did not 
cast a ballot based on rational calculations. First, independents voters do not make their 
voting decision with sufficient information. The opposite is true. Independent voters are 
less informed than partisans. It is doubtful that poorly informed voters make a voting 
choice based on rational calculations. Second, the qualitative interview data suggests that 
independent voters are not particularly influenced by their evaluation of the incumbent 
government. The voting choice of independents does not correspond to their perception of 
the health of the economy. Finally, the qualitative interview data also reveals that 
independents heavily rely on candidate evaluation in making their voting choice, but this 
is not necessarily rational. Independents often base their vote on the candidates' affective 
traits, such as warmness, or even non-political traits, such as appearance or image, which 
is completely unrelated to the candidates' competence. 
The Poorly Informed Voters 
Rational choice requires sufficient information for making the right choice. If voters were 
not well informed, they could not make a voting choice based on careful examination of 
the candidates. 
Votinj Choice without Sufficient Information 
Limited information: First, qualitative interview data suggests that many voters had 
insufficient or minimal information when they made their voting choice. In in-depth 
interviews, roughly half of independents reported that they did not have sufficient 
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information in making their voting choice, while one quarter of independents believed 
that they had enough information for voting choice. In contrast to independents, more 
than a half of partisans revealed that they had sufficient information for voting choice. In 
the focus group interviews, most independent voters reported that they did not have 
sufficient information about candidates or policies when they cast a ballot. For example, 
"I had only minimal information" (FM2), "I had a cursory knowledge about the 
candidates. I did not know them certainly" (FM1; FM4). "I made my voting decision 
based on some basic information and something I watched in the TV debates" (FM6). "I 
did not give much attention to the election. [so, I did not have much information]" (FM5). 
Passiveness in gathering information: Second, most independents are not active in 
gathering information, and this would be a main reason why they did not have sufficient 
information. In a question about the main information source for their information, many 
independent voters reported that they depended solely or mostly on the TV debates. This 
implies that they were not very eager to gather information from other sources that 
demanded more efforts or interest in the election. For example, "I hardly read newspapers 
[about election] because I was busy with business. I could watch the TV debate because it 
was scheduled in the evening" (I-141). Some respondents confessed that a lack of interest 
in election was the main reason why they failed to acquire much information for voting 
choice. For example, "I think that I did not give attention to election' (1-138; 1-133). "1 
was less interested in the election. So, I did not try to go to the Internet or to watch TV 
debates to gather information" (I-140; I-129). 
Lacks of interest in election: In focus group interviews, participants suggested that 
they were not interested in the election, so they did not have sufficient information. For 
example, "I was not interested in the election. I did not want to give attention to the 
election this time. Because I was not interested in election, I hardly know about any of the 
candidates, but I voted" (FF3). " To be honest with you, I was not interested in the 
election, so I did not even read newspapers. I had preconceptions about each candidate I 
which I could not lose" (FF2). "If I had tried to gather information, I could gather 
information. However, I did not try to gather information" (FM2; FF3). "I did not gather 
information... I cast my ballot on the basis of my feelings rather than information" (FF2). 
Reliance on family members and friends: Also, approximately one quarter of 
independent voters in qualitative in-depth interviews referred to other people, particularly 
family members or friends, as the main information source. Because independent voters 
are less interested in elections and are relatively less sophisticated in understanding 
politics, they depend on other people's opinions rather than finding out information 
themselves. For example, "Because I can't really understand politics, I did not gather 
much information. I got information from other people, so I did not have much 
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information" (1-132). "1 feel that what I heard from my friends was the most valuable 
information" (1-130). "1 heard something from my friends during the coffee break. That 
was enough for me to make my voting choice" (1-131). In sum, the voters in the 
interviews did not pay much attention to the election and did not gather sufficient 
information for making voting choice. This implies that they did not make voting choice 
based on a careful comparison of all contending candidates. 
Voting Choice with Incomplete Information 
Considering the quality and substance of information that voters obtained, it is 
doubtful that independent voters were able to make a careful calculation about their 
electoral choice. 
Unbalanced information: First, voters are narrow-minded when collecting 
information about candidates or the election in general. Qualitative data suggests that 
many independents were informed about only one candidate rather than all major 
contenders in election because they had a preconceived preferences for one candidate or 
were less interested in the election. For example, "To be honest, I knew about the 
candidate whom I voted for, but not about other candidates" (1-116; I-117; 1-124). "I was 
not very interested in the election. I did not compare all the candidates. I only got some 
information about the one candidate who I liked" (1-133). "1 had a prejudice against one 
[of the two major candidates]. I knew that I should not have any prejudice in order to 
know him in detail... " (1-134). "I did not give attention to all candidates except one 
candidate whom I supported" (FF5). 
Preponderance to candidate traits: Second, in the voters' mind, there were no 
policies or issues, but only the candidates' quality. Even a candidate's non-political traits, 
such as appearance, are important. In the qualitative in-depth interviews, many 
independents reported that they were interest in knowing a candidate's traits, particularly 
their integrity or personality. For example, "I focused on the candidates' qualities rather 
than policies or issues. I think that appearance and eloquence are important" (I-I11). "I 
was very interested in the candidates' qualities" (1-142; I-133; 1-126; 1-101; I-107). 
In answering a question about the kinds of information that they wanted to know, 
many independents suggested that they were not interested in finding out about issues or 
policies offered by the candidates. They even discredited all policies and election pledges 
offered by all candidates. For example, "There was no difference in policies between 
candidates. So, I could not make a voting choice based on policies" (I-102; I-122; 1-134). 
"Because all candidates issued policies recklessly, I could not rely on election pledges. So, 
I tried to know about what the candidates had done as politicians" (1-115). 1 did not 
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believe election pledges. I focused on the candidate's quality and personality" (1-1 16; 1- 
125; FF6). 
`Economic Perception' and Voting Choice 
Most Korean electors believed that the economy was the nation's most urgent 
problem to be solved. In the Korean Presidential Election Study survey data, almost 80 
per cent of voters perceived that economic issues, such as inflation, unemployment, or 
economic growth, were the most important national matters. However, qualitative data 
revealed that independent voters' economic perception did not greatly affect their voting 
choice in the 2002 presidential election. Neither expectation of better personal economic 
conditions nor perception of the state of the economy explained voting choice. In the in- 
depth interviews, approximately a half of independents reported that they did not pay 
much attention to economic issues when making a voting decision. Also, among those 
who referred to the impact of the economy on voting choice, a half of them suggested 
only a modest impact of the economy on their choice. Only a small number of 
respondents firmly believed that their economic perception was a significant factor 
determining their voting choice. 
Why was Economic Perception Unimportant in Voting Choice? 
Lack of difference in economic issues: First, voters failed to perceive any salient 
economic issues and faced a lack of differences in economic issue among the candidates. 
When there is no difference in economic issues, it is not possible to expect economic 
voting. In the in-depth interviews, many respondents reported that they did not perceive a 
clear difference in the candidates' economic policies or the candidates' competence to 
solve economic issues among the candidates. For example, "I do not think that any one of 
the candidates can improve economy in a short time" (1-105; I-119). "1 think that all 
candidates lack the competence to manage the nation's economy effectively" (1-106). "1 
did not think that the state of the nation's economy or my financial conditions will change 
greatly as a result of the election outcome" (1-112). "1 think that the economic policies 
offered by all candidates failed to attract voters' attention. In a broad sense, all 
candidates' economic policies were similar" (1-203). Voters also recognised that the 
nation's economy is largely influenced by economic conditions in the world market. For 
example, "The Korean economy is strongly influenced by the market conditions of the 
world economy. Regardless of who becomes president, there will be no difference" (I- 
211; 1-112; FM6; FM5). 
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Lacks of interest and understanding: Second, a lack of understanding or interest in 
the economy is another reason why voters find it difficult to make their electoral choice 
based on economic conditions. For example, a student said, "I am not interested in 
economic issues, so I did not consider economic issues when I cast my ballot" (1-138; 1- 
116). "Because I do not know about the economy, I did not consider economic matters 
when I made my voting choice" (1-127; 1-207). Also, in the interviews, most respondents 
showed that they had only a small amount of information on economic policies and issues, 
though some of them believed that economic issue was important in their voting choice. 
For example "I do not know any specific economic policies offered by the candidates" (I- 
109). 
Ambiguous influence of economic perception: Some respondents who referred to 
the impact of economic considerations on voting choice were less certain later about its 
influence on their choice of candidate. In follow-up questions, they often denied its 
importance on voting choice. For example, a professional said, "I think that the economy 
was important in my voting choice. I think that my business is directly influenced by the 
state of the nation's economy... I was not affected by prospective economic benefits. For 
instance, I am middle class, but I voted Kwon Young-gil who represents the economic 
interests of the working class and the poor... I did not consider the state of the nation's 
economy... Incumbent government evaluation was not at all related to my vote for 
Kwon" (1-208). 
Unimportance of Individual Economic Interest 
`Pocket-book voting' did not explain voting choice to a significant extent in the 2002 
presidential election. In a question about whether they anticipated any change in their 
personal financial conditions depending on the result of election, almost all respondents 
answered that they did not expect any difference in their personal economic situation 
regardless of who won the election. For example, "I suspect that no people thought about 
this [personal economic benefit]" (1-111). "Politicians are not the man who gives me my 
paycheck" (1-125). "1 hardly even considered it [a relation between voting choice and 
personal economic benefit]" (1-131; I-138). 
Prospective Perception of the Nation's Economy 
`Prospective economic voting' based on the nation's economic conditions may 
explain voting choice to some extent in the 2002 presidential election, but the relation 
between voting choice and prospective economic perception is questionable. 
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Approximately half of independents expected an improvement in the national economy, 
but many of them did not clearly confirm the influence of their perception of future 
economic conditions on their voting choice. They referred to their expectation about the 
national economy, but this was more like an expression of their wishful thinking in post- 
election interviews. For example, "I hope that the state of nation's economy is better in 
near future" (1-111; 1-121; 1-123; 1-125; 1-138). A young woman said, "l did not really 
consider economic issues... I believe that the nation's economy will be better [under the 
new administration]" (1-113). 
Candidates' competence rather than their policies: Voters suggested that they 
focused on candidates' economic competence or qualities rather than specific policies 
offered. For example, "I thought that he can run the government effectively, and this 
would lead to an increased economic competitiveness in the world market" (1-128). In a 
sense, their economic perception about the future did not influence their voting preference, 
but candidate preference instead influenced their expectations about the economy. They 
preferred a candidate due to other reasons, and then believed that the state of the nation's 
economy would improve if their preferred candidate won election. For example, "I 
thought that he [Lee Hoi Chang] will run the nation's economy well because has a broad 
knowledge" (1-132). "1 thought that he [Lee Hoi Chang] has a more competence to 
manage the nation's economy because he is man with a varied career in government" [1- 
133]. 
Salient Economic Issues in the 2002 election: Some independent voters who took 
the economy into their consideration in making their voting choice suggested salient 
economic issues in the 2002 presidential election. Some of them referred to economic 
inequality within society and social welfare. For example, "I excluded any candidate who 
offered economic policies focused on economic growth [rather than welfare] in my voting 
choice" (1-129). "1 expected that the living conditions of the poor would improve when he 
became president" (1-201). Some of them even referred to a political issue relevant to 
their economic expectations. For example, "I thought that he would clean up political 
corruption, and this is related to the state of the nation's economy" (1-141; 1-209). 
Retrospective Perception of the Nation's Economy 
`Retrospective economic voting' did not explain voting choice in the 2002 
presidential election. Most independent voters suggested that they did not greatly 
consider the incumbent government's economic performance when they made their 
voting choice. For example, "I know about it [the state of the economy], but I did not 
consider it much in my voting decision" (FMI). Only a few independent voters revealed 
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that their government evaluation affected their voting choice. For example, "I think that 
Kim Dae-jung administration was very poor in economic performance, so I cast a ballot 
to an opposition party's candidate" (1-133). Some respondents agreed that incumbent 
government was poor in economic performance, but did not clearly suggest that their 
retrospective economic evaluation affected their voting. For example, "I do not want to 
talk about it [because I think the government's performance was so bad]" (1-142; 1-141; 1- 
124; 1-107). 
Blaming current government for the bad economy: In the in-depth interviews, most 
independent voters agreed that the state of the nation's economy was bad, but there was 
no consensus that Kim Dae-jung's administration was responsible for the bad economic 
conditions. Some of them blamed the incumbent government for the bad economic 
conditions, while others recognised that Kim Dae-jung's administration overcame a 
critical economic recession five years previously. The nation's economic condition was 
bad, but had been worse when Kim Dae-jung was elected in 1997. Also, this implies that 
voters did not give much credit to the opposition party either, although voters did not 
directly mention that the previous government was responsible for the economic 
recession. For example, "Although, many people complain that the nation's economic 
conditions are bad, I think that the incumbent government was not the worst in managing 
economy" (1-130; 1-104; 1-134). "I don't agree that Kim Dae-jung's government is 
heavily responsible for the nation's bad economic conditions. I don't think that we can 
blame the government for the nation's economic conditions and should punish the 
government in election" (FM2). 
Linking current government and candidate: Independent voters suggested that they 
did not regard the ruling party's candidate as being connected with the incumbent 
government. This may be natural in Korea where political party politics are not stable. In 
the 2002 presidential election, especially, Roh Moo-hyun won the presidential primary 
and was nominated for president by the ruling party, but the ruling party did not fully 
support him even after he was nominated. Many independent voters did not really 
consider him as the ruling party's presidential candidate, and so did not blame him for the 
failure of incumbent government. For example, "I know that Kim Dae-jung's 
administration failed economically... I did not vote for the political party, but voted Roh 
Moo-hyun because I believed that he is man of competence" (I-i 15). "Roh Moo-hyun 
was not from the mainstream faction of the Millennium Democratic Party. [So, he is not 
responsible for the failure of incumbent government]" (1-130; I-113). "1 evaluated the 
candidates' competence in voting choice. I did not evaluate the incumbent government's 
performance" (1-137). "1 don't think that any president can solve all economic 
problems... I don't agree that Roh Moo-hyun will be similar to the incumbent president 
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in managing economic problems because he is a presidential candidate of the ruling party. 
I believe that Roh Moo-hyun is not Kim Dae-jung" (FF8). 
In conclusion, economic perception was not a key factor to explain voting choice for 
independents in the 2002 presidential election. Opposition party partisans were relatively 
critical of the incumbent government, but they also often mixed economic performance 
and political issues, such as political corruption or economic aid to North Korea. They 
criticised everything related to the incumbent government, including economic 
performance. Most independent voters did not really consider economic voting in the 
2002 presidential election. They saw no difference between the candidates in economic 
policies or competence to solve the urgent economic problems. They were split in 
evaluating the government's economic performance. They hardly thought about 
individual economic benefits when they cast a ballot. The economy was not a significant 
issue and `economic voting' based economic perceptions does not explain voting choice 
in the 2002 presidential election to a great extent. For example, "I didn't expect that we 
could overcome an economic crisis within a short-period time when I cast a ballot. I did 
not expect any personal benefit either. I expect that we should scrape out political 
corruption first even if we cannot solve economic problems at this moment" (FM4). 
Candidate Evaluation: Competence vs. Image 
Korean electors lay weight on candidate factors in electoral choice. In the 2002 Korean 
Presidential Election Study, more than 60 per cent of all voters answered that they 
attached importance to candidate factors in making their voting decision. In the in-depth 
and focus group interviews, most respondents referred to their `candidate perception' as 
the most important factor influencing their voting choice. In the in-depth interviews, 
thirty-five of forty-two independent voters reported that they cast a ballot based on 
candidate evaluations. Nine of fourteen partisans relied on candidate evaluation as the 
criteria for voting choice. In the focus group interviews, almost all independents reported 
that candidate evaluation was the most important factor determining their voting choice, 
while a few partisans referred to policies. 
Some of them articulated the reasons why they depended on candidate evaluation in 
their voting choice. Respondents presumed that there was no policy difference across 
candidates. Also, they stressed the candidates' ability to realise policies rather than the 
substance of policies. For example, "Every political party offers good policies. No 
political party suggests bad policies. So I paid attention to the candidates" (FM4; 1-116; 1- 
119). "The candidate factor was important in my voting choice. The candidates' abilities 
takes precedence over policies. Candidates will realise policies" (FM2; 1-134). "1 did not 
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know policies in detail. I just believed that he will conduct state affairs well if he become 
president" (1-202). "I cast a ballot on the basis of candidate evaluation. Only a competent 
president can offer good policies and realise them" (FF2). 
As examined above, a multiple regression analysis showed that candidate evaluation 
is a major factor to explain voting choice. Candidates matter to voters, but particularly to 
independents. Voting choice based on candidate evaluation may be rational behaviour. 
Independent voters who lay greater weight on candidate evaluation compared to partisans 
may be rational voters compared to partisans who are constrained by psychological party 
affiliation. However, a voter's candidate evaluations are not always politically rational. 
Voters do not always carefully compare all candidates. Voters evaluate candidates with 
only limited information. Voters sometimes evaluate candidates on the basis of irrational 
aspects of the candidate's traits such as appearance. If a voter's candidate evaluation is 
not based on careful examination and comparison, or if voters evaluate candidates on the 
basis of superficial image of candidates, it is difficult to conclude that voting choice based 
on candidate evaluations is rational. 
Multi-Dimensions of Candidate Traits 
Voters' perceptions of candidates or candidate image consists of various candidate 
traits such as competence, integrity, leadership, and empathy. " These candidate traits are 
categorised into `cognitive' dimension and 'affective' dimensions. 16 Candidate 
competence and integrity are included in the cognitive dimension, while leadership and 
empathy are in the affective dimension. Also, these candidate traits are distinguished into 
`performance related' traits and `personal', `non-political' traits, though researchers often 
do not cover personal, non-political dimensions in their research. '? 
Based upon the various traits of candidates and the various possible categories, 
candidate's traits are classified into related aspects of candidate evaluation based on five 
dimensions. The first is the candidate's competence to solve the nation's urgent problems. 
The competence dimension comprises the candidate's intelligence, ability as a statesman, 
or varied political career. The second dimension of candidate traits is trustworthiness. 
Trustworthiness dimension comprises integrity, reliability, sincerity and honesty as a 
's J. Merrill Shanks and Warren E. Miller, `Policy Direction and Performance Evaluation: 
Complementary Explanations of the Regan Elections', British Journal of Political Science, 20 
(1990), 143-235. 
16 Arthur H. Miller, Martin P. Waffenberg, and Oksana Malanchuk, `Schematic Assessments of 
Presidential Candidates', American Political Science Review, 80 (1986), 521-540. 
" Dieter Ohr and Henrik Oscarsson, `Leader Traits, Leader Image and Voting choice', a paper 
presented at the 2003 Meeting of the European Consortium for Political Research, 18-21 
September 2003, Marburg, Germany, p. 3. 
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politician. The third dimension is leadership such as the candidate's quality as political 
leader, or the ability to communicate with people. Empathy such as warmness and the 
affinity the voter feels with the candidate is another dimension of candidate traits. Finally, 
the personal dimension refers to non-political quality of candidates such as age and 
appearance. 
Candidate evaluations are more rational or less rational depending upon the criteria 
of evaluation. If voters evaluate candidates on the basis of the candidate's competence or 
trustworthiness and cast a ballot based on candidate evaluation, voting choice is more 
rational. If voters evaluate candidates on the basis of leadership and cast a ballot based on 
candidate evaluation, voting choice is less rational compared to candidate evaluation and 
voting choice on the basis of candidate's competence or trustworthiness. If voters' 
candidate evaluations are largely based on empathy or personal factors and cast a ballot 
based on candidate evaluations, voting choice is more irrational. 
Weij hing Candidate ImaEes over Candidate Competence 
In the in-depth interviews, the majority of independents supported a particular 
candidate focusing on the candidate's trustworthiness or leadership attributes. Some of 
them evaluated candidates on the basis of empathy dimension of candidate's traits. Only a 
few mentioned the candidate's competence to solve the nation's urgent problems. Also, 
most partisans answered that they evaluated the candidate focusing on the candidate's 
competence, trustworthiness, and leadership, while few referred to empathy as the criteria 
for candidate evaluation. This suggests that independents were relatively more dependent 
on affective dimensions of candidate traits, while partisans were more reliant on the 
cognitive dimensions of candidate's traits. Meanwhile, most independents referred to only 
one dimension of candidate's traits, while most partisans cited more than one dimension. 
This implies that independents evaluate candidates with limited information compared to 
partisans. Partisans who were better informed about candidate could refer to various 
aspects of candidate's traits in the post-election interviews, while independents who were 
not interested in election could not. 
Integrity and Reliability: Many independent voters reported that integrity and 
reliability were important in their candidate evaluation. Integrity and reliability attributes 
were closely related to Roh Moo-hyun rather Lee Hoi Chang in the 2002 presidential 
election. Many people perceived that Roh Moo-hyun was firm in his convictions and was 
not corrupt. Voters appreciated Roh's uprightness. Voters gave credit to Roh Moo-hyun 
and believed that he would be able to realise his political programmes or policies if he 
were elected. For example, "I appreciated highly his firm conviction, which he showed us 
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through his work in the past" (1-106; 1-115; 1-138; FM7). "I believed that he is not corrupt. 
I voted for him because he is man of integrity" (1-125). "I believe that he will keep his 
election pledges" (1-113; 1-111). Some electors who voted Lee Hoi Chang suggested that 
they voted for him because he was an honourable man. For example, "I voted for him 
because he is honest. When he was a judge he never allowed any corruption" (I-141; 1- 
142). 
Leadership: Meanwhile, electors who voted for Lee Hoi Chang often referred to the 
leadership dimension of the candidate's traits. Lee Hoi Chang has filled various 
government posts including premiership and he was superior to Roh Moo-hyun in this 
aspect of candidate traits. For example, "The candidate's qualities are the most important 
in voting choice... I believed that someone who has strong leadership could run 
government well" (1-119; 1-120; 1-124; FF5) "Leaders should act with prudence and 
should not be self-righteous" (1-128; FF5). 
Empathy: In the 2002 presidential election, empathy was one of the most important 
dimensions in candidate evaluations. Roh Moo-hyun was particularly strong in this 
respect compared to Lee Hoi Chang. Roh was born in a poor family in a rural area and he 
did not go to college, while Lee Hoi Chang was born in an upper class family and he is 
one of the elite of society. Voters preferred Roh because they perceived that Roh looked 
liked an ordinary person. For example, "I like his personality... I like his image of 
common people" (1-140; 1-121; 1-201). "I feel that he is a warm-hearted man. I feel 
friendly toward him. I feel that he is similar to one of my neighbours" (1-105). "1 voted 
for him because I believed that he fully understands how common people live" (1-108; 1- 
113). "He truly understands our lives" (1-130). "I really like him because of his humanity" 
(1-123; 1-137; 1-139). "1 believed that someone to whom we could feel friendly should be 
president" (1-134). Even some independents referred to personal, non-political traits. For 
example, "I prefer a young candidate" (FF6). 
In sum, most independents cast their ballot on the basis of candidate evaluation (or 
candidate perception). In evaluating a candidate's quality, few considered competence to 
solve urgent the nation's problems. Many independents preferred one candidate to others 
in terms of trustworthiness, leadership, and empathy. This contradicts the results of the 
quantitative analysis as discussed above. Survey data showed a strong association 
between voting choice and evaluation of a candidate's competence, but qualitative 
interview data suggested that voters hardly evaluate candidates on the basis of 
competence in problem-solving. 
Although it is difficult to conclude whether independents are rational in candidate 
evaluation compared to partisans, it is clear that the voting choice of many independent 
voters is based on a superficial image of the candidates. Therefore, voting choice based 
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on short-term considerations is not always rational. Rational voting is possible when 
voters are well-informed about candidates in voting choice. Voters who gather most of 
their information from TV debates do not understand very well the policy differences 
between candidates. They do not have enough information for voting choice, but they cast 
a ballot anyway. One participant in the focus groups, although an extreme example, 
exemplified the irrationality of the voting choice of many independents. "I cannot 
distinguish one candidate from another candidate, although I watched the TV debates... 1 
did not really know Lee Hoi Chang nor Roh Moo-hyun. But, I decided to vote for Lee 
because he is perfect image of my husband. Lee looks like my husband who is nice to me, 
so I began to trust him" (FF8). 
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Chapter 11. Conclusion 
In this chapter, the findings of this study will be summarised, focusing on the nature of 
independent voters in Korea and how they make their voting decision. There are two 
main results. First, partisan dealignment and the increase in independent voters in Korea 
over the last 10 years have been caused by falling electoral interest in politics, which was 
partly related to electoral disappointment and dissatisfaction with the political processes 
of the new democracy. Second, independent voters who are free from party constraints 
are responsive to short-term considerations in voting choice, but this does not mean that 
the electoral choice of independent voters is politically rational. These results also have 
important normative consequences. 
Empirical Findings 
The Electorate Has Developed Party Identification Despite the Instability of 
Political Parties in New Democracy 
The findings of this thesis reject a widely held assumption that Korean voters cannot 
have long-term psychological attachments to a political party because all political parties 
in Korea are institutionally underdeveloped. Most Korean voters can effectively recognise 
and distinguish between the major political parties in terms of politicians, loyal supporters, 
and platforms and policies of the political parties, even though the forms and names of 
the political parties have changed frequently. 
The strength of party affiliation in Korea is generally weak and the endurance of 
party affiliation is quite problematic. In particular, the level of party identification is 
unstable within a relatively short-time period and the voting intention of party identifiers 
is affected by short-term political events in the course of election campaigns. However, 
party identification is still clearly distinguished from party preference or candidate 
preference in a specific election. Moreover, partisan loyalty to a political party in voting 
choice is considerable. In post-election surveys, more than 90 per cent of the partisans of 
two major parties reported that they voted for the candidate of their political party in a 
specific election. 
Ideological Self-image also Explains Partisan Alignment in the New Democracy 
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After the transition to democracy in 1987, the electoral cleavage based on the 
distinction between pro-government and pro-opposition supporters has been weakened 
when the historical opposition camp leading democratic movement was split. In the new 
democracy, the electorate has been aligned along the regional cleavage based on regional 
antagonism between people from two rival regions - Gyeongsang and Jeol&a In the new 
democracy, Gyeongsang remains the regional basis for the conservative old ruling party, 
while Jeolla region become the stronghold of the opposition party (or new ruling party 
since 1997) demanding political and economic reforms within Korea. 
Although regionalism is the main explanation for the partisan alignment in Korea, 
multiple regression analysis also reveals that ideological self-image explains the partisan 
alignment in the new democracy. Liberals identify themselves with the historical pro- 
democracy party (the Millennium Democratic Party in 2002) and conservatives align 
themselves with the authoritarian old-ruling party (the Grand National Party in 2002). 
This finding rejects the controversial argument that the partisan alignment of all major 
political parties in Korea merely reflects the regional cleavage because the major parties 
cannot be clearly distinguished in terms of party platform and social class. 
Public Disinterest in Politics Has Caused Partisan Decline in New Democracy 
For the last decade, partisan decline has been extensive in Korea. After the transition 
to democracy in 1987, most Koreans quickly aligned with political parties. This runs 
counter to the pattern in other new democracies such as post-communist countries and 
Southern European countries where the electorates are still at the pre-aligned stage. Not 
only have most Koreans developed some form of party allegiance but there have also 
been signs that Korea is now following the trends of the established Western democracies. 
There has been a major electoral dealignment in Korea over the last decade. Survey 
evidence shows that the level of party identification dropped from 77.3 per cent to 59.5 
per cent between the 1992 and the 2002 presidential election. 
These findings suggest that the `political explanation' rather than the `sociological 
explanation' is more convincing in explaining partisan decline in Korea. Both 
quantitative and qualitative data confirm that electoral dissatisfaction with politics and 
disinterest in politics are the main causes of partisan decline. Many Koreans who had 
sought democracy for a long time before the eventual transition achieved in the June 
People' Uprising in 1987 had high hopes for the new democracy, but were soon 
disappointed with the political processes of the new democracy where old party politics 
prevailed. 
Although most voters are dissatisfied with the current political process and political 
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parties in Korea, most do not reject democracy or democratic institutions and system. 
Indeed, qualitative data showed that most Koreans firmly believe that political parties are 
a key institution in the democratic political process. 
Party Identification Is Endutinz, but also Changeable 
The 1997 presidential election was a critical election in terms of electoral 
dealignment. In particular, a weakening of party affiliation with the old ruling party took 
place in the new democracy. At the aggregate level, party identification with the old 
ruling party (i. e., the Grand National Party) markedly decreased in the 1997 presidential 
election when Korea faced to a critical economic recession. Many voters who had been 
loyal to the authoritarian ruling party, such as the less educated, women, farmers, low- 
income earners, and the self-employed, stopped supporting the Grand National Party. 
This rejects the view that party affiliation of individual voters endures and is consolidated 
over the course of their lifetime. Individual party affiliation is changeable and is affected 
by performance of political parties, in line with the revisionist view of party identification. 
Independents in the New Democracy Are Apolitical rather than Politically 
Attentive 
The findings of this study suggest that the young, students, white-collar workers and 
non-manual workers, centrists in liberal-conservative ideological self-image, and voters 
not from Gyeongsang and Jeolla are more likely to be independent voters. In particular, 
the increasing number of independent voters in Korea has been based on an increase in 
`apolitical independents' who are not interested in politics rather than `attentive 
independents' interested in politics. The young are more likely to be alienated from 
politics. Education enhances neither interest in politics nor produces a better 
understanding of politics. In the new democracy, individual voters have become less 
interested in public affairs and are rapidly withdrawing from politics. 
Voting Behaviour of Independent Voters Are Unstable 
The findings also confirm that voting behaviour of independent voters is quite 
different from voting behaviour of partisans in terms of turnout, changes in voting 
intention, and the timing of electoral choice. Nonetheless, the findings also show that the 
voting behaviour of many independent voters is stable in general. 
Independents as vanishing voters: In the new democracy, voter turnout in 
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presidential elections has decreased markedly from 90 per cent to 71 per cent between 
1987 and 2002. Quantitative surveys confirm that independent voters are more likely to 
absent from voting compared to partisans, but partisan enthusiasm explains only a small 
variance of turnout. Multiple regression analysis shows that interest in elections is the 
most important factor to explain a decline in turnout in Korea. Qualitative data also 
confirmed that voters mainly do not go to the polls because of a lack of interest in 
elections and politics. 
Independents as hesitant voters: Individual voting behaviour of independent voters 
is unstable compared to that of partisans. Independent voters made a later voting decision 
compared to partisans. Approximately 22 per cent of independent voters made their 
voting choice within three days of the day of the election. However, although the voting 
decision of independent voters was later than that of partisans, approximately 45 per cent 
of independent voters made voting decision before the official campaigns began. 
Qualitative data suggested that voters hesitated in making voting decision when they were 
less interested in the election, did not see many differences between the candidates, and 
did not have sufficient information about candidates and the election. 
Independents as floating voters: The voting intention of individual independent 
voters is less stable compared to that of partisans. Approximately 22 per cent of 
independent voters changed their vote intention at least once, while only 15 per cent of 
partisans changed theirs. But qualitative data showed that independent voters also hardly 
changed their voting intention, though the strength of vote preference was varied to some 
extent during the course of election campaigns. 
Independents as swing voters: In terms of voting consistency between consecutive 
elections, many independent voters cast their ballot for the same political party, though 
independent voters were less consistent compared to partisans. Indeed, about 71 per cent 
of partisans who voted for one of two major parties in the 1997 presidential election voted 
for a same party in the 2002 presidential election, while about 53.3 per cent of 
independent voters did so. 
The Impact of Election Campaigns on Voting Choice Are Minimal 
The findings did not confirm the hypothesis that independent voters are more 
responsive to election campaigns compared to partisans. Regardless of whether the voter 
was a partisan or independent, the electorate did not seem to be greatly affected by 
election campaigns. The minimal effect theory is useful in explaining electoral behaviour 
in Korea. In particular, the TV presidential debates and the Internet campaigns provided 
much information about candidate and election to individual voters, but the impact of the 
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debates and the Internet was not strong enough for individual voters to change their 
earlier voting intention or to make voting decision. 
TV presidential debates - the king of election campaigns, but minimal effects: In 
contrast to a common belief about the considerable impact of the televised debates 
between the candidates on voting choice, the presidential debates held during the official 
campaign period did not have a major influence the electoral choice of both partisans and 
independents. Quantitative surveys confirmed that the impact of the debates on voting 
choice was minimal and the TV debates did not have much bearing on the outcome of the 
2002 presidential election. Qualitative data also highlighted that voters did not watch TV 
debates carefully, but instead watched the debates cursorily and only in part. Also, voters 
were more likely to watch TV debates with a firm voting intention or at least favouring 
one candidate. 
The impact of Internet campaigns was exaggerated: Empirical evidences show that 
influence of the Internet on voting choice was overstated, although extensive use was 
made of the Internet in the 2002 presidential election campaign. The young, the higher 
educated, the liberal, those who are interested in politics, and those who distrust the news 
media are more likely to go to the Internet for gathering information. But partisanship did 
not really explain the `digital divide'. Qualitative interview data confirmed that most 
independent voters did not much pay much attention to the election campaigns on the 
Internet. Active participants of the Internet campaigns, who made up a relatively small 
percentage of the electorate and were more likely to have a strong voting intention, did 
not change their choice for a candidate regardless of the degree of exposure to the Internet 
campaigns. Those who were active off-line were also active on-line and the Internet 
hardly shaped or changed voting choice, even though the Internet was considered as one 
of key information mediums in the 2002 presidential election. 
Independents Depend on Short-term Considerations in Making Votinr Choice 
Quantitative evidence supports that partisans relied on long-term psychological 
attachment to a political party when they made their voting choice. Although party 
identification is a key factor to explain the voting choice of partisans, candidate factors 
also played a role in making this choice. In particular, critical partisans paid attention to 
the candidates when deciding upon their choice of candidate, while habitual partisans 
relied solely on party affiliation. Quantitative analysis showed that independent voters 
who were free from party constraints in voting choice were more responsive to short-term 
considerations, particularly candidate factors. Attentive independents very interested in 
politics also took government performance into account when making their choice. In 
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short, subgroup multiple regression analysis confirms that independent voters are more 
influenced by short-term factors, such as candidate evaluation, issue preference, and 
government performance compared to partisans who heavily relied on their long-term 
psychological attachment. 
Independents Cast a Ballot Based on Candidate Images rather than Policies 
However, qualitative data rejects the hypothesis that the voting behaviour of 
independent voters is politically rational. In post-election surveys, many voters answered 
that they voted for a candidate on the basis of their evaluation of candidate's competence. 
However, the relationship between voting choice and evaluation of candidate competence 
is often overestimated in post-election surveys. For instance, voters might justify their 
voting choice in post-election surveys. In the case of some voters, candidate evaluation 
did not influence voting choice in elections, but voting choice affected their candidate 
evaluation in post-election surveys. 
Qualitative data confirmed this argument. The key issue is about what kinds of 
information they use in their voting choice. ' Independent voters were most responsive to 
the candidate factor in making their voting choice, but the candidates' competence to 
solve critical national problems was hardly considered. Independent voters did not know 
much about the candidates' issue stances, policies, and pledges, but knew only a small 
amount of information about the candidates' image, particularly, the affective dimension 
of candidates' traits. Also, independent voters made their decision with only a limited 
amount of information. Indeed, qualitative data showed that the choice of voters who cast 
a ballot on the basis of candidate evaluation was not politically rational. 
Attentive Independent voters are Distinguished from Apolitical Independent 
Voters in terms of Socio-Economic Characteristics. Political Attitudes. and týotJnr 
Behaviour 
In general, the four types of voters are distinctive in terms of socio-economic 
characteristics and voting behaviour. Partisans are different from independents, but at the 
same time, partisans are not homogeneous and not all independents are the same in terms 
of social and economic characteristics and voting behaviour. Critical partisans are clearly 
distinguished from habitual partisans and apolitical independents also are quite different 
' Milton Lodge, Marco R. Steenbergen, and Shawn Brau, `The Responsive Voter. Campaign 
Information and the Dynamics of Candidate Evaluation', American Political Science Review 89 
(1995), 309-26, at. 322. 
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from attentive independents in terms of social and economic characteristics and voting 
behaviour. 
Regarding socio-economic characteristics and political attitudes, attentive 
independents are different from apolitical independents in many aspects. For instance, 
attentive independents are relatively older (35-54 years old), higher educated, male, 
professionals, the Salariats, liberal, understand politics well, and critical of politics, while 
apolitical independents are relatively younger (20-34 years old), less educated, female, 
students, routine non-manual workers, the centre in liberal-conservative ideological 
spectrum, poorly understand politics, and less critical of politics. 
Furthermore, attentive independents are closer to critical partisans than apolitical 
independents in certain aspects of voting behaviour. For example, partisans are more 
likely to go to the polls compared to independent voters, but the voter turnout rate of 
attentive independent voters is higher than the turnout rate of habitual partisans. Also, in 
terms of the timing of vote decision, partisans make an early voting choice compared to 
independents, but attentive independent voters make a voting choice earlier than habitual 
partisans. 
Finally, attentive independent voter behave differently from apolitical independent in 
voting choice. Both attentive independents and apolitical independents heavily rely on 
candidate factor in voting choice. But ideology and government performance also explain 
the voting choice of attentive independents, whereas only regionalism explains voting 
choice of apolitical independents in addition to candidate factor. 
Overall, the study confirms that non-party identifiers are not homogeneous in terms 
of social and economic characteristics and voting behaviour. Also, the study shows that 
the classification and subdivision of independent voters following the distinction of the 
new independent voters from the traditional non-party identifiers is useful in the analysis 
of electoral behaviour. 
An Overview Model of the Voting Decision of Independent Voters 
The results of this study point to three main features of the electoral decision-making 
process of independent voters. First, independent voters are less interested in politics and 
do not pay much attention to election campaigns. Second, independent voters make their 
voting decision based on limited and insufficient information. Third, independent voters 
rely heavily on candidate factors in voting choice, but evaluate candidates on the basis of 
candidate's images rather than candidate's issue stances and policies. These main features 
of voting behaviour of independent voters suggest a brief overview model of voting 
decision. 
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Initial Influence of Election Campaigns 
In prolonged election campaigns, independent voters receive a small amount of 
information from campaign events or news reports and develop a positive feeling to a 
specific candidate even before the official election campaigns begin. In particular, during 
the presidential primary or party convention for nomination, the news media increase 
reports about election events and voters are more likely to gain information about 
candidates and the election. At this stage, voters get some information about candidate 
images from TV interviews and news reports. Candidate preference and voting intention 
based on candidate image is not firm and is vulnerable to contrary information. So, each 
candidate's popularity fluctuates in the course of the election campaigns. 
ConsolldatinL' Candidate Preference 
In general, independent voters who are not very interested in politics and elections 
do not actively gather information about candidate and election. What they get from 
election campaigns is more likely to be about the image of the candidates rather than 
substance because they do not actively gather information. When they add new 
information, they are more likely to reinforce their feeling to the candidate. 
Among independent voters, those who are enthusiastic about election campaigns 
make their voting decision and consolidate their candidate preference before the official 
campaign begin, but those who are less interested in elections have only weakly favour 
one candidate and begin to pay attention to the election campaign only when the official 
campaigns start. 
Making Voting Choice 
Reinforcing voting intention: Those who have a preference for a party or candidate 
pay a great deal of attention to the election campaigns during the official campaign period, 
but they do not give equal attention to all candidates. They are more likely to be 
interested in acquiring information to support their existing voting intention. Their voting 
intention is not therefore affected by campaigns, but is reinforced. 
Making a voting decision based on minimal information: Independent voters who 
are less interested in the election begin to pay some attention to the election when the day 
of election is close. They rely heavily on the TV debates to find out about the election 
because viewing the TV debates does not demand much effort and voters can collect 
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information conveniently. Voters watch the TV debates cursorily, but not carefully. What 
they get from TV debates is not substance, but image. Also, they are not very interested in 
elections and do not actively use the Internet to find out information. Family members 
and friends often decisively influence their voting choice because they do have only 
minimal amount of information. 
They make their voting decision very close to the day of election. They make their 
choice based on minimal and quite inappropriate information. Their voting preference is 
not clear and sometime they cannot come to a decision. Those who do not pay attention to 
the election cannot make a decision and are more likely to abstain. 
Democracy without Political Parties 
One of the important conclusions to be drawn from the research is related to a question 
about the quality of new democracy. Is partisan decline good for the development of new 
democracy in Korea? The findings suggest that a weakening of party affiliation 
accompanied with an expansion of higher education and the development of the mass 
media has not resulted in an increase of rational voters in elections. Again, the issue is not 
how much independent voters are responsive to short-term considerations in voting 
choice, but what kind of information is involved in their voting choice. 
Irrational Voting Choice 
In Korea's young democracy, voting choice constrained by party affiliation is often 
condemned as irrational voting behaviour because partisan attachments are largely based 
on irrational regionalism. Major political parties often instigate regionalism among the 
electorate during the campaign and voters respond enthusiastically to it. Many partisans 
do not care about a candidate's competence and capability. Many partisans do not 
carefully compare the policies offered by different candidates. In such circumstances, 
party voting is irrational because voters rely on party loyalty influenced by irrational 
regional antagonism. But the findings of this study suggest that the voting choice of 
independent voters free from party constraints is not rational either. In a sense, partisan 
dealignment is related to a weakening of irrational regionalism in party politics. Yet at the 
same time, partisan dealignment also suggests there is an increase in ill-informed 
individual voters and that candidate image becomes even more significant in voting 
choice, which can be easily manipulated. Therefore, partisan dealignment is not a positive 
sign for the consolidation of the new democracy in Korea. 
A decay of political parties as a result of partisan dealignment does not signify an 
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increase in rational electoral behaviour. The rational choice model has assumed that 
voters are rational because they can maximise the utility to achieve their goals. 2 
Unfortunately, it is not true that voters are rational actors in elections. In an era of partisan 
decline, voters are less interested not only in political parties, but also in politics in 
general. Voters do not pay much attention to election campaigns and cast a ballot based 
on insufficient or inappropriate information. Indeed, their voting choice is not based on 
rational calculation, but on images that are easily manipulated3. 
The rational choice model has often assumed that voters are the same with 
consumers. ' But the findings of this study suggest that voters are less careful in choosing 
their politicians than they are when buying a car for instance. Most consumers examine 
very carefully the various factors involved in their decisions, such as price, terms, 
performance, and appearance, and also compare many different models when they make a 
decision to buy their own cars. Unfortunately, many voters do not behave in the same way 
when they make voting decision. In voting choice, people are similar to reckless 
consumers. In their evaluation of candidates, voters rely on images and do not recognise 
policies offered by candidates. Sometimes voters are swayed by image and thus 
mistakenly believe a candidate advocating conservative policies is a liberal. 
We may argue that voters who are poorly informed still be able to behave rationally 
by using effective `information shortcuts'. According to Downs, most voters have little 
incentive to gather information about parties, candidates, and issues in order to improve 
their voting choice. Therefore, voters rely on information shortcuts to simplify their 
choice and economise cognitive strategies. ' Downs suggested party identification as a 
typical information shortcut. Also, a political belief-system, i. e., ideology, is a kind of 
information shortcut that voters often use. In line with Downs' view of information 
shortcuts, Popkin argued that voters use various kinds of cues in making judgments --- 
even small experiences from daily life or personal behaviour, such as eating corn shucks 
of tamales 6 This is what Popkin called `low-information rationality' or `gut reasoning'. ' 
2 Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory. a Critique of 
Applications in Political Science (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 2. 3 For example, in the 1997 presidential election, Rhee In je tried to adopt the image of former 
president Park Chung Hee, who was a dictator, but who many people still admired due to his 
economic achievements in economic development. Rhee In je was, like Park, a short man and 
even copied Park's hair style, though his party (the New Party for People) hastily copied polices 
and election pledges from that of a major opposition party (the National Congress for New 
Politics) led by Kim Dae-jung, a long-time political rival of Park, in the election. Based on his 
image, Rhee was able to gain support from many voters who respected Park's leadership in 
economic development. 
° Gordon Tullock, The Vote Motive (London: Institute for Economic Affairs, 1976), p. 5. S Anthony Downs, The Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Low, 1957). 
6 During the 1976 American presidential election campaign, President Gerald Ford tried to eat 
tamales, a Mexican food, in order to shows his empathy with Mexican-American voters. But he 
made a mistake. Indeed, he bit the corn shucks which serve as a wrapper because he did not know 
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Is voting choice based on information shortcuts, i. e., the low-information rationality, 
rational? Again, the issue is not how much information is involved in voting choice but 
what kind of information is used in making a voting decision. In other words, when the 
cues that voters use are irrelevant, the gut reasoning cannot be rational. For example, 
tamale shucking may be a useful cue to choose chefs and the choice based on the cue may 
be rational. But tamale shucking is not a relevant cue to make a choice for a president 
who is going to rule the society and the voting behviour relying on the cue is more likely 
to be irrational. " Voting choice using irrelevant cues is not very different from a choice 
based on instincts or even bias rather than rational calculations. 
Furthermore, even if we accept the logic of information shortcuts, it is still doubtful 
that independent voters use information shortcuts in their voting choice. Indeed, empirical 
fmdings in the study suggest that ideology, i. e., an important information shortcut, does 
not help explain voting choice for independent voters as well as for partisans, as 
examined in Chapter 10 of this thesis. 
`Image Politics' and Meaningless Elections 
When candidate image rather than substance is important in individual voting choice, 
candidates then care about developing their image during the campaign, but not about 
developing policies that they will carry out when in government. A president who won 
the election based on carefully constructed images during the election campaign is not 
interested in the fulfilment of election pledges when he or she is in office. A president, 
who does not adequately prepare for running the government and lacks strong 
competence to manage the pressing problems in contrast to his or her image, inevitably 
depends on professional bureaucrats, who have a great deal of experience in 
administration. A new president may bring a new style to the administration, but the 
substance of the government's policies remains without much change from one 
government to the next. For example, many cabinet members and social and economic 
policies of the incumbent government led by President Roh Moo-hyun, who has the 
image of a liberal politician, are conservative. 
In these circumstances, one of the main functions of elections in representative 
democracies cannot be attained. If citizens cannot decide the direction of the nation 
that he should not eat the corn shucks. Thus, due to this incident, voters viewed Gerald Ford as a 
man who has little understanding of different ethnic culture and Ford failed to attract votes from 
Mexican-Americans. Samuel L. Popkin, The Reasoning Voters: Communication and Persuasion 
in Presidential Campaigns (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), p. 1. 
7 Samuel L. Popkin, The Reasoning Voters, p. 7. 
8 Louis Menand, `The Unpolitical Animal', The New Yorker, 30 August 2004. 
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through electing their political leaders, a crucial part of elections is lost. In representative 
democracies, people cannot be involved directly in making and administrating national 
policies and cannot directly influence the government. Voters only indirectly influence 
the government through political leaders whom they empower. Therefore, voting is the 
only way for citizens to secure their influence upon the government. But many voters do 
not properly exercise this sovereign power. Voters often waste their power because their 
voting choice is often based on inappropriate information that is manipulated during the 
course of election campaigns. 
When many voters do not carefully exercise their voting power, democracy cannot 
rest upon sound foundations. Regardless of the expansion of higher education and the 
mass media, it is difficult to expect a better democracy if more voters are less interested 
in politics and cast a ballot more and more depending on candidate image rather than 
substance. Unless voters are politically rational in voting choice, it is unlikely that the 
candidates who are successful will be sufficiently qualified. 
A False `Party Politics' 
In Korean parliamentary elections, some people known across the nation with a 
positive image of their work in the mass media, particularly TV, ran for the parliament 
and often succeeded in gaining election. It is not suggested that TV entertainers, such as 
comedians, actors and actresses, or TV talk show hosts, should not run for the office. 
However, it is legitimate to question whether they have their own clear issue stances and 
even whether they are knowledgeable about public affairs. 
In all parliamentary elections, every major party in Korea competes to recruit 
potential candidates who have a good image and are well known to people regardless of 
their ideological orientation and issue stances. Most of them have never been partisans of 
the political party and may even have opposed the party's issue positions in the past. In 
these circumstances, political parties do not necessarily consist of people united by 
common positions on issues and policies. Political parties become solely a form of 
electoral machine and party platforms and election pledges are mere accessories to 
decorate political parties. 
In sum, the decay of party politics and the prevalence of `image politics' represent a 
deterioration of democracy. A weakening of party affiliation does not lead to an increase 
of voters who are politically aware. The decay of party politics does not result in an 
increase of voters who make voting choice based on rational calculations. When voters 
rely on image in voting choice and are less interested in politics, democracy cannot be 
healthy. 
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Suggestions for Further Research 
Independent Voters and the Study of Korean Elections 
Partisan dealignment is a common phenomenon in many democracies and 
independent voters are no longer `outliers' or `remnants' in electoral behaviour. As one of 
the first studies to consider partisan dealignment in the Korean context, the thesis has 
provided new findings about voting behaviour of independent voters in Korea, but further 
analysis of independent voters is required. 
In the research, the voting behaviour of the attentive independent voters, who are 
much interested in politics, has been compared with the voting behaviour of the apolitical 
independent voters, who are not very interested in politics, by using quantitative survey 
data. But the analysis was inconclusive due to the lack of data. For instance, in the 
qualitative analysis, the attentive independents have not been clearly distinguished from 
the apolitical independents. 
The findings have some limits as to their capacity for generalisation because the 
qualitative data collection was limited to a specific group of voters, i. e., those residing in 
Seoul city or its suburb. Although it is expected that independent voters have a similar 
pattern of electoral behaviour, additional investigations into the voting behaviour of 
independent voters with different social characteristics, such as those living in rural areas 
or in regions where regionalism is very strong, are required. 
Electoral studies of Korean voters have been limited as yet. As discussed in the 
thesis, even some of basic concepts in electoral studies have not been well developed in 
the study of Korean elections. For example, the concept of party identification is not 
clearly defined in Korea and each researcher uses a different survey question in 
measuring party identification. Also, a systematic and consistent accumulation of 
research data is important in the study of Korean elections. For example, in the election 
year, more than a hundred election surveys are conducted in Korea, but the public and 
researchers are not allowed to access the data. Only a limited number of people use the 
results of surveys once and the data is discarded. Such data if publicly available would 
provide a valuable resource for researchers. 
Combining Both Qualilalive and Quantitalive Approaches 
As demonstrated in the thesis, combining both qualitative and quantitative analysis 
in electoral studies is possible and desirable. In particular, the qualitative approach should 
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be included in more election studies. Combining the two different methods within one 
study provides at the very least richer data. Moreover, a better understanding of a social 
phenomenon is possible when we apply two different methods within one study. Each 
method investigates different dimensions of the same phenomenon and provides a more 
comprehensive understanding of a social phenomenon. In particular, the social context 
surrounding electoral behaviour can be accurately represented in qualitative methods 
while quantitative methods often fail to achieve it. For example, in this research, the 
qualitative evidence suggests that the relationship between regionalism and party 
affiliation in Korea is often overestimated in quantitative analysis. Indeed, the qualitative 
approach uncovered that the regionalism of individual voters overlaps with their 
ideological self-image and suggests that ideological self-image was often ignored or 
inadequately included in explanations of the Korean partisan alignment. 
This research clearly shows that the qualitative approach compensates for some of 
the limitations of the quantitative approach and vice versa. One of the difficulties 
researchers often have in hypo-deductive approaches is related to determining the 
direction of causations. While associations are not same as causal relations in quantitative 
analyses, a causal direction of associated variables can be discerned more easily in 
qualitative analysis. For example, in this study, a causal relationship between party 
affiliation and the long-term policy preferences of individual voters in Korea is 
straightforward in qualitative approach. 
Multi-Wave Panel Studies 
Multi-wave panel studies covering both pre-election and post-election are required 
in order to overcome the limits of post-election studies. The findings suggest that 
approximately half of voters, both partisans and independent voters, made their voting 
decision before the official campaign began. Most voters did not change their voting 
intention, although the strength of vote intention varied depending upon new information 
and political events. Also, in post-election interviews, most voters hardly remember most 
election campaigns and political events that affected their voting choice, but this does not 
mean that voters were not affected by all campaigns 9 Voters acquired a small amount of 
information about the candidates, particularly images, but drew conclusions about the 
sincerity and issue positions of the candidates from the information. "' Therefore, it is 
difficult to discern the true factors influencing voting decision if we rely only on 
Lodge, Steenbergen, and Brau, `The Responsive Voter. Campaign Information and the 
Dynamics of Candidate Evaluation'. 
10 Samuel L. Popkin, The Reasoning Voter. 
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respondents' vague memories in post-election interviews. Research on voting choice 
should cover the dynamics of electoral behaviour in prolonged election campaigns. 
In particular, qualitative in-depth interviews applying a multi-wave panel study is 
recommended to explore the decision-making process of individual voters. Multi-wave 
panel surveys can show how voting intention has changed, but in-depth interviews are 
better suited to explaining why voting intention is changed in the course of election 
campaigns. It is expected that multi-wave qualitative studies based on carefully recruited 
panel groups could produce many benefits and also partially overcome the limits of 
qualitative research in generalising research findings. 
Comparative Electoral Studies 
Comparative studies, particularly country-specific case studies in a comparative 
perspective, are recommended in the study of electoral behaviour. " In their seminal work, 
Przeworski and Teune suggested the `most different system analysis' in comparative 
study. '2 They strongly insisted upon the need to develop universal generalisations about 
human behaviour across different cultures and national boundaries. Indeed, they denied 
including the influence of culture or institutions on mass behaviour. Comparative 
electoral studies looking for universal generalisations have achieved much over the last 
three decades, but there are still many unknown answers in comparative electoral studies. 
Causal relationships of electoral behaviour vary in strength across different cultures. A 
casual relationship that is strong in some cultures does not exist in other environments. 
Comparative studies looking for universal generalisations have not answered these 
questions. 
In social science, generalisations of social phenomena and human behaviour cannot 
be ignored, but peculiarities of electoral behaviour across different cultures should not be 
neglected either. " Mass behaviour is bounded by culture. Mass behaviour can be 
interpreted properly only when cultural context is included. 14 In other words, culture or 
context is one of the key variables to explain mass behaviour. Recently, researchers have 
" For the current stage of comparative electoral studies, see Samuel H. Barnes, `Electoral 
Behavior and Comparative Politics', in Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman, eds, 
Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997), pp. 115-41. 
12 Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry (Malabar, 
Florida: Robert E. Krieger Publishing Company, 1970). 
13 Barnes, `Electoral Behavior and Comparative Politics', p. 136. 
14 The multicultural approach has stressed cultural context in the study of social phenomena. 
"Moreover, individuals are reflections of the cultural and social units to which they belong. 
Personal identity is determined by the cultural and social units into which its members have been 
enculturated and socialized. " Brian Fay, Contemporary Philosophy of Social Science: a 
Multicultural Approach (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), p. 4. 
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stressed the `middle range theory' or `partial universalism' in comparative studies. IS 
Researchers have begun to realise the importance of context in electoral studies. 16 Indeed, 
neither universal generalisation nor the peculiarities of any given situation in a specific 
country should be ignored in comparative studies. When both generalisations and 
peculiarities are uncovered in electoral studies, a better understanding about electoral 
behaviour is possible and we are able to develop more sophisticated theories. 
This is the reason why we need further research on elections in new democracies. 
Most electoral studies have focused on elections in mature Western democracies, but as 
yet there are only a few studies on elections and electoral behaviour in new democracies. 
A full understanding about electoral behaviour in different contexts can enrich our 
knowledge about mass behaviour and lead to the development of more sophisticated 
theories. 
Furthermore, this is one of reasons why the qualitative approach should be included 
in the study of mass behaviour. Of the methods involved in comparative studies, the 
quantitative approach is more useful in studies looking for universal generalisations about 
mass behaviour, while the qualitative approach is more appropriate to look for 
peculiarities of mass behaviour. Comparative studies or country specific case studies in a 
comparative perspective are required in further research about elections. 
15 Barnes, `Electoral Behavior and Comparative Politics', p. 136. Green and Shapiro, Pathologies 
of Rational Choice Theory: a Critique of Applications in Political Science, p. 69. 
16 Christopher Wlezien and Mark N. Franklin, `The Future of Election Studies: Introduction'. 
Electoral Studies, 21 (2002), 157-60. 
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Appendix 1: Tables 
Table A4.1 Participants in Focus Group Interviews 
ID Age Occupation Education Hometown Interested 
in Politics 
Party 
Identification 
Grou p One: Women 
FF1 33 Fulltime Housewife University Jeolla Very much MDP 
FF2 44 Fulltime Housewife University Seoul Somewhat Independent 
FF3 39 Fulltime Housewife High School Chun cheo Not much 
_Independent FF4 35 Fulltime Housewife University G eon an Very much Independent 
FF5 40 Fulltime Housewife University Gan on Somewhat Independent 
FF6 32 Fulltime Housewife High School G eon san Somewhat Independent 
FF7 34 Fulltime Housewife College Chungcheopg Somewhat Independent 
FF8 37 Futltime Housewife College Seoul Somewhat Independent 
Grou p Two: Men 
FM I 41 Non-manual worker University Seoul Somewhat Independent 
FM2 34 Engineer University G eon i Much Independent 
FM3 35 Non-manual worker University Gan on Somewhat GNP 
FM4 34 Self-employed University Seoul Somewhat Independent 
FM5 33 Self-employed Postgraduate Seoul Much Independent 
FM6 41 Non-manual worker University G eon fflang Very much _ Ind ndent 
FM7 34 Non-manual worker University Chun cheo Somewhat Ind ndent 
FM8 36 Non-manual worker Postgraduate Jeolla Much MDP 
FM9 44 Self-employed Hi school Chun cheon Much GNP 
Key. MDP = Millennium Democratic Party; GNP = Grand National Party. 
Note: Party affiliation is identified from dialogues in the discussions. 
Table A. 4.2 Interviewees in In-depth Interviews 
ID Sex Age Occupation Education Hometown Interest 
in 
Politics 
Party 
Identification 
Independent Voters 
1-101 F 33 Non-manual worker Universi G eon an yes Independent 
1-102 F 34 Fulltime Housewife PG the north yes Independent 
1-103 M 60 Self-employed High 
school 
Gyeongsang yes Independent 
1-104 F 28 Fulltime Housewife University G eon an no Inde pendent 
1-105 M 28 Non-manual worker University G eon sa no Independent 
1-106 M 42 Professional PG the north es independent 
1-107 F 53 Fulltime Housewife High 
school 
Chungcheong no Independent 
I-108 F 27 Non-manual worker University Ch cheo no Ind dent 
1-109 F 24 Non-manual worker University Seoul no Independent 
1-110 M 54 Self-employed PG Chun cheo no Ind ent 
I-111 M 25 Student University G eon an no Independent 
1-112 M 30 other University Seoul no Independent 
1-113 F 22 other University Chun cheo es dependent 
1-114 F 25 Non-manual worker Universi Jeolla no ent 
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I-115 M 43 Self-employed University Jeolla Yes Independent 
1-116 F 21 Student University Chun cheo no Independent 
1-117 F 22 Student University Seoul no Independent 
1-118 F 22 Student University Chun cheo no Independent 
1-119 M 35 Self-employed University Seoul yes Independent 
1-120 F 24 Non-manual worker University Gyeongsang no Independent 
1-121 M 56 Self-employed High 
school 
Gyeongsang no Independent 
1-122 F 25 Student PG the north Yes, Independent 
1-123 M 25 Student Universi Chun cheon no linde pendent 
1-124 F 29 Non-manual worker Universi G eon san yes Independent 
1-125 M 30 Non-manual worker Universi G eon s no Independent 
1-126 F 25 Student PG G eon san yes Independent 
1-127 F 23 Student Universi G eon san no Independent 
1-128 M 23 Student Univers' Vksjz Ge on an yes Independent 
1-129 F 25 Professional Universi Chun cheo no Independent 
1-130 M 28 Student PG Jeolla yes Independent 
1-131 M 28 Student PG Jeolla no Independent 
1-132 F 39 Fulltime Housewife High 
school 
Chungcheong no Independent 
1-133 M 22 Student University Qveonggi no Independent 
1-134 F 34 Fulltime Housewife University Chun cheo no Independent 
1-135 F 70 Unemployed High 
school 
Gyeongsang no Independent 
1-136 M 21 Student University Jeolla yes Independent 
1-137 M 24 Non-manual worker University Gan on no Independent 
1-138 M 32 Professional PG Jeolla no Independent 
1-139 F 29 Fulltime Housewife University Seoul no Independent 
1-140 F 25 Student PG G eon i yes Independent 
1-141 M 53 Self-employed High 
school 
Gyeongsang yes Independent 
1-142 M 49 Self-employed High 
school 
Gyeonggi no Independents 
Party Identi fiers 
1-201 M 26 other University the north Yes MDP" 
1-202 F 24 Non-manual 
worker 
University Gangwon no MDP" 
1-203 M 57 Professional University Gyeongsang yes GNP 
1-204 F 38 other University Jeolla Yes MDP 
1-205 F 54 Fulltime Housewife High 
school 
Gyeongsang yes GNP 
1-206 F 25 Unemployed University Jeolla no MDP 
I-207 F 25 Unemployed University Chungcheong yes MDP 
I-208 F 27 Professional University 
-yes 
DLP 
I-209 M 53 Self-employed University G eon san yes GNP 
1-210 F 48 Self-employed High 
school 
Gyeongsang no GNP 
1-211 M 23 Student University Chungcheong, yes DLP 
1-212 F 43 Professional PG the north yes DLP 
1-213 M 47 Self-employed High 
school 
Gyeongsang 
I 
yes GNP 
I-214 M 38 Professional PG G eon san 
.Z 
es L_ GNP 
Key MDP = Millennium Democratic Party; GNP = Grand National Party; DLP - Democratic 
Labour Party; PG = postgraduate school. 
Note: *= An inconsistency of party identification between answer in mini-survey before interview 
and answer during interview; Hometown is based on hometown of interviewees' father. 
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Table AS. 1 Party Identification in British Election, 2001 
PRE ELECTION 
(A) 
POSTELECTION THE DIFFERENCE 
BETWEEN CA) AND B 
Number of cases 3163 2331 
Labour Party 42.0% 44.5% +2.5% 
Conservative Party 23.5% 23.1% -0.4% 
Liberal Party 8.3% 10.3% +2.0% 
Other 6.5% 6.8% +0.3% 
Non-identifiers 13.4% 12.1% -1.3% 
No answer / don't know 6.3% 3.2% -3.1% 
Data: British Election Stud ies. 2001. 
TableAS. 2 Change in Voting Intention between Pre-election and Post-election 
Date Voting Intention 
The day of 
election 
Month 
(Polling Date) 
Conservative 
Party 
Labour Party Liberal 
Democratic party 
11 June 1987 May 39 28 30 
June 41 34 23.5 
July 44.5 33 20.5 
9 April 1992 March 37.4 37.8 19.7 
April 38.5 38.0 20.0 
May 40.6 393 16.1 
1 May 1997 April N/A N/A N/A 
May 23.3 56.9 14.7 
June 242 60.4 11.5 
Data: Selectively copied from Gallup Polling Findings in David Butler and Gareth Butler, 
Twentieth-Century British Political Facts, 1900-2000 (London: Macmillan, 2000), pp-276-8. 
Note: The shaded cells refer to the percentage for the wining party. 
Table A5.3 Feel About a Competing Party by Labour and Conservative Party Identifiers in 
British Election, 2001 
LABOUR PARTY IDENTIFIERS' 
ATTITUDE TO CONSERVATIVE 
PARTY 
CONSERVATIVE PARTY 
IDENTIFIERS' ATTITUDE TO 
LABOUR PARTY 
N Valid % Cumulative % N Valid % Cumulative % 
Strongly dislike 26 25. 25. 73 13.6 1 13. 
1 12 11. 37. 51 9.5 1 23.01 
17 16. 54.5 7 14.5 1 37.5 
3 15 15. 70.01 92 1 17.1 54.61 
4 13 13. 83. 8 16.21 70.81 
5 11 11. 94. 9 18.21 89. 
3 2. 97. 3 6.91 95.91 
1 1. 99. 13 2. 98.3 
5 .5 99. 1.51 99. 
Strongly like 3 .3 100. 1 l00. 
Total 102 100.0 53 100. 
Mean 2.37 3.17 
Std. Deviation 1.97 2.02 
Data: British Election Study, 2001 
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Table A6.1 Region and Share of Votes by Political Parties in Parliamentary election, 2000 
SHARE OF THE VOTE BY PARTIES 
TOTAL GNP MDP ULD other independent total 
Total 100% 39.0% 35.9% 9.8% 6.0% 9.4% 100% 
Seoul 21.4% 43.3% 45.1% 4.7% 5.4% 1.6% 100% 
G eon i 22.5% 39.6% 40.8% 12.3% 2.8% 4.4% 100% 
Gan on 3.6% 38.6% 36.5% 10.2% 6.7% 8.1% 100% 
Chun cheon 10.3% 23.2% 30.0% 34.8% 5.1% 6.90/cp 100% 
Jeolla 12.4% 3.7% 66.8% 2.0% 0.4% 27.1% 100% 
Gyeongsang 28.6% 56.0% 13.1% 6.6% 11.7% 12.7% 100% 
Jeju 1.3% 44.2% 49.4% 0.6% 0.4% 5.3% 100% 
Data: Calculated from election statistics provided by the National Election Commission. 
Keys: GNP = Grand National Party; MDP = Millennium Democratic Party; and ULD = United 
Liberal Democrats. 
Table A6.2 T-Test for Equality of Means: Partisan Alignment and Age, 1992-20002 
N MEAN 
(AGE) 
STD. 
DEVIATION 
T SIG. 
(2-TAILED) 
1992 
Major party A 470 45.72 15.40 
Major Party B 324 38.71 13.87 
Third party (C) 114 36.58 12.32 
Compare A and B 6.594 0.000 
Compare A and C 6.747 0.000 
Compare B and C 1.518 0.130 
1997 
Major party A 221 43.47 15.27 
Major Party B 390 40.08 13.04 
Third party (C) 125 36.27 10.99 
Compare A and B 2.895 0.004 
Compare A and C 5.601 0.000 
Compare B and C 3.218 0.001 
2002 
Major party A 350 45.41 14.00 
Major Party B 405 42.83 16.21 
Compare A and B 2.326 0.020 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992,1997, and 2002. 
Keys: N= number of cases; Mean = average age; `Major party A' refers to the Democratic Liberal 
Party in 1992, and the Grand National Party in 1997 and 2002; `Major party B' refers to the 
Democratic Party in 1992, the National Congress for New Politics, and the Millennium 
Democratic Party in 2002; `Third party' refers to the Unification National Party in 1992 and the 
New Party for People in 1997. 
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Table A6.3 ANOVA: Average Scores of Ideological Self-Image by Cohorts, 2002 
Cohorts Number of 
cases 
Mean Std. Deviation ANOVA 
20-24 213 2.65 . 84 F=9.736 
25-29 144 2.58 . 91 Sig. = 
0.000 
30-34 191 2.49 . 89 
35-39 191 2.60 . 90 
40-44 174 2.86 . 97 
45-49 . 159 3.02 1.08 
50-54 106 3.08 1.06 
55-59 89 3.09 . 98 
60-64 88 3.19 1.06 
65-69 69 3.04 . 91 
Total 1424 2.79 . 
98 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 2002. 
Note: Mean = average score in a 5-point scale (i. e., strong liberal is 1, liberal is 2, center is 3, 
conservative is 4, and strong conservative is 5). 
Table A6.4 T-Test for Equality of Means: Partisan Alignment and Education, 1992-2002 
N MEAN 
(EDUCATION) 
STD. 
DEVIATION 
T SIG. 
(2-TAILED) 
1992 
Major party A 470 2.42 1.09 
Major Party B 324 2.77 1.04 
Third party (C) 114 3.01 0.84 
Compare A and B -4.591 0.000 
Compare A and C -6.321 0.000 
Compare B and C -2.440 0.015 
1997 
Major party A 219 2.92 1.04 
Major Party B 388 2.99 0.98 
Third party (C) 123 3.20 0.71 
Compare A and B -0.797 0.426 
Compare A and C -2.871 0.004 
Compare B and C -2.541 0.012 
2002 
Major party A 346 2.97 
Major Party B 404 3.01 1.00 
Compare A and B -0.547 0.585 
Data, Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992,1997, and 2002. 
Note: Mean = average score in a 4-point scale (i. e., the lowest level is 1, and the highest level is 4). 
Keys: N= number of cases; Major party A= the Democratic Liberal Party in 1992, and the Grand 
National Party in 1997 and in 2002; Major party B= the Democratic Party in 1992, the National 
Congress for New Politics in 1997, and the Millennium Democratic Party in 2002; Third party = 
the Unification National Party in 1992, and the New Party for People in 1997. 
358 
Appendix 
Table A6.5 T-Test for Equality of Means: Partisan Alignment and Gender, 1992-2002 
N MEAN STD. 
DEVIATION 
T SIG. 
(2-TAILED) 
1992 
Major party A 470 1.54 0.50 
Major Party B 324 1.52 0.50 
Third party (C) 114 1.49 0.50 
Compare A and B 0.555 0.579 
Compare A and C 1.026 0.306 
Compare B and C 0.614 0.540 
1997 
Major party A 221 1.56 0.50 
Major Party B 390 1.47 0.50 
Third party (C) 125 1.39 0.49 
Compare A and B 2.187 0.029 
Compare A and C 3.054 0.002 
Compare B and C 1.526 0.129 
2002 
Major party A 350 1.50 0.50 
Major Party B 405 1.51 0.50 
Compare A and B -0.382 0.702 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992,1997, and 2002. 
Keys: N= number of cases, Mean = average score in a two-point scale (i. e., I= man, and 2- 
woman). 
Table A6.6 T-Test for Equality of Means: Partisan Alignment and Location, 1992-2002 
N MEAN 
(LOCATION) 
STD. 
DEVIATION 
T SIG. 
(2-TAILED) 
1992 
Major party A 470 1.79 0.86 
Major Party B 324 1.73 0.78 
Third party (C) 114 1.67 0.78 
Compare A and B 1.088 0.277 
Compare A and C 1.391 0.165 
Compare B and C 0.687 0.491 
1997 
Major party A 221 1.56 0.66 
Major Party B 390 1.74 0.73 
Third party (C) 125 1.70 0.74 
Compare A and B -3.013 0.003 
Compare A and C -1.905 0.058 
Compare B and C 0.423 0.672 
2002 
Major party A 350 1.54 0.65 
Major Party B 405 1.74 0.71 
Compare A and B -3.895 0.000 
Data, Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992,1997, and 2002. 
Keys: N= number of cases; Mean = average score in a 3-point scale (i. e., I is large city, 2 is small 
city, and 3 is rural county); Major party A= the Democratic Liberal Party in 1992, and the Grand 
National Party in 1997 and in 2002; Major party B= the Democratic Party in 1992, the National 
Congress for New Politics in 1997, and the Millennium Democratic Party in 2002; Third party 
the Unification National Party in 1992, and the New Party for People in 1997. 
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Table A6.7 Crosstab: Voter's Regional Identification and Religion, 1992-2002 
N Buddhist Protestant Catholic Other Non Total Test statistics 
1992 Pearson's 
Seoul 129 20.2% 27.1% 10.9% 1.6% 40.3% 100% Chi-Square 
Gyeonggi 131 29.0% 16.8% 9.9% 2.3% 42.0% 100% 92.427 
Gangwon 63 23.8% 20.6% 12.7% 1.6% 41.3% 100% Sig. = 0.000 
Chungcheong 204 25.5% 28.4% 8.3% 1.0% 36.8% 100% 
Jeolla 238 18.9% 30.3% 8.8% 2.5% 39.5% 100% 
Gyeongsang 419 44.2% 15.5% 7.2% 2.6% 30.5% 100% 
Jeju 1 100.00/0 100% 
The North 15 20.0% 20.0% 33.3% 6.7% 20.0% 100% 
Total 1200 30.3% 22.3% 9.0% 2.2% 36.2% 100% 
1997 Pearson's 
Seoul 148 16.2% 31.1% 13.5% 1.4% 37.8% 100% Chi-Square= 
Gyeonggi 118 27.1% 22.0% 16.1% 2.5% 32.2% 100% 117.309 
Gangwon 76 28.9% 18.4% 13.2% 2.6% 36.8% 100% Sig. = 0.000 
Chungcheong 198 30.8% 23.7% 10.1% 2.0% 33.3% 100% 
Jeolla 266 15.4% 30.8% 7.9% 4.5% 41.4% 100% 
Gyeongsang 357 39.8% 17.4% 5.6% 3.4% 33.9% 100% 
Jeju 25 68.0% 8.0% 8.0% 4.0% 12.0% 100% 
The North 12 66.7% 16.7% 83% 8.3% 1000/0 
Total 1200 28.3% 23.9% 9.5% 3.1% 35.3% 1000/0 
2002 Pearson's 
Seoul 208 13.9% 34.6% 16.3% 0.5% 34.6% 1000/0 Chi-Square 
Gyeonggi 175 18.3% 33.7% 9.1% 2.3% 36.6% 100% =108.671 
Gangwon 93 25.8% 20.4% 8.6% 1.1% 44.1% 100% Sig. =0.000 
Chungcheong 216 25.5% 30.1% 5.1% 4.2% 35.2% 100% 
Jeolla 278 17.6% 33.1% 7.2% 1.8% 403% 100% 
Gyeongsang 499 36.5% 18.2% 9.4% 2.2% 33.7% 100% 
Jeju 6 50.0% 16.7% 16.7% 16.7% 100% 
The North 16 12.5% 43.8% 18.8% 25.0% 100% 
Total 1491 25.2% 27.2% 9.4% 2.1% 36.1% 1000/0 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992,1997, and 2002. 
Key. N= number of cases. 
Table A6.8 T-Test for Equality of Means: Partisan Alignment and Income, 1992-2002 
N MEAN STD. 
DEVIATION 
T SIG. 
(2-TAILED) 
1992 
Major party A 470 3.76 1.98 
Major Party B 324 4.18 1.82 
Third party (C) 114 4.73 2.02 
Compare A an B -3.076 0.002 
Compare A and C 4.616 0.000 
Compare B and C -2.679 0.008 
1997 
Major party A 216 5.82 2.37 
Major Party B 384 5.64 2.25 
Third party (C) 123 5.90 2.14 
Compare A an B 0.916 0.360 
Compare A and C -0.321 0.749 
Compare B and C -1.135 0.257 
2002 
Major party A 346 2.97 0.98 
Major Party B 404 3.00 1.00 
Compare A an B -0.547 0.585 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992,1997, and 2002. 
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Keys: N= number of cases; Mean = average score in a 9-point scale (i. e., 1= smallest income and 
9 is largest income); Major party A= the Democratic Liberal Party in 1992, and the Grand 
National Party in 1997 and in 2002; Major party B= the Democratic Party in 1992, the National 
- Congress for New Politics in 1997, and the Millennium Democratic Party in 2002; Third party 
the Unification National Party in 1992, and the New Party for People in 1997. 
Table A7. I T-Test for Equality of Means: Age and Party Identification, 1992-2002 
Number of 
cases 
Mean Std. 
Deviation 
t Sig. 
1992 
Party identifiers 915 42.03 14.95 3.355 0.001 
Non-party identifiers 269 38.58 14.42 
1997 
Party identifiers 757 40.34 13.73 0.981 0.327 
Non-party identifiers 442 39.51 14.45 
2002 
Party identifiers 892 42.77 15.06 2.669 0.008 
Non-party identifiers 608 40.65 15.19 
Data, Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992,1997, and 2002. 
Keys: Mean = the average age of each group. 
Table A7.2 ANOVA: Age and Korean Voters, 1992-2002 
Number of 
case 
Mean Age Std. Deviation ANOVA 
1992 F=5.659 
Critical partisan 476 41.16 14.37 Sig. = 0.001 
Habitual partisan 437 42.95 15.51 
Attentive independent 97 40.47 13.42 
Apolitical independent 172 37.52 14.89 
Total 1182 41.24 14.89 
19977 F= 18.187 
Critical partisan 533 42.23 13.43 Sig. = 0.000 
Habitual partisan 223 35.69 13.21 
Attentive independent 210 42.39 13.94 
Apolitical independent 232 36.90 14.43 
Total 1198 40.01 13.97 
2002 F =12.699 
Critical partisan 450 45.30 15.31 Sig. = 0.000 
Habitual partisan 442 40.20 14.36 
Attentive independent 203 42.55 14.73 
Apolitical independent 805 39.70 1534 
Total 1500 41.91 15.14 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992,1997, and 2002. 
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Table A7.3 ANOVA: Education and Korean Voters, 1992-2002 
Number of Mean Std. ANOVA 
cases Deviation 
1992 
Critical partisan 476 2.71 1.03 F= 11.850 
Habitual partisan 437 2.53 1.09 Sig. = 0.000 
Attentive independent 97 3.13 0.95 
Apolitical independent 172 2.91 1.06 
Total 1182 1.71 1.07 
1997 
Critical partisan 530 2.94 1.00 F=6.237 
Habitual partisan 220 3.17 0.85 Sig. = 0.000 
Attentive independent 210 3.09 1.06 
Apolitical independent 213 3.25 0.96 
Total 1191 3.07 0.98 
2002 
Critical partisan 423 4.39 2.17 F=0.103 
Habitual partisan 426 4.36 1.94 Sig. = 0.958 
Attentive independent 198 4.46 2.19 
Apolitical independent 388 4.37 1.97 
Total 1435 4.39 2.05 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992,1997, and 2002. 
Keys: Mean = average score in a 4-point scale (i. e. I= lowest level of education, and 4= highest 
level of education). 
Table A7.4 ANOVA: Size of Residence Areas and Korean Voters, 1992-2002 
Number of Mean Std. ANOVA 
cases Deviation 
1992 
Critical partisan 476 1.75 0.81 F=0.411 
Habitual partisan 437 1.75 0.84 Sig. = 0.745 
Attentive independent 97 1.68 0.78 
Apolitical independent 172 1.70 0.78 
Total 1182 1.74 0.81 
1997 
Critical partisan 530 1.67 0.72 F=1.371 
Habitual partisan 220 1.70 0.72 Sig. = 0.250 
Attentive independent 210 1.59 0.71 
Apolitical independent 213 1.60 0.72 
Total 1191 1.65 0.72 
2002 
Critical partisan 450 1.63 . 66 F=1.469 
Habitual partisan 442 1.66 . 70 Sig. = 0.221 Attentive independent 203 1.54 . 61 
Apolitical independent 405 1.61 . 69 
Total 1500 1.62 . 67 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992,1997, and 2002. 
Keys: Mean = average score in a 3-point scale (i. e. 1= large city, 2 =small city, and 3= rural area). 
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Table A7.5 Crosstab: Gender and Independents, 1992-2002 
Number Party Non-party Total Test statistics 
Sex of cases Identifiers Identifiers 
1992 Pearson Chi-Square = 
Men 571 75.5% 24.5% 100% 2.032 
Women 613 79.0% 21.0% 100% Sig. = 0.154 
Total 1184 77.3% 22.7% 100% 
1997 Pearson Chi-Square = 
Men 612 63.9% -36.1% 100% 0.304 
Women 687 62.4% 37.6% 100% Sig. = 0.581 
Total 1199 63.1% 36.9% 100% 
2002 Pearson Chi-Square = 
Men 739 61.0% 39.0% 100% 1.474 
Women 761 58.0% 42.0% 100% Sig. = 0.227 
Total 1500 59.5% 40.5% 1000/0 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992,1997, and 2002. 
Table A7.6 ANOVA: Gender and Korean Voters, 1992-2002 
Number of Mean Std. ANOVA 
cases Deviation 
1992 
Critical partisan 476 1.49 0.50 F=3.521 
Habitual partisan 437 1.57 0.50 Sig. = 0.0 15 
Attentive independent 97 1.43 0.50 
Apolitical independent 172 1.51 0.50 
Total 1182 1.52 0.50 
1997 
Critical partisan 533 1.48 0.50 F=0.560 
Habitual partisan 223 1.49 0.50 Sig. = 0.642 
Attentive independent 210 1.53 0.50 
Apolitical independent 232 1.47 0.50 
Total 1191 1.49 0.50 
2002 
Critical partisan 450 1.44 0.50 F=8.913 
Habitual partisan 442 1.55 0.50 Sig. = 0.000 
Attentive independent 203 1.42 0.49 
Apolitical independent 405 1.58 0.49 
Total 1500 1.51 0.50 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992,1997, and 2002. 
Keys: N= number of cases; Mean = average score in a 2-point scale (i. e., i= man, and 2= 
woman). 
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Table A7.7 Crosstab: Religion and Korean Voters, 1992-2002 
N Critical Habitual Attentive Apolitical Total Test Statistics 
Religion Partisan Partisan Independent Independent 
1992 Pearson Chi- 
Buddhist 355 39.4% 44.8% 5.4% 10.4% 100% Square = 
Protestant 267 472% 32.6% 7.9% 12.4% 100% 39.252 
Catholic 108 43.5% 28.7% 11.1% 16.7% 100% Sig. = 0.000 
Other religion 26 50.0% 15.4% 192% 15.4% 100% 
Non-religion 426 35.2% 36.6% 9.4% 18.8% 100% 
Total 1182 40.3% 37.0% 82% 14.6% 1000/0 1 
1997 Pearson Chi- 
Buddhist 335 43.6% 21.8% 15.8% 18.8% 100% Square = 
Protestant 285 47.7% 16.1% 18.6% 17.5% 100% 14.985 
Catholic 114 45.6% 15.8% 25.4% 13.2% 100% Sig. = 0.242 
Other religion 38 42.1% 18.4% 21.1% 18.4% 100% 
Non-religion 421 43.2% 18.3% 15.9% 22.6% 100% 
Total 1193 44.6% 18.5% 17.6% 19.3% 100% 
2002 Pearson Chi- 
Buddhist 376 29.5% 30.6% 14.4% 25.5% 100% Square = 
Protestant 408 31.9% 31.1% 11.3% 25.7% 100% 13.508 
Catholic 143 32.2% 29.4% 14.0% 24.5% 100% Sig. = 0.333 
Other religion 31 29.0% 16.1% 29.0% 25.8% 100% 
Non-religion 542 28.4% 28.2% 13.7% 29.7% 100/a 
Total 1500 30.0% 29.5% 13.5% 27.0% 1000/0 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992,1997, and 2002. 
Key. N= number of cases. 
Table A7.8 T-Test for Equality of Means: Income and Independents, 1992-2002 
Number of Mean std. t Sig. 
cases Deviation 
1992 
Party identifiers 915 4.03 1.95 -4.766 0.000 
Non-party identifiers 269 4.69 2.16 
1997 
Party identifiers 744 5.74 2.26 -2.717 0.007 
Non-party identifiers 435 6.11 2.27 
2002 
Party identifiers 849 4.38 2.06 -0.161 0.872 
Non-party identifiers 586 4.40 2.04 
Data Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992,1997, and 2002. 
Keys: Mean = average score in monthly household income coding by 1-9 scale (i. e., 1 is the lowest 
and 9 is the highest). 
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Table A7.9 ANOVA: Levels of Income and Korean Voters, 1992-2002 
Number of Mean Std. ANOVA 
cases Deviation 
1992 F=8.688 
Critical partisan 476 4.06 2.00 Sig. = 0.000 
Habitual partisan 437 3.98 1.89 
Attentive independent 97 4.96 2.02 
Apolitical independent 172 4.53 2.23 
Total 1182 4.18 2.02 
1997 F=3.101 
Critical partisan 530 5.67 2.30 Sig. = 0.026 
Habitual partisan 220 5.92 2.14 
Attentive independent 210 6.06 2.36 
Apolitical independent 213 6.16 2.18 
Total 1191 5.88 1.27 
2002 F=0.103 
Critical partisan 423 4.39 2.17 Sig. = 0.958 
Habitual partisan 426 4.36 1.94 
Attentive independent 198 4.45 2.19 
Apolitical independent 388 4.37 1.97 
Total 1500 4.39 2.05 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992,1997, and 2002. 
Keys: Mean = average score in a 9-point scale (i. e., 1= the lowest income level, and 9= the 
highest income level). 
Table A7.10 T-Test for Equality of Means: Independents and Ideology, 1992-2002 
Number of 
cases 
Mean Std. 
Deviation 
t Sig. (2-sided) 
1997 
Party identifiers 691 2.99 1.15 1.269 0.205 
Non-party identifiers 389 2.90 1.05 
2002 
Party identifiers 892 3.16 1.04 -0.942 0.346 
Non- identifiers 608 3.21 0.88 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992,1997, and 2002. 
Keys: Mean = average score in a 5-point scale (i. e., I= `very conservative' to 5= 'very liberal'). 
Table A7.11 ANOVA: Ideology and Korean Voters, 1997-2002 
Number of 
cases 
Mean Std. Deviation ANOVA 
1997 
Critical partisan 485 2.98 1.17 F=2.270 
Habitual partisan 206 3.03 1.11 Sig. = 0.079 
Attentive independent 188 3.03 1.11 
Apolitical independent 201 2.78 0.98 
Total 1080 2.96 1.12 
2002 
Critical partisan 450 3.25 1.11 F=7.526 
Habitual partisan 442 3.08 0.96 Sig. = 0.000 
Attentive independent 203 3.42 0.91 
Apolitical independent 405 3.10 0.84 
Total 1500 3.18 0.98 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992,1997, and 2UU2. 
Keys: Mean = average score in a 5-point scale (i. e. 1= very conservative, 2= conservative, 3- 
center, 4= liberal, and 5= very liberal). 
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Table A7.12 ANOVA: Levels of Education by Age Cohorts, 2002 
Age Number of cases Mean Std. Deviation Test Statistics 
20-24 209 3.70 . 4703 F= 189.304 
25-34 335 3.54 . 5822 Sig. = 0.000 
35-44 364 3.32 . 6709 
45-54 263 2.89 . 8716 
55-64 177 2.38 1.0270 
65 and over 144 1.72 . 9567 
Total 1492 3.08 . 9593 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 2002. 
Keys: Mean = average score in a 4-point scale (i. e. I= lowest educational level to 4= the highest 
educational level). 
Table A7.13 Independent Voters by the Degree of Understanding Politics, 1997-2002 
Understanding politics 
Number 
of cases 
Party 
identifiers 
Non-party 
Identifiers 
Total Test statistics 
1997 Pearson Chi-Square = 
Very difficulty 141 68.1% 31.9% 100% 1.831 
Some difficulty 391 62.7% 37.3% 100% Sig. = 0.608 
Not much difficulty 473 63.2% 36.8% 100% 
Not at all 180 61.1% 38.9% 100% 
Total 1185 63.3% 36.7% 100% 
2002 Pearson Chi-square = 
1 (Very little knowledge) 85 51.8% 48.2% 100% 35.543 
2 146 54.8% 452% 100% Sig. = 0.000 
3 274 52.6% 47.4% 100% 
4 506 56.7% 433% 100% 
5 287 64.1% 35.9% 100% 
6 107 73.8% 26.2% 100% 
7 (Very much knowledge) 95 77.9% 22.1% 100% 
Total 1500 59.5% 40.5% 100% 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1997 and 2002. 
Keys: N= number of cases; Mean in 1997 = average score in a 4-point scale (i. e., I- `very 
difficult' to 4= `not at all difficult'); Mean in 2002 = average score in a 7-point scale (i. e. I= 
`very little understand' to 7= `very much understand'). 
Note: In 1997, Question 30-6 (i. e., "Do you agree with the statement that politics is too difficult 
for you to understand? ") is used to measure the level of understanding politics. In 2002, Question 
21 (i. e., "Do you think that you have a better knowledge and a good deal of understanding of 
politics or elections compared to other people? ") is used in the measurement. 
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Table A7.14 Crosstab: Understanding Politics and Korean Voters, 1992-2002 
Understanding politics N Critical 
Partisan 
Habitual 
Partisan 
AT-I AP-I Total Test Statistics 
19977 Chi-Square = 
Very difficult 141 46.8% 21.3% 17.0% 14.9% 100% 20.426 
Somewhat difficult 390 45.4% 17.2% 16.4% 21.0% 100% Sig. = 0.015 
Not difficult 473 40.8% 22.4% 16.7% 20.1% 1001/0 
Not at all difficult 180 50.6% 10.6% 22.8% 16.1% 100% 
Total 1184 44.5% 18.8% 17.6% 19.2'/0 100% 
2002 Chi-Square = 
I(Very little knowledge) 85 14.1% 37.6% 7.1% 41.2% 100% 205.146 
2 146 15.8% 39.0% 7.5% 37.7% 100% Sig. = 0.000 
3 274 15.7% 36.9% 9.5% 38.0% 100% 
4 506 26.3% 30.4% 17.2% 26.1% 100% 
5 287 42.5% 21.6% 14.6% 21.3% 100% 
6 107 57.9% 15.9% 12.1% 14.0% 100% 
7 (Very much knowledge) 95 57.9% 20.0% 18.9% 3.2% 100% 
Total 1500 30.0% 29.5% 13.5% 27.0% 100% 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1997 and 2002. 
Keys: N= number of cases; AT-I = Attentive Independent; AP-I = Apolitical Independent. 
Note: In 1997, Question 30-6 (i. e., "Do you agree with the statement that politics is too difficult 
for you to understand? ") is used to measure the level of understanding politics. In 2002, Question 
21 (i. e., "Do you think that you have a better knowledge and a good deal of understanding of 
politics or elections compared to other peoples? ") is used in the measurement. 
Table A7.15 T-Test for Equality of Means: Independents and Interest in Politics, 1992-2002 
Number of 
cases 
Mean Std. Deviation t Sig. (2-sided) 
1992 
Party identifiers 913 1.60 . 72 -4.776 0.000 
Non-party identifiers 269 1.84 . 78 
1997 
Party identifiers 756 1.38 . 65 -7.478 0.000 
Non-party identifiers 442 1.71 . 79 
2002 
Party identifiers 892 1.63 . 73 -6.450 0.000 
Non-party identifiers 608 1.89 . 77 
2002" 
Party identifiers 892 4.23 1.58 6.875 0.000 
Non- identifiers 608 3.68 1.45 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992,1997, and 2002. 
Keys: Mean = average score in a 4-point scale (i. e., I= `very interested' to 4= `not at all 
interested'). 
Note: *= Calculated based upon scores in a 7-point scale (i. e., I= not at all interested in politics to 
7= very much interested in politics). 
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Table Al. 16 Crosstab: Independents and Satisfaction with Politics, 1992-1997 
Number 
of cases 
Party 
Identifiers 
Non-party 
Identifiers 
Total Test statistics 
1992 Pearson Chi-Square = 3.399 
Satisfaction 287 81.2 18.8 100% Sig. = 0.075 
Dissatisfaction 885 75.9 24.1 100% Pearson's R =. 054 
Total 1172 77.2 22.8 100% Sig. = 0.065 
1997 Pearson Chi-Square = 2.627 
Satisfaction 164 68.9 31.1 100% Sig. = 0.116 
Dissatisfaction 1022 62.3 37.3 100% Pearson's R= . 047 
Total 1186 63.2 36.8 100% Si . =0.105 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992,1997, and 2002. 
Table A7.17 Crosstab: Satisfaction with Politics and Korean Voters, 1992-1997 
Number 
of cases 
Critical 
Partisan 
Habitual 
Partisan 
Attentive 
Independent 
Apolitical 
Independent 
Total Test 
Statistics 
1992 Pearson 
Satisfaction 285 37.9% 43.2% 5.6% 13.3% 100% Chi-Square 
Dissatisfaction 885 41.0% 34.9% 9.0% 15.0% 100% = 7.955 
Total 1170 40.3% 36.9% 8.2% 14.6% 100% Sig. = 
0.046 
1997 Pearson 
Satisfaction 164 44.1% 20.7% 17.1% 14.0% 100% Chi-Square 
Dissatisfaction 1021 48.2% 18.2% 17.6% 20.1% 100% = 3.729 
Total 1185 44.6% 18.6% 17.6% 19.2% 100% Sig. _ 
0.292 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992,1997, and 2002. 
Table A7.18 ANOVA: Satisfaction with Politics and Korean Voters, 1992-1997 
Number of 
cases 
Mean Std. 
Deviation. 
ANOVA 
1992 
Critical partisan 471 2.92 0.63 F=7.226 
Habitual partisan 432 2.79 0.59 Sig. = 0.000 
Attentive independent 96 3.06 0.72 
Apolitical independent 171 2.95 0.63 
Total 1170 2.89 0.63 
1997 
Critical partisan 529 3.23 0.71 F= 1.311 
Habitual partisan 220 3.18 0.70 Sig. = 0.269 
Attentive independent 208 3.31 0.71 
Apolitical independent 228 3.26 0.64 
Total 1185 3.24 0.70 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992,1997, and 2002. 
Keys: Mean = average score in a 4-point scale (i. e. 1= very satisfied, and 4= not at all satisfied). 
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Table A7.19 Crosstab: Independent Voters and Satisfaction with Performance of Incumbent 
Government, 1992-2002 
Number Party Non-party Total Test statistics 
of cases Identifiers Identifiers 
1992 Chi-square - 3.138 
Very good 12 83.3% 16.7% 100% Sig. = 0.371 
Good 356 80.1% 19.9% 1000/0 
Bad 676 76.5% 23.5% 100% 
Very Bad 128 73.4% 26.6% 100% 
Total 1172 77.3% 22.7% 100% 
1997 Chi-square = 0.459 
Good 36 63.9% 36.1% 100% Sig. = 0.795 
The average 168 60.7% 39.3% 100% 
Bad 992 63.4% 36.6% 100% 
Total 1196 63.0% 37.0% 100% 
2002 Chi-square = 23.479 
Good 353 70.5% 29.5% 100% Sig. = 0.000 
The average 543 56.0% 44.0% 100% 
Bad 604 56.1% 43.9% 100% 
Total 1500 59.5% 40.5% 100% 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992,1997, and 2002. 
Table A7.20 Crosstab: Satisfaction with Performance of Incumbent Government and 
Korean Voters, 1992-2002 
Number Critical Habitual Attentive Apolitical Total Test Statistics 
of cases Partisan Partisan Inde dent Independent 
1992 Chi-square 
Very good 12 66.7% 16.7% 16.7% 0.0% 100% 37.789 
Good 355 38.6% 41.4% 6.5% 13.5% 100% Sig. = 0.000 
Bad 675 38.4% 38.1% 7.7% 15.9% 100% 
Very Bad 128 53.90/a 19.5% 15.6% 10.9% 100% 
Total 1170 40.4% 36.8% 8.3% 14.4% 100ßb 
1997 Chi-square 
Good 36 47.2% 16.7% 22.2% 13.9% 100% 16.639 
Average 168 32.7% 28.0% 18.5% 20.8% 10090 Sig. - 0.011 
Bad 991 46.3% 17.1% 173% 19A% 100% 
Total 1195 44.4% 18.6% 17.6% 19.4% 100% 
2002 
Good 353 42.2% 28.3% 11.3% 18.1% 100% Chi-square 
Average 543 24.7% 31.3% 13.6% 30.4% 100% 40.290 
Bad 604 27.6% 28.5% 14.7% 29.1% 100% Sig. - 0.000 
Total 1500 30.0% 29.5% 13.5% 27.0% 100% 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992,1997, and 2002. 
Note: In 1997 and in 2002, a 5-point scale is recoded into a 3-point scale. Indeed, `very good' and 
`good' are combined, and `bad' and `very bad' are combined. The following questions are usad: in 
1992, Question 24 ("Do you think that incumbent government is doing well in conducting state 
affairs? "); In 1997, Question 18 ("What do you think about the overall performance of incumbent 
government? "); In 2002, Question 36 ("What do you think about the overall performance of Kim 
Dae-jung's government? '). 
369 
Appendix 
Table A8.1 Correlation and Partial Correlation between Education and Turnout, 1992-2002 
1992 1997 2002 
Pearson Correlation 0.008 0.089 0.052 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.785 0.002 0.046 
N 1200 1200 1492 
Partial Correlation -0.030 -0.003 -0.034 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.302 0.936 0.187 
N 1200 1199 1492 
Data: Korean Presidential Election Study, 1992,1997, and 2002. 
Note: Partial correlation = partial correlation between education and turnout controlling for age 
variable; Education variable is coded as I= primary school, 2= middle school, 3= high school, 
and 4= college; Turnout variable is coded as I= vote and 2= not vote; Age variable is based on 
actual age. 
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Appendix 2. Figures 
Figure A5. I British Electoral Cycle (Voting Intention), 1987-1999 
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Data Source: Formulated based on Gallup poll records in David Butler and Gareth Butler, 
Twentieth-Century British Political Facts 1900-2000 (London: Macmillan, 2000), pp. 276-9. 
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